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Abstract
This thesis will analyse critically the hypothesis that Private Military Companies 
(PMCs) are a viable option for direct involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in 
African states.  The involvement of PMCs in the affairs of states is a controversial and 
divisive issue, but since the end of the Cold War, they have become increasingly 
involved in the security structures of African states, and in post-conflict reform of 
such structures.  They have also become involved in tasks related to commercial 
activities central to the political economies of African states.  Indeed, Africa was the 
theatre in which PMCs evolved from an opportunist phenomenon that emerged in 
response to rapid change in the security situation, to become part of the emerging 
post-Cold War political economy.  In the 1990s, PMCs undertook operations in 
Angola and Sierra Leone that brought about situations where warring factions were 
compelled to negotiate settlements.  While the response of the international 
community was predominantly one of condemnation of their involvement, others 
pointed out that operations conducted by PMCs had been remarkably swift and 
inexpensive in bringing violent conflict to an end, in contrast to those conducted by 
the UN in African states.  PMCs’ involvement in peacekeeping operations is 
becoming increasingly relevant; they have been involved in every major UN 
peacekeeping mission since 1990, and have carried out tasks spanning a wide range of 
UN functions.  In 1995, Christopher Bellamy speculated that the UN might augment 
their numbers with private soldiers.  While this was dismissed at the time, it is a 
concept that continues to resurface when the UN has difficulty finding sufficient 
adequately trained troops for its peacekeeping missions.  This thesis investigates the 
hypothesis that PMCs are a viable option, in practical, political, legal, economic and 
moral terms, for involvement in such missions. 
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The involvement of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in the affairs of states is a 
controversial and divisive issue.  Yet, since the end of the Cold War, PMCs have become 
increasingly involved in the security structures of African states, in roles once regarded 
as the exclusive domain of the state, ranging from the provision of advice and security to 
intelligence-gathering and troop-training.  Even more contentious is the prospect of PMC 
involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, but despite the sensitive nature of this issue, 
PMCs have been used to support every major UN peacekeeping operation since 1990,1  
in some cases performing tasks that were formerly restricted to UN personnel.2  A 
suggestion put forward by Christopher Bellamy in 1995, that the UN might augment 
their numbers with private soldiers, was met with incredulity at the time,3 and 
mainstream opinion has not strayed far from the view that the use of PMCs as 
peacekeepers is inconceivable.  In the 1990s, PMCs undertook operations in Angola and 
Sierra Leone that brought about situations where warring factions were compelled to
negotiate settlements.  The response of the international community was predominantly 
one of condemnation of the involvement of PMCs, but some pointed out that these 
operations had been remarkably swift and inexpensive in bringing violent conflict to an 
end, in contrast to operations conducted by the UN in African states.4   
The importance of the question as to whether PMCs should be involved in peacekeeping 
operations is emphasised by continuing difficulties experienced by the UN in its 
                                                
1
Avant, Deborah. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.7.
2
For example, the disarmament and demobilization by the PMCs DynCorp and Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE) of some 8,000 irregular troops in Liberia, support for the RUF disarmament programme 
in Sierra Leone by PAE and International Charter Incorporated (ICI), the provision of border monitors in 
Serbia by Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in 1994, and that of weapons inspectors 
by DynCorp in Kosovo in 1998.
3
Bellamy, Christopher. 1996. Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace. London: 
Hutchinson. p.203.
4
For example, the cost of the 18-month PMC mission in Sierra Leone was US$35 Million; that of the UN 
was $265 Million in the first year, and a total of $2.7 Billion over a 10-year period.
2peacekeeping missions.5  It is a question that emanates largely from the need for a 
solution to the increasing difficulty faced by the UN in deploying, in sufficient time, 
enough adequately trained and equipped troops for these types of operations.6 The UN’s 
ongoing consideration of alternatives to the current method of raising troops for 
peacekeeping missions is a clear indicator of the need for the issue to be addressed.7  A 
proposition put forward in a UK Government Green Paper to the effect that reputable, 
regulated PMCs might be suitable for peacekeeping roles,8 and a softening of the UN
Working Group on Mercenaries’ stance towards recognition and regulation of PMCs, 
have once again brought this issue to the fore.9
There are, however, seemingly irreconcilable differences within the UN as a whole, with 
attitudes ranging from the view that PMCs should be proscribed on the grounds that they 
are mercenaries, to the diametrically opposed standpoint that they should be legitimized 
in order that they can be used to enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping 
operations.  Calls for the use of personnel from PMCs to augment UN missions have 
come from humanitarian organizations, a fact that many detractors of PMCs find 
difficult to understand, but many humanitarian actors employ PMCs to provide security 
for their missions, and have developed close working relationships with PMCs, and an 
                                                
5
See, for example: Jett, Dennis. 1999. Why Peacekeeping Fails. Basingstoke: Palgrave., p.5., Bratt, 
Duane. 1996. "Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations." International Peacekeeping. 
Special Issue: The UN, Peace and Force 3(4):64-81., and: UN. 2000. "General Assembly 55th Session. 
UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Comprehensive 
Review of the question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (The Brahimi Report)." 
6
Of 39,300 troops mandated for the most recent UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (in Darfur and 
Congo), there is currently a shortfall of almost 8,000.  See: UN. 2009b. "UN DPKO Current Operations." 
Accessed at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.shtml/africa. 
7
See, for example: UN. 2000. "General Assembly 55th Session. UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809. Report of 
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Comprehensive Review of the question of peacekeeping 
operations in all their aspects (The Brahimi Report).", McCarthy, Patrick. 2000. "Building a Reliable 
Rapid-reaction Capability for the United Nations." International Peacekeeping 7(2):139-154.,  Roberts, 
Adam. 1995. "Proposal for UN Standing Forces: History, Task and Obstacles." In UN Rapid Reaction 
Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects, eds. David Cox and Albert Legault. Clementsport, NS: 
Canadian Peacekeeping Press., and Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart. 1994. "Renewing the United 
Nations System." In Development Dialogue 1994:1. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. 
pp.112-115 and pp.198-200.
8
HMSO. 2002. "House of Commons Green Paper. PMCs: Options for Regulation."p.4.
9
The UN Working Group on Mercenaries has moved from opposition on the basis that this would be 
tantamount to legalizing the activities of mercenaries, to one suggesting that a regulatory framework could 
be a positive move. UN. 2004b. "E/CN.4/2005/14 - 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights. Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the 
right of peoples to self-determination. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Shaista Shameem." 
3understanding as to how they can augment their operations.10  Support from this 
unexpected quarter for the inclusion of PMCs in UN peacekeeping operations will be 
analysed in depth in this thesis, but in addition to the practicalities of the use of PMCs to 
support such missions, there are questions surrounding the political and economic 
implications of their involvement, their legality under international law, and the morality 
of profit-making organizations becoming an integral part of such operations. This thesis 
will analyse critically the hypothesis that PMCs are a suitable option, in practical, 
political, legal, economic and moral terms, for direct involvement in UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa.
In order to allow a thorough analysis of the interaction between the three elements of the 
hypothesis – Africa, PMCs, and peacekeeping – the hypothesis needs to be 
deconstructed in order that each of these elements may be analysed individually, and 
then contextualized as they relate to each other.  The thesis considers each of these 
constituent parts within a research framework based, firstly, on an in-depth analysis of 
existing literature,11 and then on extensive qualitative field research.  The latter focuses 
on input from key actors through a series of semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of the UN, of humanitarian organizations, of other NGOs and INGOs, of 
civil society, and of PMCs.  As much of the debate on PMCs hinges around perceptions 
and attitudes toward them, subjects for primary research are drawn from groups involved 
in differing aspects of PMC operations and activities, with conflicting perceptions and 
viewpoints, from observers and analysts of the PMC phenomenon to members of 
populations affected by the actions of PMCs.  The originality of this thesis lies in its 
primary research, which has focused on key areas of PMC activity relevant to 
peacekeeping operations, in order to compile a comprehensive picture as to the potential 
for the involvement these organizations, in terms of appropriacy and effectiveness, in 
peacekeeping missions.  The data gathered in the course of the field research has been 
used to build up an accurate picture as to the current situation, and the potential for 
                                                
10
For example, CARE International, the ICRC, the International Rescue Committee and Refugees 
International, the latter of whom have called for PMCs to be used as peacekeeping troops. See: Gantz, 
Peter. 2003. "The Private Sector's Role in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement." Refugees International 
Bulletin, 18th November 2003., and UN. 2000. "General Assembly 55th Session. UN Doc.A/55/305-
S/2000/809. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Comprehensive Review of the 
question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (The Brahimi Report)."
11
The review of literature is carried out in Chapter 2.
4future involvement of PMCs in peacekeeping.  The selection of respondents and the 
depth of the research have produced sufficient consistent data to make a significant 
contribution to research into the nature of PMC activity in African states, into their 
capability and suitability for involvement in peacekeeping operations, and into where the 
future might realistically lie with regard to the direct participation of PMCs in UN 
peacekeeping missions. 
The first of the three elements of the hypothesis, and the most critical to the central 
question, is the African state
*
– specifically, the extent to which the emergence and 
political development of African states have contributed to the proliferation of PMCs.  
As part of an investigation into the involvement of PMCs in peacekeeping, this thesis’ 
focus on Africa is important for several reasons.  Crucial to analysis of PMCs is the 
political background that has given rise to their emergence.  It was Africa’s distinctive 
colonial and socio-political history, explored in depth in Chapter 3 of this thesis, that 
brought about the conditions giving rise to widespread PMC activity in African states 
after the Cold War.  Africa’s perceived strategic importance to the superpowers during 
the Cold War, and the patronage of African states by the superpowers as a means of 
ensuring the continued alignment of those states, contributed greatly to the relative 
stability experienced by those states during the Cold War era.  Among the major factors 
contributing to the emergence and proliferation of PMCs were the resurfacing of internal 
tensions that had been suppressed during the era of superpower patronage, and the 
downsizing of armies in African states that had been aligned with the superpowers.  The 
shortcomings of many African governments and militaries had been masked during the 
Cold War, and the precipitous withdrawal of the superpowers thereafter was to expose 
underlying problems of poor governance, corruption, ethnic division, and social 
exclusion, all of which contributed to widespread unrest.12  
Another reason for Africa’s importance to the central hypothesis is that the activities of 
PMCs in African states in the 1990s, most notably those of Executive Outcomes,13 have 
become paradigmatic in studies of these organizations.  While operations of the nature 
                                                
12
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: 
Blackwell/Polity Press. p.92.
13
This is explored in depth in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.
* See Chapter 3, Note 4.
5and scale carried out by Executive Outcomes, involving direct, lead-actor participation 
in combat,14 have not been repeated by PMCs, their activity in Africa is more widespread 
than ever.15  Also of direct relevance to the hypothesis is that African states, as both 
contractors and recipients of the services of PMCs, are a central part of the debate 
surrounding them.  This has a bearing on arguments against the use of PMCs based on 
their records in Iraq and Afghanistan, because the scenario in which PMC activity takes 
place in those states is very different to that in Africa.  PMC operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan arose from the need for direct support of large scale military operations, and 
expanded with the urgent need for security in stabilization and development operations.  
In African states, the involvement of PMCs came into being in a different way, and for 
different reasons.  The activities of PMCs in Africa did not come about as an adjunct to 
invasion by foreign armies, but in fulfillment of contracts with governments, 
humanitarian organizations, private corporations and departments of the UN.  This thesis 
will, where apt, consider whether there are scenarios in which the nature of PMC activity 
in African states is comparable with those elsewhere.16
As to the question of the aptness of Africa in a critical analysis of PMC activity relating 
directly to peacekeeping operations, not only are the majority of the UN’s peacekeeping 
missions in Africa,17 but those missions tie up more than 75% of currently deployed UN 
peacekeepers worldwide, and some 80% of the global peacekeeping budget.18  For these 
reasons, the focus of this thesis on Africa is wholly relevant in the context both of PMCs 
and UN peacekeeping operations.
This thesis, therefore, conducts an extensive exploration of factors in the political 
development of African states.  A critical analysis of those factors giving rise to conflict 
                                                
14
As opposed to unplanned involvement arising from situational need in support of another actor, 
notwithstanding the 1977 and 1994 UN Conventions (see 9.4.2).
15
Among BAPSC (British Association of Private Security Companies), and IPOA (International Peace 
Operations Association) member organizations.  Both associations agree that the number of registered 
member companies operating in Africa is likely to reflect a similar preponderance among non-members.
16
See 10.4 and subsections.
17
Eight of the fifteen current UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa. 
18
The number of peacekeepers deployed in Africa comprises some 60,000 of a total of 80,000 troops 
(excluding police and UN military observers), at a cost of $5.6 billion of a total budget of $7.2 billion.  
UN. 2009a. "DPI/1634/Rev.103 - United Nations Peacekeeping Operations."  The number of troops is set 
to rise to approximately 85,000 with the expansion of the UN Missions in Congo (MONUC) and Darfur 
(UNAMID).
6and the need for security, and thus to the emergence and proliferation of PMCs, is 
carried out in Chapter 3.  Particular attention is given to systems of governance that have 
endured through independence and the post-colonial era – notably those from which a 
blurring of the divisions between state and private interests have emanated.  Analysis of 
the conditions prevailing in African states after the post-Cold War withdrawal of the 
superpowers is also carried out.  This considers the effects of the largest demobilization 
of armies ever seen, on a global scale, bringing about a further reduction in the already 
limited capacity of African states to exercise control within their territorial boundaries.
A key factor in the emergence of PMC activity in African states was the ensuing 
resurgence of ethnic tensions that had been suppressed by the presence of the 
superpowers, and the subsequent increase in intrastate conflict combined with the 
disintegration of government authority.  This resurgence of tensions is analysed in the 
context of factors of demand and supply that contributed to the proliferation of PMCs.  
Particular attention, on the demand side, is given to power vacuums resulting from the 
decreased capacity of state institutions,19 and the accompanying rise in demand for
services offered by private security and quasi-military organizations.20 On the supply 
side, the impact of the downsizing of armies and the concomitant surplus of military 
expertise, manpower, and the hardware of warfare is considered in depth.21  Further 
analysis is carried out on factors linking the initial appearance of PMCs on the African 
political landscape with their continued proliferation – factors such as the employment of 
PMCs as adjuncts to institutions of state security, and their activities in support of 
departments of the UN and other humanitarian organizations – as this sheds light on their 
increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations.
Following analysis of the political background that has given rise to the widespread 
proliferation of PMC activity in Africa, the thesis moves on to the second element of the 
hypothesis.  Chapter 4 aims to define PMCs, in the absence of an internationally-
accepted definition, for the purpose of maintaining focus and accuracy in the research.  It 
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7then carries out an in-depth analysis of PMCs and their activities for the purpose of 
contextualizing them in the African political landscape.  It also seeks to establish the 
utility and impact of their activities on the wider political situation; i.e. the usefulness
and impact of the activities of PMCs on governance and the economies of African states, 
and their impact on the populations of those states whether directly, through state 
institutions, or through support to the UN and other humanitarian organizations. 
As the conceptual association of PMCs with mercenary organizations is fundamental to 
the debate surrounding them, the analysis of PMCs begins with an exploration of their 
origins, and into factors bringing about their evolution into the corporate bodies that now 
dominate the private military and security sectors.  Perceptions of PMCs as mercenaries 
are explored in depth, and comparisons drawn between mercenary organizations and 
PMCs.  Legal aspects of the private military sector are examined, and legal criteria from 
the conventions against mercenaries – the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA),22 the 1979 UNOHCR Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions,23 and the 1989 International Convention24 – are tested to evaluate 
their applicability to PMCs.  In the absence of an internationally-accepted definition of 
PMCs, the thesis also seeks to expound the defining characteristics of these 
organizations in order to provide a clear basis for empirical focus and theoretical 
analysis of the PMC phenomenon.
Existing theoretical analyses are discussed in the review of literature, which is carried 
out in Chapter 2.  In considering the theoretical bases that underpin the existing 
literature, it is evident that, with a few notable exceptions, the primary focus is on 
empirical aspects of the emergence and proliferation of PMCs, with little discussion 
taking place within theoretical structures.25  Exceptions to this largely empirical 
approach are based on theories of Political Realism, encompassing the primacy of state 
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8sovereignty, and of Liberal Internationalism, which highlights the part played by 
globalized cooperation.26  Both theories account for much of the proliferation of PMCs in 
Africa, but neither takes into consideration the permeation of neoliberal orthodoxy into 
the politics of African states, or the effects of commercial actors, most notably 
multinational corporations involved in extraction of natural resources, and thus the 
maintenance of revenue streams to African governments.  While the provision of 
services to extractive industries does not account for the full extent of PMC activities, it 
is a long-standing element of the political economy of African states, and one that fed 
the involvement of private security actors in African states before the end of the Cold 
War.  It is also one of a number of interrelated factors of the political economy of 
African states that underpins the theoretical framework adopted by this thesis.
After the Cold War, the withdrawal of the superpowers, the downsizing of African 
armies, and the subsequent need for strengthening of state security mechanisms were
perhaps the main drivers of the emergence of PMCs, but they were neither the only 
drivers nor the primary drivers of their continued proliferation. In the neoliberal 
orthodoxy that dominated after the Cold War, African governments came under pressure 
from expedients of neoliberalism that demanded smaller, more efficient armies and 
police forces, the liberalization of markets, and the consequent provision of services by 
the private rather than the public, leading inevitably to further outsourcing of non-
strategic military and security functions to PMCs.  Added to this was the need to protect 
states’ income streams.  The political economy of many African states still hinges 
around extraction of natural resources, and the provision of security to extractive 
industries is a staple of PMCs.  Additionally, the commercial opportunities offered by 
the privatization of state functions enabled elites to strengthen their financial base, and 
thus to consolidate their political power base, through the personalization of government 
and the economy.27
The part played by political economy in developed states is also pertinent in that it 
accounts for growth in the private military sector external to Africa.  The outsourcing to 
PMCs of diverse elements of military support operations to the armies of developed 
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9states has enabled PMCs to develop expertise in a wide range of activities.  These 
include intelligence-gathering, electronic warfare, the provision and maintenance of 
technical equipment, the training of troops in the use of such equipment, and the training 
of personnel in specialist support roles.  This diversification of the PMC industry into 
such ‘new’ areas of expertise has enabled them to expand yet further their activities in 
Africa.  The political economy of the developed world has thus fed the proliferation of 
PMCs in the developing political economies of African states.
Political Economic theory encompasses all of the aforementioned drivers; the neoliberal 
mantra of free markets was also embraced by the international financial institutions on 
which Africa had become so dependent,28 and the subsequent rush to outsource provided 
a rich source of business for PMCs.  In 1999, Cilliers and Cornwell suggested that 
growth of the private security sector would be: “…central to the structural adjustment 
agenda, globalization, and the response to privatization by many post-colonial African 
élites.29 Their forecast has been borne out by recent political developments in many 
African states.  The link between PMCs and the political economy of African states 
therefore underpins the theoretical approach adopted by this thesis.
A key focus of the field research, further to the wider involvement of PMCs and central 
to the narrower focus of their becoming directly involved in UN peacekeeping missions,
is the question as to the morality of employing what many perceive as mercenaries to 
carry out the bidding of the international community.  This thesis, particularly in the 
field research, investigates the extent to which judicious analysis of the issue may be
obstructed by emotional responses to the label ‘mercenary’.  The question I seek to 
answer is whether PMCs are suitable to carry out missions mandated by the international 
community, in practical, political, legal, economic and moral terms.  To that end, this 
thesis explores the scope and limitations of PMCs in all five respects – practical, 
political, legal, economic, and moral – and analyses critically the hypothesis that PMCs 
are a viable option for direct involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa.  
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The research seeks first to address questions regarding the use of PMCs in operations in 
support of peacekeeping, and their performance in such operations as training, logistics, 
security sector reform tasks, advice to government departments, and securing the 
‘humanitarian space’ vis-à-vis the provision of security for aid agencies.  The initial 
focus is on controversy surrounding the ‘privatization’ of military affairs and on the 
costs and benefits, practical, political, legal, economic, and moral, of the use of PMCs.  
Theoretical viewpoints and arguments as to the nature of PMCs and their capability and 
suitability to carry out such operations are explored, as is the scope of PMCs in terms of 
capabilities demonstrated in past and current operations.  The main arguments opposing 
the use of PMCs – primarily that they are a threat to human rights, that their use 
undermines the authority of states, and that their status in international law is not clearly 
defined or regulated – are then deconstructed and analysed.  In doing so, the thesis 
considers the suitability of PMCs for the direct performance of peacekeeping tasks, 
through analysis of the central arguments surrounding PMCs – primarily that they are 
mercenary operations, lacking ipso facto the ‘primary loyalty to community’ of national 
armies or intergovernmental organisations, that they face no accountability, and are a 
threat to stability.   Opposing arguments are also analysed; those suggesting that the 
capabilities demonstrated by PMCs in past and current operations, coupled with their 
non-alignment to governments, offer scope for the effective handling of conflict  
situations mandated and directed by the international community, without prejudicing 
the integrity of such operations. 
Analysis of the third element of the hypothesis – peacekeeping – has proved to be 
complex.  Peacekeeping is broad as a concept, and is fluid and dynamic in nature.  It is 
not clearly defined by the UN, for whom peacekeeping operations span activities as 
diverse as unarmed observation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which allows for 
the “mediation of international disputes between states,” to full participation in combat 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, where “maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security” is required.30 Adding further complexity is that these definitions 
were drawn up to deal with conflict between states – as evidenced by the word 
‘international’ in both definitions, and the Charter allows only for intervention in 
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intrastate conflicts where they pose a threat to international stability.31  Dag 
Hammerskjöld, Secretary of the UN from 1953 to 1961, recognizing that UN 
peacekeeping took its mandate from neither category, coined the term ‘Chapter Six and a 
Half’ which became accepted as: “…action borne of necessity and largely improvised.”32  
Every current peacekeeping operation in Africa has been authorized under this mandate, 
which has its origins in the geopolitical status quo that prevailed during the Cold War.  
Hence, ‘peacekeeping’ in its current form is a slippery concept, and the activities 
involved in its execution range from observation to demilitarization, from humanitarian 
relief to disarmament, and from training armies to supporting civil administrations.  
Defining the term peacekeeping for the purposes of this research has, therefore, been a 
complicated process.  UN approaches to articulating what is meant by ‘peacekeeping’ 
bring out a concept based on the compromise between ‘traditional’ peacekeeping –
involving negotiation, mediation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes – to more 
forceful methods of containing or bringing conflict to an end.  The UN’s 
‘multidimensional peacekeeping’ approach encompasses tasks ranging from disarming 
combatants to building sustainable institutions of state.33  For the purposes of this 
research, therefore, the activities of ‘peacekeeping’ will be defined as any or all of those 
involving military-type operations aimed at containing or ending conflict, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of combatants, observation and monitoring operations, 
security sector reform, training of police and armed forces personnel, and the building of 
fit-for-purpose institutions of security and governance.  PMCs have carried out many of 
these activities in support of UN operations,34 and have seen extensive involvement in 
post-conflict reconstruction and development.35 This thesis will investigate the extent to 
which these PMC activities have contributed towards fulfillment of the aims of the 
peacekeeping missions they have supported, and will explore the potential for PMCs to 
carry out such operations as an integral part of UN peacekeeping missions.
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Following analysis of the three elements of the hypothesis – Africa, PMCs and 
Peacekeeping, the location for field research for the thesis was decided upon.  After 
lengthy investigation, it was decided that the primary research would be carried out in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  In Chapter 6, the reasons these states were considered the 
most relevant for the collection of qualitative research data are outlined, as are the 
historical profiles of these states to the extent that they are pertinent to this thesis, and 
the prevailing political situations in both states.  The involvement of PMCs, in both 
states, is also explored, as is that of the UN, of regional peacekeeping forces, and of 
foreign national armies that carried out interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 
1990s.
The central themes emanating from data collected in the field are critically analysed in 
Chapters 7 to 10.  The nature of post-conflict operations in both states involves a wide 
range of actors, with differing experiences and views of PMCs, from the fields of 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, development, security sector reform, combatant 
reintegration, and also from the private military and security sectors,.  The nature and 
range of respondents, including observers and analysts of the private military and 
security industries, senior representatives of UN departments and INGOs,36 senior staff 
of organizations and NGOs working with PMCs, managers and staff of PMCs, and 
members of civil society, allowed for triangulation at every stage in the analysis of 
collected data.  Many of the themes emerging from the field research were reflected in 
the available literature, which enabled further verification and triangulation of data.
One of the primary themes to emerge from the field research – perceptions of PMCs as 
mercenary organizations – was also a principal theme emanating from the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2, and these perceptions are critically analysed in Chapter 7.  Views 
as to the nature and characteristics of PMCs, from a wide range of respondents with 
widely differing opinions, are analysed against the actual make-up of these 
organizations, the nature and background of their personnel, their perceived status, and 
their actual status in law.  This chapter takes into consideration arguments based on the 
international conventions against mercenarism – the 1977 Convention for the 
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Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA),37 the 1979 UNOHCR Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,38 and the 1989 International Convention,39 – used 
by advocates and opponents of PMCs to support or refute their respective positions.  
Following the analysis of perceptions of PMCs as mercenary organizations, another 
primary theme to emerge from the field research was perceptions of threats emanating 
from the tasks and activities they carry out.  Views that the activities of PMCs are a 
threat to state sovereignty, that they are part of an ‘economic recolonisation’ of African 
states, and that PMCs are foreign policy proxies, are critically analysed in Chapter 8.  
Perceptions of PMC activity as part of a neoliberal consensus leading to the hollowing 
out of the African state are also analysed in depth.
Current, ongoing activities of PMCs, and the directions and trends of their involvement
in African states – both as contractors to government departments and commercial 
organizations, and as adjuncts to UN departments and humanitarian organizations – are 
analysed critically in Chapter 9.  The involvement of PMCs in Security Sector Reform 
(SSR) is explored in depth, and a comparison of their activities as part of structured SSR 
programmes, and those in ad hoc support of institutions of state, is carried out.  This is 
particularly relevant to the central hypothesis that PMCs are suitable for direct 
involvement in peacekeeping operations, because SSR activities such as the training of 
police and armed forces personnel, and the building of fit-for-purpose institutions of 
security and governance are a central part of the UN multidimensional approach to 
peacekeeping.40  The argument as to whether PMC support to state institutions empowers 
the weak state by providing a secure environment, or, in the longer term, disempowers it 
by masking the need for the state to invest in its own institutions of security, is also 
explored.  The part played by PMCs in ‘securing the humanitarian space’ in areas of 
conflict or risk – i.e. their role as enablers of humanitarian activity – is also considered in 
depth in Chapter 9.  This is relevant to consideration of the legal status of PMCs in 
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scenarios where they provide security for humanitarian organizations, because the UN 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) both support the legality of 
PMC personnel employed to provide protection to humanitarian workers.41
, 42 It is also 
relevant to the wider debate as to the use of PMCs in peacekeeping operations, as the 
record of PMCs in humanitarian operations might be considered indicative as to their 
suitability for direct involvement in UN peacekeeping missions; this is also explored in 
Chapter 9.
Having carried out critical analyses of perceptions of PMCs and their activities, and the 
nature and effect of PMC operations in African states, the thesis goes on to explore the 
final, principal theme to emerge from the field research – that of concerns surrounding 
prospects for the direct involvement of PMCs in UN peacekeeping operations.  Foremost 
among these are considerations as to the moral dimension of the use of profit-driven 
organizations to pursue the ends of peace on behalf of the international community.  A 
critical analysis of arguments against the use of PMCs in peacekeeping operations –
chief among which are the potential for abuses of human rights, the threat to the primacy 
and authority of states, and the question as to the legality of PMCs – is also carried out.  
Particular consideration is given to situations in which PMCs have been involved that 
illustrate their past record in such situations.  The chapter finally considers the prospect 
of regulation of PMCs, and the extent to which lack of a clear, internationally-accepted 
legal definition impedes progress towards a regulated PMC industry.
The concluding chapter starts with a comparative evaluation of the existing literature 
with the findings derived from analysis of the field research data, in order, firstly, to 
highlight changes and differences in the prevailing situation regarding PMCs and their 
activities, particularly in Africa, and secondly, to establish clearly the contribution made 
by this thesis to the study of PMCs.  It then lays out the conclusions emanating from the 
research in practical, political, economic, legal and moral terms.  The first of these 
relates, in practical terms, to the capability of PMCs to operate as an integral part of UN 
peacekeeping missions, and the potential effects, positive and negative, of such 
                                                
41
UN. 1994. "Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel."
42
International Committee of the Red Cross. 2004. Proceedings of Expert Meeting. "Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law." In Expert Meeting on Hostilities under IHL. ICRC: 
The Hague, Netherlands.
15
involvement.   Conclusions are then drawn as to the political acceptability of the use of 
PMCs, both for the home and host states concerned, and at regional and international 
levels.  Economic factors are then considered, including the potential negative effect the 
direct involvement of PMCs in the command structure of the UN might have on 
economic and other advantages currently gained from the use of PMCs as contractors.  
Conclusions are then drawn with regard to legal aspects of the use of PMCs as 
peacekeepers, with particular emphasis on the interlinked issues of legal definition, the 
issue of regulation at national and international levels, and the accountability of PMCs. 
Finally, conclusions are outlined regarding the moral dimension of the inclusion of 
profit-seeking actors in UN peacekeeping operations.  
In summary, this thesis seeks to analyse critically the hypothesis that PMCs are a 
suitable option, in practical, political, legal, economic and moral terms, for direct 
involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.  This analysis is carried out 
through a comprehensive review of existing literature on PMCs, an analysis of the 
political background of factors leading to the emergence and proliferation of PMCs in 
Africa, and extensive qualitative research into the activities of PMCs – both as 
independent organizations, and as adjuncts to peacekeeping operations conducted by 
regional forces and by the UN.  The thesis aims to make an original and important 
contribution to research into PMC activities in African states, and into the potential 
benefits and effects of their involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, and offers 
recommendations for areas requiring further research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This literature review will establish the current position in academic thought and, where 
pertinent, in wider, informed contemporary thinking on PMCs and their activities.  It will 
also consider the theoretical bases that underpin the existing literature.  The focus will be 
primarily on PMC activity in African states, but their involvement elsewhere will be 
included where it is pertinent to the subject of this thesis.  The review will also cover 
issues relating to the wider implications of the activities of PMCs.  To that end, it will 
include literature on the political situation leading to the involvement of PMCs in 
African states, and will encompass pertinent issues such as the nature and causes of 
conflict in those states, the effects of a globalised neo-liberal consensus, and the general 
rise of non-state actors.
2.1 Purpose
PMCs are a relatively new phenomenon in International Relations, and there is 
comparatively little in the way of established literature on the subject, particularly in an 
African context.  Most existing publications start with an in-depth historiography of 
mercenaries, on the basis that PMCs are an evolution of the former.  Indeed, much of the 
literature, as will be shown in this chapter, assumes a continuation between mercenarism 
and the activities of PMCs, and progresses on that assumption.  Elements of past 
mercenary activity – insofar as it is relevant to perceptions of PMCs – will be considered 
in this review of literature, but the purpose here is not to provide a history of 
mercenaries.  The purpose of this literature review is to establish, first, where the 
literature is situated in terms of theoretical bases in respect of the emergence and 
proliferation of PMCs, then to determine where contemporary thought on their activities 
in African states is posited – to include theories on the effects and utility of such activity 
– and finally to establish the position on issues relating directly to the question of their 
use in peacekeeping operations.  
As will be shown in this chapter, literature on the subject of PMCs has progressed from 
evaluations based on historical precedents and a priori assumptions, through descriptive 
accounts of PMC activity, to complex analyses of the industry.  But even in much of the 
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latter, the focus is primarily on empirical aspects of the emergence of PMCs and their 
activities, with little of the published literature being posited within a theoretical 
framework.   There is a general lacuna in terms of analysis as to what the proliferation of 
PMCs means in the field of International Relations, vis-à-vis the affairs of states.
This review will first consider literature relating directly to PMCs, and will appraise how 
approaches have progressed over time with regard to issues that have emerged with the 
spread of PMC activity.  It will also, where theoretical underpinning is a feature of the 
literature, consider the theoretical framework in which it is posited.   Also, in order to 
assess the implications of the activities of PMCs in the wider sphere of International 
Relations, literature pertaining to the political situation that has led to their proliferation 
in African states will be reviewed.
2.2 Literature  –  PMCs
One of the most seminal works on PMCs is Peter W. Singer’s ‘Corporate Warriors’.  
Singer adopts a practical approach to PMCs, and introduces the first typology of these 
organizations; one that is still much-used in later analyses.  His classification of PMCs is 
based on an analogy as to how close they operate to the ‘tip of the spear’ in situations of 
conflict.1  In Singer’s illustration, the tip of the spear symbolizes direct involvement in 
combat, with activities such as battlefield support, training, and logistics placed 
progressively further down the shaft of the weapon.2  A problem with Singer’s analogy is 
that, given a viable opportunity, PMCs offering one type of service can invariably switch 
to another.  Indeed, many offer multiple services ranging from logistics to battlefield 
support, so they could be placed, simultaneously, at several points along the shaft of 
Singer’s metaphorical spear.  This is symptomatic, as will be shown in this thesis, of 
attempts to categorize PMCs, and to classify their activities as static rather than a 
dynamic in terms of scope.
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While Singer’s book addresses many issues of the debate, – including those of morality, 
political implications, and the contention that PMCs undermine the authority of the state 
– the author’s discourse is situated primarily in historical and economic narrative rather 
than in wider theories of political economy.   He does, however, make clear that his 
intention is to facilitate future research based on underlying theories relating to his work 
on PMCs which, other than a short historical account of mercenaries in Africa and the 
activities of Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, focuses on the US PMC 
industry.   The book does, however, give a precise and comprehensive description of the 
market, and while there is little in-depth focus on distinctive elements of the emergence 
and proliferation of PMCs in Africa, many of the issues it covers remain extant, in an 
African context, in the PMC debate.
Mandel’s ‘Armies Without States’ adopts a more theory-based approach, but it focuses 
primarily on the issue of the global privatization of security, rather than on PMCs per 
se.3  Mandel regards this privatization as a challenge to the supremacy of the nation-state 
vis-à-vis notions of power, sovereignty and interdependence, recognizing the dilemma it 
poses to conventional theorists’ view of the state as the sole provider of security within 
its borders; indeed, this he describes as “a basic challenge to the structure of the entire 
international system.”4  The author’s approach is to deal conceptually with prevailing 
trends in the privatization of security, thus enabling them to be placed in theoretical 
context.  Mandel considers first the effects of globalisation and interdependence: in an 
economically liberalised world, it is predictable that security will be privatised.  In the 
post-Cold War world where no system has replaced the global order provided, 
paradoxically, by bipolar confrontation, the threat of anarchy in weak states is addressed 
through the use of privatised security, mostly by governments and multinational 
corporations.  He also takes into account the rise of non-state groups and civil society in 
governance, and their use of non-state security providers, particularly in weak states.  
Mandel thus highlights a dilemma central to the question of the use of PMCs.  Does their 
use by non-state actors involve a conflict between state interests and nongovernmental 
interests?   The questions arising from this potential conflict can probably not be 
                                                
3
Mandel, Robert. 2002. Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security. London: Lynne Rienner.
4
Ibid. p.2
19
summarised much better than has been done by Deborah Avant:5
“What is the relationship between state interests and non-
governmental interests? Are issue-oriented non-governmental 
organizations that face security problems in a good position to 
ensure that a military firm will give them the appropriate services?  
Who is the nongovernmental organization ultimately accountable 
to?  Is it their supporters, their donors, the country in which they 
are citizens, the country in which they operate, or is it some 
combination?”6
These questions are at the crux of arguments that PMCs could disrupt a state-centric 
system.  But Mandel balances the notion that PMCs might have an adverse effect on 
democracy (in situations where governments elected by the majority of electors are 
equitable in their treatment of all sectors of their populations),7 with the concept that, in 
states where a high level of structural violence is present, the presence of private security 
actors can assist the functioning of even-handed democracy.8 Mandel’s approach can 
best be summed up as a reflection of the clash between political realism and liberal 
internationalism, vis-à-vis “…realist emphases on state sovereignty and the liberal 
internationalist emphasis on globalized cooperation.”9
Recognizing the issue of PMCs as a comparatively new, still-emerging phenomenon, 
Mandel acknowledges that there has not been sufficient time for the development of a 
substantial, established body of literature on the subject.  He does, however, make some 
adroit observations on what material has emerged, concluding that: “Too many existing 
analyses seem to settle comfortably on one viewpoint – most commonly that of the 
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nation-state – and downplay the importance of others.”10  In an African context, this is 
important, because the authority of the state is challenged by elements of the populations 
of many African states,11 and models of hybrid ‘post-Westphalian’ governance are 
beginning to emerge in weak African states.12  This will be discussed further, relevant to 
the theoretical implications of the literature, in Section 3 of this chapter, and in greater 
depth in the following chapter, relevant to emerging forms of governance in post-
colonial African states.
Preceding Mandel’s work, Musah and Fayemis’ ‘Mercenaries: An African Security 
Dilemma’, while largely a historic-descriptive account of mercenaries in Africa, serves 
to give context to the political situation giving rise to the phenomenon of PMCs.  The 
emphasis is on what they consider the chief causes of conflict: “…unresolved 
aspirations towards self determination… religious and ethnic differences… ownership 
and control of valuable resources.”13 and on links between conflict and the involvement 
of mercenaries, with particular regard to the latter cause.  These will be considered in 
reviews of literature on the wider African political landscape later in this chapter.  It is 
worthy of note that the two former causes identified in Musah and Fayemis’ work 
reinforce Mandel’s points with regard to the use of PMCs as a foil against structural 
violence.
After an in-depth study of the history of mercenaries in Africa, the book gives 
descriptions of PMCs that have operated in Africa, with brief case studies assessing the 
nature of their involvement.14  The chapter contributed by Kevin O’Brien, ‘Private 
Military Companies and African Security 1990-98’,15 contextualises the rise of PMCs 
after the post-Cold War security situation in Africa in positive terms where conflict 
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resolution in African states is concerned, suggesting that “… international perceptions of 
PMCs… may not ring true when examining the continued rise of PMCs in Africa over 
the 1990s.”16  This runs contrary to the book’s general thrust, which is fiercely critical of 
PMCs.  Musah and Fayemi consider the involvement of private military and security 
actors to be a result of the rolling back of the state through the neoliberal expediency of 
market expansion and private enterprise, driving the involvement of ‘modern 
mercenaries’ in a usurpation of state authority.  While once again limited in terms of 
theoretical focus, this publication is a useful critical discussion of issues surrounding the 
proliferation of PMCs.17
Appearing some 5 years after Musah & Fayemi’s work, Deborah Avant’s ‘The Market 
for Force’ affords a more theoretically-based approach to what the author entitles 
“Private security and the control of force.”18 Avant contextualises the rise of the private 
security sector in terms of its correlation with the state’s control over force in three areas. 
The first – functional control – considers the level of control exerted by a state’s 
military, and seeks to establish whether this is more effective, or less so, when a private 
actor becomes involved.  The second – political control – assesses the level to which 
political actors’ control of force, vis-à-vis shifts in the relative power of individuals and 
organizations in the political sphere, is affected by the involvement of private actors.  
The third – social control – seeks to determine changes in the level to which security 
reflects societal needs and values in terms of democracy and human rights.
Avant highlights the fact that the term ‘mercenary’ is elastic in character; it is a term that 
does not travel well in a temporal sense, and perceptions as to its meaning have changed 
over time.  As different users of the term can quite often be referring to differing 
conceptions,19 the author prefers to situate her discourse in the context of the 
public/private divide, but points out that this divide only exists within the concept of 
sovereignty, where there is a domain of collective public good over which the state has 
exclusive authority.  This is significant to this thesis’ analysis of PMCs, because in 
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considering their activities against theoretical perspectives, account must be taken of 
diametrically opposed perceptions as to their legitimacy, or otherwise, in the state 
system.  Are they mercenaries – enemies of statehood and a threat to the authority of the 
state?  Or are they part of a solution to the inability of weak states to provide the public 
good of security to their populations?
Theoretical assumptions in much of the literature are coloured by perceptions as to the 
nature of PMCs.  Differences in approach are evident when making comparisons within 
the literature, an example being the contrast between Musah and Fayemi’s work and that 
of Deborah Avant.  One could speculate that the former might reflect more of an African 
viewpoint than the latter, but with contributions from a number of eminent writers on the 
subject,20 Musah and Fayemi’s work encompasses a wide range of views.  Kevin 
O’Brien and Eboe Hutchfuls’ contributions,21 in particular, reflect a global view of the 
situation, with the former laying solid foundations for understanding the emergence of 
PMCs in a political context.
Later works, such as those of Deborah Avant22 and Christopher Kinsey,23 accept that 
there are distinctions between PMCs and mercenaries, and acknowledge the need to 
conduct analysis of these ‘new’ entities against a theoretical framework.  It is not that 
these later publications favour PMCs, but they move away from the emphasis on 
mercenarism that characterizes the atavistic nature of earlier literature, thus allowing 
more sophisticated, theoretically-based analysis.  Kinsey’s ‘Corporate Soldiers and 
International Security’ is a good example of this,24 and of the progress in theoretically-
based analysis mentioned in Section 2.1 of this chapter.
As suggested by the title, Kinsey situates his analysis of PMCs against wider theories of 
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international security, and this is the first publication that moves away from US-centred 
studies, offering an in-depth analysis of the impact of British PMCs on the global 
market.  He also goes further than previous researchers in his questioning of the reasons 
for the rise of PMCs; moving away from historicist narratives, the author adopts an 
approach of theoretical analysis and interpretation.  This takes account of the changing 
nature of PMCs, and of changes in attitude based on assumptions “… that PMCs are 
different to previous types of private violence.”25  Kinsey’s analysis maintains a rigorous 
and critical approach; while noting that PMCs are “increasingly being recognized by 
governments, civil societies and international organizations as legitimate actors that can 
have a positive impact on international security”, he also acknowledges that “while 
attitudes may be changing, PMCs still pose a real challenge for governments and 
international organizations.”26  Kinsey is perhaps the first author to demonstrate that an 
underlying international norm against mercenaries – and thus against what many 
consider as their modern manifestation in the form of PMCs – has undergone a 
legitimising trend through increasing recognition by governments, civil society and 
NGOs as to the positive nature and utility of their activities.27
Published the same year, Chesterman and Lehnhardt’s analysis of PMCs, ‘From 
Mercenaries to Market’,28 addresses the interaction between the market-force expansion 
of the industry and the limitations, theoretical and actual, placed on such expansion by 
existing international law.  It also analyses the activities and roles of PMCs in different 
contexts, and considers the potential for regulation of the industry.  The book considers 
how the problems of potentially lethal force in the hands of unregulated, unaccountable 
actors can be reconciled with the interests of an increasing number of suppliers and 
consumers of a successful industry.  James Cockayne’s contribution, an analysis of 
principal-agent theory in governments’ use of PMCs, leads to recognition that a broader 
understanding of the “…changing organization of legitimate violence”29 is needed.  
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Cockayne observes that, with existing literature on PMCs tending to focus on large, 
Western-based PMCs, it is of limited use in trying to predict future trends, as it omits 
those smaller companies emanating from, and working in, developing countries.30
Also published in 2007, Sarah Percy’s ‘Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in 
International Relations’ is, as the title suggests, primarily a historical analysis of 
mercenaries.  It does, however, hold some utility for the purposes of considering the 
analysis of PMCs against a theoretical framework, particularly in the latter part of the 
book, in the short section entitled “The Anti-Mercenary Norm and its Influence on the 
Provision of Private Force Today”.31  Percy also observes that a “striking feature of the 
present literature on mercenaries…” – in which she includes those by Singer and Avant 
outlined in this literature review –32 “… is its lack of theoretical analysis, particularly 
with respect to international relations.” 33
Grounding her work in the theoretical background of an anti-mercenary norm in 
international relations, the author’s analysis of mercenaries and their ‘modern 
equivalents’ is conducted within the framework of theories of statehood, vis-à-vis the 
nature of states, to what extent states need to monopolise force, or more pertinently, the 
“control” of force,34 and the type of force they need to employ.  Percy brings out a 
salient point in her analysis of the anti-mercenary norm against this theoretical 
background: normative objections to the use of mercenaries, even if they may be 
unwarranted where some aspects of PMC activity are concerned, have had a strong 
influence on the structure and prospects of the PMC industry.  If, as demonstrated by 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline International in Angola and Sierra Leone, PMCs 
(those offering combat services) bring positive outcomes to states, why do those 
companies no longer exist, and why does no PMC offer services of the same nature as 
these two successful PMCs?35  From the perspective of theories of Political Realism, the 
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state should be concerned primarily about cultivating its relative power, regardless as to 
whether that power comes through citizen-soldiers or mercenaries.  Percy puts forward a 
compelling argument that a major part in influencing state decision-making with regard 
to that choice is driven by the anti-mercenary norm.36
James Cockayne concurs with Percy’s arguments; he posits that the subcontracting of 
security would be more widespread were it not for social aspects and attitudes towards 
the use of outsiders, and that the anti-mercenary norm encourages states to: “produce 
their own security, rather than pay others to provide it, because the overall social costs 
of delegation… are seen as insupportable.”37  But with the growing ‘legitimisation’ of 
PMCs through increasing recognition by governments, NGOs and civil society,38 and the 
decreasing impact of the anti-mercenary norm, Cockayne’s ‘cost: benefit’ equation is 
becoming less relevant.  Opponents of PMCs argue that this legitimisation is the result of 
a ‘re-labelling’ of mercenaries.  Walter Gantz’ seminal work on the “movement of 
taboos”39 would suggest that dissociation of this kind might play a considerable part in 
breaking down the anti-mercenary norm, through a process of: “re-labelling… with 
word-symbols which have neutral or positive connotations.”40  
This argument is central to the debate surrounding PMCs.  Two key factors influence 
those who use them, and the market approach adopted by the PMC industry.  The first is 
the international norm against the use of mercenaries.  This has a bearing on much of the 
literature about PMCs, and the effects of this are summed up succinctly by Sarah Percy:
“…accounts that take a particular position for or against the use of mercenaries make 
their judgements on PMCs based on an implicit comparison with 1960s mercenaries.”41  
As mentioned earlier, much of the literature on PMCs has emerged from that on 
mercenaries, and it was not until the publication of Christopher Kinsey’s ‘Corporate 
Soldiers and International Security’ that the validity of this link was interrogated in any 
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depth.  This thesis, in order to ensure a critical approach, must answer the crucial 
question as to whether PMCs are simply ‘re-labelled’ mercenaries, or whether their 
constitution and activities differ tangibly from those of mercenaries in Africa in the 
1960s.  This will be dealt with as an issue in its own right in Chapter 4.
The second influencing factor is a preoccupation with PMCs as a threat to the authority 
of the state.42  This raises a host of questions as to the use of PMCs.  To what extent does 
the state lose its authority if it subcontracts to a PMC?  Does a weak state – one that has 
already lost its monopoly over the use of force – lose authority when it subcontracts to a 
private actor?  Or does it regain that authority?  Further, and of central relevance to this 
thesis: Would the same questions regarding the threat to state authority apply if PMCs 
were employed by the UN?  These questions can only be answered in the context of 
statehood.  A striking commonality of much of the literature on PMCs is that it does not 
evaluate their activities against a political landscape of diminishing state capacity, where 
unrest and the prospect of conflict are pervasive, in states ill-equipped to deal with them.  
This thesis will explore the relationship between the political situation and the 
emergence of PMCs, and will critically evaluate the significance of the relationship 
between political circumstances and the proliferation of PMCs in African states.
2.3 Theoretical considerations in literature on PMCs
In the context of Westphalian-model statehood it is easy to draw the conclusion that 
PMCs are a threat to the state, but few analyses take into account the limitations of 
governance, particularly in weak African states.43  Existing political and IR theories –
even that of Neoliberal Institutionalism – do not lend themselves readily to the idea of 
non-state actors wielding potentially lethal force.  But these theories are challenged by 
the emergence of new configurations of governance.  The authority of the state is 
ignored, avoided, or challenged by elements of the populations of many African states.44  
The politics of exclusion, exacerbated by a globalised neoliberal orthodoxy and the 
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associated emergence of influential, financially persuasive, non-state actors, have 
brought about serious challenges to the primacy of the state.  The neoliberal nature of 
drivers of political development, combined with persistent elements of the prevailing 
political situation in African states, are causal to the activities of PMCs in Africa.45  The 
fundamental limitation of most literature on PMCs, as has been shown in this chapter, is 
the lack of theoretical analysis, and it is therefore necessary to examine the literature 
relevant to the wider African political landscape to analyse fully the emergence and 
proliferation of PMCs in African states.
2.4 Literature – Political Context
In contrast to the dearth of literature dealing directly with the issue of PMCs in Africa, 
there is a plethora on the politics of African states.  Within this abundance of literature, 
there are several key publications addressing issues of direct relevance to the 
privatisation of security and the emergence of PMCs in Africa.  Three of the most 
pertinent to the needs of this thesis, in terms of contextualising historical aspects of 
African states with their subsequent political development, are Fernand Braudel’s ‘A 
History of Civilizations’, John Reader’s ‘Africa: A Biography of the Continent’, and 
Guy Arnold’s ‘Africa: A Modern History’.46  These three volumes, used in concert, 
enable accurate perspective to be placed on factors leading to the privatisation of 
security and the involvement of PMCs in African states, relevant to their historical and 
political emergence.  Crucially, they outline commonalities in the political development 
of many African states in which the conditions giving rise to the involvement of PMCs 
are present, moving from the pre-colonial and colonial epochs to the post-independence 
era, their development as sovereign states, internal ethnic struggles, the disasters of 
structural adjustment and the global commodity crisis, the effects of superpower 
patronage during the Cold War, and those of the withdrawal of that patronage and the 
associated loss of strategic importance after the Cold War.  More pertinently, these 
publications deal with the hollowing out and weakening of the state in the post-Cold War 
era, and the emergence of intrastate conflict.   All three books lay crucial foundations 
towards understanding these aspects of the development of African states, and highlight 
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the significance of factors that have contributed to the emergence and proliferation of 
PMCs.
Expanding on the historical accounts of the three previous volumes, and of direct 
relevance to this thesis, Ricardo Laremont’s edited book, ‘The Causes of War and the 
Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa’ deals with aspects of political and security 
regimes in African states that have simultaneously contributed to conflict and weakened 
the state’s ability to resolve it.47  Laremont’s primary thrust, having established the root 
causes of conflict, is the failure of international peacekeeping efforts in Africa, and the 
consideration of alternatives, particularly as “Africa is not presently central to the geo-
economic and geopolitical ordering of the world.”48 Other contributors consider the 
lingering effects of the colonial powers and compare their assumption that, after 
independence, “liberal democracy and its institutions would control problems 
encountered by the new African governments” with the reality of the situation: “Since 
decolonization, African foreign relations have been conducted either in the shadow of its 
former colonizers or in the shadow of the Cold War.”49  The failure of liberal democracy 
and the pre-eminence of African militaries resulted in the military coup becoming the 
most common means of transfer of power, and the need, in the absence of external 
enemies, for militaries to create an internal ‘other’ – whether ethnic, regional, 
ideological, or simply anti-government in nature.50  The result, according to contributing 
authors Mazrui and Ostergard, is an ongoing wave of political instability,51 a conclusion 
that mirrors Mary Kaldor’s extensive work on the subject.52
Crawford Young’s contribution to Laremont’s edited work considers the impact of three 
distinct aspects of the macropolitical process in African states, and the interaction 
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between them.  In ‘Pluralism, Ethnicity, and Militarization’, he first describes the milieu 
necessary for genuine pluralism – a liberalized political environment, combined usually 
with democratic governance.53  He then considers ethnicity – an elastic term, but for the 
purposes of his analysis: “… the subjective domain of collective consciousness, defined 
by… language, culture, shared historical narratives, kin metaphors of belonging, and 
beliefs.”  Young’s use of the word ‘subjective’ is apt.  From the bulk of literature on 
Africa, it is clear that ethnicity is a dynamic concept, and he acknowledges that it is 
fluid, evolving, emotive, and, pertinent to many African conflicts, is “instrumentally 
available for political activation.”54 In the era of African nation-building, pluralism and 
ethnicity were seen as potential threats to national cohesion, and conflicting concepts of 
identity, interest, and ideology were marginalized.  This coincided with the military’s 
emergence – and indeed, that of the police – as protectors of the state from potential 
threats.  As there was little in the way of external threat, the military looked to protect 
the state from the internal ‘other’ – a task that was pursued proactively by African 
armies.  The public good of security was not only limited to certain elements of the 
population, but those elements who were denied it also found their security threatened by 
the forces of the state where, in their pre-nationhood polities, no such threats had 
existed.55
Active structural violence such as this was a primary driver of conflict, and with the 
ending of the Cold War, PMCs were to play a part in many of Africa’s security 
structures, and in some cases, in conflict.  The contributors’ analyses are backed up 
demonstrably by case studies of, among others, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Angola.  These case studies are particularly relevant to this study, and the involvement 
of PMCs in some of these conflicts will be considered in later chapters of this thesis.
A publication that focuses on specific elements of such conflicts is ‘Ethnicity Kills? The 
Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa.’56  This edited book goes 
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further than the title suggests in giving context to factors that contribute to war –
specifically intrastate conflict – in African states.  The question mark in the title is well 
placed; the central theme is that many African conflicts perceived as ethnically-driven 
can be better understood when viewed against the wider socio-political context of 
statehood in the postcolonial African state.  In states where extreme forms of structural 
violence exclude elements of the population from the political process, some groups 
have to resort increasingly to violence, both as a means of protection, and in order to 
fulfil their basic needs and interests.  In the societal breakdown that follows, elements of 
the population align themselves with their traditional ethnic and familial support 
systems, and leaders of the conflicting groups resort to the politics of ethnicity to 
mobilize support.  Thus, conflicts become characterized in ethnic terms. 
This particular publication is notable for its depth as well as breadth; contributors from 
diverse academic disciplines re-emphasise the arguments from the viewpoints of 
anthropology, history, international relations, politics, and sociology.  Central to 
arguments regarding the part played by ethnicity in conflict is the nature of power, and 
the effect of neopatrimonialism in postcolonial African states – a personalised means of 
wealth-building through the acquisition of resources, to the inclusion of some parts of 
the population and the exclusion of others, and a crucial factor in the involvement of 
private security actors in African states.
The contributors also use case studies to further analyse the roots of conflict, and the part 
played by external agents, i.e. the former colonial powers, international forces, 
multinational companies and PMCs.  Morten Bøås posits that intervention by foreign 
states, and regional intervention in particular, has increased the level of strife in conflict-
torn countries, an observation he demonstrates in the use of Liberia and Sierra Leone as 
case studies.57  Pertinent to this thesis, Bøås also notes that in the case of Sierra Leone, 
the first communication between the rebels and the government towards genuine efforts 
at reaching a ceasefire, came about only after decisive action by a private military actor,58
as did the first elections since the outset of the civil war.
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Two sister-publications that enable a clear understanding of the political background that 
has seen the proliferation of PMCs in Africa are Chabal and Daloz’ ‘Africa Works: 
Disorder as a Political Instrument’, and Bayart, Ellis and Hibous’ ‘The Criminalization 
of the State in Africa’.59  Written in collaboration with the International African Institute 
and published simultaneously, both publications focus on the realities of political life –
formal and informal – in African states.  In the first of these, Patrick Chabal and Jean-
Pascal Daloz consider the apparent disorder that reigns in many African states; the result 
of weak institutions.  This, the authors argue, is less a state of “disorder” than one of 
“different order” – one that is the result of “different rationalities and causalities.”60  
They posit that manipulation of the framework of weak institutions, the 
“instrumentalization of disorder” benefits a minority elite at the helm of government, 
and those in their networks:
“… in most African countries, the state is no more than a décor, a 
pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized 
political relations.…legitimacy is firmly embedded in the 
patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks.”61
Given the frequency of violent displacement of incumbents as a means of regime change 
in Africa, Braathen, Bøås and Sæthers’ argument –62 that conflict is not so much the 
result of conflicting dimensions of nationality and ethnicity, as of exclusion and 
marginalisation of ethnic groups resulting from the “instrumentalization of disorder”63 –
is all the more convincing.  Chabal and Daloz argue that non-elites and their networks 
also gain benefit from neopatrimonial systems, though not to the extent of entrenched 
elites, through a process of ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’,64 whereby non-elites derive 
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benefit through munificence on the part of those entrenched in political networks.  
Central to this argument is the high level of communalism in African societies that drive 
this reciprocity.  In the book’s sister-publication, however, this view is contested by 
Jean-François Bayart:“… contrary to what is often said, African societies are 
characterized less by their communalism than by … frenetic individualism”,65 a view 
also shared by Braathen, Bøås and Sæther, who see conflict as a struggle over 
distribution in society.66  Combined with the conflicting dimensions of nationality and 
ethnicity, ‘asymmetrical distribution’ – a term that fails to convey the severity of the 
situation it represents, of mass exclusion, marginalization and grinding poverty on the 
one hand, and of detached privilege and opulence on the other – has contributed more to 
conflict in Africa than any other factor.67  Further, the nature of African militaries, and of 
policing in African states, has traditionally prioritised the protection of the state rather 
than that of the individual.  These institutions have, historically, been closely tied to the 
networks of the political elite, and are seen as instruments of state oppression among 
excluded groups.  Both ‘Africa Works’, and its sister-publication, ‘The Criminalization 
of the State in Africa’, put the root causes of these phenomena into perspective, vis-à-vis 
the weakened military and policing institutions of post-Cold War African states.   The 
decreasing connection of these institutions to high-level patronage networks has led to a 
burgeoning number of citizens’ groups, an increasing need for extra-state security, and 
the growing involvement of private security firms and PMCs.68  
Despite Bayart’s contradiction of Chabal and Daloz’ ‘asymmetrical symmetry’ 
argument,69 Bayart, Ellis and Hibous’ book also focuses on informal aspects of politics in 
Africa, and there are parallels throughout both publications.  The authors go further than 
Chabal and Daloz in their expression of the African state as an instrument for the self-
enrichment of elites and their networks.  Their focus is on the ‘shadow state’, which they 
regard as more real and more relevant than the façade of the ‘real state’ whose official 
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structures it has expropriated.  It is this expropriation of the state that the authors refer to 
in the title.  The choice of the word ‘criminalization’ has been criticized by a number of 
observers, notably Abdul Mustapha, who argues that the authors’ description of African 
‘social capital’ as consistent with the spirit of criminality is “a short step from the 
genetic argument of a ‘criminal gene’ or the racist argument of a criminal race”.70
While the book has not been welcomed in all circles, the authors’ arguments are 
recognized as stripping bare a number of elements of political activity in African states 
that hold back progress and contribute to unrest and violence.  Although Mustapha does 
not contend the latter point, his work highlights a contrast in conceptions of what 
constitutes ‘criminal’ activity.  For the authors, it is “the routinisation, at the very heart 
of political and governmental institutions and circuits, of practices whose criminal 
nature is patent.”71  For others such as Mustapha, interpreting such practices as 
“criminal” does not paint an accurate picture of the nature of politics in African states, 
which reflects practices that have evolved from a combination of patrimonial systems 
and the effects of colonial administrations.72  One might argue that Chabal and Daloz’ 
description of the neopatrimonial African state: “…a pseudo-Western façade masking 
the realities of deeply personalized political relations… [where] legitimacy is firmly 
embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks”,73 reflects 
Mustapha’s interpretation quite accurately.
A critical point for this thesis brought out in the second of these publications is that, far 
from the idea that the Washington Consensus democratization of African states and 
liberalisation of their economies would reduce such criminal practices, the opposite is 
true: 
“…contrary to the teachings of the neo-liberal rubric, measures of 
privatization and financial liberalization can lead to a plundering 
of the economy as widespread as did the processes on 
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nationalization, and perhaps in an even less orderly manner.”74
The wholesale plunder of Liberia’s assets was a case in point, as explored in depth by 
William Reno in ‘Reinvention of an African patrimonial state: Charles Taylor’s 
Liberia’.75 Reno’s analysis illustrates Taylor’s almost total disdain for the presence of 
state institutions as a façade for patrimonial practices, with institutions of state existent 
in title but virtually emasculated in function.  Taylor’s exercise of this extreme form of 
neopatrimonialism, far from bringing the marginalisation and unsustainability predicted 
for regimes excluded from the Washington consensus,76 developed new means of 
exploiting economic and political resources.77  Kenneth Waltz’s ‘Man, the State, and 
War’ shows us that the effectiveness of patrimonial systems that had been exercised long 
before independence was not lost on post-independence African leaders, who, like their 
predecessors, had: “… scant regard for conventional institutional notions of state power 
based on…bureaucratic capacity and administrative autonomy”78, governing instead “in 
ways compatible with rule through…non-bureaucratic elite networks.”79
Kalevi Holsti completes the picture for us in terms of conflict that emanates from such 
entrenched neopatrimonialism.  In ‘The State, War, and the State of War’, Holsti 
demonstrates why weak states become the locale for post-Cold War conflict in Africa.80  
Holsti’s connection of extreme forms of neopatrimonialism, the emergence of conflict, 
security vacuums and the appearance of private security actors is amplified compellingly 
by Morten Bøås in ‘Liberia and Sierra Leone – Dead Ringers? The Logic of 
Neopatrimonial Rule’.  The latter publication holds considerable importance for this 
thesis in determining the link between the African political landscape and the naissance 
and proliferation of PMCs in African states.  Bøås recognises, firstly, that the civil wars 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone – as with civil wars elsewhere in Africa – were the result of 
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political collapse and the recession of the state, brought about primarily by extreme 
forms of neopatrimonialism, and secondly that the situation could not be understood 
through Western conceptions, as politics in most African states “…do not conform to an 
institutionalised Western political system.”81 The article further conceptualises the 
African ‘security dilemma’ discussed by Musah and Fayemi, and puts the proliferation 
of private security actors into the context of the nature of statehood and the resulting 
fragility of many states in Africa.  This thesis will further analyse the relationship 
between the political situation and the involvement of PMCs in African states.
2.5 Summary
The two sets of literature reviewed here – the first focusing on PMCs, their activities, 
and their potential effects on the security situation in African states, and the second on 
the historical and political backgrounds that have seen their emergence and proliferation 
– afford a solid starting point for this thesis.  They provide indicators as to areas that 
need to be explored further in order to analyse critically the involvement of PMCs in 
African states, and the potential for their involvement in peacekeeping missions.  This 
review of literature will form the basis for the following chapter, which will analyse in 
depth the background from which conflict has erupted in African states, those conflict 
and post-conflict situations in which PMCs have become involved, and the prevailing 
political and security situations in which they currently operate.
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Chapter 3
Political Context
Fundamental to any analysis of PMCs in Africa is consideration of the political 
background that has given rise to their emergence.  Analysis of Africa’s political 
development brings out commonalities in many African states, but the question must be 
asked as to whether it is apt to deal with Africa as a geopolitical entity.  Achille Mbembe 
posits that:
"Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and 
continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West's 
desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world."1
Mbembe’s central argument is that Africa, with its diverse and disparate geographical, 
historical and ethnic characteristics, cannot realistically be dealt with as a single political 
entity.2   His own use, however, of the term “the West” – arguably an even more 
disparate ‘entity’ – highlights difficulties in the analysis of any geopolitical grouping 
with commonalities relevant to a specific area of research.  Chabal and Daloz observe:
“It serves no purpose to generalize excessively and to reduce all 
African political systems to their lowest common denominator.  At 
the same time, however, let us avoid the opposite excess, which 
consists in arguing that no generalization is possible because there 
are in Africa fifty irredeemably different countries.  Beyond the 
existing diversity, it is clear that any serious study of the state in 
Africa brings to light a number of analytically significant 
similarities.”3
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Indeed, the terms ‘the African State’, and ‘African Statehood’ are used by many eminent 
analysts of African politics to encompass shared characteristics of African states.4  Their 
work illustrates clearly that many African states share common trajectories; in their 
creation, independence, emergence as sovereign states and post-colonial development, in 
the prevailing political situation during the Cold War era, in the effects on their 
economies of global commodity crises, in the withdrawal of superpower patronage, the 
emergence of intrastate conflict, and in subsequent crises of state failure.  It also 
demonstrates a common tendency for African states to gravitate towards conflict as a 
means of addressing problems brought about by weak and failing state structures, 
ineffective state institutions, an inability of states to exercise control throughout their 
territories or to control their borders, an unfavourable global economic environment that 
conspires against export growth, and the exploitation of high-value natural resources.5  In 
considering the political background that has given rise to the emergence and 
proliferation of PMCs in Africa, it is therefore apt – indeed it is important – to anlayse 
factors pertinent to their emergence in the broader African context, prior to analysis in 
the more focused context of case studies selected for their direct relevance to this thesis.
3.1 Research Framework: The Post-colonial African State
Central, then, to any discussion of private actors in the military and security sectors in 
Africa is the political background that has given rise to their presence.  A clear 
understanding of the political context relevant to their emergence must be established in 
order to enable identification and analysis of factors leading to the involvement of these 
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actors in tasks that were formerly the exclusive domain of the state.6   Conceptions of the 
wider political landscape, and of the vagaries of statehood in post-colonial Africa, are 
essential to developing a clear picture as to the dynamics of the situation in which PMCs 
have emerged and proliferated.  Critical to this analysis are the nature of politics and the 
structure of government mechanisms in states in which PMCs are active, particularly 
those where PMC activity has been commissioned by the state.
This chapter will explore elements of the emergence and current configuration of 
African states that have brought about the circumstances giving rise to the proliferation 
of PMCs.  Key to this is the evolution of political systems in Africa, with particular 
regard to patrimonial and quasi-patrimonial systems of governance that have endured 
through independence and the post-colonial era.7  These have resulted in a blurring of 
divisions between state, private, and individual interests, and the widespread 
personalization of politics in African states.  The initial focus of this chapter will be on 
the period after 1956 in which the ‘rush to independence’ became a major factor in the 
shaping of statehood across much of Africa,8 but aspects of colonial rule prior to that 
time, relevant to the nature of statehood in the post-colonial era will also be considered.  
The prevailing political situation will then be analysed against factors surrounding the 
political emergence of African states.
3.2 Critical aspects of the creation of states in Africa
Analysis of the essential roots of the current political landscape requires consideration of 
the putatively ‘ordered’ creation of states in Africa.  From a European perspective, this 
‘order’, originating at the Congo Conference and ensuing Treaty of Berlin in 1885, was 
clear insofar as it served the major European powers’ economic and geopolitical 
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interests.9  From an African viewpoint, however, the European paradigm of order was 
not so evident; contrived borders had, in many cases, placed territorial frontiers between 
established communities and ‘tribal’ societies.10 The Bakongo, for example, found 
themselves divided between French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial territories in 
Congo and Angola; Burkina Faso’s borders with Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, 
Niger and Mali dissected no fewer than twenty-one ethnically cohesive societies.11
The concept of entrenched, ancestral traditions and social interaction among these 
societies was not a consideration in the colonial powers’ slicing of the African cake.  
Other than the geography of enclaves established for trading purposes,12 comparatively 
little was known of the African hinterland; maps of the time designate vast areas ‘terra 
incognita’.   Neither was much known of the human societies that inhabited its interior.13  
In all, no fewer than 177 ethno-cultural areas, socially and economically linked prior to 
colonization, were divided in the negotiation of Africa’s colonial boundaries.14  In other 
instances, these arbitrary units of political geography brought ethnic groups together 
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within common borders,15 the largest of which, Nigeria, is estimated to have contained 
over 250 ethnic groups, most of whom shared neither language nor history.16  Cultural 
and political differences between Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups – the Hausa, Igbo and 
Yoruba, who had, like other ethnic groups, co-existed in relative peace –17 came to the 
surface when their ‘nations’ were brought into one political union.  The political parties 
that emerged were based on ethnic divisions,18 as was the case within the colonially-
defined borders of many African states.19  
The borders defined by the colonial powers would nevertheless, with few changes, 
remain after independence.20  With the emergence in the 1950s and 1960s of thirty-eight 
colonially-delineated independent nations, closely followed, in the ensuing decade, by a 
further ten similarly defined territories, the ‘order’ created by erstwhile colonizers was to 
have a profound effect on the prevailing political situation in Africa.
While it is accepted comprehensively that the ethnic dimension of this emerging political 
situation, prefaced by the territorial diktats of the colonial powers, is of key relevance to 
the nature of intrastate conflict in Africa, analysis of the phenomenon has not previously 
been applied, directly and in-depth, to the activities of PMCs in Africa. The ethnic 
dimension of the emergence and current configuration of African states, and the nature 
of politics and government in relation to that ethnic dimension, is therefore critical to 
this thesis in the analysis of PMC activity in Africa.  
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3.3 Theoretical aspects of African statehood
Africa’s political emergence must also be examined in the wider context of 
developments in the international system.  Consideration in this respect must be given to 
conceptualizations of sovereignty and statehood, coupled with changes in the nature of 
conflict and of state power, particularly after World War II and the Cold War, and 
against the contemporary backdrop of an increasingly globalized world.  Moreover, it is 
crucial to establish the fundamental characteristics of the evolution and current 
configuration of African states in order to highlight their essential differences from those 
falling into accepted, classic models of statehood, as these differences play a major part 
in the involvement of external actors, including that of PMCs.
A central feature of academic discussion of the rise of PMC activity in African states, 
and its potential effect on the sovereignty of those states, is the concept of the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force as the defining attribute of sovereignty.21  European history 
bears out the Political Realist hypothesis; the formation of states through conquest and 
alliance –22 a process spanning more than 400 years, and reducing some 500 socio-
economic units to 25 nation-states.23  This brought about the concept of organized power 
as the primary political authority, with international law a secondary factor.24  But 
African statehood was destined to emerge in a very different context.  In Europe, it was 
the assimilation of weaker by stronger states followed by the emergence of international 
law that brought about balance-of-power politics giving rise to the primacy of the state 
and, therefore, to relations between states.  Colonization put paid to any process of a 
similar emergence of states in Africa, and, while elements of that process are a cause of 
conflict in some African states,25 a return to any form of ‘pre-Westphalian’ redefining of 
African boundaries, as contemporary politics show, is implausible.
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Further, academic thought on conflict relevant to the historical development of political 
systems in Africa, – and, within that body of thought, discussion on the activities of 
PMCs in conflict – revolves around concepts of state.  Discussion of the emergence of 
the state in Africa pre-supposes that European notions of statehood can be applied in a 
context where no such conceptions existed prior to colonization.  John Lonsdale, in the 
preface to his comprehensive survey of the subject, reflects on the absence of states in 
pre-colonial Africa:
“… the most distinctively African contribution to human history 
could be said to have been precisely the civilized art of living fairly 
peaceably together not in states”26
This anarchic group of ‘non-states’ – anarchic in the sense that there was no central point 
of governance – interacted through a system of ‘ethnic bargaining’.27  The potential risks 
and costs of war were great, and large scale wars between ethnic groups, contrary to 
many conceptions of pre-colonial Africa, was rare, notable exceptions being the Songha 
empire in the 15
th
century, those of Ashanti and Dahomey in the late 1700s, and latterly 
the Zulu conquests of the early 1800s.  Largely, the system of ethnic bargaining led to a 
peaceful co-existence, with mutual benefit through trade.  Achille Mbembe contrasts the 
equilibrium produced by early ethnic interaction and the prevalence of inter-ethnic 
tension after independence.28 Pre-colonial African polities could perhaps be compared 
with today’s international system – an anarchic community of interacting states, co-
existing in relative peace and deriving mutual benefit from trade.  Lonsdale’s analysis of 
social processes and ‘states’ in Africa brings out the point – as does Robert Smith’s work 
on the subject, –29 that European conceptions of state-making, notably Tilly’s first 
condition of the ‘elimination of external rivals’,30 was not a common feature of pre-
colonial African societies.  Neither, with the external arrangement of the continent’s 
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political boundaries, was it to be a feature of post-colonial African states.
Robert Jackson, also on the subject of pre-colonial polities in Africa, notes the repeated 
imposition of European perceptions in attempting to understand them, and questions the 
perceptions of outsiders as to African ‘political space’, against what really existed on the 
ground at the time:
“Africa was a continental archipelago of loosely-defined political 
systems: a world of societies rather than states and far more 
recognizable to anthropology than to international relations”.31
These political ‘systems’ – or at least ways in which pre-colonial African communities 
organized themselves – present difficulties for the use of the term ‘state’ in the context 
of Africa’s emerging political architecture.  Jeffrey Herbst argues that European 
preconceptions of ‘state’ have always obstructed understanding of the true nature of pre-
colonial polities in Africa.32 Robert Smith, similarly, challenges assumptions – based on 
accepted Weberian concepts and definitions of statehood – that territorial control was the 
fundamental determinant of the ‘state’ in pre-colonial Africa:
“International relations in peace and war were carried out in a 
more or less recognizable fashion, and… in a coherent and rational 
manner which showed itself capable under favourable conditions of 
leading to political, economic and technical improvements in 
society.”33
This view is actually strengthened by Weber’s own argument as to the limitations of 
patrimonial rule,34 particularly at the peripheries of pre-colonial African societies.35  
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Smith’s arguments are even more credible for the fact that – given the limitations on 
coercive power that pre-colonial African leaders could exert, combined with those of 
command and control that could be exercised on ‘armies’ stretched over expansive areas 
– power in pre-colonial African states diminished considerably over distance.36  Jeffrey 
Herbst adds further support to this argument, concluding that “broadcasting power over 
sparsely settled lands,”37 – the exercising of effective power in African ‘political space’38
– was the most fundamental problem for African leaders. 
Pre-colonial political systems in Africa feature little in academic discussion relevant to 
the purpose of this thesis, either in assumptions of statehood in the context of 
international society, or in consideration of Africa’s political emergence. Discussions on 
both of these aspects of African politics stem predominantly from Weberian concepts of 
sovereignty, specifically the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined 
borders.  Significantly, in cases where groups who refuse to accept the legitimacy of 
their borders are able to establish control over large areas, – and the colonially-defined 
state fails to prevent, or is unable to control this – international recognition remains with 
the central government of the territory as the sovereign power, regardless of ability to 
exercise this fundamental tenet of sovereignty.39  The ability of groups within the borders 
of African states to establish control over large swathes of territory is neither a new nor 
an uncommon phenomenon.  Given the growing trend – a global tendency, rather than 
one unique to Africa – of the weakening of state structures and the increasing difficulties 
experienced by governments in the maintenance of authority within borders,40 neither is 
that phenomenon set to become a diminishing one.
“Globally there has been a trend for state governments to lose 
power… in many states, including those in the developed world, 
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regional movements exist promoting substantial autonomy or 
secession…”41
This bears particular relevance to the study of private actors in the military and security 
sectors in Africa.  PMC involvement in African states has arisen partly from the need to 
bolster state institutions, but also relevant, in the same vein, is the phenomenon of 
territorial enclaves and enclave economies.  These are key factors in the proliferation of 
private actors in the military and security sectors, and are central to this thesis’ analysis 
of African states relevant to the involvement of PMCs.  Enclaves in African states, now 
a central part of contemporary thinking in political economy and developmental issues,42
are not new in concept.  Strongholds established by traders on the African coast, long 
before the first European forays into the continent, such as that of Zanzibar in the 8
th
century, were set up to facilitate trade – or at least the extraction and transportation of 
resources.  The ‘modern’ enclave, in essence, mirrors this model as the latter-day 
instrument of economic development and control, but in collaboration with the 
government of the territory.43  This is an integral part of the political economy of a
number of African states,44 and is central to the causes of conflict, the need for security 
beyond the capabilities of state institutions, and thus to the involvement of PMCs.
The political economy of these states is therefore central to understanding the
relationship between ‘enclavity’,45 security, and conflict.  Narratives on enclavity in 
Africa stress the dualist structure of enclave economies, in terms of the sharp contrast 
between the state’s modern and traditional sectors.46  Clear examples of this dualism are 
seen in the economies of Nigeria and Zambia vis-à-vis comparison of both countries’ 
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low-capital, low-yield, traditional economies, with the modern, capital-intensive oil 
economy in the case of the former, and the latter’s similarly intensive copper sector.  
Paradoxically, most countries with resources driving these dualist economies experience 
comparably poor overall economic and development performance,47 with the majority of 
the labour force – those not engaged in the enclave economy – involved in informal, low 
level economic activities hinging on the needs of subsistence and survival.48
This paradox, centered on the extraction and upward movement of resources from the 
informal-traditional sector to the modern sector, – from country at large to enclave, and 
thence from enclave to external, global economy –49 pits the efforts of local primary 
commodity producers against the redoubtable might of corporations and their pervasive 
influence on the host state, and excludes all but those members of the population 
involved in the economy of the enclave.  For the state’s part, the need for security in 
enclaves takes precedence over that, largely, for the rest of the country, and the 
proliferation of PMCs is a manifestation of this situation.
In this allocation of the control of coercive force according to economic criteria –
regardless as to whether the actual provision of that security is carried out by the state or 
is delegated to the corporate occupants of enclaves – a division is created and the politics 
of exclusion are brought into play.  This is indicative of the gulf between what Jean-
François Bayart terms ‘l’Afrique utile’ – that part of Africa that is useful, in terms of 
contribution to the global economy – and ‘l’Afrique inutile’, which has insufficient 
potential for usefulness or profit in terms of political economy.50   William Reno sees the 
political fragility of many African states more as a symptom of this element of enclavity 
– of the exclusion of elements of the population by the state, rather than their ‘opting 
out’ of involvement with the state.51  Reno argues that, from the point of view of the 
state, monopoly over the use of violence is neither, necessarily, the most effective means 
of control, – particularly where the equation is driven by commerce, rather than territory 
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– nor the most appropriate.52  By relying on the corporate occupants of enclaves to 
provide their own security, or by turning to PMCs as providers, the state’s need to build 
and maintain effective police forces and armies – the most basic institutions of statehood 
–53 is diminished, the net result of which is a reliance on private actors for the basic need 
of a secure environment.
Thus, consideration of statehood in the African context reveals a number of issues 
critical to this thesis.  Foremost of these, the central tenet of sovereignty in International 
Relations – the monopoly over the use of coercive force within defined territorial 
boundaries – has never been as entrenched a feature in African states as it has in the 
developed world.  Neither have concepts of nationhood or statehood, nor attitudes 
towards them, among many communities within African states.  Further, the 
concentration of the security apparatus of many states in Africa in areas of 
administration and wealth – cities, resource-rich areas, and economic enclaves – leads to 
the exclusion of many elements of the population, and the development of power 
vacuums.  This combination, the politics of exclusion and a weak state security 
framework, in a political climate that engenders discontent and fuels the potential for 
conflict, serves to make the state yet more fragile, driving the need for the involvement 
of non-state actors and fuelling the proliferation of PMCs. 
3.4 Sovereignty in African States
Fundamental to questions of international recognition and external sovereignty of 
African states is the level to which they conform to accepted models of statehood.  As 
statehood is determined by territorial power, sovereignty is a manifestation of this 
power, and international recognition is an effect rather than a foundation of statehood,54
it follows that the legitimacy afforded to African states by colonial powers was always 
dependent upon those powers’ grip on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.  The 
relevance of this point to the post-colonial sovereignty of African states hinges not least 
around the practicability of transfer of this monopoly – leaving aside questions of intent 
on the part of departing colonial powers, and of the precipitous nature of the changeover.
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The emergence of African states after independence, through the transfer of power from 
colonial administrators to members of emergent elites,55 was a process neither of 
evolution nor of revolution.  The legitimacy of statehood in many African states, rather 
than being obtained through a historical process of internal political evolution, was 
bestowed upon these elites regardless of the existence of any intrinsic capability to 
maintain that legitimacy.  Having lacked organized force sufficient to oust their colonial 
masters, African states were yet further removed from the Weberian definition of states 
prior to their independence.56  Moreover, they were not afforded sufficient resources 
thereafter, in terms of power, to facilitate effective state-building.57  Lacking sufficient 
power-resources at the dawn of their independence, and already deficient in the capacity 
to provide security, these would emerge as fragile units of statehood, with limited 
capacity to ensure survival against internal challenges. 58  Essentially, where the state is 
not a true embodiment of the ‘collective national will’, its legitimacy will be questioned 
and challenged by elements of the population,59 and if statehood in Africa is considered 
against Holsti’s ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ principles of legitimacy,
60
then many African 
states fall short in both respects.  Holsti’s principles are used here for two reasons: his 
analysis of ‘The State, War, and the state of War’ is clearly relevant to the nature of 
politics and conflict in African states, and the principles he uses are perhaps the most 
objective approach to determining whether the state is an embodiment of the collective 
national will.  These principles are particularly relevant to analyses of statehood and 
sovereignty because the fundamental element that transforms private control of a defined 
territory into state sovereignty is public legitimacy.61
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The first of these principles, the ‘horizontal dimension of legitimacy’, “upon which the 
‘right to rule’ is based”,62 is interpreted by Englebert as the presence of a consensus on 
the content of the social contract.63  The most fundamental elements of this contract –
even where positions of leadership have evolved other than from popular consensus –
are the intent and endeavour of the state to provide physical security and the most basic 
of public goods for its people.  When this ‘social contract’ is considered in conjunction 
with Holsti’s second principle, the ‘vertical’ principle of legitimacy vis-à-vis a 
“definition of the community over which rule is to be exercised”,64 – i.e. the people for 
whom the state provides the fundamental element of physical security – the reciprocal 
relationship between the state and its people is completed; the crucial link between 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ legitimacy is determined.65  From European perspectives, this 
link is central to the legitimacy of rule, for it encompasses, as key to both dimensions, 
the ‘democratic unit’:66 that from which legitimacy is derived, and over which it is 
exercised.  And, from a European perspective, this ‘democratic unit’ had only one 
definition: a territorially defined sovereign state.67  After independence, the head of state 
had political domain over the entire population within the colonially-defined territory, 
regardless of socio-cultural or historic differences, or of horizontal or vertical 
dimensions of legitimacy vis-à-vis any element of that population.  
Wide variations existed – in both dimensions – among African states at the time of 
independence,68 and this has been a primary factor in shaping their development, in both 
political and economic terms, as is demonstrated in the ensuing sections of this chapter.  
Pierre Englebert concludes that it was variations in degrees of state legitimacy that 
determined the “strategies of power”69 adopted by the ruling elite, who had inherited 
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from their departing colonial powers the machinations of statehood.  These strategies of 
power – the policy choices adopted by the ruling elite – were, for the most part, a 
function of payoffs for elites; an adoption of neopatrimonial systems and, ultimately, an 
impingement on the legitimacy of the state.70  These policy choices were determinant of 
factors shaping the political landscape in Africa, – factors that would determine the 
nature of politics in post-colonial Africa, and bring PMCs into the power equation in 
many African states.  These factors are considered in the following sections.
3.5 Statehood and legitimacy
Consideration of African statehood against this background illustrates the extent to 
which the process of early state formation in Africa took place, not through internal 
political evolution, but through external imposition and enforcement.  And it is 
enforcement – the monopoly over the use of coercive force – that is the accepted, central 
tenet of sovereignty.  African states emerged neither through a process of agreement 
among their constituent groups nor as a result of power acquisition through the use of 
force by factions within or around their geographical territories.  They were instead 
created through externally-imposed arrangements, subsequently written into 
international law.71  The external legitimacy of African states came not from within; it 
was bestowed upon them by external powers.  Similarly, internal legitimacy and 
authority did not evolve internally, but were passed from colonial ruler to incumbent.  
Thus, the historical basis, in African states, of the vital prerequisites of legitimacy, 
authority, and capacity to govern was little more than a colonial legacy.
Rather than emerging as primal nation-states, as in Buzan’s definition,72 with the nation 
preceding the state, providing it with its identity and affording a basis for domestic 
legitimacy, the emergence in Africa was of state-nations (with the exceptions of Lesotho 
and Swaziland), with the state playing the role of creating the nation.  In postcolonial 
Africa, the state – ostensibly strong in terms of statehood, with control at the centre –
was created first, with the ideal of building the nation.  To achieve this, the state had 
either to absorb or to subordinate the indigenous ‘nations’ that made up its population.  
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The options were either to suppress existing identities – in order to create an all-
inclusive, ‘new’ nationality – or to encompass existing identities with the creation of a 
layer, at national level, of collective identity.  While Europe’s national identities were 
supposedly created before the state, an example given by Buzan of British nationals 
falling into categories of English, Scottish or Welsh, highlights the nature of ethnic 
identity and the underlying emotions and tensions that accompany it, even in stable, 
egalitarian societies.  
This application ‘in reverse’ of the Westphalian model of statehood to these new African 
states on the part of the departing colonial powers,73 was compounded by questions of 
legitimacy, authority, and efficacy of government in the new African states.  De facto 
elements of statehood – legal, financial and administrative – are contingent to Weber’s 
hypothesis; these elements of statehood in Africa were held exclusively by the colonial 
masters of African states prior to independence, as was the organization of force 
necessary to enforce them.
De jure statehood, having been bestowed upon these states, was established on the basis
of their colonial rulers’ mechanisms of government, leaving them, post-independence, 
neither the de facto framework necessary for maintenance of government nor the force 
necessary to defend it.74  Furthermore, government and administrative mechanisms were 
not necessarily replicas of those of the colonial master and were often shadows, in 
respect of efficiency, of those of the ‘mother nation’.75  With subsequent administrative 
frameworks based on the remnants of those in place on the eve of independence, the 
initial hangover experienced by many African governments was a struggle to maintain 
effective governance.  This, resulting largely from the weak institutionalization of 
African states,76 was yet another contributor to the informalization of politics and the
emergence of neopatrimonialism as the predominant form of political organization in 
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African states.77
Important to this thesis are elements of this political organization that contributed to 
instability and the need for the involvement of external actors in African states.  The 
externally-driven creation of states portrayed in the above section, combined with the 
speed of the advent of independence and the precipitous departure of the colonial 
powers, gave rise to a continuing extraordinary evolution of the state system in Africa.  
These factors, and the legacy of colonial systems – particularly the underpinning of 
colonial governance through alliances with local elites –78 were significant elements of 
the framework on which African nation-building took place, and contributed 
substantially to the instability of nation-states,79 to the exclusion of elements of the 
population, to conflict, and to the involvement of external actors.  The inclusion of 
PMCs in that involvement was further precipitated by factors that took root in the post-
colonial era.
3.6 Independence and the Post-colonial era
The rubber-stamping of the borders bequeathed to Africa by its former colonial powers, 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963,80 gave recognition to the fragility 
of the newly-independent states and the need to ensure stability among the new nations 
of Africa.81  Julius Nyerere’s declaration, “The boundaries which divide African states 
are so nonsensical, that without our sense of unity they would be a cause of friction”82
was an accurate reflection of the sentiments of the thirty heads of state present at the 
ensuing occasion.  For many, the acceptance of these borders was a volte-face; rejection 
of externally-imposed boundaries was at the heart of anti-colonial movements, echoing 
Obafemi Awolowo’s sentiments, voiced in his speech against British colonial rule:
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“Nigeria is not a nation, it is a mere geographical expression. 
There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English,' 
'Welsh,' or 'French.'  The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive 
appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of 
Nigeria and those who do not.”83
But, consolidating the state was, understandably, the priority.  The Charter of African 
Unity’s formalization of the acceptance of boundaries drawn by the former colonizers 
committed its signatories to uphold the “territorial integrity of every state and its 
inalienable right to an independent existence”,84 thus endorsing Africa’s acceptance of 
her colonially-drawn boundaries. And, since that endorsement, African leaders have 
pointedly supported the territorial integrity of their inherited borders.85  
But once again a ‘reversal’ of the Westphalian process of nation-building – the creation 
of state before nation, was to be the root cause of many security crises in African states.86  
Nationalist movements, comprising a united front of diverse ethnic and multiethnic 
groups, had come together in the drive for independence, but once that independence 
was imminent, many of the groups comprising these movements split from the greater 
order, opting instead for the familiar security afforded by their own ethnic societies – a 
security not afforded by the state.  The sheer scale of ‘nation-state project’ in Africa –
the concept that the ancestral values of shared origins, kinship and traditions, as the 
bases for society among hundreds of diverse, geographically-spread ethnic groups, 
would be replaced by conceptual, intangible ideas of statehood for all – was, more than 
the imposition of arbitrary borders, the root of many problems in the new, independent 
Africa.  Key to the emergence of PMC activity was the subsequent vying for power that 
occurred between these groups – a major contributing factor to the later emergence of 
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warlordism, particularly in weak African states.87
Further, conflict among those groups that had previously united in the struggle for 
independence had the double effect of relegating national issues to the sidelines of a 
struggle for power, and polarizing economic and social issues along ethnic lines.88  
Nyerere’s ‘sense of unity’ may have been present among the state representatives at the 
OAU, but it was not so evident within many of their states.  The exclusion of many 
ethnic communities from the nation-building project, in some cases by their 
governments, and in others a desire on their own part to distance themselves from the 
state, led to the perception of these groups as the ‘other’ – a threat to the state.89  The 
post-independence re-emergence of quasi-patrimonial practices, in the form of 
neopatrimonial political systems, would further exclude many of these groups, 
exacerbating the situation in the longer term, leading to security vacuums and the 
involvement of PMCs.
3.7   What follows the post-colonial state?
The permanence of the state – and of its role – in Africa, is little-challenged in 
contemporary political thought.    But there exist, in great measure in Africa, many of the 
socio-economic factors that contribute to the erosion of state power from within.  Much
of this is driven, or exacerbated, by the impingement of external factors, compounded by 
the way in which these factors are sanctioned or manipulated by the state – and vice 
versa.  In some cases, elements of the population are excluded by the state; in others, 
state authority is ignored, avoided or challenged by elements of the population.  Belief in 
state legitimacy, and loyalty that should, in a legitimate state, radiate downwards to its 
citizens as well as upwards from them, are weakened in such climates of social 
inequality, marginalization and exclusion. 
The African nation-state project – the forging of a ’national identity’ – did not succeed in 
supplanting the identities and allegiances of traditional ethnic groups,90 nor did it manage 
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the huge increase in political scale required to make the project work.  The failure of 
rulers to build their capacity to govern at state level, and to eliminate the contradictory 
processes that emerged at ground-level from the remnants of colonial systems, resulted 
in erosion, rather than consolidation, of the authority of state.91  This brought about the 
emergence of numerous non-state actors operating in parallel with, in place of, or in 
contention with state bodies.  Many of these interacted with agents of the state, and with 
non-governmental organizations involved in state processes.
92
  These included 
smugglers, informal ‘black-market’ traders, local associations, militias, arms traffickers 
and warlords – the latter most often driving all of the former.
Consideration of the future of the state in Africa has therefore to encompass non-
conventional, particularist forms of civil society.  They are considered non-conventional 
because African politics do not share the constructs of statehood that feature in much of 
the body of literature relating to PMC involvement in Africa,93 or in the wider sphere of 
modern political thought.  Most of this literature is centered on paradigms of statehood, 
as shared between the state, political organizations and civil society.  Contrary to this 
archetype, the associated respect for liberty of the individual is not a widely-embedded 
feature of most African states, and the means employed by individuals seeking to redress 
this do not fall easily into conventional narratives or paradigms of political thought.94  
Christopher Clapham makes a pertinent point on European assumptions as to the nature 
of statehood in Africa in identifying that the welfare of those in the state, and even the 
survival of the state, are secondary to the security and well-being of those in power.  The 
state ‘machine’ is therefore designed primarily to serve the needs of the latter.95
In situations where the authority of the state is marginalized, a tactic used by rulers is to 
create ‘shadow states’, whereby parallel authority is built up, using networks of personal 
contacts to replace the failed machinery of statehood.  By manipulating what remains of 
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state power, – or at least what is perceived to exist – those holding the vestiges of power 
can manipulate the efforts and remittances of the international community and other 
donor agencies to their own ends.  The destabilizing consequences of these abuses – in 
effect ‘the criminalization of the state’96 – bring about many of the conditions and 
circumstances leading to unrest, activity on the part of weakened security institutions of 
state to contain such unrest, and the subsequent use of PMCs, and it is against this 
background that the marginalization of state authority must be analysed. 
Essentially, the ‘criminalization’ of the state, and the manipulation of disorder as an 
instrument in its political economy,97 are instruments for control of resources in African 
states.  Richard Cornwell suggests that, in countries where the interests of individuals, 
societies and the rule of law count for little against this background, we must adjust to 
the fact that they have become pseudo-states,98 and that a crisis exists – one for which the 
diplomatic and security architecture of the international community is ill-equipped to 
handle.99  Cornwell concludes that the current fixation of the international community, on 
the state as the primary actor in international affairs, is simply no longer applicable to 
many African states.  In a political climate where external actors are reluctant to become 
involved,100 and transparently lack the political will to back up, with any measure of 
force, what few instruments of foreign policy can be used to exert political pressure, the 
prospects for external influence or intervention are simply not credible.  Civil society 
cannot realistically hope to bring about order other than at local levels, and, with a 
scarcity of resources and a need for people to ensure their own security, conflict is a 
reality in the future of weak African states, as is the involvement of private actors in the 
military and security sectors.
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It is against this background that conceptions as to what might come after the post-
colonial African state must be considered.  Key to this is the nature of political systems 
that have emerged in the post-colonial era.  The most prevalent of these has evolved 
from a combination of patrimonial systems that predominated before the colonial era and 
those inherited from the colonial powers thereafter.  Christopher Clapham describes it 
succinctly: “… a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial 
type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal lines.”101  This combination of the patrimonial and the rational-legal – the 
‘neopatrimonial’ – has become the predominant political system in African states.
3.8 Neopatrimonialism
While neopatrimonialism has emerged in a wide range of academic works as the 
dominant paradigm in contemporary research on African statehood, it is not, in relative 
terms, a new concept.  Eisenstadt’s coining of the term, in 1973,102 draws comparison 
with traditional patrimonialism,103 outlining changes that had arisen from the need for a 
broader political framework – one with the capacity to incorporate new elites, socio-
ethnic groups and societal strata.104  Paradoxically, despite the propensity of 
neopatrimonial practices toward the favouring of some ethnic groups and the exclusion 
of others,105 these changes in the political framework are also identified as having 
stemmed from the need to accommodate a broader dimension of collective identity.106  
The building of the nation-state required the gathering of diverse peoples,107 with societal 
values based on assumptions of common origins, traditions and ethnic kinship, under 
this umbrella of collective identity.  Further, in contrast to colonial practices of leaving 
traditional customs undisturbed, these values were now to be replaced – for those not 
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familiar with them – with abstract, conceptual ideas of statehood.
Weber’s conception of patriarchy – the driver of patrimonial systems – as the natural 
basis of political authority in familial or ‘tribal’ groups, based on a continuum of “age-
old rules and powers”,108 leads him to regard it as “the formally most consistent 
authority structure”.109 In the context of cohesive social groups, patrimonialism is 
highly effective as a form of governance, in fact contributing to the cohesiveness of 
ethnic societies,110 but in systems of “differentiated patriarchal power”111 – those that 
exist where a state of wider patrimonial domination is necessary to accommodate larger, 
less cohesive or widely-spread groups – the ‘reach’ of the patrimonial network is 
stretched.112
Where patrimonial systems are of particular relevance to this thesis is that, in larger 
societies – those where ethno-social links are stretched or fragmented – the likelihood of 
resistance on the peripheries of society is increased.  In these cases, the patrimonial ruler 
has to be mindful as to the limits of power – “how far master and staff can go in view of 
the subjects’ traditional compliance without arousing their resistance”113 – and must 
consider ways in which power can be wielded to ensure the acquiescence of those on the 
‘fringes’ of society, in both geographical and social terms.  So, while patrimonial 
systems can be seen to be effective in the context of closely tied ethno-social groups,114 it 
was their manifest inappropriateness for governance on a ‘national’ scale that brought 
about the need for those wider political frameworks outlined by Eisenstadt and 
Roniger,115 whereby new elites, socio-ethnic groups and societal strata could be 
incorporated into a national identity.  This accommodation of the ethnic and the societal 
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– the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ elements of the population respectively –116 was regarded 
as vital to eliminating resistance from peripheral groups, and to achieving control on a 
national scale.  Where it failed, private actors would step in to fill the vacuum.  But this 
must be analysed against the situation that existed prior to colonization; patrimonial 
systems based on ethnic groupings.
The effectiveness of these patrimonial systems in African societies was not wasted on 
the colonizing powers.  Britain, in particular, recognized at a very early stage the 
potential for ‘tribal’ groups and identities to further colonial administrative efficacy 
through a system of indirect rule,117 essentially involving the cultivation and use of 
‘native authority’.118   In effect, the colonial administrators used a different set of laws for 
each tribal group, based on the existing customs and traditions of respective groups, and 
bestowed authority – together with the instruments of judicial, legislative, executive and 
administrative power – for the maintenance of these laws upon the communal leader or 
traditional ‘chief’.119  This system of indirect rule preserved the culture and tradition of 
indigenous groups, allowing them to govern locally under the umbrella of colonial 
administration.  It also had the further effect, most notably in the case of British 
administrations – by whom the policy was conceived and most widely implemented – of 
‘maintaining distance’, by keeping colonial rulers and settlers largely separated from 
indigenous populations.120  
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Of significance to the post-colonial emergence of African political systems in the former 
colonies was that in the adoption of this strategy, and, importantly, in affording greater 
privilege to groups with patriarchal and authoritarian traditions of rule,121 colonial 
administrations were the first to remove the customary restraints122 that had previously 
been a characteristic of ‘native authority’.123  These restraints required the chiefs and 
leaders of many pre-colonial African societies to hold widespread consultation among 
their people before making decisions on matters of major societal impact.124
In Britain’s case, the policy of indirect rule made its disengagement from Africa – and 
the ability to distance itself subsequently from its former colonies –125 a less complicated 
affair than that experienced by other colonial powers.126  The French approach, which 
conformed to the foreign policy surrounding ‘Francophonie’ – vis-à-vis the embedding 
of French language, politics and culture in their colonial territories, and the 
accompanying ‘absorption’ of the populations of those colonies into the wider French 
community –127 made disengagement from Africa a more difficult and prolonged affair 
than that experienced by the British.128  The latter, having made use of co-opted groups 
for the exercise of power, had allowed indigenous practices such as chieftaincy and 
ancestral law to remain in parallel with colonial administrative law.  While this created 
difficulties for the postcolonial state in creating uniform political and legal systems that 
would be accepted by all groups, it conferred a modicum of autonomy on most groups 
within the umbrella of the state.  It also helped to minimize the impression of the 
naissance of a pressurizing state, particularly in the initial period of the blanket of state 
law being brought to bear.  This is important to this thesis in terms of the extent to which 
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systems of governance employed by the colonial powers affected their involvement in 
conflict-handling, after independence, in their respective colonies, and subsequent levels 
of involvement of private actors in the security and military sectors.  The emergence of 
PMCs was closely tied to levels of external involvement, as will be discussed in the 
following section.
3.9 External involvement and the advent of PMCs
Even during the period that started with the handover of its African colonies, and ended 
with Britain’s acceptance that its passage from global hegemon to regional power had 
run its course, there was little direct British military involvement in Africa.  Britain’s 
first intervention, in 1964 – albeit across three of her former colonies – was the only one 
to compare in scale with the many interventions carried out by France.129  Britain’s policy 
towards Africa at this time – in the shadow of World War II and the vital role played in 
that conflict by her former colonies – was driven by the combined, perceived needs of 
protecting the integrity of the Commonwealth, preserving influence in her former 
colonies, and maintaining a strong global presence.130  Contingency for intervention to 
those ends was always a latent feature of this policy, but once Britain’s foreign policy 
drivers had changed to those of a regional power, her former colonies were no longer of 
strategic importance, and her interest in Africa quickly diminished.131  In effect, the 
transition from global to regional power had reduced Britain’s need to maintain 
influence on a global scale; this is pertinent in subsequent analysis of external 
involvement and intervention in African conflict relevant to the activities of PMCs.
France, in contrast, in keeping with policy related to application of the principles 
surrounding ‘Francophonie’ in her former overseas territories, sought to maintain her 
presence – and influence – by maintaining a strong troop presence.  This was formalized 
in agreements with her former colonies in 1960 and 1961.  Driven primarily as a result 
of the political and military fallout resulting from her disastrous experience in Algeria, 
France perceived a pressing need to maintain a dominant military presence in all of her 
former African territories.  The fear was that the loss of influence over France’s former 
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colonies in Africa would severely reduce her sphere of influence in the rest of the world, 
a sentiment echoed by François Mitterrand, who in 1957 remarked: “Sans l’Afrique il 
n’y aura pas d’histoire de France au 21e siècle.”132
As with Britain, however, the drivers of this foreign policy became diluted over time, 
both with changes in France’s position in the international sphere, and with the cost of 
this policy eventually outweighing political expediency.  Within a decade of these troop-
level agreements being signed, a presence of nearly 60,000 troops had been reduced to 
less than 6,500,133 and the concept of a permanent military presence in Africa was all but 
abandoned, in favour of a reaction force – La Force Intarmies d’Intervention.134  
Paradoxically, it was in the period between 1977 and 1995 that most of France’s 
interventions took place.  Prior to 1977, those French forces based in Africa undertook 
only three major operations, in Senegal, Gabon and Chad,135 and disturbances in her 
other former colonies, during the period of her security presence, were relatively minor.  
Thereafter, France’s Force Intarmies d’Intervention took part in some 17 interventions 
of an overt nature,136 as well as other, less public operations in support of heads of 
state.137  France’s strategy of providing an implicit security pledge – an ‘over the horizon 
guarantee’, in current parlance – had reduced the occurrence of civil war in her former 
colonies to less than half of that experienced in countries with similar characteristics.138
If there was a need to illustrate the urgency for African states to have reliable security 
forces,139 it was manifestly demonstrated by chain-reaction mutinies in the former British 
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colonies of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya in 1964, and by the many intrastate conflicts 
requiring French intervention in her own former colonies.  Without recourse to the 
former colonizer, the international community, or to neighbouring states for military 
assistance, a state has no external options; where the threat comes from its own security 
forces, neither does it have expedient internal options.  Even among those nations that 
have had the latter option, the most common outcome, whether through weakness, 
recalcitrance, or corruption, is an inability to cope with the threat.  In a political climate 
of discord, where the coup d’état is the default means for regime change, and the 
underlying causes of friction have been allowed to deteriorate, the options open to the 
incumbent ruler are severely limited; where assistance cannot be obtained through 
political manoeuvering, the only option left is to buy it in the form of PMCs, as was the 
case in Angola, and in Sierra Leone.
Relevant to the development of this situation in many African states, and in contrast to 
differences between Britain and France in terms of the extent of their involvement after 
independence, I believe there are three important elements of the interventions, carried 
out by both, that are analogous.  Firstly, the purpose and nature of intervention was 
driven by the foreign policy – and the self-interest – of the external power.  Secondly, 
settlements were driven by the external power, again placing strategic self-interest over 
the socio-political needs of the state concerned.  Thirdly, and most importantly, neither 
the response – i.e. the physical handling of the problem – nor the subsequently-imposed 
settlement, sought to address the underlying cause of the problem.  Notwithstanding the 
differences in approach to governing their colonies, and the subsequent extent of their 
involvement after independence, the colonial powers had pursued a common policy of 
entrenching their authority through alliances with local ‘Big Men’.140  This meant the 
incorporation of ethnically-defined administrative units – most often through European 
perceptions and assumptions of what constituted ‘tribal’ homogeneity –141 as a means of 
exercising control.  The departing powers also shared the common interest of 
maintaining influence after independence and, in most African states, ‘favoured elites’ 
would emerge from the umbrella of their former colonial administrators.  Many of these, 
as products of colonial systems, had little, if any, accepted tradition of power in pre-
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colonial societies and therefore lacked established power foundations after 
independence.142  While there were some exceptions to this pattern of ‘favoured elites’, 
most notably in the Portuguese colonies, the vast majority of positions of power on the 
eve of independence were held by those having enjoyed privilege and favour from their 
colonial administrators.  
The administrative structures left in place by the former colonizing powers, combined 
with the patrimonial systems exercised by those holding power after independence, 
formed the basis for the neopatrimonial systems that emerged in post-colonial African 
states.143  As Braudel observed in 1963, “To rule, in Black Africa, necessarily means to 
reign.”144 These systems, based on discretionary power, featured a blurring of the lines 
between persons and positions, and held little distinction between the personal and the 
public.  The central tenets of rational-legal politics, in contrast, comprising ordered 
hierarchies of personnel and procedures, incorporate an inherent, institutional separation 
of the ‘private’ and the ‘official’.145  The combination of these contradictory systems –
the co-existence of rational-legal and patrimonial systems in the form of 
neopatrimonialism – consititutes a paradox that has become central to the political 
situation in Africa.  This combination, and its subsequent corollaries for the conduct of 
the political affairs of African states, is defined succinctly by Clapham as:
“… a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly 
patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system 
which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.  Officials 
hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are 
not formally defined, but exercise those powers, as far as they can, 
as a form not of public service, but of private property.  
Relationships with other[s] likewise fall into the patrimonial 
pattern… and behaviour is correspondingly devised to display a 
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personal status, rather than to perform an official function.”146
This interpretation also encompasses Weber’s primary concepts of domination and 
legitimacy, vis-à-vis the duality of patrimonialism and rational-legal elements of 
government, further emphasizing the neopatrimonial aspect of political systems in 
African states through the relationship between personal power and rational-legal 
authority.147  The view of this relationship as the modernization of a traditional form of 
African rule has had the effect, internally, of bestowing an implicit conferral of 
acceptability on neopatrimonialism as a modern form of governance, in contrast to a 
widely-held external view that that a system based on legal ‘order’ has been subverted 
by patrimonial logic,148 vis-à-vis the ‘personalization’ of politics.  
Academic discussion as to the part played by colonial administrative systems – and by 
the modus operandi of erstwhile colonial powers – on the preeminence of personalism in 
post-colonial political systems in Africa, is extensive.  And there is a clear consensus as 
to the historical roots of personalized neopatrimonial systems stemming from the 
colonial legacy.  The main thrust of this body of academic thought is reflected by Victor 
le Vine in his perspective on African patrimonial regimes:
“What is novel about ‘neopatrimonial’ regimes is the extent to 
which personalism plays a significant role, a development that 
owes as much to the introduction of imported political structures, 
ideologies, and behaviours, as anything else”149
At the core of this legacy was the colonial African state.  This had never evolved into the 
‘modern state’ that was seen across Europe.150  Largely, it retained the characteristics of a 
traditional outpost of empire, whereby power was confined to the centre, with legal-
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rational elements exercised only on and by expatriate members of the population, those 
of expatriate descent, and a few other, non-indigenous, immigrant groups.151  Late efforts, 
post-World War II, to extend this legal-rational governance to indigenous populations in 
an effort to move toward the ‘modern state’ in the run-up to independence, were of no 
consequence.  After independence, the legal-rational bureaucracy at the core of the state 
was quickly infused with informal relationships.152  The ‘hybrid’ structures that emerged 
– this political arrangement of legal-rational domination pervaded by patrimonial rule –
became the basis for neopatrimonial political systems still in place in 48 of Africa’s 53 
states.153
The concept of neopatrimonialism has been instrumental as an analytical tool in the 
commission of numerous studies:  Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz use it as a lens 
to analyse the underlying causes of economic failure.154  William Reno explores 
insurgency in collapsing states,155 examining the monopolization of economic 
opportunities, through patronage networks, as a means of controlling elements of the 
population – a key element leading to governments’ employment of the services of 
PMCs.  Morten Bøås analyses the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone on the backdrop 
of extreme versions of neopatrimonialism that developed in both states, – 156 again, of 
key significance in the use of a PMC by the latter state’s government.  Ian Taylor 
investigates the attitudes of African leaders with regard to ‘good governance’ and 
democracy in the context of Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential elections, and considers 
problems, many related to personalized politics, for the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD).157  Charles Gore and David Pratten investigate the interaction 
between state authority and a number of social movements in Nigeria, presenting a case 
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that complicity in the control of resources and community security are a response to the 
‘politics of plunder’ endemic in the country, particularly since the 1990s.158  Roger 
Tangri and Andrew Mwenda highlight the placing of personal and political matters over 
those of public interest in neopatrimonial regimes, vis-à-vis what they term the “abuse of 
power in situations of weak transparency and limited accountability in public 
institutions.159
However, while widely used and accepted as a valuable analytical tool for the study of 
African political issues, the concept has not previously been analysed in relation to the 
activities and operations of PMCs in African states.  This thesis will argue that features 
of neopatrimonial politics have been among the most significant contributors to conflict 
and the proliferation of PMC activity in Africa. 
Neopatrimonial systems are susceptible to the modus operandi of corporate actors; these 
engage ruling elites as willing partners, in order to circumvent restrictions on their 
activities and to facilitate direct, external trade, often through the use of enclaves.  In 
weak states, many corporations provide not only security for their own operations, but 
also their own infrastructure.160  In circumstances where the state is no longer able to 
exert control over areas vital to the operations of these corporations, they may deal with 
factions opposed to the state in order to safeguard the continuance of their operations, or 
may seek to assist the state in regaining control.
161, 162
Their interest is one of commercial 
gain, and is driven by the need for maximum advantage in terms of their operations, 
rather than by singular loyalty to the host government.  
Hypotheses on neopatrimonialism as it applies to African political analysis proffer views 
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varying from endorsement of the concept as the implicitly-accepted bedrock of political 
legitimacy,163 repudiation of its place in academic thought on the bases of fallacy, 
misconception and flawed methodologies,164 and its outright rejection on the primary 
basis that it is part of a tendentious rationalization for neo-liberal attacks on the state.165
These contrasting arguments on neopatrimonialism – primarily as a concept in itself, but 
also with regard to its value an analytical tool – are important to this thesis if it is to base, 
upon that concept, a high degree of responsibility for the causes of conflict and a related 
rise in the activities of PMCs in African states.  Furthermore, analysis of 
neopatrimonialism relative to the causes of conflict in Africa requires that the potential 
pitfalls and limitations of its use in the broader analysis of politics in African states are 
also considered.
The analyses considered above, through which these characteristics are examined, have 
been identified for their pertinence to this thesis in terms of their analysis of relevant 
elements of African statehood, particularly the fundamentally important part played by 
patrimonial practices within rational-legal political frameworks.  Particularly relevant are 
the contrasting stances and conflicting views put forward by three of these works, all of 
which are considered here.  In the first of these, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz 
regard legal-rational mechanisms in African states as grossly subordinate to patrimonial 
practices:
“… in most African countries, the state is no more than a décor, a 
pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalized 
political relations.…legitimacy is firmly embedded in the 
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patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks.”166
Importantly for this thesis, the exploitation of disorder is considered – against this 
neopatrimonial backdrop – as a politically-expedient instrument, in parallel with the 
inherent inability of the system to deliver benefit to anything wider than a proximate 
group of beneficiaries, therefore precluding benefit to the wider community and the 
greater national good.167  Focus is maintained on one of the primary characteristics of 
neopatrimonial regimes, vis-à-vis the systematic appropriation of public wealth.  
Specifically, the perceived acceptability of neopatrimonialism is questioned and the 
basis of the concept – the subversion of a system that is based ostensibly on legal 
‘order’, by patrimonial logic – is highlighted.  This is a crucial consideration for this 
thesis, for if the failure of the state to provide basic resources to its people is a 
fundamental causes of unrest,168 then the state’s failure to provide one of the most basic 
public goods – that of physical security –169 will inevitably give rise to popular 
resentment toward the state, and one that, as van Creveld concludes, could lead to its 
downfall.
“The most important single demand that any political community 
must meet is the demand for protection.  A community which 
cannot safeguard the lives of its members, subjects, citizens, 
comrades, brothers, or whatever they are called is unlikely either 
to command their loyalty or to survive for very long…”170
Van Creveld’s conclusion is perhaps borne out by the number of coup attempts that 
occurred in Africa in just the first twenty years of independence, some forty of which –
among innumerable failed attempts – succeeded in toppling the incumbents.171
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In states where there is effective demarcation between the private and public domains, 
the latter works as the medium for the provision of public goods to every citizen.  This 
includes the right to physical protection, from arbitrary actions of those in power at state 
level – i.e. the state itself – as well as from other citizens.  Where this demarcation is 
ineffective – as is the case in neopatrimonial systems where, while legally defined, it is 
not actually observed, – the provision of this public good is compromised.  Whether 
threatened by the actions of other citizens or those of the state, there is only one course 
of action open to ethnic communities excluded from this basic public good; physical 
security can emanate only from action within their communities and the formation and 
mobilization of extra-state groups.
“… once violence (or the abuse of state power by one group that 
controls it) reaches the point that ethnic communities cannot rely 
on the state to protect them, each community must mobilize to take 
responsibility for its own security”172
Whether or not these groups emerge as a response to actions by the state, or as a result of 
a weak state’s inability to protect it from others, they constitute a threat to the state.  
While they may not seek to threaten the state directly, their existence is a challenge to its 
authority, in terms both of the legitimate right and the ability to hold a monopoly over 
the use of coercive force within its boundaries.  If left unchecked, their continued 
existence poses potential threats through their physical expansion and their effects on the 
views of increasing numbers of citizens on the power – and therefore the credibility – of 
the state.
In Chabal and Daloz’ analyses of the exploitation of disorder for political expediency, it 
is clear that the situation is one, not merely of states’ failure to provide for the physical 
security of elements of their populations, but of a positive, insidious use of fear – of the 
latent possibility of coercive violence – as a means of control.  If unrest among elements 
of the population is a feature of neopatrimonial systems, then these systems must feature 
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a strong element of control.  Whether or not in response to a direct threat, action to 
ensure domination of the political space is therefore an imperative.  This element of the 
political equation is directly relevant to the analysis, in this thesis, of the emergence of 
PMCs.
Insofar as they draw from contemporary situations in African politics, Chabal and 
Daloz’ arguments are convincing in their analysis of the effects of neopatrimonial 
practices on the prevailing situation.  However, the notion of neopatrimonialism as 
condicio sine qua non is called into question in the second of the analyses I examine 
here.
Abdul Mustapha, while accepting the state of crisis in African political systems since the 
1970s, contends that conclusions as to the nature of the state and of conflict in Africa are 
characterized by reductionist approaches and flawed methodologies, and are over-reliant 
on neopatrimonialism as a ‘catch-all’ concept.  Less convincingly, but relevant to the 
former argument, he questions the postures, a priori views and prejudices of the authors 
of a number of works, and their general fixation on elite politics as a lens for enabling 
full comprehension of politics in African states.173  
The last of the three analyses relates specifically to political practices in neopatrimonial 
systems that are aimed at disabling opposition to ruling parties.  It calls for political 
reform, citing defections of opposition members to the ruling party as an example,174
which results in the further disenfranchisement of elements of the population previously 
represented by those opposition members.  John Ssenkumba makes clear the relevance 
of patron-client relationships in neopatrimonial systems when he voices his sentiments 
on defectors to the ruling party in Uganda: “their stomach has dictated their minds and 
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erased their principles.”175   But once again, the analysis challenges reductionist 
approaches that use “rent-seeking, neopatrimonialist logic” as a catch-all for 
comprehension of African states’ internal politics, “particularly among those working 
within the neo-liberal ‘political economy’/public choice approach”,176 and calls for a 
more dynamic, less simplistic means of developing understanding of the African 
political landscape.  
The relevance of these arguments to the application of neopatrimonialism to this thesis –
as an analytical tool in considering the relationship between African politics, conflict and 
the activities of PMCs – demands that a critical approach be maintained and that other 
contributory factors, lying outside the political framework, are considered.177  This 
notwithstanding, the effect of neopatrimonial practices on the augmentation of conflict 
between ethnic groups must also be considered in depth.  Conflict in multi-ethnic 
African societies – and most African states since the colonial division of Africa must be 
considered as such – is rarely the result of cultural differences per se;178 it is more often 
the case that these differences become a factor in states with neopatrimonial systems, or 
are intensified by the political machinations of those regimes.179
One of the inevitable outcomes of neopatrimonialism is an imbalance in wealth and 
influence on the part of those groups excluded from patron-client relationships in the 
political network.  This exclusion from the political process brings isolation, to some 
degree, from the distribution of scarce resources and from involvement from interaction 
in political life at any level, resulting in exclusion not only from the patron-client chain, 
but from full participation in wider society.  This, combined with the manipulation of 
cultural differences – their politicization and use as an instrument of disorder, an 
inherent characteristic of neopatrimonialism harnessed for the furtherance of political 
ends –180 brings ethnic identity and loyalty into the sphere of political conflict.181  This 
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analysis must, however, be considered against the extent to which inter-ethnic 
coexistence and cooperation is a feature of African societies, and to which this feature 
was embedded prior to the entrenchment of neopatrimonialism at state level.  John 
Makumbe maintains that many pre-colonial African societies had a consensual system 
requiring widespread consultation among the people before any decision of major 
societal impact could be made.182  Studies conducted in the first ten years of 
independence concluded that the majority of constituent ethnic groups were engaged in 
activities conducive to continuing coexistence,183 through established processes of ‘ethnic 
bargaining’, but these have receded with the entrenchment of neopatrimonial systems.184  
Post-independence, much of the demise of existing civic groups, particularly those 
founded on ethnic lines, was the result of the recognition – or at least the suspicion – that 
these were potential vehicles for the mobilization of revolutionary elements of the 
population.185  Milton Obote’s drive for national unity in Uganda, and his belief that 
ethnic groups would disrupt this unity, led him to declare:
“…if the pull of the tribal force is allowed to develop, the unity of 
the country will be endangered.…the tribal force does not accept 
Uganda as one country, does not accept the people of Uganda as 
belonging to one country, does not accept the National Assembly as 
a national institution but as a …body of umpires in some curious 
game of “Tribal Development Monopoly”.”186
Even today, there remain examples of the prohibition of political movements driven by 
ethnic or religious interests, notably in Nigeria and Tanzania.187  
Parallels can, however, be drawn in the levels of participation enjoyed by these societies; 
                                                                                                                                               
181
Sandbrook, op. cit. 
182
Makumbe, op. cit. 
183
Rothchild, Donald. 1970. "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution." World Politics 22(4):597-616.
184
Ibid.
185
Makumbe, op. cit. 
186
Cited in: Kasfir, Nelson. 1976. The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African 
Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.209.
187
Young, Crawford. 2002. "Pluralism, Ethnicity and Militarization." In The Causes of War and the 
Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Ricardo René Laremont. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. p.44.
74
the factor that had the greatest effect on conflict in post-colonial African states was the 
widening of the sphere of those in power to national boundaries, and their exercise of 
that power over all peoples within the territorial construct of the state.188  However, in 
many African states, control over territory, let alone control over the legitimate use of 
force, has not always been a feature of sovereignty.189  Further, the hollowing out of the 
state, vis-à-vis the precedents of a globalized neoliberal orthodoxy, and the effects of 
intra-state conflict combined with extreme forms of neopatrimonialism, has resulted in a 
vacuum that is inevitably filled by non-state actors.  That part of the vacuum comprising 
the basic need for security is increasingly filled by PMCs, and this is a key factor in their 
continued proliferation in African states.
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3.10 Summary
Analysis of Africa’s political development demonstrates the complexity of 
circumstances that have led to the emergence of PMCs in African states, and that of the 
environments in which they operate.  The analysis carried out in this chapter highlights a 
number of factors that are key to understanding the circumstances that underpin the 
involvement of PMCs in African states, and those contributing to their continued 
proliferation.  Foremost among these is the weak institutional capacity that characterizes 
so many states in Africa, particularly in the sphere of security.  The privatization of 
security in African states was not the sole result of a wider neoliberal move from the 
public to the private, but existed as a prior function of weak state capacity.  The 
continued inability of many states to deliver the public good of security to all of their 
citizens has created security vacuums that are increasingly filled by private actors.  The 
monopoly over the use of coercive force – i.e. the ability of the state to exercise firm
control over its army and police forces, while eliminating threats from non-state groups –
has never been a strong feature of many post-colonial African states, and the resultant 
security vacuums continue to feed the proliferation of PMCs.
A further factor in the increased involvement of PMCs is the need for security in areas 
where high-value resources are concentrated.  The reliance of many African states on 
income streams from natural resources has resulted in the involvement of private actors 
in the provision of security in such areas.  This is a contentious area, particularly so 
where PMCs are involved in enclave economies, and where security of resources takes 
precedence over that of local populations, as discussed in section 6.2 of this chapter.   A 
further driver of PMC proliferation, and one of critical importance to the subject of this 
thesis, is that of external involvement in African states on the part of the UN and other 
IGOs, and of humanitarian organizations and aid agencies.  PMCs are increasingly 
involved with these organizations, in the provision of advice, security, and training, in 
Security Sector Reform roles, and in support of UN peacekeeping missions.
Following on from this chapter’s analysis of the drivers of PMC proliferation in Africa, 
Chapter 4 will explore the nature and characteristics of these organizations, their legal 
status, and the wider implications of their involvement in African states. 
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Chapter 4
PMCs
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter put into context those factors in Africa’s political development that 
gave rise to the emergence and proliferation of PMCs in African states, and the 
prevailing conditions in which they operate.  The aim of this chapter is to consider the 
attributes and characteristics of PMCs, and to compare tangible features of these 
organizations with external perceptions as to their nature.  The type and extent of their 
operations will also be considered against external perceptions as to the nature of their 
activities.  This chapter will also contextualize the operations of PMCs in terms of 
impact and utility with regard to the wider political situation; i.e. the effects and 
usefulness of their activities where stability and development in African states is 
concerned.
The chapter will begin with an exploration of the origins of PMCs, and of factors 
bringing about their evolution into the corporate bodies that now dominate the private 
military and security sectors.  Factors of demand and supply leading to their initial 
emergence and continued proliferation will be explored, and situations in which PMCs 
have become involved directly in conflict, in conflict-handling, and in post-conflict roles 
will be analysed against the wider dynamics of violence in African states.  Elements of 
their operations in support of departments of the UN, humanitarian organizations, and 
NGOs will be considered separately to operations carried out by PMCs as contractors to 
institutions of state, and those in support of commercial entities.  
Crucial to this thesis is consideration of the legal situation surrounding PMCs and their 
activities, and this will be analysed critically.  The question as to whether PMCs are, in 
legal terms, mercenaries, will be explored through in-depth analysis of the 1977 
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA),1 the 1979 UNOHCR 
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Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,2 and the 1989 International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries,3 together with 
consideration of reports issued by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ 
Special Rapporteur on the question of the use of mercenaries.  Also, in the absence of an 
accepted legal definition for PMCs, this chapter will consider descriptions and 
categorizations applied to these actors, and will formulate clear definitions for the 
purpose of analysis.
4.2 Background
Central to the emergence of PMCs in Africa was the end of the Cold War and the 
ensuing downsizing of armies aligned with the superpowers,4 coupled with instability 
and conflict that surfaced after the withdrawal of superpower patronage from African 
states.  As discussed at length in Chapter 3, underlying tensions in the state-building 
project had been masked and suppressed during the era of superpower patronage, and 
were not by any means a new development.  Anthony Parsons, in his analysis of post-
Cold War peacekeeping describes conflict in African states as: “a continuum rather than 
a break with the past.”5
“The new agenda is littered with the debris of this last 
decolonization and the release of the periphery from the old sphere 
of influence – conflicts arising out of ethnic, sectarian and religious 
hostilities; separatist tendencies within states artificially created by 
the imperial power, some purely domestic, others spilling across 
internationally recognized borders.”6
In Africa, the promulgation, through military downsizing, of former military personnel 
and the tools of war across most of the continent, was not accompanied by disarmament, 
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demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes,7 now universally accepted as vital to 
ensure stability following any instance of demilitarization.8  This was to bring about 
factors of demand and supply, both creating the conditions conducive to the emergence 
of private actors in the security and military spheres, and feeding the growth of these 
organizations.  In that they were registered companies with clear chains of management 
and hierarchy, these organizations were distinct from the mercenaries of the 1960s and 
1970s.  But the concept of the PMC was not new.  The British government, in response 
to the Yemeni rebellion of 1962, had used organized groups of former special forces 
troops to provide support to the Imam, to whom they could not openly be seen to be 
giving support.  The first PMC, WatchGuard International, was founded specifically as a 
means of capitalizing on, as well as formalizing and legalizing, the use of former 
members of HM Forces to carry out such tasks.9  Their success led to the creation of the 
type of corporate PMC that now dominates the market for security and military-related 
services in Africa.
4.3 Drivers of demand and supply
Against the political and economic circumstances prevailing in most African countries 
after the Cold War, the availability of men and military equipment was to become one of 
the most significant contributing factors to instability, particularly in weaker states, and 
to a concomitant rise in the need for private security and quasi-military organizations.10
In the previous chapter, the extent to which the era of superpower patronage suppressed 
difficulties within many African states and concealed the shortcomings of many of their 
governments and militaries was explored in depth.  The precipitous withdrawal of this 
patronage after the end of the Cold War was to bring to the surface problems of ethnic 
division and rivalry, poor governance, and corruption, each of which contributed to an 
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increase in violence.11  Thus, demand was quickly created in post-Cold War Africa for 
the nature of services offered by PMCs.12  Coupled with the downsizing of armies in the 
former NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and, subsequently, in post-apartheid South 
Africa, a corresponding supply of military expertise, manpower and weaponry was 
assured from developed countries as well as from within the African continent.13  Also 
significant in this equation, were the political effects of the ending of the Cold War, not 
only in Africa, but also in developed nations.  The most relevant of these were 
diminished military capacity and – manifestly in the case of Africa – greatly reduced 
strategic interest, bringing about an increased reluctance to intervene in countries 
experiencing conflict and instability.14
The dependence of many African countries on Cold War powers was more fundamental 
simply than reliance on those powers for their military apparatus.  Withdrawal of explicit 
external support resulted in three major factors relevant to the emergence of conflict: a 
reduction in states’ control over their respective territories, the disintegration of 
structures of government authority, and the creation of power vacuums that were quickly 
and hotly contended and capitalized upon by ethnic leaders and warlords.15  For African 
states, the monopoly of legitimate force was never absolute, and many could not provide 
the basic public good of security required to maintain stability.  Even in postcolonial 
African states that have remained relatively stable – at least in terms of an absence of 
major conflict – the ability of governments to provide effective security has, with few 
exceptions, been limited.16 Security is also a vital precursor to development;17 while the 
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military dimension of security is the primary focus of discussion surrounding PMCs, 
security as a broader issue of governance must also be borne in mind.  A major factor 
contributing to the rise of PMCs is the central nature of privatization of the public sector 
to the neoliberal consensus.  The privatization of security provision at all levels has 
provided a foundation for the entrance of private military and security companies into 
the public sphere, and into activities that were once the exclusive domain of the state and 
its armed forces.
The level of effectiveness of a state’s armed forces is fundamental to its ability to 
provide security.  Reductions in military expenditure were the norm after the Cold War; 
the development of security through the creation of capable and well-equipped military 
forces was not an element of the agenda for Africa driven by the ‘Washington 
Consensus’.  But these reductions were also driven by internal expediencies; the 
multiethnic nature of national armies, the ‘de-institutionalization’ of armed forces –
resulting in preying on the civil population as a means of income derivation – and the 
frequency of the coup d’état in Africa as a means of ‘political reform’ were all factors 
resulting from the reduction in size and power of rulers’ armed forces.18
   
African leaders 
attempting to overhaul their national armies faced the prospect of protest, typically from 
the area of greatest potential danger to them.  The rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 was 
sparked by the mutiny of some 750 troops in response to President Gbagbo’s plans to 
create a smaller, more efficient national army.19  One of the characteristics of protest by a 
country’s armed forces is the speed at which it can expand and escalate, – bringing about 
situations of destabilization and rebellion, not only at national level, but across borders –
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as demonstrated by the precipitous spread of mutiny through Tanganyika, Uganda and 
Kenya in 1964.20
Thus, loyalty of security forces to the ruling regime was to take precedence over their 
effectiveness as national armies.21  African rulers turned instead, for their own security, 
to specially formed army and police units. These were better equipped, better paid, and 
invariably picked from members of the ruler’s ethnic group, the archetypal example 
being the Zairean army,22 described as being under the patronage, rather than the 
command, of President Mobutu Sese Seko.23  Many of these forces were, however, 
limited in size, and narrowly specialized in roles centered on ‘presidential’ protection, 
and on the monitoring, investigation and suppression of subversive groups and 
individuals regarded as a threat to the ruling elite.  In effect, they operated like private 
militias,24 and were neither conceived, nor able, to deal with security on a wider basis, let 
alone at national level.25  This is borne out strongly in Arie Kacowicz’s research, which 
comes to the convincing and interesting argument that the inability of African armies to 
carry out operations at national level was the most significant factor in the relative 
absence of interstate wars in sub-Saharan Africa.26
A question that arises regarding the militaries of many African states – and it is relevant 
to this thesis’ analysis of PMCs operating within these states – is the extent to which 
they are under state control, and in accord with national and social needs and values.  
Armies that are unable to exert control are ineffective in fulfilling these needs, and are 
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primary contributors to instability.27  But they are a preferable option – for African 
governments as well as for proponents of the Washington consensus approach – to 
effective armies that abuse their power over elements of the population, and become 
potential instruments of precipitous, non-democratic political change.  In the relatively 
stable interstate climate that predominates throughout most of African continent, large 
armies, formed around the purpose of national defence, are without a role.  Paul Klein’s 
comment, “Armies sit around playing cards and plotting coups”,28 is more a truism than 
his dry observation suggests.  Where relations between the government and its military 
commanders deteriorates to a point where there is dissatisfaction in the armed forces, the 
situation most often culminates in a coup d’état.29
Kenneth Grundy’s formula for control of the state: “a military formed of one’s own 
citizens, loyal to the state, with an interest in national unity and in keeping the current 
government in power”30 becomes weakened when the spoils of power become too 
diluted to secure the continued loyalty of all of the armed forces, and notably so in those 
states where the politics of ethnic division are manifest.  As highlighted in Chapter 3, the 
exclusion of elements of the population by the state is a feature of many African states, 
as is the ‘opting out’ of involvement with the state by many ethnic groups.  William 
Reno regards this element of politics in African states as one of the main drivers of 
conflict.31
Most pertinent to the subject of this thesis is that the situation resulting from weak 
national armies is invariably one where the military forces of the state lack the ability to 
deal effectively with anti-government forces pitted against them.  With the state unable 
to gain the upper hand through the use of its military forces, and lacking tangible 
external support from the international community, the use of PMCs is a logical 
progression towards tilting the balance of power.  Indeed, the conditions placed on states 
receiving assistance through the IMF and World Banks’ structural adjustment 
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programmes have weakened their military capabilities.32  While it is generally accepted 
that state actors, justified by their legitimate right to defend the state, are most likely to 
resort to the use of PMCs, we must keep in mind that non-state actors with the necessary 
financial wherewithal could also turn to PMCs to augment their warfighting capacity, 
assuming that there were PMCs willing to act for factions not recognized as legitimate in 
the eyes of the international community.  This point is particularly relevant to 
discussions in this chapter as to definitions, legitimacy and the potential impact of PMCs 
on the wider security situation.
4.4 The Dynamics of Violence
The economic stakes and corresponding rewards – and the opportunities to capitalize on 
them – gave ample incentive for the pursuit of power in post-Cold War Africa.  In the 
absence of working mechanisms of democracy in most African states as a medium for 
this pursuit, it was to take place through what had become the virtually traditional 
manner in Africa – the use of force, if not with the aim of a full-scale coup d’etat,33 then 
to establish power over a given area. With the availability of the means to pursue this 
agenda, and the weakening of the state’s means to combat it, this was to become a 
familiar feature of many post-Cold War African states.
The currency sought by those in the pursuit of power to fund their activities is that of 
high-value natural resources in areas over which they can gain control.  The capacity to 
wage war against government forces, and to dominate vast areas within the territory of a 
state, increases dramatically for those factions able to effect control over areas endowed 
with these resources; more so when extractive facilities form part of the spoils.  But even 
in the pursuit of these commodities, and even when unsuccessful, the quest for them is 
invariably accompanied by lower-level means of funding for these factions and their 
fighting units – destructive, destabilizing activities that include looting, plundering, the 
illegal trade of arms and drugs, the products of poaching and the theft of any readily 
available, saleable resource. 
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The violence accompanying these activities results in relentless pressure on 
governments, through loss of revenue, authority, legitimacy, and the capacity to control 
or to respond effectively to growing disorder.  These are classic characteristics of a 
failing state, central to which is fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion.34  
Ethnic dimensions of this conflict – such that they are, in effect, sub-national civil wars –
take this violence to even higher levels, involving mass killings, torture and amputations, 
the use of child-soldiers, ethnic cleansing, human trafficking, and mass refugee 
movements, all of which further reduce the elemental stability of the state, reversing its 
development, and bringing inconceivable suffering and misery to its people.  In response 
to violence against their peoples, some ethnic groups form civil militias.  While regarded 
as a threat to the state’s monopoly of the use of force,35 these militias are limited in 
capacity, with a few exceptions.  The Kamajors, for example, a combination of civil 
militias from Eastern Sierra Leone, were trained by the PMC Executive Outcomes to 
assist in fighting rebel forces, and subsequently used by the Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to fight against the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF).36  The greatest perceived threat from civil militias in African states 
is their use to occupy and dominate areas rich in natural resources, thereby denying 
income streams to the state.  Protection against this contingency is an area in which 
PMCs have become widely involved in African states, being contracted to safeguard the 
assets and employees of corporations extracting such resources. 
4.5 PMCs and Corporations
Where a state is unable to deal with factions whose aims are to capitalize on natural 
resources in parts of its territory, then those extracting the resources – predominantly 
overseas contractors and multi-national corporations (MNCs) – are left to consolidate 
and upgrade arrangements for the security and protection of their own facilities.  In this 
respect, much of the narrative on PMCs hinges around the relationship between these 
organizations and the companies to which they provide their services.  The upsurge in 
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PMC activity linked to the activities of international companies is indicative of the value, 
in global market terms, of the commodities in which these companies deal, and reflects 
the enormity of their importance to African states.
Where a state’s economic assets are threatened, the aim of a government is to defeat the 
threat and maintain its grip on economic and political power; the aim of an MNC 
involved in the extraction of those same assets is to protect its financial interests.  From a 
less skeptical viewpoint, these aims equate to the common interest of promoting 
stability, an aim shared by foreign governments seeking stable countries and 
economies,37 and by the international community as a whole.  The use of PMCs as a 
means of promoting this stability, whether in the provision of an effective security 
deterrent, or to regain control of areas taken over by insurgents where the former 
provision was either absent or has failed, is the subject of acrimonious debate.  Central to 
this debate are the economic aspects of the equation.  The benefits that rulers gain from 
revenue streams provided by MNCs are free from the political intricacies involved in the 
collection of revenues from local actors, and bypass networks that complicate and 
deplete revenue sources that are local in nature.  This gives rise to three major areas of 
concern.  The first is that, while African states with natural resources benefit from 
revenues derived from their extraction and export, little of this benefit is passed on to 
members of the populations of those states.38  The second concern is that unrest, resulting 
from the exclusion of local actors and the local populace, fuels conflict, the end result 
being that much of the revenue derived from MNCs is likely to be spent on arms.39  
Pursuant to this – and the third concern – is that the presence of MNCs, and the financial 
benefits derived therefrom, provide support – and the associated diplomatic backing that 
invariably accompanies overseas investment – to host states, regardless of their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the state’s citizens.40
, 41 Thus, in some states, lesser importance 
                                                
37
Reno, William. 1999. "Private Security Companies and Multinational Corporations." In International 
Alert Conference, November 19-21. Wilton Park.
38
Solheim, Eric. 2006. "African Security, Commodities and Development." RUSI Whitehall Report 4-
06:22-27.
39
Reno, op. cit. 
40
Reno, William. 1999. "Private Security Companies and Multinational Corporations." In International 
Alert Conference, November 19-21. Wilton Park.
41
This is outlined by Eric Solheim, in his consideration of oil-derived revenues and their benefits to 
governments lacking in transparency and accountability, in:Solheim, Eric. 2006. "African Security, 
Commodities and Development." RUSI Whitehall Report 4-06:22-27.
86
is placed – by foreign investors, governments, and MNCs – on democracy than on 
stability, and little concern is exhibited as to how stability is maintained.
Given that government accountability and reciprocity between the state and the citizen 
are essential to the development of strong states, serious consideration must be given as 
to whether the current state of relations between governments and MNCs strengthen or 
weaken the state in the longer term.  As much of the work carried out by PMCs in 
African states hinges around the dual needs of the security of MNCs and the protection 
of state resources, the question arises as to whether PMCs are a solution to the problem 
of security in weak African states, or whether they are a contributor to the hollowing out 
of such states.
In the bulk of the literature on PMCs, analysis of this issue focuses on two case studies 
involving the operations of two closely related companies, Executive Outcomes (EO) in 
Angola and Sierra Leone, and Sandline International, also in Sierra Leone.  
Significantly, these cases – in the context of Africa as a model in terms of the 
privatization of security – are regarded as paradigmatic in the wider study of PMCs.42  
Most of the discourses on the first of these cases –43 that of the activities of EO in Angola 
– have, as their focus, EO’s commercial ties,44 and the much-contested allegation, that 
part of the payment for its services was in the form of mining concessions to Heritage 
Oil and Gas.45  Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, whose government – prompted by 
EO’s success in Angola – procured their services to tip the balance in its failing 
campaign against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the focus in the bulk of 
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literature on the subject is whether concessions formed part of the payment,46 and the 
implications of this with regard to wider agendas of PMCs, and of the actors contracting 
them.  Little space is given to the fact that in both cases, EO’s intervention was 
instrumental in bringing an end to conflict, in putting in place conditions that allowed for 
ceasefires to be negotiated, and, in the latter case, in stabilizing the situation such that 
elections could be held.  Their success, and the fact that human rights abuses fell 
demonstrably after their deployment to Sierra Leone in 1995 – from some 5,000 cases to 
less than 2,000 in 1996 –47 features less than postulation as to the implications of the 
financing of these operations, despite the direness of the situation, and the lack of 
alternatives available to the government.48  Similarly, Sandline International’s 
involvement in Sierra Leone – sought by President Ahmed Kabbah following coup, 
intervention by ECOMOG, and counter-coup – to regain Freetown, are analysed against 
of their links to the private mining sector.49  The level of Sandline’s influence in the 
conflict is arguable, as there is no doubt that its arms were seized by ECOMOG on their 
arrival in Sierra Leone.50  
In neither of these cases is there sufficient discussion of the crucial needs of the 
governments concerned, in terms both of security, and of the revenues provided by the 
mining companies whose association with PMCs was inextricably linked to their own 
security needs in the first instance.  It is clear, therefore, that central to discourses on 
PMCs is the relationship between commercial companies and the organizations they 
employ for protection of their assets, and the wider implication of the use of these 
organizations on the internal politics of states.  While it would seem that there is a 
pattern in these ‘paradigmatic’ examples of PMC activity, analysis of the bulk of non-
                                                
46
The Sierra-Leonean government’s inability to pay the demanded $2 million per month resulted in 
agreement that payment would be in the form of 50% of tax revenues from the Sierra Rutile mine once it 
was re-opened.  See: Avant, Deborah. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.86.
47
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2004. "Statistical Appendix - Sierra Leone TRC 
Report." p.10.
48
EO's operations in Sierra Leone commenced in May 1995; elections were held in March 1996.
49
In this case, the Jupiter Mining Company agreed to underwrite the costs of employing Sandline 
International in return for concessions once Kabbah's government had been restored.
50
It is also alleged that the weapons purchased by Sandline International arrived at Lungi Airport after the 
rebels had been defeated.  See: Jonah, James - Finance Minister of Sierra Leone 1998-2001. 2007. "From 
Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies." eds. Simon Chesterman 
and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.viii., and Avant, Deborah. 2005. The Market for 
Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.94.
88
combat PMCs – those providing security, logistics, training, intelligence and other 
support to weak African states – is lacking.  The use of inductive logic, based on this 
very limited number of cases,51 should not therefore be accepted without extensive 
analysis against the wider background of PMC activity in Africa.  Such analysis will be 
carried out in Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis.
4.6 The problem of definition
A problem evident in the debate on PMCs is the lack of definitional clarity that applies 
to these organizations.  The term ‘mercenary’ – which is clearly defined under 
International Humanitarian Law –52 is applied loosely to PMCs, but the question arises as 
to whether this definition, and the broad basis on which it is applied, is correct, or at least 
justifiable.  No universally accepted definition exists for PMCs; there is no convention or 
international law that deals specifically with them, and there are few states or regional 
organizations that feature them in their articles and legislations.  This has the effect of 
limiting both the empirical focus and theoretical analysis of debate on PMCs.  
Empirically, the debate on PMCs is still predominantly centered on international 
conventions drawn up in a climate of unconstrained mercenary activity in Africa some 
45 years ago.53  Elements of debate that address the activities of PMCs in African states 
in the 1990s fail to address pervasive developments in the security situation globally, as 
well as that in Africa, resulting in neglect of the implications of wider political and 
economic transformations that colour these developments.54
4.7 The mercenary question
The early conventions against mercenarism – Article 47 of Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions, and the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
                                                
51
This limited number of case studies would hold little credibility against the prerequisites of inductive 
logic as propounded by eminent theorists on the subject, notably those of Karl Popper. See: Popper, Karl. 
1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson/Routledge. pp.27-31
52
The term ‘mercenary’ is defined in Article 47, paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions. 
53
See 4.7 below.
54
Abrahamson, op. cit. 
89
(CEMA) –55 were primarily a response to mercenary activity in Africa in the 1960s and 
1970s, notably in the Congo from 1960 to 1966, Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, and Angola 
from 1975 to 1976.56  These early mercenary operations were a manifestation of 
opposition to decolonization, and labeled the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.57  
Guy Arnold highlights the contempt held towards mercenaries in Africa in the late 
1970s, by which time they had become “familiar and generally despised figures in 
Africa.”,58 and summarizes the negative effect they had on the government and non-
government actors employing them, on the populations of countries in which they 
operated, and on the general security situation:
“Mercenaries in Africa… have done great damage… with one or 
two exceptions the combatants would have been better off without 
using them.”59
The abhorrence of mercenaries and their activities at the time is reflected in Arnold’s 
typecasting of them as “little better than killer psychopaths”,60 although whether this is 
an apt description or an unfair generalization is a well-argued discourse.  It can be 
argued that the title “… the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination” is too narrow in that 
it fails to consider mercenary activity that may not violate human rights or impede self-
determination – nor activity that might contribute positively to either.  But Arnold’s 
sentiments are, without doubt, an accurate reflection as to feelings, in the political time 
and space of Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, towards mercenaries, both from within 
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Africa and from the wider international community.  
Consideration of situations as they may have occurred, had mercenaries not been 
involved, is near impossible, and notwithstanding the perceived morality of their 
activities, mercenaries did, in many cases, contribute significantly to the causes of the 
combatants for whom they fought.  In most analyses, the capabilities and effects of 
mercenaries employed in conflict is not separated from the negative aspects of their 
impact on aspects of internal sovereignty.  The view that the combatants – regardless of 
perceptions as to the validity of their cause – would have been better off without their 
mercenary collaborators, other than in ‘one or two exceptions’,61 is not reflected in the 
results they achieved in many cases,62 both in the use of mercenaries to train and enhance 
the capabilities of their armies, and in combat action.  Nor is it a view that encompassed 
the sentiments of many who benefited from their presence.  Moise Tshombe and the 
mining companies in Katanga in the early 1960s would not have been able to protect 
their selfish interests over a protracted period without the mercenary assistance brought 
in to train and assist Tshombe’s small army.  Similarly, in the early stages of Tshombe’s 
subsequent return to the Congo in 1964, operations carried out by mercenaries limited 
the actions of Simba rebels, seizing areas and re-opening roads that had been under rebel 
control.  These early mercenary operations enabled commerce to continue in several 
areas, released hundreds of hostages, and brought a semblance of stability and normality 
to areas of war-torn Congo, even gaining the mercenaries praise from the media of the 
time.63
While mercenaries were successful in proving their ability as a stabilizing force in 
limited areas, Arnold’s emphasis on their inability to affect the long term situation is an 
accurate reflection of the prevailing situation.  No mercenary force was able to make any 
substantial difference to the destabilization brought about by continuing revolutions and 
counter-revolutions, coups d’etat and counter-coups, or to the accompanying atrocities 
and havoc wrought by unremitting conflict.  In failing to affect positively the overall 
situation in which they were embroiled, mercenaries were seen as prime agents in 
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contributing to this continuing havoc. 
Arnold’s “killer psychopath” description, and much of the ensuing condemnation of 
mercenaries from the West, stemmed primarily from evidence provided by a mercenary 
officer returning from the Congo in 1965, of atrocities carried out by a group of his 
mercenaries on their prisoners.64  The story, published in the British press,65 tilted public 
and international opinion.  Much of the press, until then, had been roundly criticized for 
its failure to condemn mercenary activity, which had in some cases been represented as 
part of a process of restoring order in lawless post-colonial African states.  Other 
accounts put the blame for most atrocities on the Congolese Army and Katangan 
gendarmes – the latter having been recalled from exile in Angola and subsequently 
reintegrated into the Congolese armed forces – both of which, on the back of military 
operations led and carried out by mercenaries, were responsible for wreaking widespread 
terror and slaughter on members of the Congolese population.66
Derek ‘Brummie’ Barker, a mercenary in Northern Angola in the mid-1970s, and an 
advocate of many mercenary actions as having saved innocent civilians from murderous 
persecution, voiced the views of many ‘indignant’ mercenaries returning from the 
Congo, insisting that they were focused on the job in hand and took no part in aggression 
against the civilian population, nor in unnecessary acts of violence or torture.67  Barker 
maintained that mercenaries in the Congo and elsewhere were judged, after August 
1965, on the basis of atrocities carried out by a small number of ‘renegades’, comparing 
it later to the way the British Army’s handling of crowd protests in Northern Ireland –
having been lauded by governments and police forces worldwide – was judged 
subsequently on the basis of one action, by members of his own former regiment in 
1972.68  Barker’s choice of comparison is relevant when it comes to considering 
commonalities and distinctions between mercenaries and PMCs, insofar as there was no 
central entity that could be held responsible for the actions of the group of mercenaries 
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involved in the atrocities, whereas PMCs, being legal corporate entities, are accountable 
for the actions of their employees, just as the British Army, as an entity, was accountable 
for the actions of its soldiers on ‘Bloody Sunday’.
The nature of mercenaries and mercenary operations forms one of the major objections 
to PMCs, vis-à-vis accountability for actions of their personnel, but in respect of 
accountability, there are significant differences between PMCs and mercenaries.  The 
former are registered business entities; this is a necessity for them to attract a share of the 
lucrative market in which they operate.  They are, as a result, answerable to their own 
government, and to their contractor, which could also be their government, or that of 
another state, or a private entity; usually a corporation in the latter case.  All three of 
these ‘contractors’ are accountable in their own right, and the concept of employing 
mercenaries as policy proxies, with the risks this would expose them to, is hardly 
conceivable.  PMCs have clear corporate hierarchies and areas of responsibility; their 
corporate nature sits them within the public domain, affording scrutiny, and keeping 
these organizations outside the definitions laid down in the 1989 International 
Convention,69 as to what constitutes mercenaries and mercenary activity.  They, and their 
employees, are also accountable under the laws of the countries in which they operate.  
Yet, perceptions that PMCs and mercenaries are one and the same persist, and the 
definitions in the anti-mercenary conventions of the 1970s and 1980s are still regarded 
as the legal bases for defining PMCs.
  
4.8 The anti-mercenary conventions
The definitions laid down in the anti-mercenary conventions date back to the 1970s, 
when the involvement of mercenaries in conflict in Africa had brought most African 
governments together with one voice, with international backing, as to the need for 
action to counter their influence on the continent.70  The conventions related to 
mercenary activity were eventually drafted in 1977, in the form of Article 47 of 
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions, and, supplementary to the provisions 
of that UN protocol, The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in 
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Africa.  Article 47 was eventually supplemented by the 1989 International Convention,71
which covered “Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training” of mercenaries,72 but 
Additional Protocol 1 remains the authoritative document in dealing with combatants in 
international humanitarian law.  Central to the Protocol is that, while Articles 44 to 46 
detail the humanitarian norms to be observed in armed conflict by all combatants, they 
make no exceptions based on the nature or validity of a combatant’s cause, or on the 
behavior of combatants.  Even those who have violated the norms of Additional Protocol 
1, such that they are in breach of international humanitarian law, have the right to remain 
combatants or prisoners of war, provided they are not mercenaries.  Thus, the rights of 
combatants are protected regardless of the nature of any atrocity they might commit.  
Insofar as there is no a priori reason to assume that the behavior of a mercenary will 
differ from that of other participants in conflict, the first paragraph of Article 47 “A 
mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or prisoner of war” indicates the 
strength of feeling held against mercenaries and mercenary activity, and the seriousness 
of the problem perceived by the OAU and the UN in the 1970s. 
4.9 Mercenaries defined
Paragraph 1 of Article 47 – as mentioned above – which essentially outlaws mercenaries, 
is subject to their falling clearly into the definition outlined at Paragraph 2 of the same 
Article, which defines a mercenary as ‘any person who...’:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict:
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;73
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions 
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in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of the 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces.74
While the requirements of paragraph 2 of the Article seem clear as to what defines a 
mercenary, there are differing opinions as to the effectiveness and the applicability of the 
definition under law.  The phrase “any person who…” immediately limits the definition 
to individuals.  It cannot therefore be applied to those organizing and perpetrating 
mercenary activity but not taking part. But even applied to individuals, there are severe 
limitations within the conventions.  Françoise Hampson, an independent expert member 
of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights from 
1998 to 2007, describes it as: “so framed as to ensure that no one but the most foolish or 
unlucky will come within it.”75  Professor Geoffrey Best’s conclusion – that should any 
person be convicted of an offence under the Convention, both he and his lawyer should 
be shot –76 gives some idea as to how it has come to be regarded as ineffectual, and 
relating to a time and space in global politics that is no longer germane.  It is easy to see 
how elements of the definition cannot but prove problematic under the law.  Part (c) of 
the definition in particular – which requires that the party concerned is motivated to take 
part for private gain – is subjective; as Ingrid Detter points out, “only those who… join 
forces for ‘personal gain’ are held to be mercenaries. But who will decide what 
motivates a man?”77  Detter considers this part of the Article a ‘double-edged sword’, 
insofar as there is a danger that:
“…parties to a conflict will assume that a soldier is motivated… by 
personal gain, when he is not, and therefore exempt an entitled 
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person for due protection under the Protocol.”78
It is not inconceivable that some mercenaries may believe in, or might even take up, the 
causes for which they fight, nor that some soldiers are in their national armies for 
financial reward, rather than motivated by a national cause – particularly where that 
cause leads them to fight in conflicts or countries not directly connected with their own.  
The number of non-national fighters in today’s conflicts driven by religious belief is a 
clear example of the former.  Another example is to be found in the Rhodesian Army 
under the Smith government in the 1960s, at least 20% of which was made up of 
volunteers from Europe and the USA.79
,80  Burchett and Roebuck talk of foreigners in the 
Rhodesian Army, particularly those from the USA, considering it their duty to fight in 
Rhodesia, evidently motivated by ideology rather than financial gain: “After Vietnam 
and Angola we can’t afford to lose any other countries.”81
In Britain and France, were it not for their respective declarations of allegiance, Britain’s 
Gurkha regiments and France’s Foreign Legion would fall clearly within the definition 
of mercenaries under Article 47.  Also, it has long been recognized that conscript armies 
comprise a proportion of soldiers not aligned with their national cause.  An example of 
this in Africa was the level of protest against South African Defence Force (SADF) 
involvement in the Angolan War, resulting in the setting up of the Committee on South 
African War Resistance (COSAWR) and the desertion, by many conscripted SADF 
troops, after being called upon to do so by the African National Congress (ANC).  Many 
of these deserters joined the ANC, in a clear demonstration that conscripted soldiers 
were not aligned with the national cause of the state to whom they had declared 
allegiance.
It is also argued that many UN peacekeeping troops, who are paid
                                                
78
Ibid. p.148.
79
Burchett, Wilfred and Derek Roebuck. 1977. The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today. London: 
Penguin. p.139.  Michael Lanning estimates the number of overseas volunteers to have been more in the 
region of 2,000 (almost a third of the army’s strength). See: Lanning, Michael. 2005. Mercenaries. New 
York: Random House. p.166.
80
They were considered volunteers rather than mercenaries because they were paid only the same as 
Rhodesian troops.
81
Burchett and Roebuck, op. cit., p.139.
96
“substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces [of the country to 
which they are deployed]”82
are motivated by financial reward, and accusations as to United Nations troops being a 
force akin to mercenaries are common.  The UN envoy to Sudan, in 2006, was faced 
with accusations of the UN being an agent of “recolonisation, imperialism [and] 
conspiracy.”83 Defining mercenaries to the exclusion of these anomalies is a difficult 
task, and the definition in place, some 30 years on, continues to be challenged.
One of the difficulties faced by the OAU and UN committees charged with defining 
mercenaries, was the need to ensure that those involved at the fringes of conflict, such as 
aid workers and volunteers – evidently not motivated by personal gain – were excluded 
from the definition.  This gap in part (c) was specifically constructed to differentiate 
between these workers and mercenaries,84 but questions arise as to the status of those 
who provide security for these workers, and for IGOs, NGOs and other organizations 
providing such services in areas of great need.  Every multi-lateral UN peace operation 
since 1990 has included the use of organizations described as PMCs or PSCs;85
,86 that 
these organizations are not staffed entirely by philanthropists must be a reasonable 
assumption.  While this may be a moot point insofar as it applies only to part (c) of the 
Article (“motivated… by the desire for private gain”), the changing nature of the 
security situation in African states – and of the response to that situation – poses 
problems for those attempting to define PMCs within the framework drawn up in the 
circumstances that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s.  Both Conventions are centered on, 
and highlight, two main features of mercenaries; that they are foreign, and that they are 
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motivated by profit.87
“The emergence of large numbers of private companies… has 
complicated matters for those who believe that any vestige of 
‘mercenarism’, defined as paid foreign help providing security, 
must be eliminated from contemporary international politics.”88
Taulbee acknowledges that, with changing demands in security, there is an effort to 
define these private companies and their activities.89  But is it the companies, or is it the 
nature of the services they offer, that should dictate these definitions?  There are three 
main problems.  Firstly, there is a thin dividing line between the nature of the activities 
that differentiate them, and a high probability, in many cases, of crossover between their 
activities; for example, an armed security guard using a weapon to protect an installation 
from attack by anti-government forces could feasibly be regarded as taking “a direct 
part in the hostilities”,90 a shift from the more accepted service of security provision, to 
one involving military action.  Secondly, and important to the debate over definition of 
these groups, both are often part of the same corporate organization.  Thirdly, there is a 
difficulty in moving away from the general ‘pigeonholing’ of companies involved in the 
security and military sectors into the classification ‘mercenary’.  This ‘mercenary’ label, 
so often applied in discussion on these organizations, derives from a political time and 
space in stark contrast with the situation currently prevailing, a situation “…distinctly 
representative of the changed global security and business environments at the start of 
the twenty-first century.”91
Essentially, the definition of mercenaries coined in Article 47 has been overtaken by the 
needs of a transformed security environment, and the definitions in the conventions fail 
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when applied to the nature of services provided by PMCs.  The definitions drawn up by 
the OAU and UN were aimed at eliminating mercenarism insofar as it offered support to 
secessionist movements, bolstered resistance to self-determination (much of which was 
seen as colonial resistance), and was a major contributor to instability.92  Mercenaries of 
the time were able to take advantage of opportunities thrown up by the demise of 
colonialism, the end of the Cold War, and international observance of the sanctity of 
internal sovereignty and self-determination.93  But the situation – and the market – has 
changed; the International Convention,94 now, is seen typically as “at best, a curiosity”.95
Evident from the literature surrounding the subjects of mercenaries and PMCs is that the 
continued use of examples, terminology and narrative from the era of mercenary 
involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s – such as those used in the otherwise 
balanced works of Musah & Fayemi,96 and of Guy Arnold – 97 does not adequately 
encompass the nature of contemporary events in the field of private companies in the 
military/security environment in Africa.  While the annual report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur highlights continued concerns as to the effects of “…mercenaries as a means 
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self 
determination,”98 many operations carried out by PMCs are in direct support of NGOs, 
humanitarian organizations, and indeed the UN, whose activities are aimed at protecting 
peoples within state boundaries – or having fled those boundaries as refugees  – whose 
rights to self determination are threatened in many cases by the very state in which they 
live.
The continued application of the label ‘mercenary’ to PMCs has had the effect of 
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clouding, rather than clearing, the issue.  How then, if we are to analyse these 
organizations and their activities in Africa, and in the wider scheme of global politics, 
can we define them?
4.10 Defining PMCs 
In light of the difficulties that arise in differentiating the activities of PSCs and PMCs,
and the interconnectedness of many of these organizations, defining them is not – as 
would seem to be the overarching tendency in most discussion on the subject – as 
relevant as defining the task they carry out.  Both, however, must be considered against 
the backdrop of the prevailing political and security situations, in the wider global 
spectrum as well as within Africa.  Singer once again frames the problem succinctly:
“… firms that participate in the military industry neither look alike 
nor do they even serve the same markets… a true problem for 
understanding the overall military industry.”99
Alex Vines, in Musah and Fayemi’s work on the subject,
100
attempts to differentiate 
PMCs from PSCs in that the former:
“… represent a major challenge to the state’s traditional monopoly 
of armed violence. Consequently they are often portrayed by 
commentators as occupying the illicit end of the scale.”101
Mark Duffield concurs, seeing PMCs as “a major challenge to the state’s traditional 
monopoly of violence.”102  Both authors recognize that PSCs’ operations overlap into 
service territory regarded as the domain of PMCs – amplifying the argument that 
defining the task is of greater importance than defining the organization.  Sarah Percy 
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places both types of organization under the title PMC, but differentiates between 
‘Combat PMCs’ and Non-combat PMCs’ (the latter to which Percy refers, in the first 
instance, as ‘Security PMCs’).103  Organizations considering the services they offer as 
being more in the security than the military sphere might baulk at being conferred the 
title Private Military Company, but Percy points out that the range of services offered by 
these companies, while stopping short of actual combat, encompasses a wide range of 
military-orientated tasks.  One could argue that the activities of an army at war are the 
activities of war-fighting, so companies that take on tasks such as the training of fighting 
troops and the logistics of materiel cannot credibly claim that they are devolved 
completely from combat operations.  In addition, the line between combat and the use of 
force in self-defence – except by members of UN peacekeeping forces – is not 
specifically defined in international law.  
The latter point – applied to the scenario of a company employed in a security role 
whose employees may have to resort to the use of firearms to protect themselves, or a 
location they are guarding, against attack from anti-government factions – is also 
pertinent to regulation of the industry.104   One of the principal stumbling blocks is the 
prospect of regulation being drawn up on the a priori basis of what a company’s 
employees might do.  Placing these companies under the umbrella of ‘PMC’, as favoured 
by Sarah Percy is, in fact, the most apt approach in attempting to define them.  ‘Non-
combat’ PMCs differ from the former in two respects: the first – that they do not engage 
directly in combat – gives rise to the second, which is that they will generally obtain at 
least tacit approval from their respective governments, and may in some cases enjoy the 
explicit endorsement of their home state.
Currently, no PMC proffers services that include direct, offensive combat operations.  
The differentiation therefore, between ‘Combat’ and ‘Non-combat’ is pertinent in this 
analysis only to past operations carried out by PMCs.  However, in considering whether 
PMCs have any place in conflict handling and peacebuilding operations, the contingency 
for the involvement of PMCs in conflict must be considered.  That they have the 
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capability to carry out these operations is widely accepted, but this should not be left to 
assumption, and will be considered and challenged in this thesis. 
The primary characteristics differentiating mercenaries and mercenary groups from 
PMCs are that the latter are legally registered companies, organized along corporate 
lines, with centres of responsibility, and that they have a declared policy of adherence to 
the principles of international law, and to formal principles of security and human 
rights.105  The now defunct ‘Combat’ PMCs, Executive Outcomes and Sandline 
International – the subject of most discussion relating to the involvement of PMCs in 
conflict – both made policy declarations encompassing the recognition of sovereign 
states, and of selectivity, on that basis, with regard to clients to whom they were 
prepared to offer their services.  This stance was seen as addressing concerns centered 
around Duffield’s view of PMCs being “a major challenge to the state’s traditional 
monopoly of violence”,106 but it failed largely to do so, primarily by virtue of the actors 
being foreign to the states in which they were operating.  This, rooted in Machiavellian 
concepts surrounding the citizen and the state, continues to be the sticking point 
regarding both the morality of the use of PMCs, and their effect on relationships between 
citizens and their states.
In the modern nation-state – where the relationship between citizen and state is an 
effective one insofar as it brings about restraint in the use of military force – the state 
cannot perfunctorily take punitive action against elements of its population.107  There are 
many states where this citizen-state relationship is not perceptibly present, or is not 
homogeneous throughout the state.  This is particularly evident where ethnic divisions in 
society manifest themselves in the make-up of the armed forces of the state, or where the 
interests of some elements of the population are not considered, by those in power, to be 
central to the interests of the state.  To some extent, however, it is the case that where 
restraint is placed upon the state by its citizenry, it is more difficult for a state to exercise 
tyranny through the military on members of its own society.  But even in the case of 
Tanzania’s re-shaped army after the mutinies of 1964 – one of the closest to a ‘citizen 
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army’ as has been seen in Africa – the army was tied in to a close association with the 
ruling party.108
In the Machiavellian exemplar, the citizen-state relationship is disrupted when foreigners 
(mercenaries) become part of the equation, because they are not motivated by regard for 
the state, and are willing to act contrary to the interests of the citizen; while, therefore, 
they might serve the state, they do not serve the public good.109  Rousseau’s development 
of this argument leads to the conclusion that the use of foreign troops is not only 
contrary to the public good, but drives a wedge between the citizen and the state:
“… the citizens, no longer looking upon themselves as interested in 
the common cause, will cease to be the defenders of their country, 
and the Magistrates will prefer the command of mercenaries to that 
of free-men; if for no other reason than that, when the time comes, 
they may use them to reduce free-men to submission.”110
Thus, action against the citizen, by outsiders acting for the state, alienates the citizen 
from allegiance to the state and is a further impedance to – in the now familiar words of 
the UN Special Rapporteur – “the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-
determination.”111
Focus on the nation-state as the essential entity for the conduct of international relations 
is maintained throughout the UN’s approach to the policing of what it terms “mercenary 
activity”, and to increasing the power and responsibility of the state toward achieving 
this.  Absent from this approach, however, is recognition of the existence of quasi-states 
and of power-vacuums capitalized upon by non-state actors;112 one should perhaps not 
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expect the UN – an association of states – to readily acknowledge or recognize the 
existence of challenges to the primacy of the state.  The use of PMCs by a state is 
regarded as demonstrating a loss of control by that state over the monopoly of violence.  
This is arguable insofar as sub-contracting the use of force does not necessarily mean 
losing control of the state’s use of that force to achieve its ends.  In absolute terms, 
however, the assumption must be that it brings about a dilution of the state’s monopoly 
over the use of force, even in situations where it enables the state to maintain – or to 
regain – control of its territory.
Further argument arises when the reason for the use of PMCs is considered; if this is the 
result of a state’s inability to exert controlling force within its borders, then there is no 
monopoly over the use of force in the first instance, the state’s power being insufficient 
for the needs of its own internal security.  UN policy approaches do not take into 
consideration factors that might affect a state’s needs in terms of levels of force, such as 
the emergence, internally, of non-state actors, or the actions of breakaway elements of 
the armed forces.  The ‘monopoly of the use of force’ definition, central to these 
approaches, is challenged by Margaret Levi, who sees both the monopoly and the 
legitimacy over the use of force as variables, and, as such, ill-suited to rigid definition:
“… the extent to which the state has a monopoly of physical force 
and the extent to which the use of physical force is legitimate are 
variables, not elements of a definition”113
As established in Chapter 3, the extent to which African states have had a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force has been far from absolute.  William Reno argues that in 
many African states, the monopoly over the use of force has never been a feature of 
sovereignty.114  Musah & Fayemi go so far as to question the Weberian definition of 
sovereignty, and challenge the UN’s maintained view of the nation-state as central to the 
conduct of international relations.  On the weakening of the state and the associated use 
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of PMCs, they argue that the “self sustaining politics of anarchy required of state 
centralism” need to be reduced, and that an alternative view of sovereignty and security 
needs to be sought, based on a redefinition of the sovereignty concept centered around 
community consensus.115  
One part of UN policy approach, not contended in any of these arguments, is that when 
external actors are employed by a state, not only is the power of the state weakened, but 
perceptions as to that power, both internal and external, are reduced.  Peter Singer argues 
that as well as weakening the state’s power, this also cedes the ability of the state to 
enhance the power of other states and non-state actors, bringing about further uncertainty 
and potential for conflict,116 and increasing the prospect of conflict at regional level.
The realization and recognition – whether or not reluctant – that PMCs are both an 
increasing element of states’ efforts to maintain control within their borders, and a vital 
part of the operations of IGOs and INGOs, has grown apace.  So too have efforts to 
define these organizations, and to find a legal basis for their regulation.  States, –
primarily those from which PMCs originate – and legitimacy-seeking PMCs, have 
sought to construct a legal framework within which they can operate, and from which 
moral acceptability for their raison-d’être might also emanate.  The greatest obstacle to 
these attempts, in legal terms, is the framing of the existing protocols and regulations, 
and their use of the term ‘mercenary’.  These, to a great extent, ‘regulate’ the current 
market in which PMCs operate, and are seen largely as a political throwback to the 
situation in Africa in the 1960s and 70s.
CEMA is singularly regarded as the most onerous,117 its definitions very much linked to 
OAU authority in the region and the liberation movements of the time.118  This view, and 
the situation regarding the use of external agencies to bolster African governments’ 
monopoly on the use of force, is reflected in Musah and Fayemi’s comment on the 
CEMA definition:
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“whoever informed this definition of a mercenary, it was never 
foreseen that established governments would recruit mercenaries 
or fighters for the sole purpose of maintaining regime security.”119
While there is some acknowledgement of these developments in the reports of Enrique 
Ballesteros (until 2004 the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries) a 
question asked in the 53
rd
Session:
“Can it be that the mercenaries’ behaviour is changing so 
profoundly that they now constitute the rank and file of the 
personnel recruited by private companies to contract with African 
Governments…?”120
is aimed at highlighting perceived continuity between operations involving mercenaries 
that resulted in CEMA and the International Convention being drawn up, and operations 
involving private companies.  Ballasteros’ overriding concern was the apparent change 
of attitude towards PMCs, which he felt were moving from being “vigorously and 
repeatedly condemned by the UN”, to being regarded as falling outside the definition of 
mercenary organizations, and therefore gaining implicit acceptance as part of the 
security apparatus of some (predominantly African) states.  Ballasteros goes on to ask:
“Is it not a grave infringement of that State’s sovereignty to hand 
over such responsibilities to companies registered in third 
countries which sell security services staffed by foreigners, 
presumably mercenaries?”121
Once again, the UN stance regarding the nation-state as central to the conduct of 
international relations is maintained, and foreigners involved in tasks regarded as the 
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state’s exclusive domain are presumed to be mercenaries.
Pertinent to this thesis’ analysis of the activities of PMCs in Africa, is the specific 
consideration given in the 57
th
Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights to 
mercenary activities in Africa, and their violation of “the right of African peoples to self-
determination and the stability of their legitimate governments”122.  The connection 
between stability and ability on the part of the state – insofar as the stability of a state is 
dependent on its ability to maintain security –123 does not form part of the consideration 
of Special Rapporteur on the use of private entities by states to augment their ability to 
maintain security.  Commenting that these private entities are “new forms [that] might 
well sport legal façades, those behind them are still mercenaries”,124 the Special 
Rapporteur concludes, regardless of its form or nature, that mercenary activity 
constitutes a means of “violating human rights or impeding the exercise of the right to 
self-determination.”125  At odds with this are arguments that human rights and the right 
to self-determination were rarely so threatened as in Sierra Leone in 1995, when the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were readying for an assault on Freetown.  With the 
state unable to defend Freetown, had it not transferred its ‘responsibility for protection’ 
to a private entity – in this case, Executive Outcomes (EO) – the ensuing humanitarian 
disaster would have been unimaginable.  Peter Singer describes the situation leading up 
to EO’s engagement of the RUF around Freetown:
“When the rebels approached within 20 kilometers of the capital 
city of Freetown, fears that the war would end in a general 
massacre grew.  Most foreign nationals and embassies hurried to 
evacuate the country.  The situation appeared hopeless. Almost 
immediately, though, the circumstances completely reversed. A 
modern strike force quickly deployed and hammered the rebel 
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forces…”126
Despite the situation being one of national survival for the government of Sierra Leone –
recognized as legitimate by the UN and the international community – the Special 
Rapporteur maintained, two years later, in the 57
th
Session, that:
“No matter how serious the situation they face… States cannot 
transfer their responsibility for public order, security and 
protection to private entities”127  
What choice does a State have when it faces its own demise, accompanied by 
indescribable acts of violence against its people, if no help is forthcoming from its 
neighbours or from the wider international community?  While the Special Rapporteur 
expresses concern that the “establishment of paramilitary groups made up of 
mercenaries” will leave elements of the civilian population “without protection and with 
little chance for peace and democracy,”128 he gives no consideration as to the limited 
options open to elements of the population to defend themselves, and suggests that 
nationals of an affected country undergoing recruitment and training for the purpose of 
any non-state military activity are, in effect, mercenaries.129  He therefore concludes that 
the International Convention’s definition, requiring that a mercenary is a non-national of 
the country in which that person is involved, should be reviewed.  As will be shown in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, without the civil defence militias – made up of young volunteer 
men and women from local communities – thousands of Sierra Leoneans would have 
faced the same brutal fate, at the hands of the Revolutionary United Front, as did tens of 
thousands before them.  The vital nature of these locally-recruited groups in combating 
rebel troops – crucial to which was training provided by the PMC Executive Outcomes –
was illustrated by their inclusion both in later ECOMOG operations against the RUF, 
and in British forces’ actions to reinstate the democratically-elected and internationally 
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recognized Kabbah government.
International Alert, a Human Rights NGO with consultative status to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, outlines its concerns as to the inadequacy of the UN’s 
approach to the issue of mercenaries.  In light of what it terms Private Security Services 
and their activities – which supersede “traditional mercenary activity”130 – falling 
outside existing international legal instruments,131 the organization makes a number of 
recommendations based on its own findings.132  Examples of such recommendations 
include an expansion of the definition of ‘mercenary’ activity to establish what tasks 
private actors may or may not carry out, and the setting up of a new mechanism within 
the UN to enter into dialogue with PMCs.  International Alert makes clear its frustrations 
with the (then unratified) International Convention.  Rather than delaying ratification yet 
further by proposing modifications, it urged that UN Member States ratify it, – as had 
been recommended in every meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights since the 
drawing up of the Convention – 133 and address its inadequacies by introducing 
supplementary domestic laws.  Once in force, UN Member States could then seek ways 
to amend or supplement the Convention.134
More immediately pertinent to PMCs is International Alert’s recommendation for the 
Commission to engage with private companies involved in the security sector.  Prior to 
the replacement of Enrique Ballesteros as Special Rapporteur, the line consistently 
adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission was that there is no effective difference 
between mercenaries and PMCs.  This was clearly at odds with others in the UN, notably 
Kofi Annan (then Secretary General), who announced, in his 1998 speech marking 50 
years of UN peacekeeping:
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“When we had need of skilled soldiers to separate fighters from 
refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps…, I even considered the 
possibility of engaging a private firm.”135
,136
Shaista Shameem, who replaced Ballasteros in July 2004, prior to the replacement of the 
Special Rapporteur with a working group, adopted the line that international law on 
mercenaries, drawn up in a different set of circumstances than those prevailing today, 
does not form a suitable basis for the legal definition of private actors involved in 
conflict.  In her first report to the commission, Shameem sought to:
“…examine the reasons for the possible lack of interest in 
widespread ratification by States of the International 
Convention…
(137).”138
Further, Shameem’s report also posited that it would be:
“…significant to explore whether licensing and regulation of 
genuine private security companies, such as through strong 
national legislation or an international registration mechanism, 
could serve to identify clear lines of accountability for bona fide 
companies and thereby distinguish other organizations engaging in 
mercenary activity…”139
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No definitive moves towards re-classifying these actors have yet been made by the UN.  
But advocates of regulation of the private military and security industries, many of 
whose operations are carried out alongside those of the UN – and of other IGOs and
NGOs –140 are hopeful of progress towards clearer definition.  The UN accepts that 
PMCs, unlike mercenary groups, have corporate structures and conduct business in open 
markets.  But a major concern of PMC industry bodies is that, without regulation, 
individuals can establish and dissolve companies, and can exploit lacunae in domestic 
and international law to undertake activities that damage the reputations of their 
members.  PMCs and their industry bodies want a legal framework that will proscribe 
and preclude the activities of companies and individuals who fail to adhere to ethical and 
legal standards, and for this to be enforced through regulation.141  Without such a 
framework, all PMCs will continue to operate, neither proscribed nor legitimized, in a 
legal vacuum.
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, based on the issues dealt with in this chapter, 
PMCs will be regarded as companies with a permanent registered corporate structure, 
operating in the open market for security and military-related services.  As discussed, the 
differentiation between PSCs and PMCs can be ascertained more accurately by the 
nature of the task being carried out than by the nature of the company, as PSCs can 
easily switch to more military-related forms of activity should viable opportunities 
present themselves.  This is reflected by the occasional use of the term ‘PMSC’ by the 
UN and other agencies, and is given to mean the same as ‘PMC’ in the context of this 
thesis.
4.11 Summary
This chapter has explored the nature of PMCs, and has considered the legal debate
surrounding these companies.  It has investigated the relevance of the anti-mercenary 
conventions of the 1970s to the legal debate, and has analysed the approach of the UN’s 
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Special Rapporteur from 1987 until 2004,142 and the change in stance that came with the 
replacement of the Special Rapporteur.  The chapter has also outlined the advent of 
PMCs, the dynamics of violence that have led to their involvement in African states, and 
the factors of demand and supply that feed their proliferation.
The activities of PMCs have thus been contextualized against the political and economic 
backgrounds of the states in which they are involved, highlighting the centrality of the 
security situation in weak states to their activities, and, subsequently, the importance of 
their contribution to security and stability.  The link between PMCs and MNCs in Africa, 
primarily those in extractive industries, has also been explored, as has the importance of 
the involvement of PMCs in protecting revenue streams, and the effect of the activities 
of PMCs on the political economies of African states.  Such activities add to the stability 
of the state, prevent security vacuums being filled by groups acting against the interests 
of the state, and make an essential contribution to the functioning of the wider economy.  
By filling such security vacuums, PMCs deny other non-state actors access to 
economically important areas that could supply the wealth to fund the military expansion 
of anti-state groups, as was the case in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
The growing role of PMCs in the security of African states is part of the equation 
outlined compellingly by Jean-Marie Guéhenno – an erosion of the system of nation-
states by alternative means, ranging from corporate bargaining at one end of the scale, to 
challenges to the state based on the rule of might on the other.143  It is on this basis that 
field research for this thesis, into current and potential involvement of PMCs in weak 
African states must be carried out.  The research will deal with direct involvement of 
PMCs in those states, in the roles outlined above, and indirect involvement such as 
support to the operations of aid and development IGOs and NGOs, with particular focus 
on support to UN peacekeeping operations.  The following chapter details the method to 
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be adopted in order to approach comprehensively the needs of the field research, and is 
followed by profiles of the states selected as most appropriate for research into PMCs in 
peacekeeping operations. 
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Chapter 5
Research
5.1 Introduction
Following on from Chapters 3 and 4, in which the central issues and debates relating to 
PMCs in Africa are outlined, this chapter lays out the method employed in the design 
and implementation of field research.  Included are ethical issues relating to the 
gathering, handling, and use of research data specific to this thesis.  Philosophical 
debates surrounding positionality – and of their implications relevant to my own position 
– are also considered.
5.2 Basis of Research
The purpose of this research is to explore the nature and character of PMCs and their 
activities, the wider effects of those activities, and the extent to which there is potential 
for the direct involvement of PMCs in UN peacekeeping operations.  Peacekeeping 
involves a broad range of activities, ranging from unarmed observation under Chapter VI 
of the UN Charter,1 to active participation in combat under Chapter VII.2  But 
peacekeeping operations are fluid in nature; under Chapter ‘Six and a Half’,3 which is 
described as action “borne of necessity and largely improvised,”4 peacekeeping includes 
activities not provided for in Chapters VI and VII.  Every current peacekeeping 
operation in Africa has been authorized under this mandate, and in support of those 
operations, PMCs have carried out activities ranging from disarmament of militias to 
supporting civil administrations.5  This thesis seeks to address the question as to whether 
PMCs are suitable for direct involvement, in political, economic, legal and moral terms, 
in UN peacekeeping missions. 
                                                
1
UN. 1945. "Charter of the United Nations." Chapter VI.
2
Ibid. Chapter VII.
3
“Chapter Six and a Half” was the term coined by Dag Hammerskjöld, Secretary of the UN from 1953 to 
1961, recognizing that most UN peacekeeping operations fell neither into the provisions laid down in 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter (“mediation of international disputes between states”), nor those in Chapter 
VII (“maintenance or restoration of international peace and security”).   
4
UN. 1990. Blue Helmets: A Review of International Peacekeeping. New York: UN Publications. p.3.
5
See Chapter 1, Note 2.
114
5.3 Research Method
Data gathering for the purpose of qualitative research is seen, throughout texts on the 
subject, notably those of Denzin and Lincoln,6 Patton,7 and Neuman,8 as falling 
essentially into three categories.  These are: the examination of secondary and primary 
written data, interviewing, and ethnographic studies encompassing such approaches as 
participant observation.  All three are suited to the purposes of this research, and all have 
been employed in the gathering of empirical data for this thesis.  The first of these 
approaches served the important purpose, at an early stage in the research, of enabling 
the comparison of secondary and primary data.9  An example, important to my own 
research, brought out from this approach, in comparing theoretically-based literature 
with that emanating from primary research, was the contrast in perceptions of PMCs.  In 
theoretically-based works such as Musah and Fayemi’s ‘An African Security Dilemma’10
PMCs are perceived as a modern manifestation of mercenaries, whereas in later works 
such as Deborah Avant’s ‘The Market for Force’11 incorporating several years of primary 
research,12 PMCs are perceived as being markedly different than mercenaries.13
The bulk of information gathered in the primary research phase was collated through the 
second category – interviewing.  The purpose of interviews in the context of this 
research was to probe the conceptions and understandings – and to elicit in-depth 
responses – from subjects connected to the field of PMCs.  The subjective nature of the 
topic required a flexible, tacit approach; the most pertinent information was gained from 
discourse, rather than from direct responses to formal, structured questions.  Broad 
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questions were found to be most suitable, eliciting in-depth discussion as to the thoughts, 
conceptions, and understandings of respondents in these informal exchanges, with the 
dialogue being shaped according to views, ideas, and concepts brought out in the course 
of conversation.  It was also found that a less structured, more discursive approach 
allowed the ‘steering’ of discussion toward elements of the subject that were of most 
relevance to the needs of the research.  Having considered approaches to interviewing 
that would be most appropriate, and examined the pros and cons of several prescribed 
methods,14 my conclusion was that semi-structured interviews should constitute the main 
data-gathering medium for this research.
Significant to the methodological approach for this thesis is that a wide and varied cross-
section of respondents was required to achieve the breadth of research required.  This 
had to encompass not only the international community as a whole – represented by 
members of the UN, regional groupings, states and sub-state divisions, IGOs, NGOs, and 
other groups with involvement in PMC activities – but also individuals from groups and 
communities affected by conflict and/or the actions of PMCs.  Further, the nature of 
questions asked of this varied range of respondents differed, necessarily – and did so 
appreciably.  This was driven according to the nature of their interest, involvement, role, 
function or potential effect on the activities of PMCs.  It was also shaped according, 
firstly, to these respondents’ assessments of past situations and, secondly, to their 
perceptions as to what future form peace-related operations might take if PMCs were to 
be involved.
Further variation in the nature and range questions asked of these respondents was 
derived from the need to address two key issues– those of suitability of PMCs, in terms 
of moral and political acceptability, and of their capability to carry out such operations.  
The nature, position, knowledge and experience of interview subjects determined which, 
if not both, could realistically be addressed.  
Taking into consideration all of the elements discussed above, and emerging particularly 
from cross-section of issues, information and respondents, I decided that a key 
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component of the method for this research must be triangulation.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, the most method-appropriate strategy, in terms of ensuring validity of 
research, was data triangulation.15
5.3.1 Data Triangulation
Data triangulation, the comparison of data from different inputs is a “method of 
cross-checking data from multiple sources”16  The use of data triangulation enabled 
consolidation of research as it developed, and also strengthened the findings of the 
research.  Todd Jick’s description of data triangulation as – “multiple methods 
involving time, space and persons”17 – summarizes the concept succinctly, as it 
applies to this research project.   Triangulation of data also served the purpose, as 
described by Denzin, of helping to ensure that ‘personalistic biases’18 did not mask 
the ‘representativeness of concepts’19 put forward during the gathering of my 
primary research data.
The use of data triangulation in this way helped me to build up a more detailed and 
balanced picture.  It also assisted in validating data used in the research through 
triangulation of different sources of secondary and primary data already existing 
prior to my research, and data collected from the range of resources used for the 
gathering of research specific to this project.
The inclusion of a wide range of the former type of data is important to the validity 
of my research, as this brings ‘naturalistic’ data into the process – that which was 
already in existence prior to my research, and was not affected by the approach or 
activities I adopted in the gathering of my own research data.  This provided an 
established foundation, in the early stages of the project,20 from which I was able to 
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build my research.  Further, as this information emanated from diverse, often 
conflicting, sources, its inclusion in the process of triangulation served to strengthen 
the validity of data used as a foundation for the research.
Also lending itself to the process of triangulation was a diversity of data collected 
from subjects falling into differing typologies of respondents for this research.  For 
example, the conceptions and experiences of NGO personnel working with PMCs 
was triangulated with a duality of other sources.  Examples of this were other NGO 
personnel carrying out different tasks, in different areas, and in different situations, 
together with respondents who were not connected with NGOs, and members of the 
local populace who might be on the receiving end of NGO assistance, together with 
the activities of PMCs working with the providers of such assistance.  In this way, 
patterns could be examined in depth, and commonalities and anomalies in data 
identified, thus further contributing to the validity of analysis and interpretation of 
my collated data.  
The triangulation of data gathered as interviews progressed – while writing up and 
collating data in the field – enabled me to incorporate additional avenues of enquiry 
into interviews of subsequent respondents, and served to widen the scope of useful 
information that could be elicited in later interviews.  While this introduced an 
element of complexity into the data-gathering process – insofar as it brought about a 
situation whereby uniformity was not a feature of interviews of all subjects within 
the specific typologies – the method lent itself to this flexible approach, as:
 Intrinsic to semi-structured interviewing is a degree of variation in 
interviews – particularly so for the purposes of this thesis, given the varied 
background of respondents for the research, and the disparities in the 
nature of groups involved in this part of the research.
 Core questions, relevant to the central purpose of the research, were 
applicable to the majority of respondents, and maintained an element of 
commonality among most interviews.
 Triangulation itself served to negate any adverse effect of this variation, 
and had the positive effect of building on it to enhance the research.
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In summary, while the framework for this part of the research was complex in terms 
of the range and scope of research subjects, and the planning of interviews for each 
type of respondent, it offered the advantage of lending itself to data triangulation.  
This was maximized by utilizing triangulation as I progressed from interview to 
interview, but exercising caution so as not to allow questions based on information 
gained during previous interviews to influence subsequent interviewees.  Care was 
therefore taken to ensure that the way I framed my questions did not sway the 
respondent to answer in a specific way.  I also remained conscious of this when 
situations arose where I needed to ‘steer’ an interview toward a specific element of 
the subject.  When compounded with the further use of triangulation in the process 
of analysis of data gathered through the interview process, this added to the 
accuracy of both my analysis, and of the findings of my research.
5.4 Positionality
The subjective nature of issues involved in the primary research required a disciplined 
approach regarding my own perceptions and influence, as an interviewer/observer.  The 
nature of interviews conducted in the commission of this part of the research involved 
discussion and observation as part of the semi-structured interview approach.
I took great care, throughout the research gathering and interpretation process, to be 
mindful of my own background, as a former member of Her Majesty’s Forces, and also 
of my academic background, in the fields of Economics & Human Welfare, Politics, and 
International Relations.  Central to my engagement with respondents to the research, was 
to place myself in an objective position, receptive of, and sympathetic to, the 
backgrounds, attitudes, and perceptions of interview subjects.  As a white, European 
researcher, operating in Africa, I had to expect to be seen as an ‘outsider’ in most 
situations.  The relevance of white, ‘Western’ academics conducting research in 
developing countries is often regarded as questionable.21  I made every endeavour, 
therefore, throughout my field research, to remain:
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 Acutely aware of the sensitivity that surrounds issues and notions of race 
and ethnicity.
 Sensitive to cultural issues in the areas where I carried out my research.
 Aware of issues and conceptions of power, and their effects these might 
have on an interview situation.
 Observant of local manners, customs and traditions.
 Conscious of the impression made by my appearance, background, 
bearing and manner on those with whom I interacted.
These are critical factors, particularly in scenarios where respondents’ perceptions could 
affect how they respond to questions.  To this end, I took care to establish myself in the 
position, as far as is possible, of neutral observer,22 and to ask questions in such a way as 
to ensure that I did not elicit a particular response or influence the subject’s reply in any 
way.
5.5 Ethics
There are a number of ethical considerations that guide research of the nature carried out 
for this thesis.  Emanating  primarily from the Belmont Report,23 these are outlined in 
numerous documents, most directly relevant to this thesis of which are:
 The 2005 Research Ethics Framework (REF) of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC).24
 The Research Ethics Policy of the University of Plymouth, published in 
2006.25
These documents highlighted several issues of direct relevance to the conduct of 
research for the purpose of this thesis.
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5.5.1 Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent applied to all interview subjects for this research.  
This required that potential participants were informed, in full, of the purpose of the 
research, and were notified in advance, of any feature of the research that might 
reasonably be expected to influence their willingness to partake in the study.  My 
intention was to ensure that potential participants could make a fully informed 
decision as to whether they wished to take part in the research, in order to 
demonstrate respect for potential respondents’ autonomy, and to assure them that 
their welfare is of prime importance, and will be safeguarded after the interview.
In observing this principle, in preliminary discussions with prospective subjects for 
research, it was evident that there was potential for this requirement to have a 
significant effect on the research.  Some respondents expressed concern about 
discussing the concept of PMCs being sanctioned to carry out tasks related to 
peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention.  Where the principle of confidentiality, 
as detailed below, was of limited assistance in assuaging the concerns, in this 
respect, of potential subjects for research, the concerns of the respondents were 
respected.
The implication of this on the research is that subjects with a positive view of the 
concept of PMC involvement in peace-related operations would be more willing to 
take part in the research than those holding a negative view.  It was crucial that I did 
not allow this to affect the research, and my task therefore was to achieve a balance 
in input regardless of the number of potential respondents who decided not to take 
part in the research as a result of this important ethical principle.
Part of the achievement of this balance requires anonymity for respondents when 
they request it, and it was imperative that, in instances where I gave this assurance, 
it was trusted, in order that the respondent was completely at ease during the 
interview process.  No problems were encountered in this aspect of the research.  
Another consideration was whether material gathered during the research interview 
could be used without the need to seek further consent, or whether the respondent 
wished to see a transcript of the interview.  Also, relevant to this consideration, is 
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whether the material could be used solely for the purposes of the theses, or for 
publication, and whether, on an ongoing basis, the respondent would require 
permission for any instance of publication.  None of these proved difficult issues to 
resolve during the research; indeed, I felt that dealing sympathetically with these 
considerations afforded a greater degree of trust between myself and the interview 
subject and served to elicit more comprehensive and useful responses to research 
questions.
5.5.2 Openness and Honesty
The purpose and application of this research were made clear to potential 
respondents throughout the research.  The requirements of informed consent prior to 
interviews, together with full debriefing of participants thereafter, formed an 
integral part of the interview process.
5.5.3 The Right to Withdraw
Potential respondents were informed of their right to withdraw at any time prior to 
or during the interview.  This was also reiterated at the commencement of every 
interview.  In order to maximize the depth of the research, every attempt was made 
to avoid withdrawal on the part of respondents, through comprehensive briefing 
prior to the interview, with particular emphasis on the importance of their 
participation to the research, their right to confidentiality and anonymity, and the 
right to decline to answer any question.  In the event, while a very few respondents 
declined to answer some questions, none felt the need to withdraw from an 
interview.
5.5.4 Values and Beliefs
Another consideration that I kept in mind was that some questions related to 
interviewees’ values and beliefs.  Some questions related to the behaviours of 
interviewees, or to their relationships with groups, organizations and communities.  
There was only one instance where, in the interests of maintaining ethical 
sensitivity, I avoided a line of questioning, where it became apparent that it might 
have placed undue pressure on an interviewee.  I believe that judicious use of this 
decision helped to avoid having one respondent withdraw from an interview.
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5.5.5 Protection from Harm
The achievement of this principal is an important consideration in terms of the 
nature of the research for this thesis, as are the nature of the locations in which most 
of the interviews were carried out.  The principal requires that steps are taken to 
minimize the potential for harm to social groups and/or individuals taking part in 
the research, and this principle has been observed fully in the conduct of the field 
research.
5.5.6 Ethnic Considerations
Prospective participants in this research included members of ethnic groups and 
communities affected by the activities of PMCs in Africa.  The nature of interaction 
between ethnic communities in some African states is such that rivalries continue to 
simmer in conditions of ostensibly peaceful inter-ethnic relations – a product of the 
ethnic dimension of virtually all conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.26  Close ethnic 
affiliations are evident among respondents of groups affected by PMC activity, and 
of significance to the primary research for this thesis are the contrasting views of 
ethnically opposed groups on conflict, intervention and the part played by PMCs, 
particularly in Sierra Leone and Angola,27 where much of the primary research data 
was gathered.
While observing this principle, it was also important that I did not exclude any 
relevant group from the research, not only from an ethnic standpoint, but in terms of 
respecting the input of all elements of these social groups – within their own ethnic 
communities – in terms of age, gender, religion, race or other characteristic.  This 
brought another important point into focus – that of ensuring that harm is avoided 
not only to an evident, visible group of subjects, but to their family, kin and 
community.  These are weighty issues, and ensuring avoidance of the possible risks 
involved, and the potential effects, was perhaps the most important ethical 
consideration of this thesis.  To this end, I continually considered ways in which the 
results of my research might subsequently be communicated, particularly where the 
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material could be misconstrued or used by a third party against the interests of any 
research participant or their wider family, group or community.
In consideration of this most important ethical principle, it was incumbent upon me 
to ensure that respondents’ interests – particularly in the context described above, 
but also in the wider scheme of the research – should not be endangered as a result 
of their participation.
5.5.7 Debriefing
On completion of each interview, I engaged with respondents to ensure that they 
were satisfied with the way the interview had been conducted, and were aware of 
the implications of the use of data derived from their participation.  In cases where 
interviews had been recorded, the respondent was informed that a transcript can be 
made available if desired, and the conditions for use of information given by the 
respondent were established.  For example, interview subjects were asked whether
data collected from their respective interviews may be used for any future 
publication with or without their further consent, or whether they intend it to be 
limited for use only for the purposes of this thesis.  In each case, the interviewee 
was informed fully as to the reasons for and subsequent implications of their 
participation in the research process.  None took issue with the conduct of any 
interview, or with the use of the data they had provided.
5.5.8 Confidentiality
Throughout the conduct of research for this thesis, and subsequently in its reporting, 
the confidentiality of participants’ identities, and the data they have supplied, has 
been safeguarded.  Information held on computer will be treated in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act, and will be processed so as to ensure that participants’ 
identities, and the data they have supplied, are not stored in a way that allows access 
to both sets of data.  Throughout the thesis, footnotes referring to interviewees will 
be presented in a format that does not identify the respondent.  All respondents were 
informed fully of these aspects of confidentiality.  A hard copy of the record of 
interviews will be provided at the viva voce examination, and will subsequently be 
filed, securely, in a separate location from any copy of this thesis.
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5.6 Interviewing
As discussed in the previous section, semi-structured interviews were chosen in 
preference to other forms, in order to maintain a methodical approach while allowing 
flexibility to ‘steer’ the interview and assist the flow of dialogue.   One of the main 
drivers for my decision to use semi-structured interviews was that rigidly structured 
questions tend to ‘push’ respondents’ answers in certain directions, as experienced by 
Kvale,28 either towards what the respondent might perceive as the ‘correct’ direction, or 
towards a response linked to a specific subject area or category.  This, I felt, might have 
the effect of narrowing the scope of responses toward known and accepted narratives 
rather than opening up the views of my respondents.
Avoiding formal structures in interviews also helped respondents to ‘open up’ with 
regard to their personal thoughts and perceptions, and afforded an opportunity for me to 
draw out information of importance to the research.  Thus, the scope for “active 
intervention”29 on my part was facilitated through the flexibility afforded by semi-
structured interviews.
While the semi-structured approach inevitably involved concerns around transcultural 
communication and the perceived power relationship between interviewer and 
respondent, there were elements of semi-structured interviews that served to lessen the 
impact of these scenarios.  As a researcher, I had to remain not only aware of these 
elements, but also wary as to criticisms.  For example, the more actively involved I 
became in the interview process, in order to gain the maximum benefit in terms of 
research, I had to be conscious that a more active interviewing approach became a less 
passive means of gathering information – “The techniques and tactics of interviewing… 
are really ways of manipulating the respondents…”30  My aim therefore was to minimize 
any adverse effect that the relationship between interviewer and respondent might have 
had on the interviews, without influencing respondents’ answers to my questions.  I also 
remained alert to any influence respondents might impose on the interview, whether due 
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to providing information they feel I want to hear – one manifestation of the perception of 
unequal power relations in interviews – or as a result of another common manifestation, 
whereby the interview subject felt that my position or expertise (or some other trait) 
were not sufficient to merit serious consideration.  Both were addressed, at the initial 
stages of every interview, through careful briefing, explaining my own background and 
position, and by seeking ways to establish empathy with the interview subject.  The latter 
was easier where comprehensive details as to the identity and background of the 
respondent were known prior to the interview, but where these details were scant, and in 
situations where the opportunity for an impromptu interview presented itself, I sought 
these details through brief, but politely probing conversation with the interview subject.  
As well as ‘warming-up’ the interview, this also presented an opportunity to establish 
empathy with the respondent.
Also, in order to maximize to opportunity presented by each interview,31 it was my aim 
throughout the process of this research to ensure that the respondent was relaxed, that I 
demonstrated a grasp of the respondent’s area of expertise, and that I presented 
searching, open-ended questions, in order to obtain the most useful, relevant information 
from every interview.32  To this end (and early discussions with my peers and colleagues 
highlighted many of the following points) I made every endeavour to ensure that:
 The framing of questions allowed maximum leeway for the respondent to 
form a reply, in order to maximize the benefit of every question.
 Questions allowed respondents to pursue areas of the subject that were 
pertinent to their areas of expertise, knowledge or interest, but were 
framed in a way so as to ‘stretch’ whichever of these elements of the 
respondent’s capacity was in play, in order to draw out as much 
information as possible.
 The formulation of interview questions was not so specific as to preclude 
alternate avenues of enquiry that arose during the course of any interview.
 I remained open to opportunities to pursue such avenues without closing 
the existing direction of the respondent’s dialogue.
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 Each interview ended with the respondent being afforded an opportunity 
to clarify matters or to ask closing questions.  In some cases, this elicited 
further information not covered during the interview.  It was noted, even 
in informal discussions, that respondents seem to be most at ease during 
these closing stages.
In summary, questions asked and information sought from respondents varied not only 
according to the background of the interviewee, but also according to responses to prior 
questions, to the nature of discourse that emerged in the course of the interview, and as a 
result of dialogue – relevant to the subject matter – that developed between me and the 
respondent.  I tried at all times to remain, to some extent, detached, in order to maintain 
discourse awareness – if not a degree of analysis of discourse as it unfolded – during 
interviews, so as to remain reflexive and responsive as the interview process developed.
As all of my research interviews were semi-structured – and were therefore lengthy in 
terms of discursive content – there was, necessarily, considerable data to be chronicled.  
In every case, permission was sought for the audio-recording of interviews, as the 
advantages to recording are numerous.  Where respondents agreed, the recording of 
interviews:
 Enabled me to exercise greater concentration on what was being said in 
the interview, as note-taking could be minimized (although not 
eliminated; to ensure that no loss of important data occurred in the event 
of equipment malfunction, notes were taken of important data disclosed 
during interviews, and written up as soon as practicably possible 
thereafter, when gathered information was fresh in my mind).
 Assisted the natural limitations both of my own memory and of my note-
taking.
 Enhanced analysis by allowing review of respondents’ answers and 
comments away from the demands of the interview environment.
 Helped to eliminate any occurrence of ambiguity, misunderstanding or 
bias of interpretation that may have taken place during interview.
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 Assisted in triangulation by allowing repeated review of information 
against the background of data gained from other sources.
 May allow my data to be used in other ways or applied to other research 
than that originally intended, always assuming that permission can be 
gained from the respondent.
By the same token, there were disadvantages in using recording equipment, for example:
 It further stretched the already time-consuming analytical process, 
notwithstanding the potential gains in the accuracy of analysis.
 Some interviewees found it offputting or distracting (a number of 
respondents glanced repeatedly at the equipment, most notably in the early 
stages of an interview).  I was therefore prepared to switch off audio-
recording equipment if I felt it might have a detrimental effect on the 
interview, although this did not arise, as respondents seemed to forget that 
the equipment was there as they became engrossed in the interview.
 In the back of my mind was the danger of malfunction – external to that 
which may occur during interview – and therefore to loss of collated data.  
I therefore observed, as far as was possible, the precautions of back-up 
note taking, transcription of interviews and storage of gathered data other 
than on the audio-recording medium.
Overall, the advantages offered by electronic recording of interviews were considerable.  
In particular, it allowed me to concentrate fully on the implications of what was being 
said by the respondent, rather than splitting my concentration between listening and 
note-taking, thereby enabling me to respond quickly to what the respondent was saying 
by framing further questions relevant to the issue in hand.  There follows an extract from 
an interview carried out early in the research.
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Figure 1.  Extract from semi-structured interview
Date: 30
th
May 2008
Time: 15:44 
Respondent: Director General, BAPSC
Locator
Code
Context
0200
0201
0202
0203
0204
0205
0206
0207
0208
0209
0210
0211
0212
In an African context, what are the main factors contributing to the growth of PMC 
activity?
In the African context, I’d say there are three things.  One of them is the – and this is not 
in order of priority – one of them is the search for mineral wealth, particularly the Niger 
Delta, diamonds in Sierra Leone, minerals in the Congo, where  western extractive 
industries  are more and more active, and where there is more and more instability, 
therefore the extractive industries have to appoint the private security companies to give 
them protection, whether it be Shell in the Niger Delta, whether it be the offshoots of 
LONHRO in Zimbabwe or wherever it would be, they need that protection, so that’s one 
factor.  The second factor is that the security apparatus in Africa is much more fragile 
than the western world, but the desire for security is just as great, so what you have is an 
enormous domestic security industry – I mean the extreme examples I suppose would be 
Kenya and South Africa where you have an explosion of firms providing security for 
residents, and essentially providing a policing function which in the UK is provided by 
the police, but there the police can’t cope with, therefore private security is provided.  
And the third one would be the use of PSCs or PMCs – we can do a distinction later – in 
internal conflict where, the classic one in all of the literature is that when Kofi Annan was 
the director of peacekeeping and he considered the use of PSCs for the Goma refugee 
camp.  That last one everybody would quote, but the fact is that there are a dozen 
examples like that – what do you do in Darfur?  Now, if you bring in a much wider story, 
you then of course look at the role of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Angola 
etc., but I’d say the growth of PSC activity falls, generally speaking into one of those 
three areas.
Following on from something you mentioned - the line between PSCs and PMCs - the 
BAPSC defines its members as providing ‘armed defensive services’…
Armed defensive services – yes.  PMC vs. PSC is a difficult debate because it is semantic; 
we draw the line by saying that a PSC provides defensive services and a PMC retains the 
option to provide an offensive service, and we’re very comfortable with that distinction; 
I’ll defend it anywhere I hear it.  However, there’s also a cultural element to it.  If you’re 
in the US, the acronym PMC is less offensive than it is here, so you will in fact find 
companies, if you dig around, who describe themselves as a PSC in the UK, and will fight 
to the death to be defined as such, but you’ll then see on their website that they’ve 
suddenly become a PMC because there’s no shame attached to it.  So we would argue that 
conceptually the difference is between offensive and defensive, but in fact it’s blurred by 
culture as well.
Something that’s come out quite strongly in the literature on the private military sector is 
that some tasks that ‘PSCs’ undertake, such as the logistics of materiel, training of 
fighting troops, handling – and sometimes interrogation – of prisoners, are actually 
elements of combat operations, and therefore that it is incorrect for those companies to 
call themselves PSCs.  How would you see that argument?
Well, again it comes back to a bit of a cultural thing.  There are very very few, if any, 
British PSCs that I know of, who are involved in the interrogation of prisoners, and if you 
look at Abu Ghraib etc., you’re looking at American companies, whatever they may 
describe themselves as.  If you look at the provision of support services, then generally 
speaking you’ll be looking at Americans, not Brits.  If you look at training, it gets a bit 
more difficult, and certainly if you look at British PSCs, they will be involved in 
providing training for Middle Eastern offensive forces.  So it’s again – the people who say 
this I fully understand – but on the whole it’s a problem that doesn’t arise in UK 
terminology.   But they’re absolutely right, and one extension they frequently use in their 
arguments is what exactly is the difference between defensive and offensive, and this is a 
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perfectly valid intellectual point to make.  And so, we know what we mean, and the 
companies concerned know what they mean, but there is never going to be an absolutely 
simple definition that resolves the issue.  
An issue that seems to be quite hot at the moment is PSCs providing security for NGOs –
securing the ‘humanitarian space’.  There seems to be an uncomfortable relationship 
there.  Has that been the experience of your member companies?
Very very much so.  I personally come from a background where I’m more associated 
with NGOs than I am with security issues, and yes, NGOs – the problem is that the 
humanitarian space has become more and more contested, and more and more difficult to 
define, and NGOs essentially now have a choice: do they ignore the security industry and 
thereby rule themselves out of operating in certain spaces, or do they accept the security 
industry and operate in those spaces.  Now, every single NGO operates in a different point 
on that spectrum, and there are some NGOs who would say “no, we will never, ever treat 
with a PSC; this is beyond the pale for us”, and that’s a perfectly valid position for them 
to take, but by taking it, they rule themselves out of being able to operate in certain areas.  
So what you actually find is that the problem is the greater number, or the greater 
percentage of NGOs do use PSCs and just keep very very quiet about it, and the ultimate 
analogy for that is the United Nations where, if I remember my facts correctly, the UN 
maintains the position that it would never, ever accept a PSC or deal with a PSC, but it 
then very carefully redefines itself as a security council or something, and allows the UN 
operational agencies to work with the PSCs at all times, so the 38
th
floor may well never 
have employed or given a contract to a PSC, but the same is certainly not true of UNHCR, 
UNDP etc.
In DRC, Liberia, and in Sierra Leone, the UN have used PSCs as security providers. 
PSCs argue that by having their security force separate from blue helmets, the latter are 
not involved in ‘conflict’ and are therefore more identifiable as a peacekeeping force.  
How do you feel about that argument?
I would actually twist that around and say that blue helmets are involved in conflict, to the 
extent that they’re trying to keep the warring parties apart, or keep the peace, or whatever 
it may be, depending on which blue helmet, which theatre and which type you’re talking 
about, whereas the PSCs are only ever providing security for another force, whether it be 
a UN or civilian force – whatever it may be.  But we haven’t yet had a case, to the best of 
my knowledge, of a PSC replacing a blue helmeted force.  We have the example of Eric 
Prince, from Blackwater, frequently offering a battalion – or whatever it is – to Darfur, 
but nobody’s ever taken him up on it, and politically, as of 2008, that is without doubt a 
step too far.  Whether it will still be a step too far in 2009 or 2010 remains to be seen, but 
as of the moment it is.  You have a very very clear distinction between UN peacekeeping 
forces and PSCs protecting UN operations.
So, a little too early to talk about the prospect of PSCs taking on the role of blue helmets?
I don’t think so, because there are political barriers to be overcome at every stage, and if 
one is looking at the UN, you’re looking for consensus, at least within the security council 
members or whatever, and I don’t think you’ve got sufficient consensus for that.  If you 
just look within Europe, say, you’d have the Brits, very ready to at least talk about that 
sort of thing; you probably have the Germans saying this is absolutely unthinkable, and so 
if you move that into a UN context, it’s too early to talk about it.
Going back to the idea of providing a battalion-sized force.  Are there PSCs with the 
capacity to do that – realistically, in a given time frame?
Well, the interesting thing about your question is when you say realistically, within a 
given time frame, it depends what the time frame is.  The answer is no – and everybody 
laughs about Prince, and they get rather cross about that.  He couldn’t field a battalion 
tomorrow, because battalion-sized forces are all about training, interoperability etc., and 
no PSC actually has the ability to do that in a short timescale.  In a medium timescale, the 
answer is yes, a lot of PSCs do; they employ ex military people, so if you employ ex 
military people, you can invent a battalion-sized force, but you can’t do it in a period of a 
month or two months.
So, if our given time frame is that in which the UN could respond, would a PSC be able to 
match that?
Well the awful answer to that is a quite simple yes, but the reason it’s a yes is because of 
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the terribly slow way in which the UN gets its forces together.  If you hadn’t put the UN 
in with it, I’d say it would be very very difficult, but if you look at any peacekeeping 
operation, the time lag between the decision– between the Security Council authorization, 
and the implementation on the ground is just so horrendous, that the answer is yes, a PSC 
could mobilize.  If you look at the current – I can’t remember the initials – but whatever 
the current force in Darfur is, it was supposed – it was authorized, I think; you probably 
know – I’d have to check; I think it was authorized in September; it became technically 
operational on 1
st
January, and it’s still not practically operational because they have no 
heavy lift capacity.  So we’re talking about a seven month period.  Well, if you gave 
Armor Group the job of putting together an operational battalion within seven months, the 
odds are that they could do it.
Is it fair to dismiss people who say that if EO can do it, why can it not be done again, 
given the fact that the equipment and the troops were readily available.  Is that 
achievable again, or do you think that was that an anomaly?
Two factors.  One of them is putting the force together, and EO certainly had the 
advantage of large numbers of South African forces, highly trained, highly disciplined, 
and disaffected, and willing to do anything for a wad of cash – I’ve just been reading 
about it in Eeben Barlow’s book – and so I think that’s one factor.  But I think the other 
factor, the more important factor, is that politically what EO did simply isn’t acceptable 
today.  It’s very interesting reading EB’s book about how he claims – and I’ve never met 
him, so I have no axe to grind – but he claims he was putting together a defensive force, 
excuse me, with attack helicopters.  No, no, you were putting together an offensive force.  
He would argue semantically that he was putting together an offensive force for a 
defensive purpose.  Well hang on, that’s getting to a level of semantics beyond me.  The
fact is that Executive Outcomes were quite prepared to operate as an offensive force.  And 
maybe for the good of the world – I’m not being judgmental, but the fact is that today, in 
2008, I don’t think the world would accept a private company operating in that offensive 
capacity.  And that’s not a criticism of Eeben or Executive Outcomes; it’s just the fact that 
15, 20 years on, the world feels different.
The ‘mercenary’ tag is still applied to PSCs.  Have you perceived any change or any 
‘softening’ of that?
It’s never going to soften, for two reasons.  One of them is… no, three reasons.  One of 
them is, who really cares?  Second reason is that in media terms it’s always going to be a 
good headline – The Dogs of War; ‘Tim Spicer, former Dog of War, today said in 
Baghdad’…why would the media do it any differently?  And the third reason is that 
nobody, including me by the way, can ever remember what the definition of a mercenary 
is.  Because there isn’t a straightforward definition, and international lawyers can spend 
three week conferences arguing over the definition of a mercenary.  Are the Gurkhas 
mercenaries.  No.  Well why not?  There are definitions of mercenaries enshrined in UN 
language, but they aren’t enshrined properly in international law.  And as long as… you 
can’t accuse me – sorry to be very direct – of being a paedophile, because there’s a very 
strict definition of what a paedophile is; I can defend myself against it, and I can sue you 
this afternoon.  You can accuse me of being a mercenary, because what can I defend… I 
get paid money to do things.  Do I get paid money to fight, well, occasionally yes.  
Essentially it gets much more difficult, so it seems that the mercenary tag will be around 
for a long time.
Do you feel that the media are always going to feed those?
Why not?  It’s good for… if you’re writing newspapers you’re trying to sell newspapers, 
so it reads better.   ‘Tim Spicer, family man who enjoys holidays with his son, today…’ –
why would you write it? 
So realistically, there isn’t going to be such a thing as a PR battle to try and…
Occasionally, some of my members ask me to fight the PR battle, and I always say if you 
give me a million pounds, yes, I’ll do it for you, but why bother – just grow up, get brave 
and get on with life.
On government engagement with PSCs in this country – we had a green paper In 2003, 
and it seems that something is always ‘on the brink’ of happening…
The official position as listed in Hansard is that the 2002 green paper was reopened for 
review in 2004, and that a government review concluded in 2005, and that the conclusions 
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of that review are under study by ministers, and that an announcement would be made to 
the house as soon as appropriate, and there was a parliamentary answer to that affect last 
week.
How important is regulation?
To my members, regulation is important for two reasons.  One is to fight the mercenary 
tag; in other words to give them an air of respectability.  And the other one is to 
differentiate themselves from people who are not being regulated, in other words to say 
‘We are better than… whatever it may be’, just as Tesco would stand up and say ‘We 
obey food hygiene standards’ whereas your little halal butcher on the corner of the street 
doesn’t claim that – therefore you buy your meat from Tesco rather than the little halal 
butcher – or you may not, for all I know.  So those are the two reasons why it’s important 
to the membership.
There are a lot questions that arise from the whole idea of regulation, one of which is that 
PSCs are part of the political landscape, particularly in Africa.  They have become that 
way without regulation; would it have been any different if they were regulated?
Well to say that they’re not regulated in Africa would not be wholly correct.  Most 
African countries have regulation of one form or another.  The obvious example –
although people think that the obvious example is the only example – is South Africa.  
Now, South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that actually has this Foreign 
Military Assistance Act.  So yes, South Africa has got more stringent regulation than 
anybody else.  However, if you look at most other African countries, they do have 
regulation.  You might argue that they are incapable of enforcing it, but in Nigeria for 
instance, there’s fairly strict regulation of PSC activity.  So it’s simply not true to say 
there is not regulation in Africa.  There is regulation in Africa.
So it’s a question of regulation on the part of this government, giving a  veneer of 
respectability to PSCs
No, the veneer of respectability I was talking about was in the UK, where British 
companies would like British regulation to give them that veneer of respectability.  In 
Africa what you’re looking at is countries trying to regulate, and impose legislation that 
they may or may not be able to enforce, but attempting to regulate the industry in their 
own country.
What of the argument that regulation reduces the need for PMCs to be transparent – if 
they’re self-regulated they have to be seen to be ‘behaving’ whereas regulation gives 
them more licence to do things without being open.  Is that a fair critique?
No, I don’t think that’s fair or that is the case.  Whether you’re regulated by government, 
or are regulated by self-regulation, the degree to which you are transparent is a different 
issue.  I suppose you could argue – and I’m sorry, I’ve never heard that question before 
which is why I need to think – I suppose you could argue that if you’re self-regulated you 
have to expose yourself more to other members of the industry, so that implies a greater 
degree of transparency, but I’m not sure I see that as a valid argument.  If you’re 
government regulated you have to expose yourself to the government – to civil servants.  
If you’re self-regulated you have to expose yourself to other members of the industry, so 
who’s to say that one involves greater transparency than the other.  I don’t see that.
There’s an argument that regulation is not necessarily a good thing;there are small 
companies saying that regulation could have the adverse effect of excluding them. What 
are the implications of the exclusion of small companies, from the industry?
There are several arguments stuck together there – on the transparency side, a perfectly 
valid argument there, would be that government regulation could only regulate British 
companies, however we decide to define them, and therefore you could be a British 
company registered with the British government, and in fact conduct your operations 
through an offshore subsidiary and avoid British government regulation that way, so that 
is in fact one of the arguments we use of the benefits of self regulation – not at the cost of 
government regulation – what we say is that one of the benefits of self regulation is that 
we won’t allow that to happen.  In other words if you’re firm XYZ, you’re not allowed to 
hide your subsidiaries from us or we won’t accept you into self regulation, but if you’re 
the government, by definition you can’t enquire about your offshore in Dubai or 
whatever, because you have no right to do so etc.  So I can see where that argument is 
coming from, but we have never used that as an argument against government regulation.  
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We just use it as an argument in favour of self regulation.  In terms of small companies, 
well yes, small companies are always worried, and quite rightly so, because the world 
mitigates against small companies and that’s life.  But the – for the small company – it’s 
difficult to say that there’s any difference in cost between self regulation and government 
regulation.  It depends how you define the pricing structure at the end of the day.  We 
were given very firm instructions from the British government very early on in our 
existence, that we had to make sure that we didn’t disadvantage small companies because 
it’s part of British government policy not to disadvantage small companies, so we’ve had 
to design our procedures etc. to make sure that we obey that and we’ve been very happy 
to do so.  But likewise if the government does regulate, it will have to devise its own 
procedures to make sure that it doesn’t disadvantage small companies.  Now, all small 
companies are, by definition, are going to be disadvantaged, because the smaller you are, 
any opportunity cost is a problem, but that’s a bit like saying if you’re an individual it’s 
annoying to have to get a driving licence.  The fact is that the government can devise a 
pricing structure that will allow small companies not to be disadvantaged, just in the way 
we do.
Something that also comes up is that regulation cannot work unless it is international, 
which would seem to be difficult to attain.  I know you’ve spoken about it within the 
BAPSC; where do you stand on that?
Where we stand is this: the industry is international.  It is international when a company 
from one country, employing nationals from a second country, operates in a third country.  
And that’s the normal model of operation.  So the idea that any form of national 
regulation can cope with that is a joke.  Therefore it is an industry that is crying out for 
international regulation.  However, there is no stomach whatsoever out there for 
international regulation by the people who would actually have to do it.  There are any 
number of NGOs out there who will stand up – and even the UN whatever it is on 
mercenaries will probably stand up and say ‘we insist on international regulation’; well 
fine, you can insist on anything you like, but the fact is there is no stomach out there to 
actually do it because international regulation – well there are two reasons why there is no 
stomach to do it.  One of them is that it’s difficult and expensive.  And so the best 
example is probably ICAO, or International Civil Aviation, which I think was formed in 
about forty-something.  There’s no stomach out there for forming international bodies 
with million-dollar budgets these days; there was in 1940, there isn’t today.  So the idea 
for the international office for the control of PSCs, I actually find immensely attractive 
and I’d love to be the head of it, but it isn’t going to happen – practically.  But even if it 
could happen practically, it’s not going to happen politically, because you’re looking at 
this quite correctly from a British point of view, well the world’s a bit different out there, 
and I don’t think the Russians are very worried about this, and I have reason to believe 
that the Poles rather like selling their special forces and I don’t think they spend a lot of 
time debating the difference between defensive and offensive.  What they debate is profit 
margin, and so, no, you’d never get international agreement for any form of regulation 
like that, so what we spend our time doing is – we certainly fully support international 
regulation, but we’re very realistic and say there will be no international regulation as 
such – dream on – in 20 years’ time maybe, for all I know, but what we do is we put our 
entire weight behind things like an international code of conduct.  Now of course you 
don’t have to obey a code of conduct, but at least it gives the big international forces the 
ability to differentiate between those who do sign up for an international code of conduct 
and those who don’t.  So that’s where we put all our weight.
The US – and I know we shouldn’t exclude other countries, because we look at the US & 
UK mostly – the US government’s attitude toward private security contractors is vastly 
different that of our own government. Is it true therefore that UK companies are 
diverging in the way they develop and operate?
No, I would say they’re converging rather than diverging.  Can I justify that – if you look 
at an enormous number of things in life, they happen in America and we follow on ten 
years later.  Now, times are actually irrelevant – I’m making them up, but the fact is that 
the US is many years ahead of the UK in terms of outsourcing military support activities, 
and people who – again, you have the figures, I’m sure – people who differ between the 
first gulf war and the second gulf war, the ratio of American contractors to American 
soldiers.  And so the US had plunged headlong down that path.  Now, the UK, I would 
argue, is ten years behind it.  And the fact that we’re ten years behind it explains why the 
UK industry is very different to the US industry, because you can be a big successful US 
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company and only ever work for the US government, whereas nobody can be a big 
successful UK company and only work for the UK government.  However, the reason I 
would say that it is converging rather than diverging is that the UK is going down that 
path as well.  We do things more slowly, there are cultural differences, etc., but the UK 
military is now outsourcing more.  People always want to look for the sexy stuff to do 
with security, but if you’re looking for trends, it’s often better to get away from anything 
politically sensitive and look at the politically neutral.  And so if you look at the provision 
of food for the UK military – I’m pretty sure you could argue that ten years ago, the 
British military cooked 100% of its own food, whereas today it only cooks 5% of its own 
food.  So that’s a politically non-contentious issue, but the trend is there.  We’re in 
discussions with the MoD every day, about what more use the MoD could make of PSCs, 
so if you look at the industry today, 2008, yes, you see that big divergence between the 
US and the UK, but I see the two converging.  And I often use that one as well, in terms 
of British PMCs – forget the semantic arguments, the one reason there aren’t any British 
PMCs is that the MoD isn’t giving out any contracts, but if the MoD was giving out big 
contracts, quite a few of our PSCs would become PMCs tomorrow morning.
One of the reasons I asked that question is that the US military are moving from their 
operations in Africa being under EUCOM to a centralized, independent command in 
October…
AFRICOM
Could AFRICOM suggest a post-Iraq ‘bubble’ where US PMCs and PSCs pick up 
contracts in Africa?  
I don’t buy that at all.  I think that is a combination of optimism on the part of PSCs 
looking for other markets and academics trying to be too clever.  The US reorganizes its 
military structure every 15 minutes – with CENTCOM … and EUROCOM (sic) and 
SACEUR and DSACEUR and DSACEURS, and now it’s decided to have an AFRICOM.  
Well so what?  The reason for that is nothing to do with PSCs; the reason there’s going to 
be an AFRICOM is because some wise guy realized, probably correctly, that threats of 
insecurity – we now move purely to security, nothing to do with PMCs – threats to 
security are more likely to be based in Africa than elsewhere because of the ability of al 
Qaeda to be in places like Somalia.  And so, yes, AFRICOM has come into existence, and 
nobody knows where AFRICOM’s going to be based yet – there’s talk about basing it in 
Europe which is a fairly odd concept, but never mind.  I mustn’t be too dismissive, but 
what you’ve got is the AFRICOM debate, and it seems to me this is part of a standard 
military debate; militaries reorganize themselves continually, and for the current threat 
they’re dealing with it makes sense to have an AFRICOM, but to try and link the creation 
of AFRICOM to the idea that PSCs have more business in Africa I don’t see that at all.  
PSCs may have more business in Africa, but it’s nothing to do with AFRICOM; it’s to do 
with the fact that there is a threat level in Africa that may be dealt with by PSCs.  But I 
find it pretty difficult to see that that’s going to be anything to do with al Qaeda.  That 
would have to do with greater resource extraction from Africa and the fact that if you like, 
the last 50 years have been 50 years of oil in the east, and now what you may be looking 
at is the next 50 years of oil in Africa, in which case you’ve got the likes of Shell, Esso 
etc., and you’ve got PSCs alongside them.  But I really would separate the two.
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Note: This excerpt is a verbatim transcript of the respondent’s words.
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5.6.1 Interview preparation
While the interviews conducted for the research were semi-structured, the following 
points were observed to ensure maximization of the potential of every interview:
 Questions were formulated specifically with the purpose of addressing the 
research, but were not so narrow as to limit interviewees’ responses.
 Topic areas were arranged to ensure that a flow was maintained during 
interviews, but these were committed to memory sufficiently to allow me 
the flexibility to alter the order of questions whilst ensuring that all topics 
were covered.
 I made every effort to ensure that interviews took place in suitable 
locations, and, where it was not in my power to do so, I tried to impress 
upon interviewees beforehand, where possible, the importance of selecting 
a place in which they were comfortable and free from disturbance.  This 
was particularly relevant when engaging with local people.
5.6.2 Typology of respondents
Constructing a framework for interviews pursuant to the needs of this research 
required, firstly, a typology of the primary sources that would be required.  As 
outlined previously, my research, and therefore the nature of respondents required 
to carry it out, encompasses not only the international community as a whole – for 
which members of the UN, regional groupings, states and sub-state divisions, IGOs, 
NGOs, and other groups with involvement in PMC activities must be represented 
among my interview subjects – but also individuals from groups and communities 
affected by conflict and/or the actions of PMCs.  
Prior to identifying subjects for interview, I had first to consider the nature of 
respondents needed to achieve both breadth and depth in the research.  Interviews 
were undertaken with respondents of the following types:
 Experts
Specifically, this group comprises those possessing a detailed and respected 
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knowledge of the subject; in particular, analysts, observers or senior 
representatives of the private military industry.  The information and/or 
experience held by these respondents were of considerable importance to the 
research, particularly at the early stages, as they served to inform and develop 
further aspects of research carried out in later stages of the project.  Some of 
these were also aware of key players from whom further information could be 
sought, and this opened up further opportunities for interviews – another 
important element of the early stages of my research.
 Those with Experience of the Private Military Industry. 
While not necessarily deemed experts of the industry as a whole – as their 
knowledge and experience may be limited to specific aspects of the industry, 
or to a narrow field – these respondents brought a depth of information to the 
research that links theoretical aspects to the situation on the ground and to 
developments that have not as yet been analysed in depth.  As insiders, they 
also brought the realities of assumed aspects of their company or sector, or of 
the culture of PMCs generally, to light.  This category included staff and 
representatives of PMCs.
 Other Observers and Analysts.
This included members of organizations concerned with the activities of 
PMCs.  Members of groups such as these were vital to ensuring that a 
meaningful sample of sources and viewpoints were included in the gathering 
of research data.
 Those with Secondary Experience of the Activities of PMCs.
This group comprised members and representatives of organizations for 
whom PMCs have carried out work, and those that have worked alongside 
PMCs.  This included IGOs, including members of UN missions, INGOs, and 
NGOs.
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 Directors, Managers, Staff and Employees of PMCs.
Specific examples of respondents falling into this category are the 
management and staff of Drazah Solutions, a PMC providing key security 
trainers and managers to companies in countries among which are those that 
are the target of this research, namely Sierra Leone and Liberia; and the 
directors of Acris International, a security and investigation organization that 
remained in operation in Liberia throughout the civil war.
 Those Affected by the Actions of PMCs
This group included members of the local populace in areas where PMCs 
operate, or have carried out operations in recent years.
5.6.3 Research subjects: Suitability of PMCs
Primary sources for research into the suitability of PMCs included, but was not 
limited to:
 Representatives of industry bodies for private security companies 
involved in overseas contracts.
 Permanent staff of private security companies.
 Recruitment companies for private security contractors.
 Current employees of security companies, employees of NGOs and IGOs 
involved operations in Africa (particularly those for whom private 
contractors provide security).
 Representatives of commercial companies employing or contracting 
private security personnel.
 Members of civilian communities affected by the actions of PMCs.
This was a starting point for the process of identifying, and arranging interviews 
with potential respondents.  During some of these interviews, further potential 
respondents were identified and contacted. 
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Some of the initial respondents identified were UK based; others were based in 
France, Brussels and Washington DC.  Several were based in London, and much of 
the initial field research took place there, as a means of laying the foundations for 
further research both in UK and overseas. 
Having compiled a typology of primary research subjects for the question of 
suitability, the nature of information that can be learnt from each type of primary 
source was considered in depth, but I took care not to allow this to influence the 
study so as to place limitations on the scope of useful information that might be 
revealed from any source.  I therefore considered the nature and extent of expertise 
and knowledge of each respondent and the specific type of information that should 
be sought in each case, to ensure that, while a specifically appropriate form of 
interview for each type of respondent was drawn up, it did not constrain the 
flexibility to draw from questions and subjects that are primarily intended for other 
forms of interview – those conceived primarily for respondents of a different nature 
– where this was apt, and was of importance to the research.
5.6.4 Research Subjects: Capability of PMCs
Primary research for the question of capability was limited to fewer respondents –
those with knowledge and expertise in fields relevant to the activities of PMCs, 
some of which were relevant both to suitability and capability.   The range of 
primary sources sought in respect of research into the capability of PMCs was 
therefore centered upon, but not limited to:
 Analysts of PMC activity
 Representatives of industry bodies for private security companies
 Permanent management staff of private security companies
 Current and former employees, of apposite level and responsibility, of 
PSCs involved in overseas deployments
This range of sources did not preclude the presentation of questions pertinent to the 
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capability of PMCs to other categories of interview subject, where the course of the 
interview suggested that such questions might be apt.
5.6.5 Framing of Research Questions: Capability of PMCs
The second crucial element of the research involved questions as to whether PMCs 
have the capability – in terms of capacity and expertise – to perform tasks that 
might be demanded of them.  Questions essential to the assessment of capability are 
centered around the composition, in terms of physical organization, of PMCs, the 
size and nature of the recruitment pool, the scale and intensity of operations in 
which they may be involved at the time of notification for a further deployment, and 
the time needed for recruitment and training of a mission force. 
Pertinent to this issue are factors that differentiate PMCs from national or standing 
armies.  Discussion surrounding the issue of capability is invariably centered upon 
the most significant physical aspects of differentiation.  As PMCs maintain no 
standing force or weapons stockpile and retain a minimal permanent staff, questions 
regarding their capability hinge around how rapidly and effectively they can 
combine the needs of planning an operation, recruiting suitable personnel, in 
sufficient numbers, and equipping and training a capable force in response to a call 
for deployment.  
Aspects of PMCs that are of importance to this part of the research include:
 Their permanent structure and composition, in terms of the staff and assets 
that make up the organizational ‘headquarters’; this must be considered 
separately to organizations’ operational structures (see below).
 The structure and composition of elements of these organizations that 
undertake specific operational tasks and contracts – i.e. their structure 
once a contract has been agreed and the process of hiring, training, 
equipping and deploying personnel, and undertaking the task, takes place.
 The expertise available to the organization, either held permanently (by 
the staff) or available for operations in the form of hired personnel – ergo,
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the nature of the pool of potential employees available to the organization 
for operations.
 The nature and views of those who work either permanently or as hired 
operatives.
 The extent and nature of experience gained by the organization in terms of 
operational tasks.
 The relationship between the organization and its stakeholders, whether 
those for whom it has carried out operations (e.g. commercial companies, 
NGOs, state bodies) or those on whom its operations have had a 
secondary effect (e.g. sub-state, regional or local representatives, members 
of the state’s police and military, members and representatives of civilian 
communities).
 The conception held by the organization’s home state as to its nature, and 
to its former, current or potential operations.
 Conceptions of the organization held by other states, sub-state bodies, 
regional groups, IGOs, NGOs, civilian communities and individuals.
5.6.6 Framing of Research Questions: Suitability of PMCs
The issue of the suitability of PMCs gave rise to a difficult area for this study, 
concerning the perceived acceptability – or at least the ‘tolerability’ –34 of these 
organizations in conflict handling and peace-building roles.  This involves questions 
as to political, ethical, moral and social concerns, central to which is the issue of 
accountability.  Debates on accountability hinge around international humanitarian 
law, regulation, and the ethical, moral and social implications of the use of PMCs –
most of which gravitate toward the use and semantics of perhaps the most 
contentious term in the entire debate: that of ‘mercenary’ – my questions had to take 
account of diametrically-opposed views and conceptions stemming from this 
                                                
34
‘Acceptability’ of PMCs in any form of intervention is regarded as a difficult concept when held against 
the ideal of intervention on the part of the international community, by UN troops alone; “…in Goma, I 
even considered the possibility of engaging a private firm. But the world may not be ready to privatize 
peace” (UN. 1998a. "Excerpt from speech by the UN Secretary General: Intervention by the UN Security 
Council in internal affairs of states." UN Chronicle, Sep., 1998.). It is therefore regarded that ‘tolerability’ 
of PMCs– where UN intervention fails or is precluded as the only alternative means of humanitarian 
intervention – is a more realistic concept for discussion.
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contentious term, and to explore its implications and impact on the entire 
‘suitability’ debate.
5.7 Data Sources
A total of 49 interviews were carried out; seven in the UK, and forty-two in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia.  As well as these respondents, thirty eight others were engaged in informal 
discussions that produced noteworthy contributions to the research, and many 
individuals, groups and situations were the subject of observation in both countries.  In 
Sierra Leone, interviews were carried out in Freetown (including Kissy and Wellington), 
Lungi, Waterloo, Bo, Kailahun, and Koindu.  In Liberia, interviews were carried out in 
Monrovia, Robertsport, Harbel, and Roberts Field.
There were twenty seven subjects who declined to be interviewed.  These comprised an 
SSR Advisor to a British IGO, four representatives of prominent mining companies in 
Sierra Leone (two mining managers and two security managers), and two in Liberia, a 
UNIOSIL representative,35 a consultant to the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform 
Programme (SILSEP), an academic from Njala University,36 three representatives of 
Sierra Leonean Government Ministries (two indirectly, through administrative staff, 
from the Ministries of Marine Resources and Finance and Development, and one 
directly, from a representative of the Ministry of  Internal Affairs), three OSD officers 
and two former members of the NPFL.  Five representatives of humanitarian NGOs and 
four of local civil society also declined to be interviewed.  In addition, there were four 
potential respondents I had made contact with and obtained agreement in principle for 
interviews, but with whom I was unable to re-establish further contact.
A small amount of interview data was lost before I had an opportunity to back it up, 
when I was robbed while travelling from Sierra Leone to Guinea, but this did not 
seriously compromise the needs of the research.  The backing up of data was a slow 
process, and I had prioritized the most data rich interviews for back-up.  While some 
interviews were more useful than others, all of the information obtained during the 
process of data-gathering played a part in furthering my knowledge, grasp, and 
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UNIOSIL were, at the time, in the process of being replaced by UNIPSIL.
36
The subject had agreed to be interviewed but declined subsequently “for reasons of time”.
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appreciation of the situation overall, and served the purpose of shaping my approach to 
subsequent data-gathering.
The typology of interview respondents, as detailed in Section 5.4.2, was adhered to as 
closely as possible.  The breakdown of respondents and their categories is as follows:
 Experts: Analysts and observers with respected knowledge of the subject.  
Respondents from this category included specialists in the subject area, 
and members of recognized think-tanks and professional forums, such as 
the Royal United Services Institute and Exclusive Analysis.  Five 
respondents from this category were interviewed. 
 Senior staff of organizations – other than Private Military or Security 
Companies – involved in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and development, and with some level of knowledge and experience of the 
private military industry.  Interviewees from this category included senior 
officials of UNDP, UNDSS, DFID, and IMATT in Sierra Leone, and of 
UNMIL, UNDP, UNPOL and BMATT in Liberia.  Eleven respondents 
were interviewed.  
 Representatives of industry bodies for PMCs.  Interviews were carried out 
with the Director General and the Director of Policy of the British 
industry body for private security providers.  Information sought from, 
and provided by, these respondents encompassed the situation on an 
international basis, and was not confined to the British industry.
 Government representatives in the countries subject to research.  Two 
interviews were carried out with government officials in Sierra Leone, one 
from the Ministry of Mines, and one from the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
In Liberia, where no government minister could be persuaded to speak 
with me, two interviews were carried out, one with a senior government 
security official, and another with a former high-ranking police officer.  
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 Directors, managers and staff of PMCs.  Of the eight interviewees in this 
category, there were three company directors, three senior managers, and 
two consultants.  Five of the eight were expatriates, one had previously 
been employed both by DynCorp in Liberia and PAE in Sierra Leone, one 
had been a member of Executive Outcomes during the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, and one had been an investigative consultant in Liberia for the 
duration of the civil war.
 Members of organizations, excluding those listed in the preceding 
categories, working or interacting with PMCs in the course of their work.  
Of seven respondents in this category, one was a government contractor, 
three were members of NGOs, and three were in the mining industry.
 Others affected by, or concerned with, the activities of PMCs.  This 
category includes observers, critics, and members of the local populace 
directly affected by the actions of PMCs.  As well as thirteen formal 
interviews, much of the information in this category was gathered outside 
the interview process, in informal discussions carried out during the 
course of the field trip.  These discussions were very much guided by 
information gathered during the formal interviews of subjects in this 
category, which included four members of humanitarian NGOs, one of 
whom was a human rights journalist, five members of civil society 
groups, two members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, one 
public diplomacy representative and a representative of the WFP.
5.8 Analysis
The best, and most usable data, gathered in the process of this research consists of rich, 
in-depth descriptions and narratives, drawn from the conceptions and understandings of 
a wide and varied cross-section of interview subjects.  Those instances where the 
qualitative data gathered in the course of my interviews has been ‘thinner’ than desired –
and I approached the research having prepared sufficiently to negate their overall effects 
by seeking quantity, to some extent, as well as quality – have fed the research in their 
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own, albeit more limited, manner.  More importantly, however, they serve the purpose of 
augmenting the rich data gathered in the former instance; the value of the latter must not 
therefore be dismissed or underestimated in terms of their contribution to the overall 
picture, or in their importance to the process of triangulation, both during the interview 
process and, subsequently, in the analysis of gathered data.
The critical question was how I should approach the analysis of this gathered data in 
order to draw from it what Miles and Huberman describe simply as valid meaning.37  
From this question stemmed others that highlighted the potential for subjectivity in any 
conclusions I drew from the qualitative nature of the data under analysis.  For example: 
To what extent could I ensure valid, credible, conclusions from data drawn from a 
comparatively limited number of sources?  How might I overcome generalization in 
findings, when specificity is a feature not apparent in all field research interviews, and 
when secondary and primary sources on the subject of this thesis show myriad examples 
of generalization?  How is the possibility of researcher bias overcome in qualitative 
studies, and how can I show this in the reporting of findings?  Of most concern – against 
the reality of the fact that I, the researcher, am the main ‘measurement device’ of my 
own study – is Miles’ assertion that:
“…the analyst faced with a bank of quantitative data has very few 
guidelines for protection against self-delusion, let alone the 
presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions…. How can we be 
sure that an ‘earthy’, ‘undeniable’, ‘serendipitous’ finding is not, 
in fact, wrong?”38
My approach, therefore, was to encompass a range of strategies in order to ensure apt, 
judicious analysis of my research data.  My aim in adopting a multiple-strategy approach 
was to minimize the potential for findings and conclusions that could be regarded as 
erroneous, biased or unrepresentative.  In effect, the use of the three strategies employed 
for my analysis is the basis for analytical triangulation.
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Miles, Matthew and Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Sage. p.245.
38
Miles, Matthew. 1979. "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 24:590-601.
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5.8.1 Strategies for analysis
The strategies used for the analysis of data in this thesis are:
 Grounded theory
 Content analysis
 Narrative analysis
The downside to the use of three strategies – the additional time and complexity 
introduced to the analytical process – is counteracted in the following ways:
 The primary method of data collection for this thesis – that of semi-
structured interviewing – has lent itself to all three strategies.
 They could be carried out concurrently.
 All of the strategies could be applied as data builds up – i.e. during the 
process of data gathering.
 They complemented each other in the analysis of data, vis-à-vis 
commonalities in coding for all three strategies.
 Sorting and categorization of data also afforded commonalities relevant to 
all three strategies.
Additional benefits to the use of these three strategies are:
 Disadvantages of one strategy were counteracted by the advantages of one 
or both of the others – for example, difficulties in the selective coding 
phase of the grounded theory approach, when applied to research of the 
nature undertaken for this thesis, were counteracted by the production of 
core constructs in content analysis, and by the broader analytical approach 
of narrative analysis.  The converse is also true.
 The use of these strategies offers three different ‘levels’ of analysis, 
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ranging from the ‘quantification’ (as far as is possible) of gathered data in 
the grounded theory approach  – and, to a lesser extent, in that of content 
analysis – to the more quantitative end of the analytical spectrum dealt 
with through narrative analysis.
 The mix of strategies use the application both of systemic method (in 
grounded theory) and of general principles.  The former has helped me to 
overcome some of the difficulties in application and interpretation of 
content and narrative analysis, thus affording validity, through cross-
comparison, across all three methods.
5.9 Grounded theory
In dealing with the questions brought up at the beginning of this section – primarily, how 
to ensure, as the main ‘measurement device’ of my own study, that I maintained 
appropriateness in analysis and the avoidance of bias,39 – the most apt strategy, in terms 
of rigour, was that afforded by the grounded theory approach.  The aptness of the 
approach is best outlined by Glaser, as enabling the avoidance of data being “filtered 
through and squared with pre-existing hypotheses and biases”,40 although to this end, 
Glaser stresses the need to approach the research with as few preconditioned thoughts as 
possible.41  The strategy seems complex, initially – and gives the impression, as 
expressed by Melia, of “the technical tail beginning to wag the theoretical dog” –42 but 
it is a valuable means of breaking down qualitative data, in a structured and systematic 
way, into ‘quantifiable’ sections, without impinging on meaning.  This, I believe, has 
provided as objective an approach as perhaps could be achieved in the analysis of data of 
the qualitative nature gathered for this thesis.
For the approach required of this strategy, in attempting to ‘quantify’ my data, I carried 
out three forms of coding on the information that I had gathered.
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Notwithstanding Strauss and Corbins’ assertion that “it is not possible to be completely free of bias” 
(emphasis added), in: Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: 
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage. p.97.
40
Glaser, Barney. 1978. Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory. Mill 
Valley, CA: Sociology Press. p.3
41
Ibid.
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Melia, Kath. 1996. "Rediscovering Glaser." Thousand Oaks: QHR. p.376. 
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“Coding is analysis. To review a set of field notes, transcribed or 
synthesized, and to dissect them meaningfully, while keeping the 
relations between the parts intact, is the stuff of analysis.” 43
In brief, during the first stage – ‘open’ coding – I broke down the data into categories 
based on their relationship to key features of the research.  In the second, ‘axial’, coding 
stage (aptly referred to by Glaser as ‘theoretical coding’),44 I established connections 
between the categories of data coded in the first instance, thus helping to form a 
conceptual framework of issues relating to the various categories.  In the final stage, that 
of ‘selective’ coding (or ‘constant-comparative’ coding),45 I selected core classifications 
into which the formerly-identified categories fell, and, from this, built my conceptual 
framework.  These steps are covered in further detail, and examples given below.
5.9.1 Open coding
This required careful examination of distinct ‘information-bites’, in order to enable 
identification of similarities and differences in data gathered from different sources.  
I refer, in the use of the term ‘information-bites’, to strings of speech, whether 
sentences, passages, or connected phrases, relating to a specific concept, topic, or 
element of the subject matter – those pieces of information regarded by Strauss and 
Corbin as the basic units of analysis for grounded theory.46  I took great care, 
throughout this process, to ensure that I did not overly deconstruct information-bites 
that were reliant upon each other for meaning, nor that I split data-strings such that 
they detracted from, or changed, meaning, or were removed from a context that was
necessary to ensure full understanding.
In carrying out this process, I continually analysed and questioned the information 
acquired from my gathered data.  For example: What is the basis for the point of 
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Miles, Matthew and Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Sage. p.54.
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Glaser, Barney. 1992. Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs. Forcing. Mill Valley, CA: 
Sociological Press. p.38.
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Ibid.
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Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage. pp.92-93
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view behind the information?  Is there a specific premise, concept or theory to 
which it relates?  Do other interview subjects express similar or disparate views or 
beliefs?  My purpose, in this continuous analysis and questioning of information, 
was to enable identification of concepts that are analogous, and could be labelled as 
such, to allow me to define them in terms of a set of properties that add clarity and 
understanding to the overall analysis.  These concepts were then grouped according 
to their respective properties, and categorized for the purposes of moving this first 
level of ‘open’ coding to the next stage of the analytical process, vis-à-vis ‘axial’ 
coding.  
The following are samples of data gathered in the early stages of the research, and 
their categorizations, collated through the process of inductive open-coding.47  
Where appropriate, content analysis was applied to the wider data from which these 
samples were extracted, in the form of enumerative key word in context analysis.48
, 49
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More than one category has been identified in many cases, in keeping with the fundamentals of 
grounded theory expounded by Glaser, in: Glaser, Barney. 1992. Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: 
Emergence vs. Forcing. Mill Valley, CA: Sociological Press., and in: Glaser, Barney. 1978. Theoretical 
Sensitivity: Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press., and by 
Strauss and Corbin, in: Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: 
Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage.
48
Weber, Robert. 1990. Basic Content Analysis. London: Sage.
49
Manning, Peter and Betsy Cullum-Swann. 1994. "Narrative, Content and Semiotic Analysis." In 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, eds. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. London: Sage. p.464.
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Figure 2. Example of initial open-coding inductive category process.
Locator Data Sample Inductive Category/Observations
Data from responses relating to what, in an African 
context, is driving the proliferation of PMC activity.
0201 The search for mineral wealth; western extractive 
industries are more and more active, and there is more 
and more instability, therefore the extractive industries 
have to appoint PMCs for protection
Resource Extraction
Security Provision
Commercial Interests
0202 …the security apparatus in Africa is fragile, but the 
need for security is just as great
Stability
State Security Apparatus
0103 …we have this assumption that it’s going to affect the 
way things are done, whether it’s peacekeeping, 
security sector reform…
Perceptions of PMC Proliferation
0106 …within the African context, security vacuums across 
the whole continent
Stability
Security Vacuums
0108 PMCs see Africa as an area where there’s a huge 
amount of potential work
Perceptions of PMC Proliferation
0112 …in terms of drivers, it’s a capacity issue – PMCs can 
provide capacity [lacked by African states]
Capacity
Perceptions of PMC Proliferation
0335 The work PSCs are picking up in Africa is related 
mainly to commercial interests, usually in terms of  
security contracts
Western Commercial Interests
Security Provision
0337 Smaller PSCs are benefiting from the need for niche 
services in Africa, like intelligence gathering, surveys, 
safety of personnel etc.
Services provided by PMCs
Sub-categories:
Intelligence Surveys
Data from responses to questions relating to regional 
peacekeeping forces (specifically in an African
context) and the involvement of PSCs
0153 on the one hand, they [AU peacekeeping forces] want 
the assistance, but they want to do it themselves as 
well
PMCs in Peacekeeping
AU Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
0506 African peacekeepers are often greeted with suspicion; 
their capabilities and motives are questioned
African Union
Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
0514 there already exists a preference in many cases for 
external forces, private or otherwise, to those from 
within Africa
Peacekeeping
Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
0404 Since the increased involvement of PSCs in Security 
Sector Reform, there seems to be a greater 
understanding of the role these companies can play
Security Sector Reform
Attitudes to PMCs
Capability
0503 There are many cases where the concept of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’ is questioned
Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
0504 …either because of lack of capability Capability
Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
0505 … or because of internal perceptions, whether ethnic 
or national
Intervention
Sub-category
Regional Intervention
0506 involvement by neighbouring states in African 
countries [is questioned]
Intervention
Sub-category:
Regional Intervention
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Data from responses relating to actions of intervening 
groups, including PMCs, in Liberia and Sierra Leone
0414 In Sierra Leone, there was a lead-nation approach, 
whereas that was not the situation in Liberia
Intervention
Sub-category: External Intervention
0429 They (Executive Outcomes) were brought in by an 
internationally-recognized government seeking 
assistance
PMC Operations
Sub-Category:
Executive Outcomes
0431 the most interesting part of the debate is that EO were 
extremely effective
PMC Operations
Sub-Category: Executive Outcomes
0434 EO went for the diamond areas, which took the rug 
from under the rebels’ feet
PMC Operations
Sub-Category: Executive Outcomes
0435 … this strengthened the government, even though it 
was a ‘private army’ doing it
PMC Operations
Sub-Category:
Executive Outcomes
0436 I didn’t come across anything that indicated there was 
criticism of that kind towards Executive Outcomes 
within Sierra Leone
Attitudes to PMCs
Sub-Category:
Executive Outcomes
0437 … people appreciated the stability they helped provide Stability
Attitudes to PMCs
Sub-Category: Executive Outcomes
0439 the UN demanded that they leave, but there was no 
coordination between the departure of EO and 
somebody stepping to fill in the security vacuum
United Nations
PMC Operations
Sub-Category: Executive Outcomes
Data from responses to question relating to regulation 
of the British Private Security Industry
0301 regulation, having emanated originally from 
government pressure, has moved to a position where it 
is PSCs themselves who are pushing for it
Regulation of PMCs
0304 the British representative body, which pushes for 
regulation, was conceived by PSCs themselves
Regulation of PMCs
Representative Bodies
Sub-category: BAPSC
0309 good, professional companies want to protect their 
names and the reputations they have built up
Regulation of PMCs
0332 the real benefit of regulation is when you regulate 
contracts for governments
Regulation of PMCs
Note: Lnks to categories related to 
PMCs as foreign policy proxies.
0334 international regulation can only work as a matrix of 
interlocking, mutually-reinforcing schemes
Regulation of PMCs
International Regulation
0245 regulation is important…to fight the ‘mercenary’ tag Regulation of PMCs
Attitudes to PMCs
Sub-category:
Perception as Mercenaries
0256 … and to differentiate …from people who are not 
being regulated
Regulation of PMCs
0249 to say that they’re not regulated in Africa would not 
be wholly correct; most African countries have 
regulation…
Regulation of PMCs
Sub-category:
Regulation in Africa
0250 South Africa has got more stringent regulation than 
anybody else
Regulation of PMCs
Sub-categories:
Regulation in Africa
Foreign Military Assistance Act
0257 [British] government regulation could only regulate 
British companies
Regulation of PMCs
0265 the idea that any form of national regulation can cope 
is a joke… it is an industry that is crying out for 
international regulation.
Regulation of PMCs
International Regulation
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5.9.2 Axial coding
In this stage, the data that I categorized in the first instance was subject to further 
analysis, in order to identify causal relationships among categories, and to make 
connections between them.  The key feature of this stage were identification of 
specific features of the various categories of information, such as the context in 
which concepts are placed, conditions giving rise to them, interactions among these 
conditions, and their consequences.  While this analysis of information – in terms of 
context, conditions and consequences – is what distinguishes axial from open 
coding, Strauss and Corbin stress that, although each is a distinct analytical 
procedure, they can be carried out concurrently.50
My aim, as I progressed with axial coding, was to spot patterns in the data, and to 
identify both relationships and contradictions among and between data categories.  
One of my primary reasons for choosing to use grounded theory in the analysis of 
data is that the nature of the field I am studying features starkly competing 
perspectives.  Rather than bringing the results of an analysis into dispute, as with 
some approaches, grounded theory allows for competing perspectives to add 
variation and depth to the understanding of concepts under analysis.  In order to 
speed up the process of axial coding, data-sets were input into matrices for clarity in 
establishing relationships and contradictions between categories,51 and for ease of 
cross-referencing as a means to facilitate the third phase of coding.  There follows 
an example of the matrices used for enabling data bites to be axially coded.
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Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage. p.124.
51
Ibid.
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Figure 3.  Example of matrices used for axial coding
11. Counteracting
networks and 
corruption
12. Proliferation of 
PMCs in Africa
13. Ongoing
PMC operations
14. Past PMC 
operations in 
African States
15. Capacity and 
capability
of PMCs
0807 the preferred 
option is or local 
companies, but it’s 
easy for locals to 
set up illicit 
networks
0101 we would have 
to establish if that is 
the case… there are 
people who would 
challenge the whole 
phenomenon
0143 DynCorp in 
Liberia… is a bad 
example of SSR, in 
terms of lack of 
consultation and the 
sums of money that 
were spent
0115  EO, Sandline 
etc., however much 
they may have been 
successful … that 
kind of use of 
PMCs, I think there 
is very little chance
3311 There’s no 
doubt that PMCs 
have shown 
themselves capable, 
in a wide range of 
tasks, both conflict 
and post-conflict
0507 they [PMCs] 
were professional 
and had no local 
connections, so 
could not be 
‘bought off’ or 
indulge in rackets 
like other 
organizations did –
and that includes 
ECOMOG and 
some of the UN
0201  the search for 
mineral wealth… 
where western 
industries are more 
and more active, and 
where there is 
instability…  
extractive industries 
have to appoint
private security 
companies for 
protection
1004 In Liberia our 
organizations often 
come across PMCs 
who train the army, 
and our conclusion 
from what we’ve 
seen is that they 
should be involved 
on a deeper level and 
for a longer time 
span
3418 As time 
passes, it becomes 
clear that EO’s 
involvement in 
Angola and Sierra 
Leone  – and this is 
not to downplay the 
impact of that 
involvement – is an 
anomaly more than 
a precursor of things 
to come
2334 Compared to 
the UN, they can 
move much quicker 
– although that’s not 
saying much – but 
they aren’t held back 
by the need to 
constantly refer back 
to high level, along a 
long line of 
communication
0756 loyalties at 
that level tend to be 
local more than 
national
0203 you have an 
explosion of firms 
providing security… 
and essentially 
providing a policing 
function
0186 from the 
Liberian side… 
many of them feel 
that the local has not 
been taken into 
consideration
0119 …in terms of 
that kind of blunt 
instrument, of 
assisting a 
government in need, 
I don’t think so
2121 The real value 
of PMCs is in their 
use as a means of 
providing the 
capacity lacked by 
African states
0107 PMCs have to 
be wary of entering 
into contexts of 
insecurity…getting 
embroiled in a 
situation where 
there’s not 
agreement from the 
various parties on 
the ground 
0380 the market 
cannot support the 
number of large 
companies … so you 
will see all the things 
that markets do –
buy-outs, mergers etc
0733 On the basis of 
their success in 
training the new 
army, DynCorp won 
the contract to equip 
and train the ERU, 
and to rebuild the 
LNP headquarters.
2044  What EO, the 
CDFs and the 
British Army had in 
common was that 
they engaged with, 
and defeated, people 
who were 
terrorizing the 
population
0193 there will be 
scope within Africa, 
because the more it 
develops, the more 
requirement there 
will be for the 
capacity that it 
simply doesn’t have
0622 there is far 
more loyalty here, 
generally, to your 
tribal group and 
your chief rather 
than to the 
government.
0105 some pre-
eminent Africanists 
would challenge the 
extent to which this is 
going to become a 
big issue
3044 when a 
DynCorp spokesman 
was interviewed [by 
Ezekiel Pajibo], he 
said they were not 
concerned with 
"nation building."
0126 I don’t think 
the world would 
accept a private 
company working in 
that offensive 
capacity
2337 the most 
interesting part of 
the debate is that EO 
were extremely 
effective
0625 That doesn’t 
mean there isn’t 
immense pride in 
being Sierra 
Leonean, but when 
it comes to politics, 
loyalty is to tribe 
rather than to the 
government
0202 the security 
apparatus in Africa is 
much more fragile 
than the western 
world, but the desire 
for security is just as 
great
3410 The U.S. gave 
$35M in aid, which 
was for the sole use 
of  recruiting and 
training an army of 
4,000, and that was 
subsequently scaled 
back to 2,000 due to 
lack of funds 
3232 Until they 
[EO] appeared, it 
just seemed that 
nothing would ever 
stop the rebels from 
taking Freetown
0506 when British 
troops went into 
Sierra Leone, they 
were seen to address 
the problem and to 
make a difference 
that helped the 
people there. The 
same was true of EO
Page 1 of 8 
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This brought my analysis to the stage necessary for the third part of the process, that 
of ‘selective’ coding.
5.9.3 Selective coding
In this part of the coding process, a core category,52 to which all other sub-categories 
relate, was identified.  Strauss and Corbin describe this stage as being driven by the 
researcher’s “gut sense”,53 but Glaser goes so far as to argue that, at this stage of the 
process, the researcher has only to observe the various connections and relationships 
between categories: “…it always happens that a category will emerge from the 
many and ‘core out’ of its own accord”.54 When identified, this core category is 
related systematically to all other sub-categories in order to validate the relationship 
between them, and to further analyse and refine each category.  This is key to 
grounded theory, as it is this part of the procedure that moves from the process of 
coding and categorizing, to “reflection of the data at hand.55  It was from this stage 
that I was able to build up a conceptual framework, and to develop a coherent 
grounded theory.
The value of the grounded theory process in the analysis of the nature of data 
gathered in my research is further emphasized by Charmaz, in that it is the 
“interactive process and its temporal, cultural and structural contexts”56 that 
provides a true “window on reality”.57  It is the explanatory power afforded by 
grounded theory that I believe has made it most apt for analysis of my research data.
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Given the number and complexity of concepts involved in the subject matter of this thesis, more than 
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Figure 4.  Examples of core categories emerging from the selective coding process.
Core Categories
Perceptions:
PMCs or 
Mercenaries?
Perceptions:
Activities
of PMCs
PMCs
in
Practice
PMCs
as
Peacekeepers
Examples of Subordinate Categories
Nature and 
characteristics of 
PMCs
Economic 
Recolonisation
Proliferation of 
PMCs 
Moral Dimension
Legacy of 
mercenaries in 
African states
Undermining state 
sovereignty
PMCs in Security 
Sector Reform
Threat to Human 
Rights
Attitudes towards 
PMCs
PMCs as Foreign 
Policy Proxies
Empowerment of 
the weak state
The Question of 
Legality
Actual and perceived 
nature of the PMC 
industry
Past PMC 
operations in 
African States
PMCs, NGOs and 
Humanitarian 
Agencies
Regulation
Perceptions of PMCs 
as mercenaries
Ongoing
PMC operations
Stability and
the threat of 
security vacuums
Capacity and 
Capability
The International
Conventions
PMCs in 
Development
operations
Counteracting
networks and 
corruption
PMCs in 
Humanitarian
operations
Defining PMCs
Commercial 
interests
Industry Bodies
and Self-
Regulation
PMCs in UN 
Support Roles
5.10 Content analysis
Content analysis presented a more quantitative method of producing core constructs 
from data than the grounded theory approach.  The debate on PMCs hinges around a 
number of core concepts, and this method lent itself to analysis of key aspects of these 
concepts.   Due, however, to its reliance on systematic reduction of textual data,58 I did 
not believe that this method would be ideal as a stand-alone method in the analysis of 
data of the nature involved in this research.  Its value therefore to this research is in the 
analysis of key concepts and, when used together with the grounded theory approach, it 
further validates research findings realized through the former method.
The method does, however, have significant value in itself, and, in some respects, has 
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advantages over grounded theory.  The most significant of these – specifically in respect 
of my own concerns relative to analysis outlined at the beginning of this section – is that 
it is derived from actual, spoken content, whereas, in grounded theory, I am forming 
concepts more from my own interpretation and judgment of gathered data.
My use of content analysis was focused on addressing the concern that text can, in some 
cases, lose meaning through the radical reduction required of this method.  Criticisms of 
early use of the technique were centered upon the reduction of text to words ‘orphaned’ 
from their original context, and a more qualitative approach was advocated, whereby 
themes and implications are derived more holistically from the overall text.59  To this 
end, I employed the approach developed by Altheid, “ethnographic content analysis”,60
or “qualitative content analysis”,61 whereby emergent themes were developed, but with 
an emphasis on the use of manifest content – actual textual data – rather than of latent 
content whereby my own judgement and interpretation was applied to respondents’ 
discourse.  This use of actual text afforded the time-saving advantage of being 
compatible with computer software, and, as transcripts were produced in the process of 
prior analysis, the use of content analysis for the purposes of this thesis proved to be a 
time-efficient process.  A further time efficiency afforded by this form of analysis was 
that its quantitative nature means that several paragraphs of text could be reduced 
through content coding.
My first step in the process was to formulate categories from core concepts covered in 
the process of my interviews.62  The number of occurrences of similar words, word-
groups, or phrases, attributable to a specific category – essentially ‘idea units’ relative to 
the concept in hand – were then counted.  A personal reservation that I have with this 
method is that the form of question used in interviews can influence use of words in the 
response.  My approach, to minimize this, as outlined previously, was twofold:
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 Questions were formed, as far as was possible, so as not to use or to elicit 
specific words, word-groups, or phrases identified as ‘idea units’ in 
respondent’s answers.
 In situations where the use of specific words in the question is 
unavoidable,63 allowance was made in the analysis for occurrences of 
those idea units identified as having been elicited by the question.
Once the counting of these occurrences was complete, I then moved to analysis, through 
the checking and questioning of themes emerging from the clustering of idea units.64  
This method does not preclude a qualitative approach to analysis, and my emphasis was 
on the context and meaning of recurring data – and relationships between elements of the 
data – rather than purely on frequency of occurrence.
The reliability of this method was checked by reviewing previously processed data 
which, again, was achieved in a time-efficient manner through the use of computer 
software.  This form of checking added an important element to the analysis, vis-à-vis 
checking the validity of selected idea units in completed research, and enabling ‘fine 
tuning’ of the method as the research progressed.
There follow two examples of key-word-in-context enumeration; one example from a 
single interview, and one from a multiple-interview comparison.
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Figure 5.  Key-word-in-context enumeration example (single interview)
“In most of Africa, almost every transaction, whether it’s business or just an everyday transaction, is done 
through some kind of network.  Loyalties are to family and tribe above all else, and those are extensive 
networks, because when we describe somebody as a brother he could be a cousin or even a friend, so 
there aren’t any clear edges to what we consider our ‘family’ network.  The Salones
[65]
knew the 
ECOMOG troops’ first loyalty was to their own networks, and that their time here was going to be used 
for the benefit of those networks, at the cost of the local people.  Now, we didn’t expect that of the UN, 
but the way I see it, if you put a group of people somewhere long enough, with very little to do, they’ll 
establish their own networks and start to make the most of the situation, and some of the things the UN 
troops got up to put our own networks to shame.  Do you know the saying? “African armies sit around 
playing cards and plotting coups?”
[*]
  Well, the same is true of any group. If they sit around long enough, 
they end up thinking of what to do to profit from their situation. So the crux of this matter is that if you 
have locals you end up with very well established networks, if you have groups from other African 
countries they exploit their own networks to the maximum, and even a permanent foreign force 
establishes networks to exploit their situation.  Now, this is the reason many prefer to deal with private 
security companies.  They come to do a job, and they have limitations on time, so they never get 
entrenched enough to establish networks.  Cost-effectiveness drives them, because they’re private 
companies, so they do the job and they leave.  There are no openings for people to establish corrupt 
networks with them, and even the ones who stay for long periods, it’s impossible to establish an effective 
network with, because they change over every month, or every six weeks.  And for that reason, we have 
more trust in private companies than of locals, or our own police or our army, or regional troops, or the 
UN, because the private companies aren’t penetrated by the networks.  I know there’s low opinion of the 
South Africans who came here to fight the RUF. Most people from outside have the opinion that they were 
enemies of Salone, who came to plunder our diamonds, but them [sic] and the British were the only people 
who didn’t steal and take food away from the villagers, and who didn’t get penetrated by corrupt 
networks, so many Salones have a good opinion of them.
66
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Extracts from interview with representative of Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources, 7
th
December 2008.
[*]
This expression was encountered in several interviews. See Chapter 4, Note 28.
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Figure 6.  Key-word-in-context enumeration example (multiple interview comparison).
0197 …their senior officers and so forth were happy with the kind of training they received; they 
just kind of wanted the whole thing to continue for a little bit longer.
0316 We stipulate armed security services as including recruitment or training.
0328 It covers things like training, vetting, qualifications of staff and employees.
0386 …a PSC, and that can be one person sometimes, or a team, wins a contract for training local 
company, but as soon as that contract is finished, it reverts to a local manager
0403 The most useful thing we offer is situational awareness training, and it’s been taken up by 
quite a few organizations
0642 It was the actions by EO, and the training they provided to the CDFs that brought the RUF to 
the negotiating table.
0742 Training consultants have now given way to in-house trainers.  There were quite a lot of 
resources put in to equipping and training the police…
0745 There is a private aspect to training, but it involves just a few advisory positions now.
0805 …they’re provided with additional training and supervision.  Training for security 
companies has been provided by contractors in the early stages of some operations, but that’s now 
taken care of by staff from UNDSS.
0808 …at the same time there is awareness and acceptance of the expertise a professional security 
company can provide in terms of training and consultancy…  
0833 The nature of our operations requires contractors, not necessarily in security directly, but there 
are PMCs who provide a wide range of services – logistics, training, equipment provision…
0835 …they have a major operation in Liberia, which is part of the DynCorp contract for training
the army, but they’re also involved in the provision of equipment, training of equipment operators, 
provision of maintenance facilities, training of maintenance personnel, that sort of thing.
0879 The police now have the training and equipment they need to deal with unrest, but the job is 
far from finished.
0902 …they supply equipment, mostly things like vehicles, plant, stuff like that, fuel trucks, water 
tankers, that kind of thing.  And they do training on the equipment, and maintenance…
0905 …not combat training, IMATT do all that; PAE do training on the equipment they provide.
0919 …they supply a lot of the stuff the UN needs to get things built up here, and the equipment 
and training to make the army effective.
1008 The problem is that the training – and sometimes it’s a private contractor that gets the 
contract – is for a basic level only, and as soon as that is achieved, the contract ends.
1016 …although you know there are some people working for those companies who have 
professional backgrounds, police, military, whatever, and who actually understand and are well able 
to deliver that sort of training.
1039 But for example, if you read any of the reports on police training here, you will see that they 
emphasise training ‘front line’ officers in crowd control and in ‘confronting disorder’
1047 Well, having met people who do that training... or rather who did it, because it’s mostly been 
handed over to state ministries now... they have the ability to deliver that; they understand that time 
and resources are stretched, and many of them feel that rather than training it should be about 
putting it into practice, so for example, police units being accompanied by a trainer or an observer.
1404 Certainly those private companies do a good job of training them, but all that does is 
strengthen the ability of governments to deal with protest by ordinary people.
1850 PMCs get involved in a lot of work… security, logistics, training.  But as they wind down 
they just end up doing basic security, and apart from a few expat managers, the ones that remain are 
locals, so the PMCs end up morphing into local security firms.
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5.11 Narrative Analysis
This was a method well-suited to the nature of information gathered in my initial 
interviews, which is rich in description and narrative, and emanated from the 
conceptions and understandings of informed and insightful interview respondents.67  As 
many of my prospective respondents were from similar categories, as outlined 
previously in this chapter, I believe that the method was a valuable addition to my 
analysis.  External to data gathered in interviews, narrative analysis could also be applied 
to existing documentation, forming a baseline from which to make comparison, to verify 
and validate findings, and to inform the direction of further research.
Within the scope of data gathered during in the course of interviews, the use of narrative 
analysis required analysis of my transcripts for discourse relating to areas of specific 
bearing on my research, after which key segments of text were selected for more detailed 
analysis.  In this ‘macrotextual’ analysis – the analysis of the representation of concepts 
through verbalization –68 I used text as a means of framing, defining and giving meaning 
to those concepts.
In the context of this research, narrative analysis has been particularly useful for the 
purpose of analyzing extended discourse, in which respondents provided the kind of rich 
data described at the beginning of this section.  Although guided through the medium of 
the semi-structured interview, there was a tendency for respondents to enter an 
unstructured narrative when verbalizing issues that are of personal significance to them, 
and this has proved useful to this research.  In most instances, this took the form of an 
unstructured, meandering, complex, expressive response from interviewees, which lends 
itself to narrative analysis, and has provided both a rich source of information, and a 
grouping of conceptions, enabling core issues relevant to the research to be compared 
and evaluated.
Of the most prominent issues identified through narrative analysis were conceptions of 
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change and progress among interviewees.  Several respondents stopped short of ruling 
out even the more controversial proposals that feature in the wider debate on PMCs.  For 
example, temporal qualification of responses, such as those given below, recurred among
interviewees responding to similar questions:
0224: “… that is without doubt a step too far.  Whether it will be 
still a step too far in 2009 or 2010 remains to be seen…  You have 
a very very clear distinction between UN peacekeeping forces and 
PSCs protecting UN operations.”69
1061: “the big difficulty, even if they are controlled and monitored 
by UN personnel, would be the perception that the UN were 
employing people motivated by profit rather than by humanitarian 
motives; I think that’s an insurmountable difficulty in the current 
climate.”70
3814: “I could see a scenario where peacekeepers are trained by 
PMCs; there’s a need to train some UN troops to a higher level 
than that provided by their own armies.  But directly involved in 
actual peacekeeping operations?  I would say that’s a long way 
off.”71
This recurrent qualification of remarks is pertinent insofar as it would indicate that, in 
the minds of those being interviewed, there is a general move toward the view that 
PMCs might, at some time in the future, be employed as peacekeepers.  This was borne 
in mind throughout the data-gathering process so that similar qualification during other 
interviews could be explored further.
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Interview with Director General of BAPSC. 30
th
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Interview with representative of humanitarian NGO in Sierra Leone, 19
th
October 2008.
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Interview with representative of UNWFP. 27
th
November 2008.
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5.12 Analytical Process
The initial step in the analysis of gathered data took the form of transcription, – both 
from electronic recordings and written notes – and was carried out as soon as practicably 
possible after completion of each interview.  This process involved structuring the 
material for the purposes of clarification, and eliminating – where there was no danger of 
ambiguity or alteration to meaning – redundant content such as hesitations, digressions 
(limited strictly to those that are short and of no conceivable relevance to the overall 
data), and unnecessary repetitions.  My overall aim in this part of the process was to 
separate the essential from the non-essential, in order to allow meaningful analysis.
Analysis of the material gathered during the field research was focused on interpreting 
the implications of gathered data, on further consideration of respondents’ understanding 
of issues discussed at interview, and on the meaning and bearing of their input in the 
wider context of the research.  During the process of gathering primary research, as well 
as informing the central purpose of the research, this provided new perspectives from 
which I was able to further develop aspects of the research from my own viewpoint.  The 
initial procedure applied to data gathered in the commission of the research was that of 
open-coding, of each unit of new data as it was collated.72  As an initial approach to 
analysis, it was found to offer the following advantages:
 It enabled structured and systematic analysis from the outset, having been 
applied to individual units of data as these were collected.
 It allowed for ongoing comparison, cross-referencing and analysis against 
subsequent data units as these were gathered and collated.
 It served to open further avenues of enquiry for subsequent interviews as 
emergent categories and themes were identified.  
 It provided the most objective approach that could be achieved with the 
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These units of information consist of strings of speech from the interview data, comprising phrases, 
connected phrases, sentences or passages relating to a specific concept or element of the subject matter.  
My guidance as to what comprises a data unit is derived from Strauss and Corbin’s concepts of basic units 
of analysis for grounded theory, in: Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative 
Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage. 
pp.92-93.
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qualitative nature of data relating to this research.
5.12.1 Coding
The initial, open-coding, phase of the analysis was applied to data from the earliest 
stages of interviewing, firstly as a means of identifying what were likely to be the 
most relevant inductive categories, secondly in order to relate the initial data to key 
features of the research, and thirdly to guide my approach to collecting further data.  
This enabled me to better apply coding required of the second and third stages of 
analysis.  In the second stage – theoretical coding – connections between the 
categories were established, towards establishing superordinate categories in order 
to build a conceptual framework.  The third stage – the application of selective 
coding to build this conceptual framework – proved the most difficult, requiring 
repeated application of the first and second stages.  Examples of the coding process 
are shown in Section 5.8, above.
Units were therefore multiple-coded where applicable, with no mutual exclusivity 
being applied to codes.  This approach was adopted in order to avoid, as far as was 
possible, my coding being influenced either by pre-existing theories, or by emergent 
themes as they became evident.  The drawback of this approach was that it was time 
consuming, as data had be coded and allocated several times, and the process 
repeated exhaustively, but it provided a continuous form of cross-referencing, and 
served as an effective method of familiarizing myself with the complexities of the 
data I was handling.
5.12.2 Categorization
Categories and subcategories were revised as analysis progressed, and the previous 
process of multiple coding and cross-referencing assisted considerably with the 
allocation of superordinate categories in the later stages.  Categories were linked to 
specific locations in transcripts and field notes, which provided for fast cross-
checking and for identification of data, of exemplars, and of source strength.  This 
also facilitated the identification of ‘outlying’ data – that on the periphery of a 
category, but necessary, firstly to define the limits of my categories, and secondly, 
to clarify inter-category linkages and limits.
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5.12.3 Content Analysis
Content analysis was applied, where relevant and applicable, for the purpose of 
maintaining focus on core concepts around which the essential debate on PMCs 
hinges.  These concepts are drawn from the inductive coding categories obtained 
through the initial analysis, as detailed above.  The use of this approach in 
conjunction with grounded theory considerations – where these are a more apt form 
of analysis –73 offered a means of further validating my analysis, based on the 
prescribed concurrent use of both methods.  Even in the early stages of the 
application of content analysis, key concepts in the debate surrounding PMCs –
such as the effect of perceptions of PMCs in the popular mindset, the nature and 
wider effect of tasks they undertake, policy towards their use – were identified as 
prominent.  The process of enumeration, using key-word-in-context analysis,74 was 
used as part of the content analysis to emphasize the recurrence and prominence of 
these concepts, and was then applied as a means of comparison and analysis of 
further recurrences, in subsequent interviews, of the same key words in context.  
5.12.4 Narrative Analysis
Narrative analysis was applied from an early stage, as the conceptions and 
understandings of some respondents early in the interview process were particularly
insightful.  I felt therefore that they merited this form of analysis, and that this 
would contribute to my approach to subsequent data gathering.  Also, as some of the 
prospective interviewees I had contacted at an early stage fell into similar categories 
of these early respondent-types, as outlined in Section 5.6, the early application of 
this method served to form a base for the development of my approach to 
interviewing these later respondents.  
                                                
73
Miles, Matthew and Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. London: Sage. pp.55-56.
74
Manning, Peter and Betsy Cullum-Swann. 1994. "Narrative, Content and Semiotic Analysis." In 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, eds. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln. London: Sage. pp.464-465. 
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5.13  Field Research
There were some practical elements of the field research that proved challenging.  The 
most difficult was travel, within both Sierra Leone and Liberia, to places where 
interviews were scheduled to take place.  Guidelines for travel in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia are based on assumptions that the traveller has access to a vehicle (or a convoy 
of two vehicles) and sufficient funds for secure accommodation.75  There follow extracts 
from FCO guidelines on travelling to/in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Figure 7. FCO advice for travel to/in Sierra Leone
Travelling to/in Sierra Leone
Almost all international flights to Sierra Leone arrive during, or shortly before, the hours of darkness.  We 
advise against all road or sea transfers between Freetown and Lungi outside of daylight hours (dusk is 
around 1900 hours). This is due to the absence of navigational lights on boats and ferries, the hazards of 
driving at night in Sierra Leone, the decreased likelihood of help reaching you in the event of an 
emergency, and your increased vulnerability to crime. 
FCO staff only travel by day outside Freetown and at moderate speeds using competent, well-rested 
drivers driving in convoys of at least two vehicles suitable for travel on badly-rutted unmade roads. You 
should take precautions when travelling and avoid demonstrations. The main roads from Freetown to 
Makeni and Mile 91 are tarmacked and suitable for most types of vehicle. The majority of other roads 
outside Freetown are constructed from rocks and mud, with frequent potholes. During the rainy season 
(May to October) rural roads can become difficult to use, even for off-road vehicles. Illegal roadblocks 
are sometimes put up by youths… occasionally those manning the roadblock will be armed. Roadblocks 
are most common at the weekend… they are easily distinguishable from the legal checkpoints erected by 
police, who are uniformed and normally use marked barriers or vehicles to indicate where drivers should 
stop. The safest response to seeing an illegal roadblock ahead of you is to turn the car around before 
reaching it and use an alternative route. Stopping at a roadblock and winding down your window could 
allow someone to reach into your vehicle. 
We advise against using the private taxis and "poda-podas" (minibuses) that provide transport along fixed 
routes in Freetown and the Western Area. They are often crowded and not subject to European road safety 
standards. There have been several incidents recently of Western passengers in public taxis and poda-
podas having belongings stolen. Serious road accidents occur quite frequently in Sierra Leone due to the 
hazardous driving conditions, poor vehicle maintenance and erratic driving. All roads are unlit and 
potholes are common, especially during the rainy season (May to October). The emergency service
response to accidents in Freetown is very slow and unreliable. Outside the capital you should assume that 
there would be no emergency service response to an accident. 
   
                                                
75
In countries where there are high numbers of UN, humanitarian and development organizations, the cost 
of accommodation invariably becomes inflated to levels on a par with that in advanced countries.  Source: 
Interview with senior representative of the UNDP, Freetown, 15
th
October 2008.
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Figure 8. FCO advice for travel to/in Liberia
Travelling to/in Liberia
You should not travel to Liberia unless you have made adequate security arrangements with a reliable 
organisation in advance of your arrival.  You should also check the security situation before travelling to 
any part of the country.  Public transport (including taxis) may be neither reliable nor safe; you are 
advised not to use local public transport.  You should arrange for private transport in advance of arrival.  
We advise against all but essential travel to all areas of Liberia outside the capital, Monrovia, and in 
particular against spending the night outside Monrovia.  UNMIL and the local security services are less 
able to offer assistance outside the capital. The availability of secure accommodation in most towns and in 
rural areas is very limited.  Medical facilities are even more basic than in Monrovia, and in many areas 
non-existent.  Many organisations, including the UN and the US Embassy, impose restrictions on staff 
travel outside Monrovia.  If you decide to travel outside Monrovia, you should avoid travelling alone...
Road conditions are generally poor.  Apart from a small number of major roads in central Monrovia, all 
roads are unlit. Driving and road conditions deteriorate significantly during the rainy season (May to 
November), and many roads may become impassable. You should make precautionary arrangements for 
dealing with breakdowns with the general security situation in mind, including considering travel with 
more than one vehicle.  Traffic accidents can quickly draw hostile crowds, who may attempt to take justice 
into their own hands.  You should use a local driver outside Monrovia and in the high density areas rather 
than driving oneself.  The standard of driving is generally poor.  You should be prepared to stop at 
checkpoints operated by UNMIL, the Liberian National Police, or other Liberian security authorities, 
which are found on roads throughout the country.  You should also immediately pull over to the side of the 
road when instructed by security forces accompanying VIP convoys.  The rainy season (May to November) 
makes travel to outlying areas particularly difficult and hazardous.
I found most of the advice given by the FCO, particularly that against travelling in the 
local minibuses, to be well-founded (see Section 5.12 above), but for a lone researcher 
without access to the transport and secure accommodation enjoyed by the humanitarian 
and development communities, there is little choice.  One option was to hire a 
motorcycle, but having done so for a week, I decided that the dangers of public transport 
were preferable to the dangers and inconveniences of negotiating West African roads on 
a motorcycle in the rainy season.76  There were a few days of my research trip that were 
particularly educational as to the hazards of travel in West Africa, and the ingenuity of 
the providers and users of various modes of transport.  The days in question also 
reflected the frustration I quite often experienced when trying to arrange interviews.  The 
following extract is an abridged account of some of those days.
                                                
76
Having turned up for a pre-arranged interview after one such motorcycle journey during which I had 
accumulated a coating of mud, the respondent called the interview off “for reasons of time” (See: Supra, 
Note 36).  
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Figure 9.  Extract from Field Research Notes.
77
Thursday 13
th
November.  
After yesterday’s unproductive day – one of two respondents didn’t show at Harbel, the other was of 
limited use, my Liberian cell phone sim card packed up, ergo unable to make contact with any potential 
respondents at UNMIL – decided to head to Tubman Boulevard, and straight in to UNMIL HQ.  Asked if I 
could see somebody from the public information office.  UN official told me to take a seat. Another person 
came in and asked, also, to see a public information officer.  UN official gestured towards the seats.  This 
person had obviously been here before; introduced myself.  Investigator for a Human Rights NGO, 
looking into DynCorp’s re-training of the Liberian Army.  Asked if I could have a formal interview later.  
Refused flatly, but relented when it seemed that my area of research (which was received in a very 
negative way) might be useful in terms of interview leads.  Interrupted by a smiling UN official.  
Introduced himself as Michael, and asked us individually, what we wanted.  Very helpful; made some calls 
and scheduled an interview with an UNMIL representative for me, for tomorrow morning.  Arranged to 
meet the ‘investigator’ at 5pm.  Met Richard Stanley (researcher from Oxford University) for lunch; he’s 
completed his scheduled interviews and is looking for new leads.  Suggested he go to UNMIL and ask if 
he can see a public information officer.
Taxi picked me up at exactly the pre-arranged time.  Interesting chat with the driver, Sam, on the way to 
Roberts Field; pointed out that William Tolbert rubs noses with his murderer, Samuel Doe, in most 
Liberians’ pockets every day (Tolbert’s picture is on the LRD100 note, Doe’s on the LRD50 note). 
Respondent at Roberts Field was a former AFL officer, now a senior security official at the airport.  
Highly knowledgeable on the subjects of PMCs, the Mano River Wars, and the development of Liberia 
since the end of the civil war.  Very useful interview.  Sam had agreed to wait, but was nowhere to be 
seen.  Hadn’t yet paid him anything, so I waited; realized that I hadn’t mastered the African approach to 
time.  Very fidgety by the time he reappeared, but got me to Bella Casa (the investigator’s hotel) on time.  
Long, difficult interview; respondent was very negative, and not very objective, but I got some 
information that put different angles on some of the data I’d collected the previous week.  Definitely 
worthwhile for me, but not entirely mutually beneficial; asked me, after the interview, for information 
about some of my respondents, which I explained I couldn’t divulge.  Meeting ended very tensely.
Friday 14
th
November. 
8am. Back to Pan African Plaza for interview with UNMIL representative.  Useful interview – new data,
from an authoritative source, and puts much of my previous data into context.  Also corroborates some 
data I had thought questionable.  Ventured, politely, to get the respondent to elicit more information about 
reports of rebel activity in Côte d’Ivoire last week.  Other than confirming that UN patrols along the 
Ivoirian border have been stepped up, he played down the significance, but talking to Michael on the way 
back to the reception area, he commented that there’s been a buzz around UNMIL HQ this week. There 
were also extensive UN troop movements under way on my arrival in Liberia.
                                                
77
Note: Some names have been changed.  See Section 5.5.8.
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Waited around the reception area; Michael managed to get another UNMIL representative to agree to an 
interview later in the morning, which also went well.  Respondent was very informed on SSR and 
elections.  Tried to get leads for further interviews, but he holds little hope while the Côte d’Ivoire 
situation continues. Informed me it’s unlikely to change until after the Ivoirian elections (voting was 
scheduled for 30
th
November, but not looking likely – UN Security Council met on 10
th
to express 
concerns).   Did manage, however, to get allocated a slot on a computer in the media centre.  Very little 
about the reports of increased rebel activity that wasn’t in Monday’s edition of the New Democrat.  
Seemed like there was an air of resentment from the other people using the media centre.  Looked through 
the UN staff list for potential respondents and used the computer to back up as much of my interview data 
as I could; managed to back up 6 of 11 interviews before being told, politely, that I’d exceeded my time.  
Left UNMIL for meeting with representative of InterAction (Council for International Action, a US 
NGO).  No taxis, walked, got stopped by plain clothes immigration officers demanding to know why I’d 
been granted an extended visa on entry (visitors to Liberia are usually stamped to report to the immigration 
office within 48 hours after arrival, and have to return to immigration to request an exit visa seven days or 
less before departure; I had managed to circumvent this).  Paid the ‘fee’ they required for my having 
inconvenienced them, and the irregularity regarding my visa, and made my way to Sinkor.
Arrived very late.  Fortunately, the respondent had been in theatre long enough to understand the situation.  
Interview was informative, data-rich, and involved real coffee! (from the respondent’s personal supply; 
definitely the highlight of my day so far – very productive interview, the first real coffee I’ve had since 
August, no congealed milk powder floating on top).  Met Richard back at Pan African Plaza after the 
interview; he was having the same problem finding potential respondents for interviews.  Little chance of 
setting any up over the weekend, and not looking good with the current situation.  Considered my position 
– 13 interviews during my time in Liberia, most of them worthwhile, a wealth of useful data, plenty of 
scope for cross-referencing and triangulation.  No leads on the horizon, and my visa has two days left.  
Decided it would be a good idea to use the dead time over the weekend to travel to Bo, where my WFP 
contact would be staying until Monday.  No time to get a UNHAS flight (had managed to get to get to 
Liberia on a UN Humanitarian Air Service flight from Lungi to Roberts), so when I got back to Logan 
Town, I asked the market traders (from whom I’d been buying most of my food) the best way to get to the 
border.  They suggested I travel with a reliable driver they knew, who would charge US$30.  Checked the 
price with some other traders who said it was about right.  Richard hadn’t had any luck with potential 
respondents, so persuaded him to travel with me so we could split the cost of the journey to the border.
Saturday 15
th
November.
Gave the market traders a few dollars (making sure I kept enough for ‘fees’ on the way to the border).  
First time I’ve handed money over sans duress, which runs against the advice I’d been given, but they’ve 
been incredibly helpful, and my logic is that it could be useful to have a ready source of local knowledge 
should I need to do further research in Liberia.  Driver was punctual; shouldn’t generalize, but my 
experience has been that Liberians seem on the whole to have a greater sense of urgency than Sierra 
Leoneans.  Left at 6am sharp; journey to the border (Bo Waterside) took a lot longer than anticipated, due 
to stops at various immigration ‘checkpoints’ along the route.  The journey also cost more than expected 
(US$30 fare, and roughly the same again in ‘small small’ to immigration officials).  The official at the 
border told Richard his visa wasn’t in order.  He was furious.  Didn’t even ask what the fee would be to 
rectify it; negotiated a price with our driver for his journey back to the embassy in Monrovia.  Said our
goodbyes, and I carried on across the border.
Pushed for time, so paid my additional ‘exit fee’ to the last immigration officer without arguing and 
crossed the bridge into Jendema.  Found the next bush taxi that was due to leave, booked my seat, and 
bought some breakfast at a stall (jollof rice with just peanut sauce – decided to play it safe before taking a 
long journey; avoided the chicken).  Used the time to talk to the other people at the stall about the civil 
war, from the initial RUF incursion into this (Pujehan) district until the cessation of hostilities, and how 
life has changed for them since the end of the war.  Found an interesting elder citizen – not wholly lucid, 
and seemingly not entirely sober (despite it being not yet 9am), who gave me an account that became more 
fascinating he elaborated… and, unfortunately for the needs of my research, less believable.  The driver’s 
‘assistant’ added my bag to the mountain of baggage on the roof of the taxi (the ubiquitous 1970s Peugeot 
504 estate), and I took my place with the driver, his assistant, and the eleven other passengers travelling to 
Kenema.  Journey was billed as a 7-hour jaunt, a target that looked less and less likely with each mile we 
put behind us.
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Fortunately, had an intelligent and interesting character sitting next to me.  Robert, a Liberian, had married 
a Sierra Leonean while a refugee during the civil war, and now travels between Robertsport and Kenema.  
My probing conversations with him were interrupted frequently; whenever the vehicle had to negotiate 
anything more than a slight incline, we had to dismount and walk – or help to push.
        
I was deep in conversation with Robert the first time our vehicle broke down.  We climbed out and helped 
to push it out of what our driver called a ‘puddle’, onto the flattest piece of road we could find. 
After much discussion between the driver and his assistant, followed by a long period of dismantling, the 
problem was found to be a broken rear half-axle.  Thinking this would be the end of our journey in this 
particular vehicle, I asked the driver, what would happen next.  His answer was to produce, from a bag 
he’d pulled out of the mountain of baggage on the roof, a spare half-axle.  I marveled at this 
resourcefulness, and now understood why his assistant, whose sole action so far had been to load the 
baggage, was such an indispensible addition, taking up a valuable seat for the entire journey.  It took him 
less than an hour, with the most basic of tools, to fit the new half-axle and get us once again on our way.
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I wondered, while this work was being carried out, how long and costly a process it would be to obtain and 
replace a half-axle in the UK, and how many middle-men would be involved.  My thoughts were disturbed 
by a high-pitched buzzing around my ears, and I realized why had the other passengers had walked so far 
away from the vehicle.  They were sat in the shade, a sensible distance away from the pools of standing 
water around the car, chatting and laughing, completely nonplussed about the major mechanical repairs 
being carried out on their transport.
After a further 90 minutes of slow progress, we broke down a second time.  This time, it was a rear wheel 
bearing that had failed, on the opposite side to the replaced half-axle. The bearing was quickly replaced 
(they had a spare, of course) and we were on our way again, but only for a short time before the 
replacement bearing failed.  There was no second replacement; for spare parts, bush taxi operators are 
dependent on a supply of vehicles that have either crashed or are beyond repair, and can be ‘cannibalized’.   
Our driver’s view of this haphazard element to his inventory of spares? “It makes for an interesting life.”
I talked to the other passengers while the driver and his assistant considered their options.  During the civil 
war the RUF had commandeered all the taxis; some of the drivers lost their vehicles and their livelihoods.
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My friend Robert advised me to prepare for a long wait.  I spent the next few hours getting to know my 
fellow passengers; their resignation and good humour were impressive. This journey was not the worst I’d 
had during my field research trip so far; I was gaining a valuable insight into the impact of the civil war 
and intervention, and the lack of impact of reforms of government institutions and the security sector, on 
the lives of ordinary Liberians and Sierra Leoneans.  I made the most of my time with these resilient and 
resourceful people.  At around 3pm, a motorcyclist approached and was flagged down by our driver (we 
had been on the road for 6 hours at this stage, and were not yet a third of the way to our destination).  A 
few minutes later, the driver’s assistant was on the back of the motorcycle, off to seek a replacement 
bearing.  Some 3½ hours later, as dusk was falling, we heard once more the welcome buzz of the two-
stroke engine.  By 7pm we were on our way again.  Those of my fellow passengers who had had the 
foresight to bring food had long finished it.  Having only brought water, I was getting very hungry.  4½ 
hours later, after numerous stops to let the engine cool down, we arrived in Kenema.  I went with Robert to 
a stall for something to eat.  It had the shape, texture and taste of the chargrilled ears of some small animal.  
Phoned my WFP contact in Bo to tell her that I was considering overnighting in Kenema, but she advised 
against it and told me to get the midnight bus.  Despite it being full, I managed to persuade the driver to 
allow me to travel, at a price, and spent the journey perched on a one-legged stool, with a small, padded 
seat, between the driver’s seat and the door.  Had it not been such a tight squeeze, and had the roads to Bo 
been as bad as those from Jendema to Kenema, I would have fallen off several times when sleep overtook 
me.  My friend from the WFP, who was waiting when I arrived at Bo, realised there was no chance of 
getting a conversation out of me.  Understood also that I was very hungry.  Bread and Happy Cow cheese 
for supper – interesting dreams.
Sunday 16
th
November
Very frustrating day.  Contacted Will, the minerals dealer I’d met in Freetown, to arrange a meeting in Bo, 
and to discuss leads for interviews with the mining community here.  Told me he had to leave for Kailahun 
later today, but could see me briefly.  Met for lunch; he provided some very useful information and 
insights into the political economy of mineral resources at every level, from multinationals to artisan 
prospectors.  Had to cut the interview short when his driver turned up; didn’t provide any further leads, but 
agreed to accommodate me in Kailahun for a couple of nights next week, and to introduce me to some 
potential respondents for my research.  Spent the rest of the day going into the various diamond dealers’ 
premises on the off chance that I could get an impromptu interview (no joy).  Followed up a lead I had 
been given by my friend Obi (who had been visiting Freetown from London to arrange his wedding) at the 
Kindoya Hospital, but was told when I arrived there that my contact would not be back until later the 
following week.  A further contact, Paul, an NGO coordinator, had left Bo for Lungi, but told me he would 
meet for an interview when I got back to Freetown, and could give me details of some potential 
respondents.  Spoke later to my WFP contact, who was leaving the following day for Freetown.  Told me 
she could get her driver to drop me off at Kissy, for the ferry to Lungi.  Accepted the offer of a 
(comparatively) comfortable ride back to Freetown, on the basis that little was happening in Bo, I had 
several leads to follow up, and the journey to Kissy in a Land Cruiser would be by far the fastest option.
170
Monday 17
th
November
Left early, and made impressive progress; less than six hours for a journey of some150 miles. Phoned 
Paul on arrival at Kissy.  Considered taking a pirogue which was about to leave, but he advised against it.  
Had fish & fufu for lunch, while I waited for the ferry.
Paul was waiting at the terminal when I arrived.  Interview made the effort worthwhile, and produced a 
number of good leads.  Talked informally to some of Paul’s colleagues; mixed reaction to my research, but 
some useful information was forthcoming.  Had to rush to get back to the ferry port while it was still light. 
Took a pirogue back; I now understand the risks.  No lights (with dusk falling), no life jackets, no method 
of signaling distress.  Worth it for the experience, but would only do it again if there were no other option.
Tuesday 18
th
November.
Phoned a respondent I had interviewed in my first week in Sierra Leone at State House, and asked if I 
could do a follow-up (motive being to get into State House with a view to arranging more interviews).  
Too busy, but agreed to answer some questions on the phone.  Asked how I should go about arranging 
meetings with Ministry representatives.  Gave me some numbers, and I spent the next three hours being 
refused.  Called into a couple of the lunchtime haunts usually frequented by the development community.  
Very quiet, but met Ahmed, a local security consultant who had been involved with the CDFs in the civil 
war (who I had interviewed the week before leaving for Liberia).  Introduced me to his colleague, Mo, 
who was a former CDF combatant, and had run a bar on Lumley Beach before it was demolished by the 
OSD.
78
  Asked if I could interview him; he wanted money.  Explained that it would be ethically wrong for 
me to ‘buy’ an interview.  Ahmed suggested, as he left to go back to work, that we talk over a drink or 
two, which turned out, for a time, to be a good move.  Mo became more talkative after his second and third 
drinks – and proved to be more useful in terms of usable data than I had anticipated.  Very productive 
interview, and he also had a family contact in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Things started to get 
slightly difficult when he became loud and bitter about the prison sentences that had been handed to CDF 
leaders by the Sierra Leonean Special Court,
79
for which he blamed external interference.  Diverted his 
attention by buying him another beer and extricated myself.
80
Spent the rest of the afternoon transcribing 
and arranging interviews for the coming week.
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On 8
th
October, a large contingent of Police and OSD personnel demolished every bar on the beach at 
Cockerill Bay.  This was a move by the Department of Tourism to make the beach more ‘tourist friendly’.
79
Two CDF leaders, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, received sentences of 15 and 20 years 
respectively, in connection with human rights abuses and the use of child soldiers by their CDFs.  Many 
Sierra Leoneans find it difficult to understand why those they considered to be liberators had to face trial.
80
Mo contacted me again through Ahmed, and some two weeks later I was able to interview his contact in 
the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Internal Affairs.
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5.14  Field Research – Emergent Themes
The most difficult element of this analysis has been the building of a determinant 
conceptual framework, due primarily to the difficulty in conclusively allocating 
inductive data sets to superordinate categories.  This is, necessarily, driven by the need 
to encompass the number and complexity of overlapping spheres impacted by aspects of 
PMC activity, and requires analysis of each data set as a part of several inductive 
categories.  Examples of this, in the themes emerging from this research, are embedded 
in the conflicting viewpoints as to those activities that comprise, or should comprise, 
concepts of peacekeeping and development, and those expediencies of a neo-liberal 
consensus not driven by the true requisites of these concepts.  Compounding this 
variance in views are perceptions of PMCs as agents of democracy, as expediters of the 
neo-liberal consensus, as foreign policy proxies, or even as mercenaries.  The building of 
the conceptual framework has therefore had to encompass all these viewpoints in every 
instance of data analysis.  Dominant themes emerging from the field research were:
5.14.1 PMCs
Few of the respondents spoke about PMCs in isolation; even when asked directly 
for their views and perceptions, most interviewees related the activities of PMCs to 
their own specific role, task, or area of expertise.  Themes emerging from 
discussions specifically of the nature and characteristics of PMCs were:
 Perceptions and attitudes towards PMCs
 Perceptions of PMCs as mercenaries
 Capacity and Capability of PMCs
 Suitability of PMCs in Political and Economic terms
 Legal status of PMCs
5.14.2 PMC Operations
Emerging from this category, and clearly delineated from each other by 
respondents, were themes relating to PMCs’ tasks, activities and perceived roles:
 PMCs in Security Sector Reform
 PMCs in support of the State
 PMCs in Humanitarian Operations
172
5.14.3 The final category, which comprises the most contentious and unsettled 
issues surrounding the use of PMCs, encompasses the following themes:
 The prospect of PMCs as peacekeepers
 The morality of PMCs
 PMCs and Human Rights
 The threat to state sovereignty
 Prospects for national and international regulation
5.15 Framework for Fieldwork Analysis
Among the themes that have stood out during the field research, three have emerged as 
superordinate categories vis-à-vis their relationship with the subcategories most 
significant to this thesis’ analysis of PMCs.  This has been confirmed, throughout the 
research process, by the levels of importance placed on these themes by the respondents 
taking part.  First, and most prominent, is the variance in perceptions of PMCs and their 
activities, and the extent to which these perceptions drive attitudes towards PMCs.  
Second is the effect of their use, particularly in weak, failing, and post-conflict states, 
and the impact these practices have on the wider security situation.  The third 
superordinate category is policy, in terms of external involvement in African states, and 
the part played by PMCs in that involvement, and, most importantly for this study, on 
policies regarding the use and potential regulation of PMCs.
5.15.1 Commonalities
Common to all superordinate categories are, firstly, that the proliferation of PMCs 
in Africa is a consequence of state failure, and, secondly, that they are being used as 
part of a solution.  The first of these commonalities is not a disputed issue; the 
second, whether it is right for PMCs to be used as part of a solution to problems 
faced by African states, has been by far the most contentious element of this study, 
and it remains one of the central questions for this thesis.  
5.15.2 Perceptions
Throughout the field research, two factors regarding perceptions of PMCs have 
stood out.  Most prominent has been the immense gulf in attitudes towards PMCs in 
the popular mindset, between African states in which the research was carried out, 
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and states from which the PMCs in question originate.  The second issue that stands 
out is the palpable difference in perceptions, and thus in attitudes, between those 
whose work connects them with PMCs, and those who have no contact with these 
organizations.  Impacting further on these perceptions are respondents’ concepts of 
the nature of African states, particularly in terms of the impact of failures in 
governance, and of corruption.  Conceptions of the characteristics of weak African 
states are a primary influence on attitudes towards external involvement – whether 
by PMCs or other actors – in those states.  Liberia and Sierra Leone are clear 
exemplars of such characteristics, as they typify the attributes of states in which the 
political situation has contributed to the proliferation of PMCs.  
On the same note, the perceptions of many of the respondents involved in this 
research are guided by Western political thought.  It is important to ask the question, 
where African states are concerned, as to whether this is apt in considering the 
political aspects of situations that have given rise to the involvement of PMCs.  
Indeed, in wider academic terms, one must consider whether the predominance of 
the application of Western political precepts is wholly apt in the analysis of such 
situations – past and present – in African states. 
5.15.3 External factors
On these bases, analysis of data in the following chapters takes into consideration 
the impact of respondents’ conceptions of the African political landscape –
particularly those of socio-political organization in African states, relative to their 
levels of ‘stateness’. The analysis therefore draws from aspects of these conceptions 
discussed in depth in Chapter 3. To the same end, the analysis compares the 
perceptions of respondents taking part in the field research, with those drawn from 
wider sources.  Further, this is applied comparatively, to the weak states in which 
PMCs relevant to this study operate, and to the strong states in which they originate. 
5.16 Analytical Framework
The framework for analysis follows on from the superordinate categories identified 
earlier in this chapter, and on the key issues surrounding the subcategories emanating 
from these themes.  The first of these themes – ‘Perceptions’ – was by far the most 
contentious, the most energetically argued by respondents, and the most prodigious in 
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terms of data.  In order to address all the aspects of this theme fully, it is dealt with in 
two chapters, the first of which, Chapter 7, deals with perceptions of PMCs as 
mercenaries.  The superordinate categories that emerged in the data coding process for 
this theme are outlined in Section 5.16.1.  The second chapter under this theme, Chapter 
8 – deals with perceptions of activities carried out by PMCs, the individual categories 
being detailed in Section 5.16.2.  The other dominant themes – ‘PMCs in Practice’ and 
‘Prospects for PMCs in Peacekeeping Operations’ – are analysed in Chapters 9 and 10.  
The superordinate categories dealt with in these chapters are outlined at 5.16.3 and 
5.16.4 respectively.
5.16.1 Perceptions of PMCS as Mercenaries
 ‘Modern’ mercenaries and PMCs
 The nature and characteristics of PMCs
 The issue of definition
5.16.2 Perceptions of the use of PMCs
 Undermining state sovereignty
 Economic ‘recolonization’
 Foreign policy proxies
5.16.3 PMCs in Practice
 Security Sector Reform
 Support for state institutions and empowerment of the weak state
 Securing the ‘Humanitarian Space’
5.16.4 The Prospect of PMCs as Peacekeepers
 Prospects for the involvement of PMCs in Peacekeeping Operations
 The moral dimension
 Arguments against the use of PMCs
Critical analysis of gathered data surrounding these emergent themes is carried out in the 
following chapters.
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Chapter 6
Research Context: Conflict and Peacekeeping in the Mano River Region
6.1 Introduction
Key criteria for the selection of states for field research case studies were, firstly, that 
there must be sustained PMC activity over a representative period; i.e. a period 
encompassing the initial emergence of PMCs and the development of both the market 
for their services and that of the companies providing those services.  Secondly, in order 
to address the hypothesis that PMCs are a viable option for involvement in peacekeeping 
operations, there must be a sizeable component of peacekeeping in the equation, with a 
credible element of direct PMC involvement.  
Two states that have seen prolonged PMC activity, together with large scale 
peacekeeping missions carried out not only by the UN, but also by regional 
organizations – both supported by PMCs – are the neighboring West African states of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Entrenched in the colonial histories and post-colonial political 
development of these neighbouring West African states are the characteristics of states 
and statehood in Africa discussed at length in Chapter 3.  This chapter will explore the 
relationship between these characteristics and the conflicts that erupted, and will draw 
comparisons with the political situation in other African states.  It will also analyse the 
nature of peacekeeping interventions that took place in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and 
will evaluate the effects of the involvement of PMCs, both as adjuncts to those 
interventions and in the wider security situation in both states.
Significant to the central theme of this thesis – and illustrative of conditions, highlighted 
in the preceding chapters, that have given rise to the involvement of PMCs in Africa –
are analogous elements of the political trajectories of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  What 
appear at first to be striking contrasts in their foundations – Liberia’s long independence, 
compared with the colonial legacy of Sierra Leone – belie remarkable parallels in their 
historical formation and emergence as nation-states.  This is reflected in the development 
of both states, and is representative of the political situation that has emerged in many 
other African states.
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6.2 Research Background
Fundamental to consideration of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are aspects of 
these states’ historical background, political development, and political economy.  These 
aspects relate to themes drawn out in Chapters 3 and IV, relevant to the emergence of 
PMC activity in Africa.  This chapter will consider the key factors bringing about the 
conflicts: the colonial legacies of both states,81 the presence of high value natural 
resources, the coercive and wealth-accumulative practices of ruling elites, the 
development of excessive forms of neopatrimonialism,82 and the emergence of security 
vacuums giving rise to conflict and warlordism.  Although there are identifiable 
‘triggering’ occurrences in both conflicts, the root causes were deeply-entrenched, with 
origins stretching back many decades.
While it is not the aim of this chapter to conduct in-depth historical analyses, there are 
elements of the colonial and post-colonial eras that have a significant bearing on later 
events, both in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, and these must be considered in terms of 
their relevance to the political context in which conflict occurred, and to the situation 
that now prevails in both states.  The latter is important because it relates to current, 
post-conflict involvement of PMCs.  Aspects of the historical emergence of both states 
will, therefore, be discussed in this chapter, specifically because their relevance to the 
relationship between the exercise of power – in terms of coercive, wealth-accumulative, 
and distributive practices – and the socio-economic situation in the state over which that 
power is exercised,83 drives and links the conflicts that occurred in both states. 
Resource wealth is another key factor in the involvement of PMCs in African states, and 
this is exemplified by the situation that developed in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s.  The wider consequences of that situation, and its impact from sub-regional to 
international levels, have far-reaching implications for peacekeeping interventions.  
Equally, they have implications for the involvement – current and prospective – of 
PMCs in those operations, and there are pertinent examples of this involvement in the 
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states under discussion here.  This chapter will examine both the wider consequences of 
the Mano River Wars,84 and their implications for the involvement of PMCs in 
peacebuilding operations.
6.3 The Mano River
The border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, from the coast to about 50 miles inland, is 
formed by the Mano River.  The river enters Liberia from its source in the highlands of 
Guinea, which abuts the northern borders of both states, and the river basin is straddled 
along its entire length by Liberia to the East, and Sierra Leone to the West.  The basin, 
flood plains, and delta of the Mano river are endowed with alluvial deposits of some of 
the most valuable minerals in the world,85 the most abundant of which are aluminium 
hydroxide, commonly known as bauxite,86 and rutile, a titanium ore, the rich composition 
of which, along the Mano River in particular, makes it the most sought-after of the 
titanium oxide ores.87  Most pertinent, however, to the conflicts that took its name, is that 
the basin, flood plains and delta of the Mano River are among the world’s most prolific 
sources of large diamonds.  Being alluvial, no complex mining facilities are needed for 
their extraction, and the desire for control of this accessible, easily-smuggled mineral 
resource was one of the most significant contributory factors in the protracted nature of 
the conflicts in the Mano River states that started in Liberia in 1989.88  It was central also 
to the involvement of PMCs during, and subsequent to, those conflicts. 
6.4 The Mano River Union
The Mano River Declaration, signed in 1973 by Presidents William Tolbert of Liberia 
and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, was conceived for the purpose of bringing about a 
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customs union between their respective states.  From that declaration emerged the Mano 
River Union (MRU).  This preceded, by two years, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), an organization with the same aim as the MRU – that of 
economic integration – but on a wider, regional, basis.89  Guinea later joined the MRU –90
a reflection both of commonalities in the nature of resources in this tripartite sub-region, 
and in the levels of trade being conducted across its borders.91  By 1981, instruments of 
economic co-operation within the MRU had progressed to the inclusion of agreed trade 
levels, an intra-union liberalization of goods of local origin, and a common external 
tariff.92
But the promise held by these impressive agreements had little hope of manifesting itself 
in the period following the boom of the 1970s, when the collapse of global commodity 
prices brought about a disastrous economic situation for the African continent as a 
whole.  This was an era that exposed, in many African states, the degree to which 
neopatrimonial practices relied so much upon, and stripped so much of, the wealth 
generated by their natural resources.93  
This situation was amplified in Liberia and Sierra Leone by the extreme forms of 
neopatrimonialism that had been cultivated in those states.94  Despite the economic 
decline and poor governance experienced in both states during the 1980s and 1990s, it 
was assumed that their centres of power were strong enough – in terms both of 
patronage, and of the instruments of coercive force – to deal with any internal threat.  
Stephen Riley, in 1996, commented:
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“Few observers expected that the two small West African states of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone would become embroiled in civil 
conflict…. their shaky systems of rule were backed up by small but 
privileged standing armies and police forces.  It was assumed that 
any threat to the established regimes had been bought off by 
patronage in Sierra Leone or crushed by Liberia’s more repressive 
regime”.95
When conflict erupted in Liberia late in 1989, it was expected neither to be protracted 
nor far-reaching, but the ripples that emanated from it were felt for many years, in many 
West African states.  None, however, would be affected so deeply, or for so long, as the 
states on Liberia’s northern and western borders, Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, 
Guinea.  Trade – formal and informal – across the expansive and permeable borders of 
these three states had brought about a close relationship between them, even before the 
inception of the MRU.  Factors that drew Guinea into the conflict that had erupted to its 
south included the proximity of its highlands – the source of the Mano and other 
resource-rich rivers – to some of the richest diamond-fields, the use of its terrain as a 
base for the launching of cross-border attacks by parties to the conflict, and, ultimately, 
incursions into its territory by the RUF in a disastrous, failed attempt to destabilize the 
country.96  While not a driver of the conflict, Guinea’s role, and the use of its territory, 
impacted on its course.
The political background, and the prevailing political situations in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, will be analysed in this chapter relevant to the eruption and spread of conflict in 
those states.  Guinea’s relevance to this thesis is limited to the extent that it was affected 
by, and subsequently involved in, the conflict.  The prevailing situation in Guinea was 
not a driver of conflict; neither has it been a driver of PMC activity.  Guinea will not 
therefore be subject to extensive analysis in this thesis.  
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6.5 Liberia – Country Profile
Figure 10. Map of Liberia
6.5.1 Political Background
Liberia is a paradox insofar as its history, far from what might be expected of a state 
founded on the ‘love of liberty’, is characterized by political repression and social 
deprivation.  Its establishment in 1822 by the American Colonization Society 
determined that a political system, based – uniquely in Africa – on that of the 
United States, was in place when it emerged as the first independent African state in 
1847.  America’s interest in the territory had been limited to its usefulness as a 
solution to the problem of freed slaves in the United States; it held no colonial 
expedient for the U.S., who compelled the settlers to declare themselves an 
independent sovereign state some 25 years after their arrival.  The resettlement, 
during that quarter-century, of former slaves and their descendants – who became 
known as ‘Americo-Liberians’ – would shape the basis on which Liberian society 
was formed.  In particular, the self-identity of these settlers, as culturally separate 
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and superior to the indigenous inhabitants, would engender mutual hostility and 
mistrust that would endure to feed conflict some 170 years after the first settlement.  
Put simply, the territory that became the ‘independent’ state of Liberia, just as other 
African states, was colonized – not by an external power, but by settlers who had 
established the coastal enclave of Monrovia.
Control of trade played an important role for the small elite of Americo-Liberians.  
Even before the formalization of political control, the economic raison d’être of 
their coastal settlement was trade with the interior, for the purpose of feeding 
external commerce.  This is a situation replicated in many such enclaves in Africa, 
and as with those enclaves, it was the maintenance of external commerce that drove 
the involvement of non-state and para-state security actors in Liberia in the early 
1900s.97  From the 1990s, similar involvement, driven by the same expedients, was 
conducted by PMCs.98  These situations in Liberia, both early and recent, are a truly 
accurate illustration of James Ferguson’s hypothesis that, while mineral wealth and 
violence are not predestined to co-exist in every case, there are many cases where:
“…in specific industries (especially certain forms of mineral 
extraction), and with the help of specific institutional innovations 
(especially the privatization of security), capital investment can be 
institutionalized in ways that make it possible to cut the ‘overhead’ 
of a nation-level societal project and to provide political order 
‘flexibly’ on an as-needed basis...”99
Uprisings by ethnic groups, driven by taxation, appropriation of land, and control of 
trade, were commonplace in Liberia until 1915, when a destructive and 
destabilizing rebellion by the Kru was put down brutally by the U.S. trained 
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Liberian Frontier Force (LFF).100  This is pertinent to this thesis because the 
assistance and training of Liberian troops has parallels in latter-day Liberia, albeit 
by PMCs rather than U.S. troops.  Most relevant to this thesis are the implications of 
PMCs in roles similar to that of the LFF – as foreign policy proxies – and this is an 
area of focus for the field research in Liberia.
Violence on the scale of these early uprisings was not seen again until the 1990s.  
But ethnic tension, discussed at length in Chapter 3, – the primary source of division 
in African societies,101 an element of most conflict in sub-Saharan Africa,102 and the 
primary cause of the conditions that lead to failing states and the involvement of 
PMCs – was firmly entrenched.  It was the relationship between the coercive, 
wealth-accumulative, and distributive practices of the ruling elite, and the resulting 
socio-economic situation in the hinterland, that had brought it about.
The extreme lopsidedness of Liberia’s development, and of the fruits of its 
economic progress – demonstrated by the distribution of power and wealth more 
than 100 years after its independence – was the primary factor in the escalating level 
of ethnic tension.   Americo-Liberians – comprising, at that time, less than 2% of 
the total population – still imposed rule over the remainder of Liberia’s peoples.  In 
fact, the bulk of power and influence emanated from an oligarchy of no more than a 
dozen closely-related families, still concentrated in their small coastal enclave.103  
The arrival of multinational companies, notably Firestone, which held the promise 
of prosperity for the whole of Liberia, became, instead, a feeding frenzy to the 
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benefit of none but this Americo-Liberian oligarchy:
“The multinationals bought off important people in Liberia’s ruling 
elite, who, in return for personal gain protected the companies’ 
favourable terms.  The revenues which should have flowed to the 
government treasury flowed instead to influential individuals”104
Of importance to this study, during the period of Liberia’s development discussed 
thus far, is that the extreme levels of ethnic tension that had taken root throughout 
the country are characteristic of the political development of states in which conflict 
leads to external intervention, post-conflict reform – most notably in the form of 
structured Security Sector Reform (SSR) – and thus the involvement of PMCs.  The 
latter was to become a feature of large overseas extractive companies in Liberia, 
notably Firestone, which, with its own security system, became, arguably, a state 
within a state.105  The situation in Liberia mirrored that in many other African states, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, and had a significant impact on the emerging political 
landscape.  This situation will now be explored further, in terms of its relation to, 
and effect on, subsequent developments leading to conflict and intervention.
6.5.2 The Transformation from Oligarchy to Neopatrimonialism
The part played by neopatrimonialism in the development of conditions bringing 
about involvement of PMCs in African states,106 became a central feature of Liberian 
politics under President William Tubman.  The benefits of economic growth were 
still confined to groups close to the political elite; few ordinary Liberians would 
derive any benefit from the rapid growth of the 1960s and 70s –107 largely the result 
of post-war U.S. investment.  These benefits brought problems, internally, of their 
own; the influx of foreign money, and the limitation of its benefits to those with 
entrenched trade and family ties, simply exacerbated the social divide.  Christopher 
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Clapham’s observation of the Liberian state, as: “a centralised source of benefits 
which easily outweighed any rewards that could be achieved by genuinely private 
economic activity” was never so true as during this period of Tubman’s 
presidency.108
Tubman did, however, make use of this increased material base to boost the security 
of his own position – by extending his clientele to include many of those outside the 
Americo-Liberian elite in the way that other African leaders cemented their 
positions .109  In the process, he brought about a radical change in Liberian power-
politics – moving them from oligarchic to patrimonial.110  Tubman’s granting, to the 
97% of the population that had never before had it, the right to vote, caused alarm 
among Tubman’s administration, but he regarded it as crucial to his strategy of 
extending his power-base.111  Tubman’s long period in office was characterized 
increasingly by control based on personal loyalty and graft,112 and by a steady 
increase in repression of political opposition, gagging of the press, and the 
establishment of a network of secret police which utilized methods of intimidation, 
violence, arbitrary arrest and detention.113  By the time Tubman died in 1971, during 
his 27
th
year in office, protest and unrest were endemic throughout Liberia.
Private guarding companies, which even then had become an indispensible part of 
Liberia’s extractive industry, were faced with mass unrest.  The private guards at 
the Firestone plantation headquarters in Harbel (ironically named after the founder’s 
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son and daughter-in-law, Harvey and Elizabeth Firestone) were faced with 
widespread protests against human rights abuses, inhumane working conditions and 
the use of child labour by the company.114  At the time, the company employed some 
250,000 Liberians, whose protests were to achieve nothing; even in 2006, working 
conditions at Firestone remained largely unchanged.115
The crisis that had been predicted would erupt on Tubman’s death did not 
materialize, but his understudy of twenty years, William Tolbert, took power at a 
time of serious economic decline and increasing political opposition.  Tolbert did 
not have the political connections of his predecessor.  He had been bequeathed a 
changed political power-system,116 which came with the need for an extensive 
network of adherents to ensure the ruler’s hold on power.  Economic decline 
exacerbated Tolbert’s inability to maintain the power base that had underlined 
Tubman’s later years of rule.  Revenues were no longer sufficient to meet the needs 
of the expansive network of clients that had been assimilated into Tubman’s power-
base, and the capabilities of the government’s coercive machinery became the single 
most important element of Tolbert’s tenure of power.  Civil protest followed the 
harsh laws he introduced to curb the activities of political opponents,117 and the civil 
protest that followed was put down brutally, resulting in the deaths of many 
protestors, and widespread damage to the capital city and its infrastructure.
In power, Tolbert had been stuck between a desire for change – his proposals for 
more indigenous representatives in government had been opposed by his own 
administration – and a self-preservationist leaning towards maintenance of the status 
quo.  This, and his failure to stamp the authority imposed by his predecessor, 
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created a dangerous vacuum.118  On the backdrop of a failing economy, an 
emboldened political opposition, and burgeoning civil unrest, Tolbert’s tenuous 
hold on power and loss of credibility – which had by now extended to the Liberian 
Army – were easily exploited.
In summary, the broadening of the government’s power base during the Tubman 
years had replaced a small, oligarchic elite with an extensive client network whose 
patronage, in a time of economic downturn, was difficult both to maintain, and to 
rekindle – particularly for a new leader.  As would be the case in Sierra Leone just a 
few years later, many of these clients came to understand that loyalty to the 
government was no longer a guarantee of economic security.119  The political shift, 
from oligarchy to neopatrimonialism, is regarded as one of the key causes of the 
conflict that ensued.120  As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of extreme 
forms of neopatrimonialism is a key characteristic of states in which unrest results 
in conflict,121 and circumstances synonymous with intervention and the involvement 
of PMCs.  This was the case in Liberia in the early 1980s.
On 22
nd
April 1980, a few days after just 17 enlisted men of the Liberian army had 
carried out a successful coup in which Tolbert and six of his supporters were killed, 
the public execution of a further 13 members of the cabinet sent a clear message as 
to the intent of Samuel Doe, the Liberian Army sergeant who had masterminded the 
takeover.  Welcomed, initially, by large segments of a population whose hatred of 
the Americo-Liberian elite had simmered for many decades, Doe’s honeymoon 
period was short-lived.  An ethnic Krahn, Doe understood the need to secure and 
extend his power base by building on what patronage remained from the previous 
governments, and through the further assimilation of elites into his own political 
machinery.  The situation in Liberia once again exemplified the description of the 
state as: 
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“a source of power and wealth in which a very broad coalition of 
forces had an interest”.122  
One of the most significant indicators of Doe’s efforts to build a supporting elite 
was a 300% increase, from 1980 to 1983, in the appointment of civil servants, but 
this was primarily an extension of the supplanting of non-Krahn members of 
government that immediately followed Doe’s takeover of power.  Time, however, 
was not on Doe’s side; neither was the economic situation into which he had forced 
his way.  Government revenues had long been diminishing, and had been plundered 
to a level that, as with his predecessor, denied him the ability to draw sufficient 
spoils for those from whom he sought support.  Doe was unable to achieve the 
extent of the assimilation of elites that he desperately needed to secure his power,123
but in the dying stages of the Cold War, U.S. funding for the Liberian Army had 
ensured that he was able to maintain a strong coercive apparatus.  Doe consolidated 
his power through the replacement of senior military officers with members of his 
own ethnic group, the Krahn.  There were three important consequences to Doe’s 
use of the military as an instrument of Krahn-dominated government oppression: 
First, the military had become the sole source of power.124 Second, Doe’s targeting 
of specific groups for persecution by the military had resulted in a further 
weakening of his attempts to assimilate elites into his power base. And third, the 
army itself had become ethnicised and divided.
After three years in power, Doe was acutely aware of the level to which internal 
tensions had risen, and of increasing international pressure, particularly from the 
U.S., for democratization.   He attempted to bring legitimacy to his rule with the 
introduction of a constitution in 1984, and elections the following year.  But these 
tensions were heightened by his ‘victory’ in a farcical election, which was 
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denounced as fraudulent by foreign observers.  The United States’ withdrawal of 
military aid had already made Doe’s hold on power more tenuous; its withdrawal of 
economic assistance after the elections spelt catastrophe for him.
The same year, following a failed coup attempt by former general Thomas 
Quiwonkpa – an ethnic Gio who had been demoted in Doe’s ethnicisation of the 
army –, Doe exacted his revenge with a killing spree of Gio, and of their allies, the 
Mano, in Nimba County.125  The failed coup was exactly the excuse Doe needed to 
clamp down on growing opposition to his government.  Political opponents were 
eliminated through forced exile or assassination,126 newspapers that had been critical 
of the regime were closed down, and Doe’s henchmen went on the offensive.  
Human rights abuses, initially against protesters and dissenting journalists, and then 
against civil society groups, students and members of ethnic groups other than those 
of Doe’s own, were at the centre of violence and repression that would trigger civil 
war.  Any hope of reconciliation had been destroyed by the methods and levels of 
violence employed by Doe to destroy opposition to his rule.127
To summarise, Doe had replaced a small elite and its weak power network with an 
elite drawn from his own Krahn community – a group comprising less than 5% of 
the population – with an equally limited power base.  His implausible attempts to 
bring legitimacy to his military dictatorship by transforming it into an elected 
government had worsened the situation, alienating church groups, trades unions, 
students, and elements of the army.128  Liberia, under Doe, had become a failed state 
– once again, the model of a state in which conditions arise leading to activities 
carried out by PMCs.  
Most relevant, in the situation prevailing in Liberia in the 1980s, to the central 
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hypothesis for this study is the link between the end of the Cold War and the 
increased importance to African leaders of revenue from commodities such as 
timber, rubber and other minerals.129  Also important are, first, the resultant 
relationships between states and the companies extracting their commodities, 
second, the need for effective security on the part of those companies – most often 
driving the need for them to arrange its provision by private means – and third, the 
part played by these commodities on the motives and activities of warlords and 
armed groups.130  These are all elements in the shaping of conflict, and in events 
concurrent with conflict, or subsequent to it, that bring about conditions conducive 
to the involvement of PMCs in African states.  These elements are a marked feature 
of an era that culminated in civil war in Liberia, and that led to intervention and the 
involvement of PMCs.
6.5.3 The Beginning of Rebellion.
Charles Taylor, having run the General Services Agency in Doe’s government, had 
had a taste of the wealth that could be derived from power in Liberia.  In 1984, he 
was arrested in the U.S.A, on a warrant for extradition for the embezzlement of 
some US$900,000 of Liberian government funds.  Taylor’s improbable escape from 
a U.S. prison, his exit, unnoticed, from that country, and his recruitment, in Côte 
d’Ivoire, of a core of fighters for training in Libya,131 were a reflection of the 
abilities he would demonstrate in the years to follow, and a foretaste of his 
inexorable rise to power.
Taylor – a supporter of Quiwonkpa’s attempted coup against Doe – recognized that 
the level and nature of ethnic tension engendered by the actions of Doe’s regime 
presented the ideal opportunity for successful action against him.  This was
punctuated by his initiation of rebellion from the area that had suffered most under 
Doe’s regime, Nimba County, where the Krahn-dominated army had alienated the 
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vast majority of the population.  Taylor’s entry into Nimba County from Côte 
d’Ivoire on Christmas Eve of 1989, with a force of few more than 100 lightly armed 
men – the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – was the trigger that would 
lead to the collapse of Doe’s regime, and to a protracted civil war.  Support for 
Taylor’s rebellion, reflected by the numbers of followers he attracted, and the speed 
with which they were recruited, was remarkable.  Within 6 months, his army was 
nearly 5,000 strong; three months later, that number had nearly doubled.132  This 
reflects the relevance of the ethnic dimension to the Liberian conflict – a dimension 
that is present in every conflict in which UN peacekeepers and PMCs are currently 
involved,133 and, as discussed in Chapter 3, in most conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.
In the early stages of the conflict, Doe’s Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL), rarely met Taylor’s NPFL head-on.  Casualties among the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) and the NPFL were comparatively low in number; the overwhelming 
majority of dead and injured were civilians, and a mass exodus of refugees, into the 
bordering countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, ensued.  There are 
still, even at the time of writing of this chapter, some 75,000 Liberian refugees in 
these three countries, and a further 13,000 internally displaced persons within 
Liberia.134
On the occasions when the NPFL and AFL did actually face each other in combat, 
the army was unable to hold the rebel forces, who gained ground rapidly.  Their 
advance was not stalled even when in-fighting between Taylor and one of his 
confederates, Prince Johnson, led the latter to form a rebel group of his own – the 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) – which eventually 
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numbered some 6,000, concentrated mainly in the north of the country.135  Buoyed 
by their successes against the AFL, and despite the splintering of the rebel 
movement, both factions had advanced to the outskirts of the capital city by July 
1990.  The AFL commander was forced to withdraw the remainder of his army, to 
Monrovia – where it remained for the rest of the war.  While the NPFL controlled 
over 90% of the country, Johnson’s INPFL forces, who had attacked from the north, 
gained most ground in the capital, including the Freeport of Monrovia – an area to 
the north of the city, across the Mesurado River – and it was their occupation of key 
areas of the city that prompted the evacuation of foreign nationals, and precipitated 
intervention.  But this was intervention of a kind not seen before in Africa.
6.5.4 Regional Intervention
The nature of intervention that took place during the Liberian conflict was to impact 
directly on its duration, on the nature of fighting that took place, on its eventual 
outcome, and on the subsequent involvement of PMCs.  There were also regional 
factors that complicated its planning and execution, and it continues to have 
implications for regional intervention elsewhere, notably in the Darfur region of 
Sudan.136  It also has direct implications as to the current situation, with particular 
reference to the part played by the PMCs DynCorp International, Pacific Architects 
and Engineers (PAE), and International Charter Incorporated (ICI), both in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.
The situation in Liberia prompted an ECOWAS summit.  In May 1990, a Standing 
Mediation Committee (SMC) was set up with the aim of bringing about ceasefire in 
Liberia, with a view to arranging new elections.  It failed, and in August, ECOWAS 
convened once again, this time to consider intervention.  Lacking any mandate or 
mechanism through which to set up an intervention force, the establishment of the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) came about through careful manipulation 
– exhorted by representatives of the Nigerian president – of the SMC.
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Many inferences have been drawn from the manner in which ECOMOG came into 
existence, the nature of its operations, and the extent and nature of involvement of 
ECOWAS member states in those operations.  Some have implications for this 
study, and must therefore be considered here.  ECOMOG was seen as:
“…the instrument of a foreign policy which genuinely arose from 
the first genuinely collective political initiative of a sub-regional 
economic organization in Africa.”137
This ‘collective political initiative’ was, however, forged amidst conflicting 
objectives, domestic and regional, among the member states of ECOWAS.  That the 
SMC managed to establish ECOMOG at all was a considerable achievement, as it 
had not been set up with a mandate, or with the political legitimacy, to do so.138  Of 
ECOWAS’ 16 member states,139 the SMC was made up only of Nigeria, Ghana, 
Gambia, Mali and Togo.  Nigeria proceeded with the deployment of ECOMOG 
troops without securing full regional political support,140 and the two Francophone 
members of the SMC, Mali and Togo, subsequently declined to provide troops for
the initial deployment.141  It was at this stage of the ECOMOG deployment that 
PMCs became heavily involved; they took on logistical support tasks, including the 
air movement of virtually the entire contingent of ECOMOG troops to Liberia.142
The political tussles that obstructed and delayed ECOMOG’S formation and 
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deployment are pertinent to the analysis of PMCs in the Liberian conflict – as 
indeed they are to the consideration of PMCs as peacekeepers.  The PMCs involved 
in providing air movement and logistical support to ECOMOG were not subject to 
political interference, internal or external.  PMCs, being apolitical, are not subject to 
the constraints that impede the deployment of regional peacekeeping forces, nor 
those of the UN.  While the ECOWAS member states were involved in political 
wrangling, the PMCs supporting them were in place and fully operational.  And 
ECOMOG’s problems had not yet been overcome; the personalized nature of 
politics in African states – an element of African politics discussed at length in 
Chapter 3 – presented further opposition and delay.
Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso opposed the deployment of ECOMOG, but the 
Francophone/Anglophone rift was secondary amongst their motives; the driver of 
this opposition, in both cases, was a demonstration of the personalized nature of 
politics in these – as in many – African states.  Côte d’Ivoire’s president, Félix 
Houphouet-Boigny, was father-in-law to former Liberian president William 
Tolbert’s son, who had been executed by Doe along with his father.  Houphouet-
Boigny had supported the NPFL with the provision of training locations in Côte 
d’Ivoire prior to the launch of Taylor’s rebellion, and continued his support with 
shipments of arms throughout the war.143  President Compoaré of Burkina Faso had
been supported in his seizure of power by elements of the NPFL,144 and opposed 
intervention on the basis that it would prevent Taylor from ousting Samuel Doe,145
who had angered Compoaré with his support for U.S. anti-Libyan policies.146
Compaoré’s involvement in Charles Taylor’s instigation of rebellion was, in fact, 
very significant; he had arranged the first meeting between Taylor and Muammar 
Qadaffi of Libya, and had provided Charles Taylor with several hundred Burkinabe 
mercenaries in the opening stages of the conflict, and with a personal bodyguard of 
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Burkinabes after an attempt was made on his life from within the NPFL in 
1994.147
,148  Both states’ support for Charles Taylor, and their opposition to 
ECOMOG, were driven by personal agendas, and it was Houphouet-Boigny’s 
lobbying of Mali and Togo – both members of the SMC – that led them, initially, to 
withdraw their support for the deployment of ECOMOG.149
Any illusion on the part of those whose desire was for an ECOMOG based on the 
UN model of a peacekeeping force evaporated with Nigeria’s rejection of the need 
for the consent of the NPFL for its deployment to Liberia.  This was consolidated by 
Guinean President Lansane Conté’s declaration that ECOWAS did not need “the 
permission of any of the parties involved in the conflict”150 to deploy troops to 
Liberia.  Ghana, despite its support of the ECOMOG concept, differed with Nigeria 
over the key issue of the type of force it was to be.  Rawling’s vision had been that 
of a peacekeeping force, but Nigeria’s desire that it should, firstly, deploy without 
the consent or toleration of the disputing parties, and, secondly, that it should target 
one of the warring parties – the NPFL – negated its neutrality.151
In summary, Africa’s first experiment in home-grown peacekeeping, far from being 
a “genuinely collective political initiative of a sub-regional economic 
organization”,152 was punctuated with reluctance, lack of co-operation, an 
Anglophone/Francophone rift, and sub-regional politics, much of which was 
personalized in nature.  ECOMOG also had operational problems – the lack of a 
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clearly-defined goal, a chain of command not of a military model, despite its 
military structure,153 poor financial and bureaucratic support,154 and poorly-trained, 
ill-disciplined troops.155
This contrasted with the PMCs supporting ECOMOG, who were not dogged with 
problems of organization, chain of command, levels of expertise and training, or 
support structure.  As will be shown in this chapter, ECOMOG’s use of PMCs had a 
major bearing on the conflict, and in the subsequent use of PMCs in Liberia.  This 
chapter will also consider how actions taken by ECOMOG in response to its 
internal political problems affected the nature, duration, and in some respects the 
outcome, of the Liberian civil war.  
While Doe and Johnson agreed to the dispatch of the initial ECOMOG contingent 
of 4,000 troops, Taylor refused to accede to the deployment:
“For its part, the NPFL considered the dispatch of ECOMOG to 
Liberia as a conspiracy by certain powerful interests within the 
sub-region using the ECOWAS umbrella as a means to deprive it of 
seizing power in Monrovia which was almost at reach.”156
Despite Doe’s agreement to the deployment of ECOMOG troops, his government 
expired with him in September 1990, when he was captured by Johnson, at 
ECOMOG’s headquarters in Monrovia.  Rumours that Johnson had been informed 
of Doe’s presence by ECOMOG personnel – effectively handing him over to 
Johnson’s men – seriously compromised ECOMOG’s credibility.157   According to 
Stephen Ellis:
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“ECOMOG’s peacekeepers looked on as Johnson’s men pushed 
Doe downstairs, bound him, and drove off to Prince Johnson’s 
Caldwell base…’158
Doe was tortured to death at the hands of Prince Johnson, who then declared 
himself president.  There then ensued a rush by all factions to claim the presidency:
“Prince Johnson declared himself President… Doe’s people have 
appointed Colonel Nimley as temporary President.  ECOWAS’ 
President, University Professor Dr. Sawyer is out of the country.  
Rebel leader Charles Taylor proclaimed himself President… he 
controls 90% of the country”159
Taylor’s response to ECOMOG’s backing of Amos Sawyer as interim president was 
to launch a full-scale attack on Monrovia, using field artillery captured from the 
AFL.  Despite intense pressure, ECOMOG, with additional logistical support from 
PAE, managed to hold the NPFL’s advance, forcing Taylor to rethink.  In the early 
stages of the war, he had been resolute in the use of force to achieve his ends.  
When he realized the weight that Nigeria was putting behind the now well-supplied 
ECOMOG, and that he also faced a fighting coalition of the AFL and INPFL, he 
understood clearly the need to further his cause beyond the use of force.  His 
eventual move towards negotiation was borne of recognition that conciliation could 
be used, in conjunction with force, to accelerate progress toward his ultimate goal.
That goal was the presidency, not only of Liberia, but of an expanded ‘Greater 
Liberia’, which included areas on the western side of the Mano River, in Sierra 
Leone.  Taylor, as will be shown here, was accomplished in combining of the use of 
force with the employment of political manoeuvre.  Having recognized also that 
ECOMOG sought to avoid direct conflict, the eventual opportunity for a ceasefire 
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was an ideal option for him.160
, 161  He simply assumed the presidency, widening his 
power-base and influence through the establishment of patrimonial networks, 
funded by the sale of diamonds and other resources from the areas over which he 
had control.162  While his National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly was not 
recognized by any state, several overseas firms engaged in business with him.163  It 
was estimated that at one stage, Taylor was bringing in some US$8 million a month 
through the sale of diamonds, gold, iron ore and timber.164
ECOMOG, in the meantime, had employed the PMC Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE) to airlift yet further troops and equipment to Monrovia, increasing 
its strength to 6,000.  But despite embarking on several offensives against the 
NPFL, it was still unable to drive them out of the city.  Taylor saw this as a further 
opportunity to further his cause, and resorted once again to negotiation – following 
which he broke every accord that didn’t suit his aspirations for power.  With each 
negotiation, he came a step closer to his ultimate aim, and to a peace accord that 
would suit his purpose.
“Charles Taylor and his NPFL have been engaging in a game of 
cooperational defection because… peace accords may not 
guarantee them the peace that suits their needs.”165
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6.5.5 ECOMOG and the Warlords
Significantly, the actions of ECOMOG had shifted its role from peacekeeper to 
peace enforcer.  There was also another problem – the proliferation of warlords and 
factions in Liberia.  In 1991, the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO),166
composed mainly of Krahn and Mandingo refugees who had fled to Sierra Leone, 
was formed.  Over 10,000 strong, ULIMO subsequently split along ethnic lines, 
forming ULIMO-J, under Roosevelt Johnson, an ethnic Krahn, and ULIMO-K, 
under Mandingo leader Alhaji Kromah, the latter outnumbering the former by some 
3,000.167  Other factions included the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), formed in 1993 
by former minister George Boley, who had served in both the Tolbert and Doe 
administrations, and, in Lofa County, the Lofa Defence Force (LDF), headed by 
François Massaquoi.  This put ECOWAS in an increasingly difficult position; it 
could not ignore this proliferation of warlords, or allow their control over swathes of 
territory within the state of Liberia to continue expanding, but it was wary of the 
high costs and potential consequences of confrontation with them, and with the 
NPFL.  From the point where ECOMOG had first deployed, its approach had been 
inconsistent; it had switched from a peacekeeping to peace enforcement, it had 
become unsure of its mandate,168 and it was becoming regarded as increasingly 
partisan.169  Its subsequent approach, and the nature of its further involvement in 
Liberia, are of key relevance to considerations of international intervention, regional 
intervention, and the involvement of PMCs, because in adopting the strategy that 
followed, ECOMOG shed what little remaining semblance of neutrality it had 
managed to maintain.170
The strategy adopted by ECOMOG, in seeking to achieve its ends while avoiding 
direct conflict, was to pit faction against faction, primarily through the use of 
Taylor’s enemies as proxy forces to fight him, as they had done – unsuccessfully –
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with the INPFL in Monrovia.  The outcome was that ECOMOG lost whatever 
veneer of neutrality it had managed to retain until that time, and reduced its level of 
control over the conflict – thereby prolonging it.  Another outcome was that the 
benefits being gained by many of its members from the political economy of 
conflict were exposed.171  This involved dealings with warlords who had established 
control over areas of the country, the resources of which they were then able to 
exploit.  Liberia’s resources provided the means for warlords to enrich themselves 
and to expand their capacity for warmaking.  When ECOMOG took over control of 
the ports, the middlemen simply paid their officers off.172
With Nigeria supplying some 80% of ECOMOG’s troops, other ECOWAS states 
became increasingly critical of Nigeria’s troops.  A group of former AFL soldiers –
predominantly from the Krahn group – who formed the Liberian Peace Council 
(LPC), were clandestinely armed and supported by Nigerian contingents of 
ECOMOG.173  Officers of contingents from other ECOWAS countries working with 
the Nigerians were particularly concerned with:
“what they perceived as the patronage relationship between 
Nigerian officers and soldiers, the involvement of Nigerian soldiers 
in various corrupt and illicit businesses, and command practices 
that compromised discipline and operational security”.174
In summary, there are considerable implications for this thesis in the use of regional 
peacekeepers, in comparison to that of international peacekeepers or PMCs.  The 
actions of ECOMOG in Liberia reflect a major problem in the use of troops of 
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regional origin, particularly where these are poorly motivated, trained and paid.175
,176
Atrocities aside – and many atrocities were committed against civilians by 
ECOMOG peacekeepers – 177 the plundering of villages and towns for supplies was 
a routine activity on the part of ECOMOG personnel, who were not regularly 
supplied with rations while in the field.  UN troops and PMCs, being fully equipped 
and resupplied while in action, did not have to plunder to obtain supplies as did 
members of ECOMOG and Liberian and Sierra Leonean troops.   In Sierra Leone, 
where reports of atrocities were mapped and investigated, some 300, including 
murder and torture, were found to have been perpetrated by ECOMOG 
peacekeepers.178  In contrast, despite accusations to the contrary, no abuses of human 
rights were found to have been committed by PMC personnel, and the presence of 
PMCs brought about a significant reduction in human rights abuses.179
6.5.6 The Spread of Conflict to Sierra Leone
Taylor realized that a stalemate had developed; his strategy for overcoming it was to 
present ECOWAS with another, wider challenge.  He understood the impact of 
ECOMOG’s use of Sierra Leonean territory as an operational base, and its airport as 
a logistical hub.  In November 1990, having threatened to attack and destroy the 
airport, describing it as a legitimate military target,180 he was galled by Freetown’s 
response: “Sierra Leone has a trained army… we need not remind Charles Taylor 
of our performance…”181 After this, Taylor hinged his subsequent moves towards 
power around an extension of the war into Sierra Leone.  He had several aims in 
taking the war across the border, the first of which was to drive a wedge between 
the member states of ECOMOG by demonstrating that it could neither maintain 
stability in Liberia, nor prevent conflict from spreading to other ECOWAS states; 
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opening up a second front in Sierra Leone was a direct means of achieving this.  
Another aim was to force Sierra Leone into withdrawing its ECOMOG troops from 
Liberia in order to deal with the more pressing issue of homeland security.  And a 
further aspiration on Taylor’s part was to increase in his financial base through 
control of Sierra Leone’s most productive diamond fields.
If, for ECOWAS, the Liberian conflict constituted “the greatest threat to the 
stability of the sub-region”182, then the consequences of the spread of that conflict to 
Sierra Leone would surely be catastrophic – a situation that Charles Taylor 
understood fully.  While the conflict in Sierra Leone materialized, the one in Liberia 
continued, the latter continuing to have a bearing on that in Sierra Leone.  After 
1996, although large-scale conflict in Liberia had ceased, action between warring 
factions continued to flare up.  Large-scale conflict re-erupted from 1999 to 2003 
when it was brought to an end by US and UN intervention, again with logistical 
support from PAE and other PMCs.
6.5.7 Summary – PMCs and the Liberian Conflict
The part played by PMCs in the Liberian conflict was significant.  Unprepared for 
deployment beyond their own borders, and not afforded the equipment to do so by 
the international community, ECOMOG’s deployment – the formidable operation of 
airlifting thousands of Nigerian and Ghanaian ECOMOG peacekeepers and several 
thousand tonnes of equipment – was executed by the PMCs Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE), and International Charter Incorporated (ICI).  PAE continued to 
provide logistical support to the ECOMOG force throughout its campaign in 
Liberia, and airlifted thousands more troops and many tonnes of materiel in the 
subsequent reinforcement of Monrovia.  The company’s involvement in 
ECOMOG’s effort was both crucial and extensive – as indeed it was in the UN 
peacekeeping operation that replaced ECOMOG.  When UN peacekeepers took 
over from the regional force, PAE provided logistics and operational support.  PAE 
was tasked subsequently with putting the infrastructure in place to rebuild the 
Armed Forces of Liberia, with recruitment, vetting and training of the new Liberian 
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army being carried out by another PMC, DynCorp. DynCorp was also tasked with 
disarmament of fighters from Liberia’s rebel groups – some 8,000 irregular troops 
in total.  PAE and DynCorp continue to play a part in rebuilding Liberia’s 
institutions of security.
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6.6 Sierra Leone – Country Profile
Figure 11. Map of Sierra Leone
The most relevant part of the conflict in Sierra Leone to the subject of PMCs in Africa –
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one that has engendered more contributions to the body of academic work on the matter
than any other – hinges around one person, and his clear understanding of the limitations 
of the regional intervention force tasked to protect his country from the rebel forces that 
threatened it.  Valentine Strasser, a junior military officer who had taken power in a 
bloodless coup, had served with ECOMOG and understood its limitations. He did not 
believe that ECOMOG could solve the problem posed by Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), nor that it would be able to prevent Sankoh from taking power.  
The events leading up to the RUF’s invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia will be 
discussed in this chapter, prior to considering Strasser’s decision to turn to PMCs for 
assistance, the part played by PMCs in the conflict, and the wider implications of their 
involvement in Sierra Leone. 
6.6.1 Political Background and Independence
Sierra Leone’s early political history parallels that of Liberia, in that it is 
characterized by acrimony and conflict between resettled slaves – the Creole, or 
Krio – and the indigenous peoples of the interior.  The peninsula on which Freetown 
was established saw the arrival, in 1787, of some 400 freed slaves from Britain, 
Nova Scotia and America.  Had it not been for some of the settlers themselves 
resorting to slave trading, the British government would not have declared Freetown 
a crown colony.  In 1808, having been a slave trading port since 1560, it became 
Britain’s base for enforcement of the prohibition on slave trading, and the first 
crown colony in West Africa.  The Royal Navy’s interception of human cargos over 
the ensuing decades saw many more freed slaves – ‘recaptives’, as they were known 
–183 resettled with the original ‘freedmen’ occupying the Crown Colony of 
Freetown. 184
Similarly to the situation in Liberia, these settlers assimilated elements of the 
lifestyle of their parent nation.  Detached from their origins, they developed a means 
of communicating – based, loosely, on the English language – across the diversity 
of their own languages; from this language, Creole, was derived their name.  Over 
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time, the Krio benefited from the advantages of Britain’s strategic use of Freetown 
as headquarters for administration over the Gold Coast (now Ghana), and Gambia, 
and were afforded access to the first university in West Africa, Fourah Bay College, 
in Freetown, set up by the British in 1827.  This – and other British-model 
educational establishments – meant that members of the Krio could gain standards
of education not available to ethnic groups in the hinterland.  This was evidenced by
the notable success of trade carried out from the Krio’s coastal settlement, and their 
dominance in political life over the indigenous peoples of the interior.  It was not 
until 1896 that the remainder of what is now Sierra Leone was declared a British 
protectorate.
As in Liberia, early colonization of the interior had been characterized by struggle 
and rebellion on the part of the indigenous occupants against both British and Krio 
domination.  Unlike the situation in Liberia, however, most of the early 20
th
century 
was relatively peaceful throughout Sierra Leone.185  In 1961, Milton Margai was 
appointed Prime Minister of the independent Sierra Leone.  This appointment, 
which had been bestowed from London, was endorsed in the first election in 1962, 
in which his party, the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) took power.  On his 
death in 1964, Milton Margai’s brother, Albert, assumed power until 1967, when 
the SLPP lost power to the All Peoples’ Congress (APC), headed by Siaka Stevens.  
Stevens’ takeover of power was delayed until 1968, while the first of many coups 
and counter-coups of Sierra Leone’s history were played out.  
6.6.2 The Development of Neopatrimonialism 
The roots of Sierra Leone’s civil war, similarly to that of Liberia, lie in the coercive 
and wealth-accumulative practices of successive governments – notably those of 
Siaka Stevens, from 1968 to 1985, and General Joseph Momoh, from 1985 until
1992.  As with Liberia, the ruling elite and their neopatrimonial networks, combined 
with economic conditions that led to a drying up of income sources, were key 
contributory factors to the outbreak of conflict.  
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Stevens’ establishment of a neopatrimonial power base, from the earliest 
opportunity, was uncompromising; to ensure strong political support, he 
immediately set about creating a network of loyal clients.  After several coup 
attempts by the armed forces, loyalty from that quarter was secured by a purge of 
senior officers, who were replaced by members of Stevens’ network.  The extent of 
his neopatrimonial web extended even into trades unions and business 
organizations, who were brought into government sway as part of his emasculation 
of civil society from political involvement.186  Within 5 years, the prospect of 
democratic elections had evaporated.  There were, however, two key groups who 
resisted Stevens’ pervasive influence into civil society.  The first of these was the 
press, who maintained their resolve to expose government corruption and, despite 
intimidation, remained critical of the president throughout his rule.  The second 
group comprised students of the previously-mentioned Fourah Bay College – which 
had brought Freetown to become known as ‘the Athens of West Africa’ for its 
contribution to society and to the fostering of extra-societal and international 
friendships.187  It was action by these two groups – demonstrations by students of 
Fourah Bay against the rigging of the 1977 elections, accompanied by outspoken 
press coverage – that engendered widespread objection against Stevens’ hijacking 
of the democratic system.  Stevens’ actions had, however, secured him a further 
term in office, and he capitalized on this to convert Sierra Leone into a one-party 
state.
Similarly to the situation that had emerged in Liberia, Sierra Leone’s revenues –
those from diamonds in particular – were milked by Stevens to inflate his own 
wealth and to feed the needs of his expansive network of clients.  The country’s 
annual income from diamonds alone dropped, during Stevens’ term of office, from 
US$200 million to less than US$100,000, and he amassed a personal wealth 
estimated at some US$500 million.188  This, combined with the global commodity 
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price crisis leading to declining revenues from all of the country’s main exports,189
resulted in economic disaster.  
In 1985, against the background of an economic crisis, a deeply divided ruling 
party, and a country in social turmoil, Stevens’ handed over to power to the 
commander of Sierra Leone’s army, General Joseph Momoh.  Stevens’ term of 
office had been marked by recurring conflicts between coercive elements of the 
APC government, and groups of increasingly radicalized students of Fourah Bay 
College.  The handover of power to Momoh was marked by violent demonstrations 
from this group, after which a mass expulsion of students, and a number of its 
faculty members, ensued.190  
Whether or not Momoh was expected, or himself expected, to make a positive 
difference to the situation, the opposite was the case.  While exports of Sierra 
Leone’s main source of wealth, its diamonds, declined from almost a third of all 
exported goods to less than a fifth, it is estimated that up to half of all diamonds 
gathered during Momoh’s rule were smuggled out of the country.191  By 1988, as 
well as struggling to cope with widespread deprivation, the impoverished 
population of Sierra Leone was faced with inflation in triple-digits 
6.6.3 The Emergence of the Revolutionary United Front
Politics in Sierra Leone, as with its conflict-blighted neighbour, had progressed to 
an extreme form of neopatrimonialism.192  As discussed in Chapter 3, the corruption 
that accompanies elements of neopatrimonialism becomes institutionalized in many 
African states,193 and Sierra Leone was an extreme example.  One description of 
politics in the country goes some way to illustrating the excessive form of 
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neopatrimonialism that had taken root in Sierra Leone:
“The pervasive nature of corruption in almost every kind of 
activity…allowed questionable practices to continue and eventually 
become an institutionalized way of life for Sierra Leoneans.  
Consequently…the whole bureaucratic structure was converted 
into an instrument of self-advancement and enrichment by 
prominent civil servants.”194
The politics of exclusion and self-enrichment, combined with inept and corrupt 
government, had brought about burgeoning numbers of disaffected youth 
throughout the country, and a young émigré intelligentsia that was now in the 
process of establishing links with Libyan intelligence.195  It was from this group of 
radicalized students and their confrontations with the APC that the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) first emerged as an entity.196  At the same time that abuses of 
power were increasing in Momoh’s government, several of the expelled former 
students of Fourah Bay College were undergoing training in Libya,197 with a view to 
‘revolution’ against the APC government of Sierra Leone.  Foday Sankoh, who had 
been imprisoned and subsequently dismissed from the Sierra Leonean Army for an 
alleged coup plot, saw the potential of this group as a means of achieving his own 
ambitions for power.  Sankoh’s contact with the leaders of this ‘revolutionary’ 
student group, whose followers were trained in the same Benghazi training camps 
as the NPFL, would lead him eventually to Charles Taylor.
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6.6.4 Civil War in Sierra Leone
Sankoh’s desire to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone suited Charles 
Taylor’s needs,198 and Taylor’s expertise assisted Sankoh in getting the RUF 
established sufficiently to form a rebel force.  In March 1991, two columns of RUF 
insurgents, each backed by small groups of NPFL veterans, entered, from Liberia, 
the Pujehan and Kailahun districts in the diamond-rich south-east of Sierra Leone.  
Accompanying these columns were Burkinabe mercenaries – the product of 
Taylor’s close ties with President Blaise Compoaré of Burkina Faso, and the 
manipulation of the Anglophone/Francophone split, both in ECOWAS, and in the 
region generally.199  The initial incursion through Liberia, coupled with the 
involvement of these Burkinabe fighters, and the inability of his army to halt the 
rebels’ advance, led Momoh to believe that this was an invasion by an external 
power, rather than an insurgency.200
In contrast to the support Charles Taylor was able to rally in the early stages of his 
rebellion, the RUF managed to recruit only small numbers of fighters, even in the 
traditionally militant Pujehan and Kailahun districts.201  Despite this failure to garner 
support, they succeeded in pushing back the poorly trained and ill-equipped Sierra 
Leonean Army (SLA), and in taking control of the diamond mining areas in Kono 
district.  In fact, frustrated at the lack of support he was able to rally, Sankoh’s 
approach became even more intimidatory.  Beatings, mutilations, torture and 
executions became a routine part of the arrival of the RUF to any area, engendering 
an ethos of fear, and serving to alienate, rather than to engage with, rural 
populations.
The contrast in the approach of the RUF to that taken by the NPFL in Liberia had 
many observers questioning the motives of this supposedly revolutionary group, 
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whose initial targets were villagers, farmers and alluvial miners.
“…how rational is a movement whose methods of revolutionary 
struggle have simply served to alienate the bulk of society from its 
so-called revolutionary agenda?”202
The RUF continued, nevertheless, to make gains in territory, focused primarily on 
the areas containing the greater part of Sierra Leone’s mineral wealth.  There was 
increasing frustration among Sierra Leoneans toward their president’s corruption 
and incompetence; long before the arrival of the RUF, the government had stopped 
paying teachers and civil servants, and had weakened the army to prevent it from 
becoming a threat the government.203  In April 1992, Momoh was overthrown by 
Valentine Strasser, a young army captain, whose first action was to seize and 
release to the public the supplies of fuel and rice that Momoh’s cronies had hoarded 
in order to create artificial shortages and raise prices.  This brought instant 
popularity to Strasser’s National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).204  
The expansion of the SLA from some 3,000 to over 12,000, – a desperate attempt to 
stem the tide of the advancing RUF – was the only response available to the 
government of Sierra Leone, requests for external assistance by both Momoh and 
Strasser having been rebuffed.  But in the rush to expand the capacity of their armed 
forces, recruitment was indiscriminate.  Disenfranchised youths, criminals released 
from prison, and even young children were recruited, and subsequently neither 
adequately trained, nor equipped, nor paid.205  With the exception of a few early 
successes against the RUF in 1992 and 1993, the results were disastrous; the ‘new’ 
soldiers resorted to plundering from those they were ostensibly there to protect, and 
many colluded with the rebels and joined in their activities.  The term ‘sobel’ –
soldier by day, rebel by night – was coined to describe these ‘soldiers’.  The Sierra 
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Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that some 2,700 serious human 
rights abuses – of those reported to the Commission – were carried out by members 
of the SLA.206  Further, many senior ranks colluded with the RUF in order to extract 
resources – primarily diamonds – from areas in which they were supposed to be 
engaging them in battle,207 and some army units even fought against one another.208  
The few successes that the SLA had attained against the RUF in 1992 and 1993 
were overridden by opportunities for plunder by troops, and the use by officers of 
their military units to gain de facto control of private mining assets.209
6.6.5 PMCs in the Sierra Leonean Civil War
The subsequent failure of the expanded army to deal with the RUF – who, by the 
end of 1994 looked poised to launch an attack on Freetown – and the negative 
response to further requests for external assistance, prompted Strasser to seek the 
assistance of private actors.  Under Joseph Momoh, several PMCs had been 
involved in small-scale operations in Sierra Leone,210 but the first to be appointed by 
Strasser’s regime was Gurkha Security Guards (GSG), an organization that had 
conducted de-mining operations for the UN.  GSG refused to become directly 
involved in combat, instead taking on a contract to train some 160 ‘specialist’ troops 
– the ‘Sierra Leonean Command Unit’ (SLCU).  GSG’s leader, Robert McKenzie, 
on meeting the men of the SLCU, understood fully the difficulties he faced.  Most 
of them were: “…louts, having been enticed off the streets … with offers of regular 
meals, uniforms, weapons and drugs.”211  But McKenzie refused to allow members 
of his organization to take part in combat,212 as did his successors after he and 
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several other GSG personnel were killed in an ambush while carrying out 
reconnaissance for a weapon-training site.  Despite their losses, the company was 
committed to carrying out its contract.  Strasser, however, wanted GSG to take part 
in combat.  Having established itself as a reputable PMC, GSG was not prepared to 
compromise its client base by becoming directly involved in fighting, and would 
agree only to continue with the contracted task of training.213  
By now, some 15,000 Sierra Leoneans had lost their lives and an estimated 4 
million had been displaced.214  Provision of the common good of security for the 
population of Sierra Leone was no longer a function of the state; the RUF’s 
widespread occupation of the country and its imminent – or so it was thought –
assault on the capital, Freetown, had put paid to any idea that security was an aspect 
of civil life in Sierra Leone.  Loss of control of its natural resources to the RUF had 
ruined its economy.  This combined threat to the security and economy of Sierra 
Leone, without external intervention or internal action, held only one outcome.  As 
for internal action, Strasser understood fully the limitations of his army, and knew 
that his only option was to find a force that could engage the RUF directly and 
decisively.  His problem was that the RUF’s control of the country’s resources 
meant that he did not have the funds to enable him to do so.  But the combined 
security/economy threat was also of concern to those companies involved in 
extracting Sierra Leone’s resources.
Branch Energy, a company that had seen its joint interests with the government of 
Angola rescued by Executive Outcomes (EO) less than a year earlier, proposed that 
Strasser employ EO to engage the RUF.  But Strasser’s coffers were drastically 
short of the US$15 Million fee required to secure the EO’s services.  Such was 
Branch’s confidence that EO could stabilize the situation, they agreed to underwrite 
the costs until the Sierra Rutile mining operation was once again in the hands of the 
Sierra Leonean government, when the fee would be paid out of tax revenues raised 
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from Sierra Rutile.215  Branch Energy evidently had a great deal of faith in EO’s 
capability; with the mines in question in rebel-held territory, and all major roads in 
Sierra Leone controlled by the rebels, EO would not only have to recapture and 
defend the mining areas, but also regain the greater part of the country’s 
infrastructure.  In addition, there was an immediate need for them to regain control 
of the capital.
In May 1995, some 170 EO personnel arrived in Sierra Leone.  Contrary to reports 
that their interest was solely in retaking the diamond, rutile and bauxite mining 
areas, and that they “only went where the pay-offs were high,”216 their first priority 
was to identify concentrations of rebels close to Freetown, and to eliminate the 
RUF’s imminent threat to the capital.  The first phase of the plan EO had submitted 
to Strasser was to “Relieve the pressure on Freetown and drive the RUF… as far 
away from the capital as possible.”217  EO had allowed 3 months for completion of 
the first phase of the operation.  It took 9 days.  
It was only after this phase had been completed that EO entered the further phases 
of their operation, which involved dislodging the RUF from areas of natural 
resource concentration, thereby denying them the funding they needed to prosecute 
the war and giving the government the funding it urgently required to begin the 
restoration of order.  EO also concentrated on breaking the RUF’s operational, 
training and logistical functions, denying them the use of the country’s roads as 
supply routes.  EO continued to train the army and the civil defence forces (CDFs) 
in order to ensure that the gains made from the rebels would be consolidated and 
maintained.218
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Within six months of the commencement of EO’s operations in Sierra Leone,219 the 
RUF, for the first time, had agreed to take part in peace negotiations.  By the end of 
1995 Strasser announced that elections would take place in February 1996.  Ahmed 
Kabbah, a former UN administrator, was subsequently elected president, but Foday 
Sankoh resumed RUF attacks on the civilian population in an effort to demonstrate 
that the new government could not guarantee their security.  EO, together with the 
CDFs and, to a lesser extent, the army, once again took the rebels on, and defeated 
them within weeks.220  One of the conditions of the subsequent peace agreement laid 
down by the RUF was that EO was to withdraw from Sierra Leone.  EO did so, but 
warned Kabbah that the RUF would regroup and re-start their offensive.221  Within 3 
months, Kabbah was ousted in a coup headed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who 
had colluded with Foday Sankoh.  As part of the peace accord between Kabbah and 
the RUF, an ECOMOG force had been dispatched to Sierra Leone, but had 
deployed no further than Lungi Airport.  Koroma’s Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) took power in May 1997 and, unopposed by the army, the RUF 
entered Freetown wreaking widespread destruction and savagery.
6.6.6 Regional Intervention 
It took two attempts, and the deaths of many Nigerian and other regional troops, 
before Kabbah was restored to power in March 1998.  The second attempt was 
supported by another PMC, Sandline International, who provided materiel but 
whose direct involvement, although part of Sandline’s operational plan, was not 
implemented.  This was due to Sandline having broken a UN arms embargo with at 
least the knowledge, if not the complicity, of the British government,222 a situation 
that became known as the ‘Arms to Africa affair’.
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Sierra Leone’s long and bloody civil war was not to end with the return to power of 
their elected president.  In January 1999, with Sankoh in prison appealing against a 
death sentence for treason, the RUF launched yet another attack, resulting in the 
deaths of a further 6,000 civilians and many members of ECOMOG.223  Desperate to 
bring an end to the killing, Kabbah offered to share power with the RUF, an offer 
Sankoh accepted, and which was formalized under the Lomé agreement in July 
1999.224  But Sankoh’s greed was to assure that this would not bring an end to war in 
Sierra Leone; he refused to give up control of Kono, the country’s richest diamond 
area.  When the UN, who had replaced ECOMOG under the Lomé agreement, 
declared that they were to deploy to Kono’s diamond areas, they were attacked by 
the RUF.  It was only when the RUF were directly engaged by British and Indian 
troops that order was once again restored.
6.6.7 Relative Successes of Intervention in Sierra Leone
The contrast in approaches adopted by the five actors that intervened in the Sierra 
Leone civil war, two of whom were PMCs, and their respective levels of success, 
are of central relevance to this thesis.  The first of these actors, Gurkha Security 
Guards, adopted an approach that involved only the training of Sierra Leonean 
troops – one that proved unsuccessful.  The second, Executive Outcomes, engaged 
the rebels directly, achieving success in a short space of time, and at a 
comparatively low cost; the entire EO operation, which was extended after the first 
successful phases, cost the Sierra Leonean government a total of US$35 million.225  
EO also trained the Civil Defence Forces in Sierra Leone, having identified them as 
a more effective force than the Sierra Leonean Army.  The third, ECOMOG, was 
mired in political difficulties; the Francophone members of ECOWAS, and Ghana, 
were critical of the military operation and suspicious of Nigeria’s motives;226 they
supported ECOWAS’ embargo against the AFRC/RUF, but opposed military 
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action, resulting in a confused approach that shifted between non-violent 
intervention and the use of direct force.  Under Nigerian leadership, ECOMOG 
launched an offensive in February 1998 occupying Freetown and taking on the 
RUF, an episode that was characterized by high numbers of – mainly Nigerian –
casualties, lack of discipline among its troops, looting, and human rights abuses 
against the civilian population.227  The fourth intervention, that of the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), successor to the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL), comprised initially some 11,000 troops.  UNAMSIL attempted to 
clear the diamond-mining areas of rebels in order to return them to the control of the 
government.  UNAMSIL’s approach contrasted starkly with that of EO, who some 
three years earlier had engaged the rebels directly and returned the mines to 
government control in a matter of weeks.  The RUF’s response to UNAMSIL’s 
attempt to dislodge them from the mining areas was to attack its DDR centres, 
killing a number of peacekeepers and taking 500 of them hostage.  The cost of 
UNAMSIL’s operation in Sierra Leone was some US$450 million per annum.228  
The fifth intervention, carried out by British and Indian troops, was undertaken 
under the auspices of the UN, but involved the use of force, and was successful both 
in freeing the hostages and enabling the UN to occupy the mining areas.229  British 
troops also used force, in September 2000, to release a number of its troops taken 
hostage by the West Side Boys, a splinter faction of the AFRC, in Operation Barras 
– a decisive action that effectively saw the end of rebel activity in Sierra Leone.
6.6.8 The End of Civil War
By October 2000, the RUF, with their leader in custody, their income stream from 
the plunder of the country’s natural resources disrupted, and facing overwhelming 
opposition from an angry and emboldened public, started to crumble.  UNOMSIL, 
the UN observer force that had been limited from the outset by conditions insisted 
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upon by Foday Sankoh in the Abidjan agreement,230 was replaced, under the Lomé 
Accord, by UNAMSIL – a much larger force with a wider mandate than its 
predecessor.  The latter force was prompted by Nigerian president Abacha’s
decision to withdraw his ECOMOG contingent from Sierra Leone, although some 
3,500 Nigerian soldiers were controversially seconded to UNAMSIL as blue-
helmetted troops.231  But the Lomé Accord was little more than an “appeasement of 
the RUF by West African leaders and an international community that had wearied 
of a protracted eight year conflict.”232
, 233  The UN moved into the mining areas in 
November 2000.  By March 2001, UNAMSIL had a strength of some 17,500 troops 
– the largest UN contingent ever seen at the time – yet was unable to maintain a 
lasting ceasefire.  Factors that brought the war to an end were the arrest of Foday 
Sankoh, and his removal as leader of the RUF, the actions of the Kamajors in 
tandem with the Guinean armed forces against RUF fighters, international action on 
the illegal diamond trade, international intervention to prevent Charles Taylor 
providing tangible support to the RUF, and the success of British forces against the 
West Side Boys. Two years later, the war was formally declared over by President 
Kabbah.
6.7 Summary
The conflicts that plagued the neighbouring states of Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
borne of factors driving conflict in many African states – a combination of ethnic 
rivalries, or more pertinently the manipulation of such rivalries,234 the desire for control 
over resources, the development of extreme forms of neopatrimonialism,235 and the 
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politics of exclusion.236  Compounded by weak institutions of state, particularly those of 
security, bringing such intrastate conflicts to an end is beyond the means of the state 
itself.  Without timely intervention, conflicts of this nature are destined to descend 
further into brutality and destruction by all warring parties, including those of the state.  
Incidences of human rights abuses by all parties to conflicts increase with time, as 
demonstrated viscerally in Sierra Leone.237  This is particularly true of low-intensity, 
intrastate conflicts – those conducted between factions rather than state armies. “…the 
very process of combating low-intensity conflict will cause both sides to look alike, 
unless it can be brought to a quick end.”238
Successive interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both by regional peacekeepers and 
those of the United Nations, failed to bring an end to fighting in either case.  In Liberia, 
the actions of ECOMOG, in supporting some factions against others, both intensified 
and lengthened the conflict; ECOMOG was roundly criticized as being over-represented 
by Nigeria, the regional hegemon in West Africa, and as a partisan force rather than a 
neutral peacekeeping body.239  In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG peacekeepers committed 
hundreds of human rights violations against ordinary Sierra Leoneans; the Sierra 
Leonean security forces themselves committed thousands of such atrocities against their 
own people.240
The part played by PMCs in both conflicts was significant.  ECOMOG, whose forces 
were not fully equipped for cross-border deployments, and were not afforded the 
wherewithal to do so by the international community, were airlifted to their bases in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone by the PMC Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE).  PAE also 
transported several thousand tonnes of equipment, and provided logistical support to 
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ECOMOG’s entire operation for the duration of the conflict.  When UN peacekeepers 
took over from the regional force, PAE continued to provide logistics and support, and 
was tasked subsequently with putting the infrastructure in place to rebuild the Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL), and with providing logistical services to the RSLMF.
The PMC DynCorp International took on the formidable task of disarming some 8,000 
irregular troops, and recruiting, vetting and training the new, professional AFL from the 
ground up.  In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG was supported by the PMC International Charter 
Incorporated (ICI), who provided logistics and medical evacuation. PAE now provides 
logistics and support to the RSLMF, and runs an extensive logistics training centre at 
Murray Town Barracks in Freetown.  Other PMCs are involved in Security Sector 
Reform tasks in both countries, even to the level of providing national security advice to 
the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with DFID and IMATT.241
While the case of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone is the most written about in the 
history of PMCs, studies as to the level of involvement of other PMCs are limited.242  
There is little awareness as to the degree of PMC activity in support of post-conflict 
peacebuilding efforts in the region, and the wider extent to which the UN – which has 
used PMCs every major operation since 1990 –243 and other aid agencies have become 
reliant on PMCs.  While the exploits of Executive Outcomes – the more dramatic side of 
events, relating to combat, which PMCs no longer undertake – is the most written about, 
it is these later activities of PMCs that are the most relevant to international 
peacebuilding efforts in African states. 
The following chapters of this thesis will outline my approach to research and analysis of 
the activities of PMCs in the two countries profiled in this chapter.  The findings will 
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then be analysed in the context of the hypothesis that that PMCs are a viable option for 
direct involvement in conflict handling and peacebuilding operations in Africa.
221
Chapter 7
Perceptions I: PMCs or Mercenaries?
7.1   The PMC/Mercenary Issue
In Chapter 4, it was established that external perceptions of PMCs are based on the idea 
that they are simply ‘modern manifestations’ of the mercenaries that were active in 
African states in the 1960s and 1970s.1  This was mirrored in the field research, where a 
central theme to emerge was that attitudes towards PMCs are based largely on the 
perception that they are mercenaries.  This is a perception that persists irrespective of 
whether their activities are in support of governments, private companies, humanitarian 
agencies, NGOs or departments of the UN. In trying to get to the bottom of this 
perception, the immediate questions that arise are what is meant, and what is understood, 
by the term ‘mercenary’. 
7.2   Perceptions of PMCs as Mercenaries
As noted in the Chapter 6, perceptions of mercenaries in the popular mindset were fed by 
press coverage of their activities in post-independence African states in the 1960s and 
70s.2 The images conjured up by these reports, of ‘hired guns’ terrorizing the populations 
of newly-independent African states, still remain strong. In the 1990s, perceptions of 
PMCs were driven by media reports of their emergence as a ‘new’ phenomenon, with 
these organizations being labelled ‘mercenaries’ and ‘Dogs of War’.3  Michael Ashworth 
concludes that their popular image has been shaped by those “pirates who operated 
throughout Africa in the Sixties and Seventies”.4  Despite PMCs having operated in their 
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current form since the 1960s,5 it was the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Angola 
and Sierra Leone from 1992 to 1995 that drew widespread attention to their activities in 
Africa.  Being perhaps the most sensationalist issue of the PMC debate, the ‘mercenary’ 
label has become accepted by PMCs as an inevitable part of media coverage of their 
activities, albeit one they regard as unjustified.  This chapter will address contentions as 
to whether the description of PMCs as mercenaries is apt.
7.3 ‘Modern’ mercenaries and PMCs
While several respondents raised points supporting the argument that PMCs do not fall 
into the legal definition of mercenaries, they continue to be regarded as such, even by 
some respondents who are supportive of their work in African states.  PMCs are still 
referred to consistently, in the press, as ‘mercenaries’, or, more commonly now, as the 
‘new mercenaries’.6  One respondent, a representative for the British industry body for 
PMCs observed:
“...in media terms it’s always going to be a good headline – “The 
Dogs of War”… why would the media do it any differently?... so it 
seems that the ‘mercenary’ tag will be around for a long time.” 7
The view that the press would always opt for the sensationalism offered by the 
‘mercenary’ label was shared by other respondents, among them the former manager of a 
PMC that carried out tasks in support of international community efforts in Sudan, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone:
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“The nature of the task we do, or the organization for whom we 
carry out the task, don’t come into the equation.  Even when we 
operate in support of peacekeeping operations, we’re still 
represented as mercenaries… changing our image from ‘Dogs of 
War’ to agents of peace and democracy doesn’t make good press, 
so we’ve accepted that it’s a label we’re going to be stuck with for 
a long time to come.”8
The term ‘new mercenaries’9 receives criticism not only from detractors of PMCs – as 
the title infers that they are not mercenaries in a true sense – but also from their 
proponents in that it infers that mercenary activity is now manifested through PMCs.  
The actions of Simon Mann and 69 others in 2004, whose intentions were clearly to 
overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea, demonstrate that mercenarism proper 
has not disappeared,10 and PMCs are quick to point out that they are not of the same 
genre:
“PMCs actually helped to foil Simon[Mann]’s ridiculous coup 
attempt. It was private intelligence-gathering companies who 
provided the information that led to the interception of his group of 
mercenaries. 11  Theirs is not the sort of activity that any PMC 
would get involved in, and I think most PMCs would be quick to 
take action to see that anybody attempting to go down that route 
was stopped from doing so.”12
Certainly, the activities of PMCs are far removed from those involved in the Equatorial 
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Guinea coup attempt, but perceptions that PMCs and mercenaries are one and the same 
are deeply-held, and when probing for the root of these perceptions,13 it seems that many 
of them are based on traditional ‘dictionary’ definitions, which take no account of the 
provisions and exceptions of the international conventions that form the accepted legal 
definition.14  This is perhaps illustrated by the following quotes, from respondents 
interviewed in Sierra Leone and Liberia.  
… if somebody gets paid to do things of a military nature in a 
country that isn’t their own, they are a mercenary.”15
While this sounds a reasonable statement, it fails to take into account the provisions, in 
every relevant international convention, for the legal definition of mercenaries, without 
which UN troops – who are ‘paid to do things of a military nature in a country that isn’t 
their own’ – would themselves fall into the legal category of mercenaries.  Another 
respondent quotes:
“…three things: they’re working in a country that isn’t their own, 
they’re earning high levels of money for what they’re doing –
Western rates of pay, not African ones – and they’re doing 
military-related work.  How are they any different to the 
mercenaries that were here immediately after independence?”16
Once again, this quote could apply equally to UN troops, but one could argue that the 
most obvious way in which PMCs differ from the mercenaries that were in Africa 
immediately after independence – certainly in Sierra Leone and Liberia – is that their 
activities have been carried out in support of departments of the UN, of regional 
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Interview with representative of human rights NGO in Monrovia, 13
th
November 2008.
16
Interview with representative of humanitarian NGO at Lungi, 17
th
November 2008.
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peacekeeping organizations, of humanitarian NGOs and of governments recognized by 
the international community.
A crucially important point raised by one respondent – a former senior British Army 
Officer, now the Managing Director of a PMC – regarding both preceding quotes, is that 
‘military-related work’ and ‘things of a military nature’ have been in a state of 
continuous change for the last twenty years.  State militaries have taken on an increasing 
humanitarian role; they have outsourced many of their support activities to PMCs, and 
the lines between the ‘state’ and the ‘private’ in military operations have become 
increasingly blurred. 
“The US Army, and the British Army particularly among European 
armies, now rely on PMCs to operate… training, logistics and 
maintenance are outsourced … so why do people assume that when 
we use PMCs to do the same tasks in another country, it’s some 
kind of insidious plot?”17
Further, as pointed out by another respondent, PMCs, unlike mercenaries, carry out 
activities in support of the development and humanitarian communities, most of which 
fall within the scope of UN Development Assistance Frameworks.  The same respondent 
points out:
“The only other work PMCs carry out here, apart from logistical 
support, or support to humanitarian and development 
organizations, is basic, unarmed security, and in Sierra Leone, that 
is overseen by the OSD,18 and licensed by the government.”19
Most respondents who were critical of PMCs did not go so far as to say that PMCs are 
‘no different’ than mercenaries who operated in Africa in the 1960s and 70s, but many 
                                                
17
Interview with representative of the Public Diplomacy Section, US Embassy in Liberia, 12
th
November 
2008.
18
The Operational Support Department, an armed wing of the Sierra Leone Police.
19
Interview with Managing Director of a Sierra Leone based PMC, 21
st
October 2008.
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were discomforted by the fact that there are fundamental attributes of mercenarism that 
attach themselves to PMCs and their employees.  However, it was found that perceptions 
of PMCs as mercenaries was significantly greater among respondents from the UK and 
other European countries than among those from Liberia and Sierra Leone.20  The 
situation was similar between those having worked with PMCs (whether in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia or elsewhere in Africa), and those having had no contact with them.21  
“It’s incredible how attitudes in Africa are so different from back 
home.  When you read the papers in England, we’re pariahs, but 
it’s amazing how positive the coverage is here, and the response 
from people where we work is vastly more positive than 
negative.”22
Attitudes towards PMCs of respondents in these countries are based on first-hand 
experience of their activities, and are shaped by personal experience, as opposed to 
attitudes elsewhere, where, without any direct experience of PMC activities, perceptions 
are built up primarily from media reports, from the negative connotations of the word 
‘mercenary’, and, in the case of one respondent, from advice given by those who had 
never encountered PMCs.
“I would say that working here opens your eyes to what’s really 
happening.  I mean, before you come here, you get all the stories 
about avoiding contact with them because they [PMCs] are 
completely at the other end of the spectrum to what we’re trying to 
achieve, but then you come across them on an almost daily basis… 
                                                
20
11 of 27 formally-interviewed respondents, from the following categories, perceive PMCs as 
mercenaries: 2 from ‘Observers and Analysts’, 4 from ‘Senior Staff’ (of UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP,
IMATT and DFID), 1 from ‘Organizations and NGOs working with PMCs’, and 2 from ‘Other Concerned 
Parties’ (specifically: 1 respondent from Journalists for Human Rights and 1 from InterAction, a US 
NGO).  Only 1 of these respondents was from Africa (from the Panos Institute NGO).  Respondents from 
the categories ‘Industry Body Representatives’ and PMC Directors/Managers’ were excluded from the 
sample.
21
6 of 7 respondents from NGOs, 3 of 4 Government Officials, and 11 of 13 other concerned parties 
having worked with PMCs did not believe that the term ‘mercenary’ was an apt description.
22
Interview with former manager of the PMC DynCorp in Liberia and of PAE in Sudan and Sierra Leone, 
4
th
December 2008.
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you begin to see that their tasks are supporting yours, and you 
realize that, well, to some extent, you’ve been misinformed.  There 
are still some people who won’t go to the same bar as them though, 
and won’t sit in the same room, and I think you’d be hard pushed to 
ever shift their view of them as mercenaries.”23
Indeed, ‘shifting the view’ of PMCs as mercenaries is seen by some as nothing more 
than a propaganda campaign on the part of PMCs and their supporters.
Several respondents who took part in the research were of the opinion that perceptions of 
external military or security orientated activity in Africa, not directly executed by the 
forces of states or of the UN, are coloured by images and perceptions of mercenaries that 
endure from post-colonial times.24  One such respondent, the managing director of a 
PMC, believes that organizations such as his should give up trying to fight the 
‘mercenary’ tag:
“Yes, there’s definitely a long hangover from the days of 
mercenaries in Africa, and I think it’s still the number one driver of 
opinions about us.  We even looked at allocating a budget to 
publicise what we do, to show… that we’re a million miles from 
that, but when you open up to people from outside, especially 
reporters, you very quickly learn that no amount of trying is going 
to convince them.  I mean, it just doesn’t make good press, does it.  
So we just have to get on with it and hope that eventually more 
people will understand that… we’re making a positive 
contribution.”25
Many respondents, whether from PMCs, NGOs, or departments of the UN, believe that 
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Interview with representative of Democracy Institute (NGO), 6
th
November 2008.
24
23 of 36 formally-interviewed respondents from the following categories: 2 from ‘Observers and 
Analysts’, 2 from ‘Industry Representatives’, 6 from ‘Senior Staff’ (of UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP, 
IMATT and DFID), 7 from ‘PMC Directors/Managers’, 4 from ‘Organizations and NGOs working with 
PMCs’, and 2 from ‘Other Concerned Parties’ (specifically: 1 Ministry of Mineral Resources official, and 
1 manager from the Koidu Kimberlite Project).
25
Interview with PMC managing director in Sierra Leone, 21
st
October 2008.
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this situation will not change until such time as these organizations are regulated in some 
form.26 But there are also respondents who do not wish to see PMCs gain the 
respectability that regulation would confer, as they feel that regardless of the legal status 
of PMCs as organizations, their employees are still “soldiers for hire”, which makes 
them mercenaries.27  This is a perception which is central in influencing attitudes towards 
PMCs; it is important therefore to explore the nature and characteristics of PMCs in 
order to develop a clear understanding of the drivers of this perception.  The following 
section will consider perceptions as to the nature and characteristics of PMCs, their 
defining features as organizations, and their modus operandi, in order to draw 
conclusions as to whether these negative perceptions are justifiable.
7.4 The Nature and Characteristics of PMCs.
As with general perceptions of PMCs, those of their nature and characteristics, and of the 
individuals working for them, hinge – perhaps more understandably in the latter case –
around the conviction that they are mercenaries.  Mercenaries are individuals; every 
internationally-recognized definition as to what constitutes a mercenary contains the 
phrase “any person who…”.28  A perception of PMCs is that they are commercial 
organizations that have emerged to circumvent the proscription of mercenaries in 
international law:
“PMCs are creating a situation where mercenaries take on some 
kind of legality by being part of a company.  That’s why there was 
such an expansion after the Cold War”.29
                                                
26
16 of 20 formally-interviewed respondents from the following categories: 7 from ‘Senior Staff’ (of 
UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP, IMATT and DFID), 2 from ‘Industry Representatives’, 7 from ‘PMC 
Directors/Managers’, and 2 from ‘Organizations working with PMCs’.
27
Interview with representative of humanitarian NGO at Lungi, 17
th
November 2008.  The respondent 
went on to explain that the acid test used by many in the humanitarian and development organizations to 
categorize somebody as a mercenary is to decide if they fall into the definition “soldier for hire”.
28
OAU. 1977b. "Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(CEMA), Doc. CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev.1 (Revision of 1972 Convention: Doc.CM/433/Rev. L.).", 
UNOHCR. 1977. "Article 47.2 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).", and UN. 1989. 
"International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, Doc. 
A/RES/44/34."
29
Interview with representative of JHR (Journalists for Human Rights), 13
th
November 2008.
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This perception also needs to be explored in order to decide whether it is justified.  The 
ending of the Cold War was, indeed, the single most significant event leading to the 
current involvement of PMCs in Africa, but it is important to put this occurrence into 
context, in terms of the political situation that most African states were caught up in at 
the time.  From December 1991,30 on a scale never seen before, a global withdrawal, 
reduction and rationalization of armed forces took place.  The subsequent outflow of
some six million individuals,31 with skills related to combat and all of its support 
operations, from logistics to intelligence, found a ready market for those skills.  The 
greatest part of this market, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, was in African 
states for which the stability afforded by the confrontation of ideological dichotomies, 
through the perceived need for strategic influence, had now been removed. 
Many perceptions of the companies involved in this new market, and the individuals 
employed by them, were driven by the concept of former soldiers selling their combat 
skills as mercenaries, motivated purely by financial gain, and with no regard for the 
nature of tasks they may be required to carry out.  PMCs argue that this is far from the 
truth, and some respondents are highly critical of the part of the legal definition in 
CEMA as to motivation by private gain, 32 which they believe is both wrongly cited and 
over-used in arguments against them. 
“This whole ‘motivated by money’ thing is flawed. …the rule that 
mercenaries are people who are paid more than local armed forces 
is ridiculous.33  Do you know how much a soldier in the RSLAF 
[Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces] earns?  Less than $100 
[US dollars] a month.  How can you possibly employ anybody 
                                                
30
The precise date of the ending of the Cold War is a moot point; the falling of the Berlin Wall on 9
th
November 1989 is regarded as the most symbolic event, but the date most widely regarded as the official 
ending of the Cold War is 8
th
December 1991, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were 
dissolved with the signing of the Belazheva Accords.
31
Singer, Peter W. 2001. "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its 
Ramifications for International Security." International Security 26(3):186-220.
32
OAU. 1977b. "Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(CEMA), Doc. CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev.1 (Revision of 1972 Convention: Doc.CM/433/Rev. L.)."
33
Under CEMA, at Article 47, Para.1.(c)., mercenaries are:  “… promised, by or on behalf of a Party to 
the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party.”
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without paying substantially more than that?  No expatriate, PMC 
or not, gets less than that.  Even the stipend that some ‘volunteer’ 
workers get over here is more than that.  So that part of the criteria 
is unrealistic.  It’s outdated, and it’s completely irrelevant to the 
situation in Africa now.”34
The section of CEMA in question was also regarded by other respondents as unrealistic, 
partly because of the low comparative pay of African soldiers and police,35 but primarily 
because the comparison with “combatants… in the armed forces”36 infers a situation of 
inter-state conflict.   Another point brought up by many of the same respondents was that 
one of the key motivators for PMC employees is lifestyle choice, and – for those with no 
working experience other than in the military – a lack of alternatives.  A similar theme 
emerged from discussion with respondents who work for NGOs, whose choices are 
driven by a desire to work overseas and the nature of expatriate life, many of whom 
found it difficult to contemplate a different lifestyle.
“Most of the guys I employ have tried… many times to resettle into 
normal civilian life, but it just doesn’t work for them.  They’ve 
spent a whole career in the forces – some of them have been retired 
after 22 years of service at the tender age of 40, and this is a 
lifestyle choice for them.  They don’t know anything else.  They 
don’t have any other skills after that long in the services.  I’ve been 
in that situation myself, and I can tell you that money is not the 
main motivation.”37  
But what of the organizations that employ these individuals?  Most PMCs comprise a 
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Interview with former French Foreign Legion NCO, Managing Director of a PMC during and after the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, 28th October 2008.
35
21 of 36 formally-interviewed respondents from the following categories: 3 from ‘Observers and 
Analysts’, 4 from ‘Senior Staff’ (of UNIOSIL, UNDP, IMATT and DFID), 2 from ‘Industry 
Representatives’, 7 from ‘PMC Directors/Managers’, and 5 from ‘Organizations working with PMCs’.
36
OAU. 1977b. "Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(CEMA), Doc. CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev.1 (Revision of 1972 Convention: Doc.CM/433/Rev. L.)."
37
Interview with PMC Managing Director (Supra, Note 34).
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permanent staff of three people or less,38 taking on employees, usually on a short-term 
basis, when a contract is won.  Observations by respondents who run PMCs are 
indicative of the nature of the market, and of the employment pool available to PMCs.  
Specialized staff, such as intelligence experts, operators and maintenance personnel for 
sophisticated weapons systems, and those with experience in specific locations, are 
highly sought-after.  Finding personnel to carry out tasks such as these can be a problem 
for PMCs, and the sellers’ market that results when specialists are needed invariably 
results in bidding wars, in terms of salaries offered to attract those with the requisite 
skills.  Apart from making the choices of would-be employees easier, this highlights two 
other features of the PMC industry, one of which is that many companies bid for the 
same contracts, and the other, that the pool of employees is common to all.
The downside to this is that until a PMC has actually won a contract, it cannot start to 
recruit.  In situations where time is of the essence, this has potentially negative 
consequences for the quality of personnel recruited for a task.  While PMCs maintain 
lists of vetted personnel, and alert potential employees during the process of tendering 
for contract, there is little time for vetting new employees where large numbers of 
personnel are recruited for deployment at short notice.  This was demonstrated 
graphically when an employee of ArmorGroup, a PMC with a hitherto impeccable 
record,39 shot dead two of his colleagues in Iraq.40   This surely has implications for the 
need for regulation, together with mechanisms for inspection and enforcement.41
In an increasingly sophisticated market, the eventual outcome – and it is an outcome that 
is already becoming manifest – is that larger, established companies survive where 
smaller operations do not, and high-level expertise is carried from company to company.  
Examples of both phenomena are demonstrated by the takeover of the British PMC 
Defence Systems Limited (DSL) by Armor Holdings in 1997.  Founded in 1981 by 
former officers of 22 SAS, DSL continued to draw on the expertise of former officers 
from the Regiment, two of whom went on to found the now well-established PMCs 
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Interview with policy director of the BAPSC, 2
nd
July 2008.
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See10.4.1.  See also: International Alert. 2002. "Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies: 
Opening the Debate." pp.15-16.
40
The Times, 10th August. 2009. "Briton May Hang for Shootings in Iraq."
41
See 10.4.5 and 10.4.6.
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Erinys,42 and The Hart Group.  Armor Holdings were themselves acquired by Group 4 
Security in 2008.
“It’s not about expertise anymore; you can buy that.  We’re 
chasing a contract right now that needs expertise in petroleum 
installations, and we’ve taken on two experts to put together the 
tender for us.  That’s taken a huge lump out of our budget, but if we 
manage to build up enough contracts, we become attractive for a 
takeover from one of the big boys, and right now, I would bite their 
hands off, because there are people in bigger companies than us 
with big fat address books full of influential contacts, and they’re 
hell bent on getting a big chunk of this market”.43
In contrast, where the demand is for personnel such as security guards, logistics 
personnel and trainers, the situation is very much one of a buyers’ market.  Salaries of 
PMC employees are no higher than they were 5 years ago,44 and further pressure is being 
exerted on salaries due to the level of competition, and  a shrinking employment pool.  
“It’s been twenty years since the demobilizations that followed the 
end of the Cold War, and the number of potential employees 
coming into the pool has plummeted.  Everybody thought that the 
numbers in Iraq would drop and the pool would take a lift, but we 
got that wrong – as well as chronic troop shortages, the nature of 
the task over there has moved more to a security focus so demand 
there has actually increased, and Afghanistan looks like it’s going 
the same way.”45
There is a noticeable difference between respondents’ perceptions of soldiers serving in 
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Now a joint British/South African company, Erinys International.
43
Interview with Managing Director of a British PMC working in Sierra Leone, 4
th
December 2008.
44
Interview with Policy Director of the BAPSC, 2
nd
July 2008.
45
Interview with Risk and Security Consultant (former manager of the PMC DynCorp in Liberia, and of 
Pacific Architects and Engineers in Sudan and Sierra Leone), 4
th
December 2008.
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national armies and former soldiers now serving with PMCs, and this is true in both 
strong and weak states.  One respondent, an NCO from the RSLAF, made a noteworthy 
observation about attitudes of army officers towards former soldiers now serving with 
PMCs:
“These officers are very proud of our soldiers, and that is rightly 
so.  We have a well-trained army now, but in the last round of 
reductions, 3,000 men were discharged.46  Some of my friends who 
were discharged… have got work with PMCs now, but our officers 
are very critical of them, because they say that people who work for 
those companies lack… the morals of soldiers.  But why?  Is the 
training they received so poor that they have forgotten it all?  Have 
their morals suddenly changed?  Of course not.  They are still the 
same people inside.  They are good people, and they just want to 
work, and somebody needs their skills, and I thank God for them”.47
The same analogy could be drawn of the disparity between many respondents’ 
perceptions of those former soldiers from developed states who work for PMCs and 
those of serving soldiers in those states.  One PMC manager pointed out that he was 
compulsorily ‘retired’ – as were many of his employees – at the age of 40, having 
completed a full term of service in the British armed forces.  Most attitudes towards 
serving soldiers encompass perceptions of patriotism, integrity, heroism and high moral 
standards.  On leaving the services and joining a PMC, however, it seems that there is a 
perception that these qualities, built up during careers spanning more than 20 years, are 
replaced within days by those commonly perceived as the attributes of mercenaries –
motivation driven only by personal gain, and disregard for human rights.  I considered 
exploring, during the field research, whether these opinions might be underpinned by 
nationalist ideologies, but concluded that the nature of my research, and of the majority 
of respondents, were not conducive to that avenue of analysis.
                                                
46
The RSLAF was ‘rightsized’ by some 3,000 personnel in 2007-2008 (‘rightsizing’ has taken preference 
over the term ‘downsizing’ in Sierra Leone).
47
Interview with RSLAF NCO, 7
th
November 2008.
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On a final note to this section, one observation was made several times in social settings 
during the field research in Sierra Leone.  The number of social venues frequented by 
expatriates, after the Tourism Department of GoSL had demolished some fifteen of the 
bars most popular with them,48 became quite limited.  Two of the remaining venues, in 
particular, were popular with staff of the UN, IMATT, the many NGOs based in 
Freetown, and other expatriates – including those running PMCs operating in Sierra 
Leone.   On occasion, I joined in conversation with groups made up of individuals from 
several of these organizations; many members of PMCs had former colleagues in 
IMATT, and in some cases, in humanitarian NGOs, having previously served with them 
in H.M Forces.  In conversing with these individuals, and in listening to their 
conversations with one another, it became evident that they shared many of the same 
aims, concerns and values.  In discussion with members of other NGOs in non-social 
situations, however, I learned that there were others with extremely negative views 
towards PMCs, who would either avoid those venues they were known to frequent, or if 
in the same venue, would leave or avoid contact with them.
“I know of members of NGOs who won’t eat in the same dining 
facility as members of their security teams, and I’ve heard of cases 
where they won’t sit in the same room.”49
7.5 The Issue of Legal Definition
When asked to draw distinctions between mercenaries and PMCs, or to define PMCs, 
respondents invariably referred to the definitions laid down in the 1977 Convention for 
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA),50 the 1979 UNOHCR Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,51 or the 1989 International Convention.52  Most 
were aware of the fact that there is no accepted definition for a PMC, and believed that 
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This was a move by the Department of Tourism to rid the most popular beach along the Freetown 
peninsula of bars.  The demolitions were carried out on 8
th
October 2008.
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Interview with UNWFP representative, 27
th
November 2008.
50
OAU. 1977b. "Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(CEMA), Doc. CM/817 (XXIX) Annex II Rev.1 (Revision of 1972 Convention: Doc.CM/433/Rev. L.)."
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UNOHCR. 1977. "Article 47.2 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1)."
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UN. 1989. "International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, Doc. A/RES/44/34."
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this, combined with a ‘defaulting’ to the conventions against mercenarism for a 
definition, was – at least in part – the root of perceptions of PMCs as mercenaries.
Most respondents from PMCs interviewed in the course of the research accepted that the 
backgrounds of most of their employees, and the fact that the majority of their work is 
carried out in conflict or post-conflict situations, could be perceived as attributes of 
mercenarism.53
“…the fact that most of us are former military or former police is 
one of the obvious things that gets us pigeon-holed as mercenaries, 
but the other thing is that the only time we’re in the public eye is 
when there’s a conflict, or when there’s been a conflict and things 
are still unstable; when there’s a heightened need for security and 
the state is too weak to provide it….”54
Those interviewed were, however, clear as to the distinction between their activities and 
those of mercenaries.55  The main differences articulated by these respondents were that 
the activities of PMCs are transparent insofar as they go through tendering and 
contracting processes whereby all aspects of their operations are clearly laid out, that 
they operate only at the request of the state or legal body for whom those operations are 
being carried out, and that both the companies and their individual employees operate 
within the law, and in observance of the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human 
Rights.56  One respondent, a PMC manager with many years experience in Africa, sees a 
clear need for differentiation between PMCs and mercenaries on the part of the 
international community:
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From formal interviews with 7 respondents from the category ‘PMC Directors/Managers’ and 2 from the 
category ‘Industry Body Representatives’, and informal discussion with 9 other members of PMCs.
54
Interview with PMC Manager in Sierra Leone, 4
th
December 2008.
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From a total of 18 respondents; 2 from the category ‘Industry Body Representatives, 7 from the category 
‘PMC Directors/Managers’, and a further 9 employees of PMCs. 
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OECD. 2006. "Risk Awareness Tools for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones."
236
“One of the main reasons for the ‘false start’57 of the 1989 
Convention was that it is part of an obsolete concept.  In 2004, 
after she took over as Special Rapporteur, Shaista Shameem’s first 
action was to question why states didn’t want to ratify the 
convention.58  Her suggestion was that it was because of 
shortcomings in the way it defines mercenaries, and she called for 
international recognition of accountable, bona fide companies 
…and that’s what we’ve been calling for, for as long as I can 
remember.”59
Several respondents external to, but with experience of working with PMCs, hold similar 
perceptions as to the practical differences between those organizations and mercenaries.60  
They observe firstly that PMCs are primarily business ventures, with centrally planned 
and organized operations involving personnel employed under a corporate umbrella, in 
contrast with mercenaries, and the motivations of individual financial gain and 
adventure-seeking on the part of most involved in the post-independence mercenary 
‘boom’ in Africa of the 1960s and 70s.61
The second observation of this group of respondents is that these corporate ventures 
exhibit a high degree of professionalism at every level of their operations – indeed they 
see it as vital that they do so if they are to survive – and operate in observance of 
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This was a reference to the time taken for the 1989 Convention to be ratified by the 22 states required 
for it to enter into force, which was not completed until October 2001.  There are currently 35 ratifying 
states and a further 9 signatories whose governments will not ratify the Convention.  The UK did not sign 
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Interview with Managing Director of PMC in Sierra Leone on 28
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October 2008.  The respondent was 
referring to Shaista Shameem’s concerns as to the 1989 definition, and her suggestions for licensing and 
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Executive Director, and 1 UN Programme Coordinator).
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See, for example: Mockler, Anthony. 1987. The New Mercenaries: The History of the Hired Soldier 
from the Congo to the Seychelles. New York: Paragon House.; Arnold, Guy. 1999. Mercenaries: The 
Scourge of the Third World. London: Macmillan.
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internationally accepted norms and standards.  Two respondents argued that, while there 
is evidence to back up this claim on the part of PMCs based in western countries,62 there 
is little in respect of companies from other parts of the world.
“…companies here operate within the Voluntary Principles of 
Security and Human Rights.63  I don’t think there are any western 
PMSCs who haven’t adopted that as policy, but… there are 
companies operating elsewhere in Africa that don’t have any stated 
policy at all.”64  
“PMCs from some of the former Soviet bloc countries have no 
recognized overseeing bodies working towards internationally 
accepted norms, or towards regulation, and of course they have no 
link to the EU or the OECD where a lot of the norms relating to 
human rights have emanated from.”65
When engaging with respondents from UN agencies, IGOs, and NGOs, perceptions as to 
the role that PMCs can play in their fields of operations were mostly positive.66  While 
most were less inclined to articulate, in simple terms, what they considered to be the 
defining aspects of PMCs as opposed to mercenaries, they expressed a need for 
pragmatism, particularly in the light of recent use of PMCs in UN operations.67  They 
were, however, very cautious about criticizing the conventions laying down the 
definitions of mercenaries.  Most accepted the need for an internationally recognized and 
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as PAE and DynCorp 
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accepted definition of PMCs as a baseline from which to move forward.68
“The current situation is one of confusion, and that needs to be 
sorted out from an international law aspect, regardless of whether 
we conceive them [PMCs] to be good or bad, or whether IGOs or 
NGOs are going to work with them.”69
There was concern among some respondents that the basis for current definitions of 
mercenaries, the 1977 definition, which, itself, superseded attempts at defining 
mercenaries put forward in 1967 and 1972,70 has always been subject to challenges even 
from some of those supporting it,71 and that the subsequent conventions and protocols 
continue to be challenged both from within and without the UN.72
A common theme arising from the research, among respondents from PMCs, NGOs and 
UN agencies alike, is that there are deficiencies in the conventions.   Critics argue that 
applying the conventions to PMCs infers that some reputable companies, such as the 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) – a company registered as a charity in the UK and 
employed by DFID and the UN – when operating in zones of conflict, are mercenary 
organisations.73  The same inference can be drawn for companies that were employed by 
the UN to carry out air movements and logistics for the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) during the Liberian civil war.  On the other hand, companies 
committing themselves to direct involvement in conflict have been able to avoid falling 
under the definition – Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone because it contracted itself to 
the state during its involvement in the civil war, and Sandline International in Papua 
New Guinea by having its operatives enlisted as Special Constables in the Royal PNG 
                                                
68
Thirteen respondents, from 18 drawn only from the categories ‘Senior Staff’ (8 respondents from a total 
of 11), and ‘Organizations working with PMCs (5 respondents from a total of 7).
69
Interview with IMATT training officer, 6
th
December 2008.
70
This was preceded by OAU. 1967. "Resolution on the Activities of Mercenaries, AHG/Res.49 (IV)."
71
International Alert made recommendations for the modification of CEMA in 1997, but, fearful of 
delaying ratification yet further, urged UN member states to ratify it and address its inadequacies through 
the introduction of domestic laws.  It was not until 2001 that the Convention was ratified.
72
The UN Commission on Human Rights has, since the 53
rd
Session in 1997, proposed changes to CEMA 
and Additional Protocol 1.
73
The Mines Advisory Group, while a company limited by guarantee, is a profit-making organization 
whose employees in the field fall into Article 1.2.(b) of the 1989 Convention.
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Constabulary.  
Some proponents of the conventions were dismissive of the need for a ‘redefinition’ of 
PMCs.74  Two viewpoints were expressed: the first is that a definition separate and 
independent from the conventions on mercenarism would afford an element of 
undeserved respectability to these organizations, and the second, that there is no need for 
a complex definition:
“No, I can never remember the UN definition, and I don’t know 
many people who can, because it’s so complex, but unless you’re a 
lawyer, you don’t need to, because what it comes down to is this: if 
somebody gets paid to do things of a military nature in a country 
that isn’t their own, they are a mercenary.”75
Once again, perceptions as to what constitutes a mercenary are driven by the basic 
‘soldier for hire’ analogy, but no consideration is given to the fact that others being paid 
to do things of a military nature in a country that is not their own – UN peacekeepers, for 
example – fall into this definition.  As mentioned before in this chapter, many 
conceptions of PMCs as mercenaries are based on similar, classic definitions – as are 
those appearing in most authoritative dictionaries – along the lines of ‘one serving for 
wages in a foreign army’, or, as previously mentioned, ‘a soldier for hire’.  Much of the 
difficulty with the definitions laid down in the conventions lies in their complexity, but 
the above quote, and to some extent the classic ‘dictionary definition’ infers that UN 
troops are mercenaries.  Those supporting the conventions argue, therefore, that the 
many codicils that form part of these complex definitions, while clouding the issue, are 
necessary, and should not, as one respondent put it, be ‘tinkered with’.  But another 
respondent pointed out:
“In 1997, when we [Executive Outcomes] were still operating, a 
                                                
74
5 of 11 respondents supporting the conventions would not support a move to define PMCs separately 
from mercenaries.
75
Interview with representative of the NGO JHR (Journalists for Human Rights), 13
th
November 2008.
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UN report stated that our legal status was not mercenaries”76
For the UN Special Rapporteur – whose views consistently opposed the activities of 
PMCs during his term of office – to express reservations as to the applicability of the 
conventions to these companies,77 there would have to be some evidence that there is 
indeed a need for some form of ‘tinkering’.  These definitions were drawn up in a 
climate of inter-state conflict, which is far from the situation in which PMCs emerged. 
Mainstream conceptions of African states are, largely, of more cohesive political units 
than is, generally speaking, the case, and where intra-state conflict is concerned, the 
concept of interference in sovereign states by external actors is not one that sits 
comfortably in the popular mindset, particularly when those external actors are private, 
profit-seeking companies.
The issue of definition was further complicated when, at a meeting between the UN 
Special Rapporteur and UK and US companies representing the industry vis-à-vis the 
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA),78 the representatives ‘rebranded’ 
themselves ‘Peace and Security Companies’, on the basis of their extensive work with 
the UN and other humanitarian organizations.  
“In light of the fact that PSCs [Peace and Security Companies] are 
frequently employed by UN Member States and the UN’s own 
entities, we strongly recommend that the UN re-examine the 
relevance of the term “mercenary”.  This derogatory term is 
completely unacceptable and is too often used to describe fully 
legal and legitimate companies engaged in vital support operations 
                                                
76
Interview with former member of Executive Outcomes, 5
th
December 2008.  Further research suggests 
that the respondent’s information emanates from the 1997 UN Report on mercenarism, which stated 
“…the contracts which private military advisory, training and security companies conclude with States 
and the personnel working for them, even when they have a military background and are highly paid, 
cannot be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status…” UN. 1997. 
"E/CN.4/1997/24 - 53rd Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination."
77
Ibid.
78
UN. 2005. "UN Document A/60/263. Annex II - Communication of Peace and Security Companies at 
meeting with the Special Rapporteur - London, 27th-28th June 2005, in Report of the Sixtieth Session of 
the General Assembly."
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for humanitarian peace and stability operations.”79
The Special Rapporteur, at a subsequent UN meeting to consider the issues, concluded:
“…there is ambiguity with regard to the status of Private Military 
and Security Companies [who]… are under contract with Member 
States, non-governmental organizations, and, increasingly, the 
United Nations… the core issue revolves around the question of 
who is entitled to legitimacy in the use of force in the current 
political and security climate.”80
This reflects increasing recognition within the UN as to the complexity of the issue of 
PMCs in peace and security-related tasks, and increasing engagement with the issue by 
the UN Working Group on Mercenaries.
7.6 Summary
Differences between mercenaries and PMCs, to some respondents, are striking; to others, 
mercenaries and PMCs are one and the same.  As can be seen throughout this chapter, 
perceptions vary even among groups of respondents from similar categories, key factors 
being the nature and level of their experiences of PMCs.  Defining PMCs cannot 
therefore be carried out in a vacuum, isolated from the context in which they perform 
their tasks, or from the people and agencies for whom they carry out those tasks.  As 
discussed in depth, in this and earlier chapters, the political climate in African states, 
which has driven the use of PMCs, and the nature of political change and progress in 
those states, are of critical relevance to the issue.  They are also critical to respondents’ 
perceptions of PMCs.  In summary, it is not the organization, but the task, that defines 
whether mercenary activity is taking place.  To put this into context, the following 
chapter details the findings from field research into the nature of tasks undertaken by 
PMCs in African states from the eyes of respondents who study, work with, observe, or 
are affected by the actions of PMCs.
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Ibid.
80
Ibid.
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Chapter 8
Perceptions II: Tasks and Activities of PMCs
8.1 Perceptions – Tasks and Activities of PMCs
Perceptions of PMC activity in African states today is still driven largely by the nature of 
the involvement of the PMC Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 
early 1990s.  The subject of mercenarism, which, prior to this involvement, had been 
virtually absent from the press since the mid 1970s, resurfaced in 1992, and the issue of 
PMCs saw more coverage in the 1990s, in terms of press reports and academic 
commentary, than almost any other security issue.1  Given the public perception of 
mercenaries driven by press articles in the immediate post-independence period, and the 
correlation generated by those of Executive Outcomes in the 1990s, the association 
between the terms ‘mercenary’ and ‘PMC’ is a major driver of perceptions of the type of 
activity carried out by PMCs in African states.  Key issues emanating from the field 
research are perceptions that PMCs are agents of economic recolonization, that they are 
used as foreign policy proxies to effect non-attributable objectives on the part of state 
governments, and that PMC activity undermines state sovereignty – as did mercenary 
activity in African states in the 1960s and 70s.  There is also a widely held perception 
that PMCs perform the same tasks as did Executive Outcomes (EO) in Angola and Sierra 
Leone in the 1990s.2
EO was directly involved in combat, both in Angola and in Sierra Leone.  The 
perception that PMCs perform tasks of the same nature that EO carried out in those 
states is true, to a point.  EO trained the Sierra Leonean Army; PMCs are still involved 
in training armed forces, but no PMC in any country today offers services directly 
involving their employees in combat,3 and the legal situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
precludes the bearing of arms by any PMC working in those countries.4  This latter point 
                                                
1
With the exception of the conflicts in the Balkans. See: O'Brien, Kevin. 2000a. "PMCs, Myths and 
Mercenaries." Royal United Services Institute Journal 145(1).
2
Interview with Director of Policy, BAPSC, 2
nd
July 2008.
3
Although there are arguments that some activities carried out by PMCs in support of combat troops (the 
operation of surveillance drones and the delivery of materiel, for example) are an integral part of war-
fighting.
4
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the law prohibits the bearing of arms by private companies.
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has not prevented the expansion of PMC activity in either country.
“What we do here [Sierra Leone] is the same as we do anywhere 
else – advice, training and support for security forces.  We don’t 
want, in fact no company wants, to have their staff carrying 
weapons unless it is absolutely necessary – what’s the point? We as 
a company don’t have any task, anywhere, where our people carry 
firearms… so the work we do here, and the number of contracts 
we’ve taken on, hasn’t been in any way affected by the legal 
situation on firearms.  So the accusations that we’re ‘guns for 
hire’, or that we’re about work that involves lethal force just don’t 
hold water.”5
In response to this argument, detractors point out – correctly – that the legal definition of 
a mercenary does not exclude unarmed individuals, and they argue that peripheral tasks 
in support of armed forces fall into the definition of combat.  PMCs accept that much of 
their raison d’être is based on their former expertise in combat, and in combat support 
tasks.  But, in Liberia and Sierra Leone particularly – regardless as to misconceptions as 
to the nature of their activities – they argue that accusations that they are mercenaries are 
legally incorrect in any case, because neither country is at war.6
“… take MAG [Mines Advisory Group].  They’re a part of the 
same expansion of military type services as we are.  They do de-
mining, we do de-mining.  They’re managed and staffed by ex-
military personnel.  We’re managed and staffed by ex-military 
personnel.  Ok, they’re registered as a charity, but they’re a profit-
making organization, and their expats are paid substantially more 
                                                
5
Interview with Managing Director of a British PMC in Sierra Leone, 4
th
December 2008.
6
The definitions in OAU. 1972. "Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, 
Doc.CM/433/Rev. L. Annex I.", UNOHCR. 1977. "Article 47.2 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1).", and UN. 1989. "International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, Doc. A/RES/44/34." carry the stipulation that a mercenary is “specially recruited 
locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict and “does, in fact, take a direct part in the 
hostilities”
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than the armed forces where they work, just like ours, so if the 
situation is seen as one of combat, then legally, they are 
mercenaries.”7
The point argued by the respondent was that the proliferation of activities by companies 
such as his own is no different than the wider expansion of tasks related to post-conflict 
recovery and development that are carried out by many NGOs; MAG, for example, are 
employed by DFID as part of many of their post-conflict recovery programmes. 
In Sierra Leone and Liberia, much of the work carried out by PMCs is similar to that 
undertaken by private security companies in the UK – unarmed security guarding, but 
with the difference that small cadres of expatriate managers provide training and 
management for locally-recruited personnel.  The question, then, as to what constitutes a 
PMC, or what differentiates a PMC from a PSC, is a matter that comes down largely to 
perception.  Some independent security contractors see themselves as PMCs, while 
others distance themselves from any suggestion that they might fall into that category.  
Similarly, external perceptions tend to ‘pigeon-hole’ certain security contractors as 
PMCs, but not others, regardless of the fact that their employees are from the same pool 
– former members of the uniformed, disciplined services – and that they have the 
capacity to offer combat-related services.
“I regard my company as a PMC, and I know that we’re regarded 
externally as a PMC, because we make it clear that the range of 
services we can provide includes training and support for combat 
groups, but the only service we provide here [Sierra Leone] is 
unarmed security and security consultancy.  And it’s the same for 
most companies I know who call themselves PSCs – they know full 
well that they could, and probably would, provide combat-related 
services if a good opportunity presented itself, but the term PSC is 
less controversial so they’re discreet about that part of their 
                                                
7
Interview with PMC manager in Sierra Leone, 4
th
December 2008, referring to de-mining operations in 
DRC.  The Mines Advisory Group is registered as a charitable organization in the UK.
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portfolio.”8
The Security Sector Manager for Sierra Leone, a position with responsibility for 
country-wide strategic development of the security sector, and for advice and guidance 
to the Office of National Security, is a former British Police officer contracted to DFID 
as a consultant.  
“I had worked for the UN here previously… I’ve moved from the 
UN to the private sector; the post of Security Sector Manager is 
contracted out by DFID… so I suppose you could say I’m a private 
contractor, but I wouldn’t say I fall into the category of a PSC…”9
The status of ‘one-man security contractor’ is held by a number of respondents 
interviewed in the course of the research – all former servicemen – who regard 
themselves as PSCs, but would not rule out taking on work of a combat support nature.10
“... most PSCs are very small companies – sometimes no more than 
two or three people, and quite often just a one man band with a list 
of useful contacts.”11
Many respondents, particularly those from NGOs and organs of the UN, do not 
differentiate between PSCs and PMCs.  Some refer to them as Private Military/Security 
Companies (PMSCs), a blanket term used increasingly in publications on the subject of 
these organizations.12  
                                                
8
Interview with PMC Managing Director, Freetown, 4
th
December 2008. 
9
Interview with Senior Advisor to Sierra Leonean Office of National Security, 15
th
October 2008.
10
Specifically: 1 independent consultant for mines security in Kailahun, 1 security training consultant on 
contract with African Minerals, and 1 technical security consultant (a former member of Executive 
Outcomes) at Lungi Airport in Sierra Leone.
11
Interview with BAPSC Director of Policy, 2
nd
July 2008.
12
See, for example: War on Want. 2006. "Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of PMSCs."; UN. 2007a. 
"PMSCs and Challenges to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries."; Swiss 
Initiative/International Committee of the Red Cross. 2008. "Pertinent International Legal Obligations and 
Good Practices for States related to Operations of PMSCs."
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“We have chosen to use the term private military and security 
companies (PMSCs)… in order to express the essential continuity 
between the military and security services provided by the 
companies in question.”13
Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA),14
takes the concept further, using the term Military Service Providers (MSPs) to 
encompass all companies involved in the private military and security sector.  Under the 
blanket of MSPs come:15
 PMCs, who deliver Military Training and Offensive Combat
 PSCs, who provide protection for embassies, industrial sites and 
humanitarian organizations, and
 Non-lethal Service Providers (NSPs), who carry out such tasks as logistics 
and mine clearance
Once again, the existence of companies providing services spanning two or three of the 
categories listed above – not necessarily in the same country – or those who provide one 
category of service but have an ability and a willingness to consider tasks in another 
category, suggests that it is the task, and not the company, that should be categorized.
This is not, however, the case where perceptions of the activities of PMCs is concerned; 
the true nature of their current involvement in African states is not widely known.  For 
example, the extent to which PMCs are used by the UN – they have taken part in every 
multi-lateral UN peace operation since 1990,16 was not commonly known among 
respondents who had not worked with PMCs.  But even among many of those who are 
aware of the extent to which the UN employs PMCs, and even in cases of benign activity 
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War on Want. 2006. "Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of PMSCs."
14
The IPOA is the US industry body for the private military and security sector.
15
Brooks, Doug. 2002. Protecting People: the PMC Potential. Alexandria, VA: IPOA.
16
Avant, Deborah. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., p.7.
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– one example being the provision of water tankers in Sierra Leone –17 they are 
criticized.   One might conclude, therefore, that it is what they are, rather than what they 
do, that is the primary driver of perceptions of PMCs.   This was the subject of 
interviews with some 40 respondents, and the three main issues that came to the fore will
be discussed in the following section.
8.2 Issues of primary concern
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, respondents expressed three main concerns 
regarding the use of PMCs in African states.  The first is that they undermine state 
sovereignty, particularly in weak and failing states.  The second concern is that they are 
part of an ‘economic recolonization’ – a means of maintaining control of resources in 
African states.  And the third is that they are used as proxies to pursue Foreign Policy 
objectives in a way that cannot be attributed directly to state governments.  This section 
will address each of these issues in turn.
8.2.1 Undermining state sovereignty
A perception that drives one of the central arguments against PMCs is that they 
usurp the state’s monopoly over the use of coercive force.  In both cases where 
PMCs have become directly involved in the use of force in African states – those of 
EO in Angola and Sierra Leone – their involvement was at the request of the states’ 
respective host governments.  This raises the question as to whether the state, in 
employing a contractor to fulfil a need, which it has decided is necessary but cannot 
itself fulfil, is being usurped.  If the contractor is working for the state, to assist the 
state in achieving its legitimate ends, then it is surely the case that the state has not 
relinquished control over the use of force.  Regarding arguments that it is a 
dereliction on the part of the state to employ a PMC, one could argue that, where the 
state is unable to protect its people and its government, and no assistance is 
available from the international community, the greatest dereliction would be for the 
state to take no action.  Further, it could be argued that the state, in subcontracting 
the use of force to a PMC, has regained the definitive element of sovereignty by 
recovering its monopoly on the use of coercive force.  
                                                
17
Part of PAE’s contract for logistics includes the supply and maintenance of water tankers.  While this 
works conveniently for all parties, it has been subject to criticism in Sierra Leone.
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“… there’s pressure from the international community to reduce 
the size of states’ military and police, and to concentrate more on 
infrastructure and social needs… . But smaller and less capable 
security forces lead to security vacuums being filled by non-state 
actors… [who] can eventually become powerful enough to 
challenge the state… the monopoly over force is lost to non-state 
groups, which is essentially the involuntary transfer of force to 
private hands.”18
This transfer of force to private hands – of a malignant nature towards the state –
contrasts with the employment of a PMC, which, one could argue, is a voluntary
transfer of force to private hands, and one whose terms are dictated by the state.  
The point regarding the transfer of power to warlords – the loss of the monopoly of 
force to private actors bent on controlling at least part of the state – was seen by 
some respondents as the greatest potential danger to weak states.19  It was regarded 
as such because it can quickly overturn efforts of the state, and indeed the 
international community, towards greater democratization and development.  It was 
also seen as the primary driver for what the international community most wants to 
avoid – the need for external intervention.  The same group of respondents, with the 
exception of one representative of UNMIL (whose strength in Liberia at the time of 
writing is some 15,000 personnel),20 did not believe that the international 
community or the African Union could, or would, mount sufficiently fast, sizeable, 
or robust interventions to deal decisively with such a threat.  Some respondents 
pointed to difficulties encountered the current UN missions in Darfur (UNAMID) 
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Interview with representative of humanitarian NGO at Lungi, 17
th
November 2008.
19
23 of 34 formally-interviewed respondents: 4 from the category Observers and Analysts, 8 from the 
category Senior Staff (of UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP, IMATT and DFID), 6 from the category PMC 
Directors/Managers, 3 from the category Organizations, NGOs working with PMCs, and 2 from the 
category Other Concerned Parties (specifically: 1 from the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Mineral Resources, 
and 1 Risk and Security Manager for African Minerals).
20
The presence of UNMIL in Liberia is an intervention in progress; the respondent believed it likely that 
UNMIL would be swiftly redeployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to deal with any threat in 
Liberia, or in the states on Liberia’s borders. 
249
and Congo (MONUC) as evidence of this.21  Others argued that PMCs were 
preferable to UN troops because the quality of troops sent by the international 
community did not inspire confidence in the ability of the UN mission. 
“Last year, European armies had nearly 10,000 soldiers seconded 
to the UN.  How many of those were in Africa?  Less than 300.  So 
there’s no credibility in the West’s interest in Africa in the first 
place, and there’s very little credibility in the troops the UN send 
here.  Now try telling people the UN will protect them better than a 
PMC.  You might get sympathy in some places, but not here.  
They’ve seen what happened under ECOMOG and the UN, and 
they’ve seen what happened when a private company came in… 
and they’ve seen what happened when that company was forced 
out.”22
The argument for self-reliance through larger and stronger African armies, as a 
means of avoiding the need for intervention by the AU or the UN, or by private 
entities, was not supported by many respondents.   
“… strong armies have more often than not been a threat to 
African governments, rather than being their protectors.”23
The recent coup in Guinea,24 which has evolved as a more military dominated state 
than its neighbours in the Mano River Union, is a demonstration of the latter point.  
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Most of these difficulties were related to troop numbers.  At the time of writing, UNAMID had a 
shortfall of 4,896 UN troops (19,555 authorised, 14,659 actual), and MONUC a shortfall of 2,971 troops 
(19,815 authorised, 16,844 actual).  Source: UN. 2009b. "UN DPKO Current Operations." Accessed at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.shtml/africa.
22
Interview with Security Manager, Lungi Airport, Sierra Leone, 5
th
December 2008.  In 2007, 8,000 of 
the UN’s entire contingent of European blue-helmetted troops were in Lebanon; less than 300 were 
deployed in Africa.  These figures are corroborated in: Gowan, Richard. 2007. "The EU's Africa Strategy: 
What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?" Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper. p.29. 
23
Interview with representative of UNMIL’s Public Information Department, 14
th
November 2008.
24
On 23
rd
December 2008, some six hours after the death of President Aboubacar Somparé, Captain 
Moussa Dadis Camara of the Republic of Guinea Armed Forces (RGAF) announced a dissolution of the 
government, a suspension of the constitution and a National Ruling Council, ‘le Conseil National pour la 
Démocratie et le Développement’ (CNDD) consisting of 26 officers of the RGAF, and 6 civilians.
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In an interview with the Chief Advisor to the Office of National Security in Sierra 
Leone, prior to the Guinea coup, he pointed out that:
“In Sierra Leone they have a concept of human security... aimed at 
encompassing and involving civil society... in Guinea they just 
don’t have the same concept – theirs is a very militaristic 
approach.”25
, 26
While PMCs have neither taken part in, nor proffered services for, direct 
involvement in combat for more than a decade, their prior involvement has been 
instrumental in driving perceptions as to the nature of their current activities.
“Even my former army colleagues don’t believe me when I tell 
them how mundane it all is.  Everybody seems to think we’re 
running around in combat gear like a load of mercenaries.”27
Operations currently performed by PMCs in Liberia and Sierra Leone are typical of 
those carried out in other African states.  They fall into three main categories.  The 
first consists of tasks forming part of development operations, or Security Sector 
Reform tasks, on behalf of international community bodies such as the UN and 
DFID.  These include the training of the AFL in Liberia, and elements of Security 
Sector Reform and the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) in Sierra 
Leone.28
  
The second is the provision of security to enable NGOs to operate in 
dangerous areas – ‘securing the humanitarian space’ – which is carried out by 
arrangement between the PMCs and NGOs in question.   The third is the provision 
of consultancy, training, and security operations to private companies or 
individuals.  In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the latter requires that PMCs are 
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Interview with Senior Advisor to the Sierra Leonean Office of National Security, 15
th
October 2008.
26
As demonstrated clearly by the actions of bérets rouges units of the RGAF against anti-government 
protestors on 28
th
September 2009.  See, for example: International Crisis Group. 2009. "Africa Policy 
Briefing No. 66 - Guinea: Military Rule Must End."
27
Interview with PMC Managing Director, Freetown, 28
th
October 2008
28
The Senior Advisor to the Sierra Leonean Office of National Security, and head of the Sierra Leone 
Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), is a private contractor seconded by DFID to the 
Government of Sierra Leone.
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registered with the government of the host country, and other African states have 
similar registration and licensing arrangements.  This, however, is not the image of 
PMC operations that predominates in the popular mindset, where their use is 
“equated with the use of private armies, or worse, with mercenaries”.29   The 
operations of PMCs are overt, and are conducted within the law of the country in 
which they operate.  Far from usurping the power of the state, the range of activities 
PMCs are involved in augments the state’s ability to provide the public good of 
security.
On the downside to this argument, some respondents in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
expressed concerns that in areas where PMCs operate, whether performing private 
security for extractive companies, or services under the auspices of the international 
community, the population experiences levels of security that are not representative 
of the wider security situation.   These respondents felt that the higher levels of 
security in these areas take the onus off the state to invest overstretched resources in 
state security mechanisms. 30  Some see this as the point where progress ceases to be 
made in the reform of the state’s security forces, and, with little prospect of change, 
a situation where dependence on PMCs is likely to be a long term factor.  This is 
considered further in Chapter 9, where the situation regarding state institutions that 
draw support from PMCs is analysed.
In summary, the perception that PMC activities undermine the sovereignty of states 
in which they operate is not the reality of the situation.  The record shows that 
PMCs augment the state’s ability to provide the public good of security, and that 
they bolster the ability of weak states to prevent the rise of anti-state actors where, 
previously, the state’s institutions of security had insufficient capability to do so.  
What is evident is that states will endeavour to gain maximum advantage from the 
use of PMCs, and several respondents believed that this could translate into a 
situation where the state fails to reform or rebuild its security forces, thereby 
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From a survey conducted by International Alert.  (See: International Alert. 2002. "Humanitarian Action 
and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate." p.9).
30
14 of 34 formally-interviewed respondents: 2 from the category Observers and Analysts, 6 from the 
category Senior Staff (of UNMIL, UNDP, IMATT and DFID), and 4 from the category Organizations, 
NGOs working with PMCs.
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making dependence on PMCs a long term necessity.31  Many respondents, as the 
following section will show, believe that this dependence could be part of a 
calculated policy whereby Western states – those from whose territories PMCs 
originate – also endeavour to gain maximum advantage from the continued need for 
PMCs in weak African states.
8.2.2 PMCs as agents of ‘economic recolonization’
A perception that has emerged strongly from the field research is that the 
proliferation of PMCs is part of a neoliberal consensus; that they are proxies of 
Western governments in a ‘recolonization’ of African states, linked primarily to 
resource wealth.
“The reason most PMCs are here is to protect Western companies 
in their efforts to maintain control of resources.”32
Many respondents from, or working closely with, PMCs, are acutely aware of this 
perception,33 but argue that much of their work is for local as well as for Western 
companies.  In Sierra Leone, while the protection of companies involved in resource 
extraction does not make up the bulk of PMCs’ work, the demand for the current 
level of resource-related contracts is unlikely to decrease as it is with SSR-related 
activity.  While not a precondition of the involvement of overseas companies in 
Sierra Leone’s extractive industry, they have little choice but to use PMCs to 
provide security for their facilities.  The Sierra Leone Police (SLP) do not have the 
capacity to provide even the levels of public policing demanded of it.
“There’s no way the SLP could handle the kind of security the 
private mining sector needs.  They’re stretched enough as it is.  
                                                
31
Supra, Note 30.
32
Interview with representative of a Human Rights NGO, 13
th
November 2008.
33
29 of 36 formally-interviewed respondents: 4 from the category Observers and Analysts, 2 from the 
category Industry Representatives, 9 from the category Senior Staff (of UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP, 
IMATT and DFID), 7 from the category PMC Directors/Managers, 4 from the category Organizations, 
NGOs working with PMCs, and 3 from the category Other Concerned Parties (specifically: 1 from the 
Sierra Leonean Ministry of Mineral Resources, 1 from the Public Diplomacy Section of the US Embassy 
in Liberia, and 1 Independent Consultant for Mines Security).
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They were supposed to have been expanded from a strength of 
about 6,000 to 9,500… which they have, strictly speaking, but the 
extra 3,500 are all OSD [Operational Support Department],34 and 
the OSD are not involved in that kind of policing, so the situation is 
no different from about 5 years ago; there still aren’t enough 
police.”35
Much of the work of PMCs in Africa has come about from the need to augment 
states’ institutions of security.  This is true of Sierra Leone, where PMCs supplant 
the shortfall, in terms of numbers and capability, of the SLP.  But while PMCs 
provide the professional levels of service that extractive companies require in terms 
of securing their expansive and complex facilities, they cannot provide armed 
security, and recent events have shown that an armed presence is necessary in 
facilities that deal with high value resources.36  Companies involved in resource 
extraction have no option therefore but to employ members of the OSD to provide 
armed backup for their permanent security teams.  The cost per armed OSD officer 
is 500,000 Leones per month,37 and the hirer is required to provide subsistence and 
accommodation for each officer.  While this system ensures that the monopoly over 
the use of armed force remains with the state, it is unpopular even with agencies of 
the UN.  Essentially, the Government of Sierra Leone has addressed the 
international community’s desire for it to re-monopolise the use of armed force by 
making the OSD a government-run PMC. 
“We don’t agree with the way they use the police as a sort of 
government-run private security force, because it is a state 
monopoly on private armed security, and it’s limited to those who 
can afford to pay for it.38
                                                
34
The Operational Support Department (OSD) is an armed government department whose personnel can 
be hired by private companies.  Although ostensibly part of the SLP, OSD officers are drawn from the 
RSLAF.
35
Interview with Mining Manager, Kono District, 29
th
October 2008.
36
An example is the attempted ‘invasion’ of the Koidu mine by local townspeople in December 2007.
37
Approximately US$175.
38
Interview with representative of the UNDP DDR Programme in Liberia, 12
th
November 2008.
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The main concern voiced by respondents from UN agencies is that this reduces the 
numbers of officers carrying out the primary police role of providing the public 
good of security, defeating the object of UN Development Assistance Framework 
aims.  There is also a belief among some respondents who employ OSD officers 
that some are involved in local criminal networks, as are many members of local 
security companies.39
“The Ministry [of Mineral Resources] feels more secure with 
overseas… companies, because there is much corruption among 
Salone
40
companies.  As far as security is concerned, I prefer to 
deal with British-managed security companies than local ones, 
because from our experience it gets around the problem of local 
companies being involved in criminal networks.  Obviously… there 
needs to be some sort of state input, and that comes through the 
OSD, and through our own force of Mine Monitors.  But I have to 
say, even they are not above suspicion...”
41
The respondent stressed that it was the management of these companies that was an 
issue; most companies used by the Ministry of Mines are made up of local guards, 
but with foreign managers.  In Sierra Leone, with the winding down of UN 
operations, and the associated reduction in the number of PMCs supporting those 
operations, the percentage of PMC work in support of mining operations is 
estimated to be higher than that in Liberia, although the actual number of employees 
involved in such operations in Sierra Leone is considerably lower than in Liberia.42
In Liberia, large US PMCs in particular are the target of accusations of being an 
insidious element of ‘economic recolonization’.  Part of this perception is that the 
proliferation of PMCs from the US is a new phenomenon in Africa, but two of the 
                                                
39
Interview with Sierra Leonean Ministry of Mineral Resources representative, 7
th
December 2008.
40
‘Salone’ is a local ‘Krio’ expression meaning ‘Sierra Leone’, or ‘Sierra Leonean’.
41
Interview with Ministry of Mineral Resources representative (Supra, Note 39).
42
Supra, Note. 39.
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largest North American PMCs, DynCorp, and Pacific Architects and Engineers 
(PAE), have provided logistics and support to the UN in West Africa since 1990.  In 
Liberia, where the bulk of PMCs’ work is linked to the international community’s 
development efforts, it is estimated that the number of PMCs operating in support of 
Western mining companies makes up only a small proportion of their total work.43
Another commentator argues that perceptions of the use of PMCs as part of an 
expansionist consensus are unfounded because their use in supporting governments 
at home has become a liberal norm:
“The US Army, and the British Army particularly among European 
armies, now rely on PMCs to operate, and that’s evolved 
completely separately from the use of PMCs in failed states.  
Things like training, logistics and maintenance are outsourced even 
in our own countries, and PMCs are used firstly because they 
achieve financial efficiencies, and secondly because they free up a 
lot of capacity in armies that are thinly stretched… so why do 
people assume that when we use PMCs to do the same tasks in 
another country, it’s some kind of insidious plot?”44
In sum, claims that PMCs are part of a Western attempt to maintain control of 
resources are regarded by many respondents as part of the throwback to the 
activities of mercenaries in 1960s post-independence Africa – when it was indeed 
the case.  But African governments are today seeking to regain control of their 
resources, and a carrot-and-stick approach to the granting and withdrawing of 
mining concessions ensures that control is being recaptured by the state.  Efforts by 
the Sierra Leonean and Liberian governments to reduce the influence of 
multinationals have been demonstrated recently, in Sierra Leone with the 
withdrawal of Sierra Rutile’s exclusive legal right to maintain their own armed 
                                                
43
In interviews with Senior Staff of IGOs, PMC Directors/Managers, NGOs, and two others (specifically: 
1 Military Training Advisor, and 1 former Chief of Police), estimates varied from ‘less than a quarter’ to 
‘less than 20%’.
44
Interview with representative of Public Diplomacy Section, US Embassy in Liberia, 12
th
November 
2008.
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security presence, and in Liberia with a review of the institutional framework of 
concession agreements with the Government of Liberia.45  The perception, however, 
that foreign governments exploit the opportunity presented by the presence of 
PMCs in African states, remains.  There is a deeply-held suspicion that Western 
governments use PMCs as a non-attributable means of pursuing Foreign Policy 
objectives.
8.2.3 PMCs as Foreign Policy Proxies
A phrase used quite often to describe PMCs – invariably in a derisory sense – is 
‘foreign policy proxies.’  This gives rise to a number of questions: if the elements of 
foreign policy in question are not, in themselves, bad – and there is a general 
consensus that current British foreign policy, towards Sierra Leone, in particular, is 
ethical – then why should the use of a proxy to effect such policy be seen as bad?
“Should it be regarded as negative that proxies are used, where the 
institutions of the state are so overstretched that, without their use 
the policy would be neglected?”46
One might perhaps draw the inference of ‘plausible deniability’ – that there may be 
instances where the use of PMCs offers an opportunity to diverge from stated 
policy; some respondents pointed out the Sandline ‘Arms to Africa’ affair as an 
example of this.47  In most cases, however, it is evident that it is not the use of a 
proxy to carry out foreign policy that is being criticized, but the proxy itself, the 
inference being that PMCs are unsuitable for use as agents of foreign policy.  In 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, however – two countries in which the use of PMCs is 
central to post-conflict rebuilding of the state – that is not an opinion that 
predominates, either among those whose work brings them into contact with PMCs, 
or those whose daily lives are affected by the activities of these organizations.  
                                                
45
The Informer, Monrovia, 20th July. 2009.
46
Interview with representative of the US Embassy Public Diplomacy Section, Liberia, 12
th
November 
2008.
47
  In 1996, the PMC Sandline International attempted to import weapons into Sierra Leone in apparent 
violation of a UN arms embargo.  An inquiry concluded that Sandline’s actions were carried out with the 
knowledge and tacit approval of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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Perceptions and realities of the nature and outcomes of the activities of PMC, in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, are closely linked to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
process, and comprise mainly the provision of private security.  The central aim of 
SSR in post-conflict states is to re-establish (or in many cases, to establish from 
scratch) what is considered the minimum requirement for stability vis-à-vis 
functioning institutions of public security and law-and-order.  In Sierra Leone, this 
is the keystone of British foreign policy, implemented through DFID, and in 
Liberia, it is the first requirement of the UN Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF),48 implemented by the UNDP.  Attitudes towards PMCs working for both 
of these agencies, from their detractors, falls into the ‘foreign policy proxy’ 
argument, with one of the more evident perceptions being that foreign policy has 
been delegated to agents who are not morally suited to carry it out.
Another concern is that PMCs could become involved in activities that are contrary 
to the foreign policies of their home states.  It is the explicit policy of PMCs – at 
least those from western states –49 to avoid taking on contracts counter to the 
national interests of their own state.50  This took on new importance after the 
Sandline ‘Arms to Africa’ Affair,51 the apparent complicity by elements of the 
British Government leading the then Under-secretary of State to conclude:
…the Sandline Sierra Leone affair was something that was not only 
embarrassing but I would say quite damaging to the government.”52
PMCs have, since then, kept at the top of their agenda the need to be seen to be 
working only with internationally-accepted governments and agencies, and within 
                                                
48
UN. 2007b. "United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012 -
Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development."
49
Both the British Industry body – the BAPSC – and that of the US, the International Peace Operations 
Association  (IPOA), maintain that no registered PMC will entertain any task that runs contrary to national 
interests, to the interests of the international community, or to the Voluntary Principles of Security and 
Human Rights.
50
House of Commons. 2002. "House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. Ninth Report: 
Private Military Companies."
51
Sir Thomas Legg KCB QC and Sir Robin Ibbs KBE. 1998. "Report of the Sierra Leone Arms 
Investigation (the Legg Report)." p.75. 
52
Ibid., quoted by Dr. Dennis McShane, then Under-secretary of State for the Foreign Office.
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the Foreign Policy aims of their governments. 
“It would be commercial suicide to take on a job that conflicts with 
any small part of the national interest.  The media would have a 
field day.  Some of my guys worked for a company that turned 
down millions of pounds worth of contracts because they weren’t 
sure about the ethics – a massive pipeline security contract, a load 
of investigation work and a high-value load transportation job, all 
within a few months of each other.”53
Advocates of PMCs argue that their activities in relation to foreign policy are 
benign.  The foreign policy aims of most governments towards African states are 
analogous with the aims of the UN.
“Most nations’ [foreign] policies towards Africa are centered 
around development and democratization, which mirrors UN 
policy towards Africa, so the use of PMSCs to support the UN, and 
their use in SSR, reflects those foreign policy aims.”54
“Well, DFID and the FCO are the main British Foreign Policy 
agents in most African states. British foreign policy hinges around 
ensuring stability as a vehicle to democratization and development, 
and SSR is a keystone of that policy, which mirrors the UN 
Development Assistance Framework.  In fact, the aims of DFID 
and the UNDP are practically the same in many areas....”55
Supporters of PMCs also argued that without their involvement, the aims of many 
                                                
53
Interview with PMC Managing Director, 4
th
December 2008.  The company in question is believed to be 
ArmorGroup, who claim also to have turned down a contract in the same year to supply equipment to a 
government they suspected might use it to suppress democratic movements. There is evidence of this in 
the 2002 Select Committee Report on PMCs (see: House of Commons. 2002. "House of Commons Select 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Ninth Report: Private Military Companies.").
54
Interview with representative of UNMIL, 14
th
November 2008.
55
Interview with representative of DFID, 24
th
November 2008.
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ethical policies would not be achieved. 
“PMCs can help to pursue ethical foreign policy aims.  Should it be 
regarded as negative …where the institutions of the state are so 
overstretched that, without their use the policy would be 
neglected?”56
Those opposed to the use of PMCs argue that regardless as to how innocuous a 
foreign policy may be, its delegation to non-state organizations sets a dangerous
precedent.  Should a government decide that a divergence from stated policy is a 
necessary evil, the availability of PMCs as a ‘foreign policy tool’ affords the 
opportunity for plausible deniability.  The Sandline ‘Arms to Africa’ affair is cited 
by most detractors as an example of how the use of PMCs can become an insidious 
element of governments’ foreign policy aims.  
Many proponents of the use of PMCs, and some who were not so supportive,57 were 
satisfied that, after the international outcry generated by the Sandline affair, the 
declassification of many revealing documents, and the advent of the Freedom of 
Information Act,58 the likelihood of PMCs being used as clandestine government 
proxies is not a realistic prospect.  While some are satisfied that, provided the 
foreign policy aim is ethical, the use of private companies to achieve it is a positive 
act, others believe that PMCs should not, under any circumstances, be used to 
pursue foreign policy aims, whether ethical or not.  PMCs are well aware of this 
allegation, but argue that it is policies backed by the international community that 
drives their activities.  This is particularly so in Liberia.
“Well there’s no arguing that we fill a foreign policy need, but it’s 
actually driven by the international community, not the US 
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Interview with representative of the US Embassy Public Diplomacy Section, Liberia, 12
th
November 
2008.
57
17 of 29 formally-interviewed respondents from the following categories: 2 from ‘Observers and 
Analysts’, 3 from ‘Senior Staff’ (of UNMIL, UNDP, and DFID), 2 from ‘Industry Representatives’, 7 
from ‘PMC Directors/Managers’, and 3 from ‘Organizations working with PMCs’ (specifically, 1 
representative of the NGO ‘InterAction’, 1 from the NGO ‘DDI International’, and 1 from UNWFP).
58
See: UK Parliament. 2000. "Freedom of Information Act, Chapter 36."
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Government.  The training of the AFL [Armed Forces of Liberia] 
wasn’t a unilateral decision by the US; it’s part of the UN 
framework, but would attitudes be any different if it was US troops 
doing the job?  I mean, wouldn’t that be even more like a 
‘recolonization’, as they put it, than a PMC doing it?”59
On the issue of delegation of tasks by governments to PMCs, proponents and critics 
of PMCs used the same argument to back up their point of view.  Both argued that 
the use of PMCs enables governments to delegate tasks they feel are necessary, but 
from which they wish to distance themselves for political or financial reasons.
8.3 Summary
Taking the issues discussed in this chapter to their broadest context, one can see that the 
provision of military and security related activities by private entities does not sit 
comfortably in conventional political thought.  This is reflected in the field research, by 
those respondents who regard the actions of PMCs as undermining state sovereignty, 
regardless as to the positive effect they might have on the security and stability of the 
state  Security and stability are matters regarded as being the duty of the state, and the 
duty of state institutions, rather than private actors.
Mainstream IR Theory – that of a system in which states have, for centuries, held the 
monopoly on governance and moral license – cannot adequately account for the growing 
significance of the activities of private actors in matters of state security.  The United 
Nations is an association of states; the primacy of the sovereign state in the international 
system dictates that there can be no departure from states as principal agents in the 
consideration of international ethical norms related to the use of force.  But the rise of 
private military and security actors demonstrates such a precipitous and radical alteration 
in the public/private divide – at international as well as national levels – that the actions 
of states cannot meaningfully be contemplated without consideration of these actors.
The following chapter considers the implications of the increasing use of private military 
and security actors in matters of state security, their effects on the wider security 
                                                
59
Interview with former DynCorp Manager, 4
th
December 2008.
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situation at regional and international levels, and, most importantly for the central theme 
of this thesis, their growing involvement in peacekeeping operations.
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Chapter 9
PMCs in Practice
9.1 Introduction
While the majority of respondents interviewed in the course of field research felt that
PMCs have, overall, made a positive contribution to the security situation in those 
African states in which they have been involved,1 not all were convinced that they are a 
desirable addition to the political landscape in the longer term, or an optimal addition to 
all of the operations of IGOs and NGOs.  Most striking was the lack of awareness among 
many respondents as to the extent of involvement of PMCs in peace support operations 
and Security Sector Reform tasks.2  There were, however, some commonalities in the 
views of those with opposing standpoints towards PMCs, and these are likely to give 
some indication as to probable future developments in the private military and security 
sectors as they relate to African states.3  In Liberia and Sierra Leone particularly, where 
PMCs have been involved continuously for several years, many respondents believe 
there are areas of expertise that show potential for growth.4  Three areas in particular that 
were seen as holding promise for the future of PMCs in Africa were:
 Security Sector Reform
 Support for state institutions, and empowerment of the weak state
 Securing the ‘Humanitarian Space’
                                                
1
23 of 35 respondents.  The sample excluded those managing, or employed by PMCs.
2
Other than those respondents in the categories Observers/Analysts, Senior Staff (of UN bodies, IMATT 
and DFID), Industry Body Representatives, and PMC Directors/Managers.
3
The sample includes those with specific knowledge of policy towards the use of private companies; 4 
Observers/Analysts, 11 Senior Staff (of UNMIL, UNIOSIL, UNDP, IMATT, DFID), 2 Industry Body 
Representatives, 4 Government Representatives, and 7 from Organizations working with PMCs.
4
19 of 35 respondents (as with the sample outlined in Note 1, above, this excluded those managing, or in 
the employ of PMCs).
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9.2   Security Sector Reform
Both in Liberia and Sierra Leone, those respondents tasked with Security Sector Reform, 
the central component of the UN’s Development Assistance Framework, acknowledge 
the positive nature of the involvement of PMCs in the SSR process. The following quote 
reflects the sentiments of many working in UN departments that regularly use the 
services of PMCs:5
“…the process that underpins the UN framework is Security Sector 
Reform. The need to provide basic human security and prevent 
violence is central to all the outcomes, because that is central to 
stability… it’s a long process, and it permeates all the security 
institutions of the state, and all aspects of security.  So it’s not a 
process that can be micro-managed, and, whether we’re 
comfortable with it or not, it’s come to involve the input of private 
companies…”
6
This suggests an acceptance, in some departments of the UN, of a deepening need for, 
and an increasing involvement of, PMCs.  Counterbalancing this, however, is entrenched 
recalcitrance on the part of others.  This is wholly representative of the turmoil within 
the UN that surrounds not just the use of PMCs, but their very presence, and it is 
important to consider this issue further here.
Throughout the research, it proved difficult to get anybody from the UN to provide 
information as to their use of PMCs.7  A 2002 survey found that UN staff members’ 
denial of their involvement with private security companies was due to press and public 
perceptions that their use equated to the use of mercenaries.8  An interview with a former 
                                                
5
Vaux, Tony. 2002. "European Aid Agencies and Their Use of Private Security Companies." In 
Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate, eds. Tony Vaux, Chris Seiple, 
Greg Nakano and Koenraad Van Brabant. London: International Alert. pp.8-9.
6
Interview with representative of the UNDP in Liberia, 11
th
November 2008.
7
PMCs employed extensively by the UN since 1990 include Aegis, ArmorGroup, DynCorp, DSL, Hart, 
and PAE, all of whom are UN Approved Contractors (UN. 2007. "UN Office of Central Support Services. 
List of Approved Suppliers.").
8
International Alert. 2002. "Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate." 
p.9.
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Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (now Chairman of the 
British Association of Private Security Companies) was particularly informative with 
regard to this issue:
“...the UN maintains the position that it would never, ever accept a 
PSC or deal with a PSC, but it then... allows the UN operational 
agencies to work with PSCs… so the 38
th
floor may well never have 
employed or given a contract to a PSC, but the same is certainly 
not true of UNHCR, UNDP, etc.”9
This is perhaps an indicator of unease, within elements of the UN, of the involvement of 
private actors in any international community effort in which the UN has a leading role.  
Sarah Percy talks of ‘institutional discomfort’ in UN agencies, where the use of PMCs is 
concerned, and points out that there are still some players within the UN who adopt an 
abolitionist stance, based on moral objection to the involvement of private companies.10  
This stance is regarded as short-sighted by some, and hypocritical by other respondents 
from PMCs:
“We’re told that the UN has an aversion to force being put into the 
hands of private actors, and to those actors being incorporated in 
their framework, but central to their approach to peacebuilding is 
doing deals and making compromises with warlords and other non-
state actors who exercise force of a horrific nature, outside of any 
framework.”11
This was reflected nowhere better than in Liberia, where peacekeeping forces pitted 
                                                
9
Interview with senior representative of the British Association of Private Security Companies (formerly 
Head of the Emergency Aid Department of the ODA, Deputy High Representative of Reconstruction in 
Sarajevo, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in charge of the European Union Pillar 
of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, and Director of Operations for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority in Iraq), 30
th
May 2008.
10
Percy, Sarah. 2007. "Morality and regulation." In From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation 
of Private Military Companies, eds. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p.24.
11
Interview with Managing Director of a Private Security Organization in Sierra Leone, 5
th
December 
2008.
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faction against faction in an attempt to contain violence that instead brought about an 
escalation, a situation that is being reflected today in Congo.12  In Sierra Leone, 
UNAMSIL’s approach to negotiating with the RUF was characterized by deals that 
brought about accusations of the UN being biased in their favour.13 Further frustration is 
echoed in the words of a PMC manager who has worked alongside organizations 
forming part of the international community’s SSR operations:
“The most annoying thing for me is that there are so many senior 
UN staff who know the scale of the contribution we make… they’ve 
used PMCs in every major operation they’ve done for over 25 
years… but there’s no way they’re going to weigh into the 
argument…  that would attract bad press for them, I guess...”14
This quote is a clear reflection of the impact of wider, negative perceptions of PMCs, as 
discussed in chapters 7 and 8.  Departments of the UN, having employed the services of 
PMCs for many years, have built up an understanding of the nature, the capabilities, and 
the contribution these organizations can make to the wider peacekeeping effort.  While 
the voices of the abolitionist camp have not managed to preclude this long-standing use 
of PMCs, it raises the question as to how the current, softened, approach of the UN 
Working Group on Mercenaries fits with the wider, negative views, and how it is 
perceived among abolitionists within the UN.  From 2005, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur adopted an approach that proposed:
“… a fundamental rethinking of the issue of mercenarism … a 
substantive and comprehensive review of the legal definition of 
mercenaries… contacts with private military and security 
companies and… efforts to encourage the development of a code of 
conduct for that sector, including through consultations with 
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The East African, 30th November. 2009. "UN Must Stop Backing Congo's Disastrous Operation Against 
Marauding Rebel Militias."
13
Concessions made by the UN to the RUF, including the release of three senior RUF leaders, the 
legalized control of diamond resources, and the guarantee of senior positions in government for former 
RUF leaders, prompted accusations of bias. See: ‘Unwillingness to Use Force’, in: International Crisis 
Group. 2001. "Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty." Africa Report No.35.  pp.7-8.
14
Interview with PMC Managing Director, Sierra Leone, 4
th
December 2008.
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representatives of the relevant organizations.”15  
This was a departure from the approach advocated by the previous Special Rapporteur, 
and is perhaps the clearest indicator of turmoil within the UN over the issue of PMCs.  
Some regard the use of PMCs in SSR as acceptable only if it is carried out within 
parameters specified by, and under the authority of, the international community, 
regardless as to how positive an outcome it may otherwise achieve. This sits comfortably 
among those who believe that authority for SSR must rest between the state and agents 
of the international community whose specific task is to put it into effect.  
Significantly, even among those who feel that there are negative aspects of the use of 
PMCs in SSR, there is consensus that they fill the ‘capability gap’ – the lacuna between 
what the international community wishes to achieve and the limitations of the 
instruments at its disposal.  In Sierra Leone, where the UN presence has been wound 
down to less than 100 personnel, the issue is not whether PMCs should be involved in 
SSR, but how long they should remain involved.16
“Right now, we need them [PMCs], because without them I don’t 
think we would have been able to maintain the stability that can 
attract foreign investment and kick-start economic reform.  They 
continue to play a part in that, but we would not wish them to be 
seen as a permanent part of our security structure, or even a long-
term part of that structure… there is still work to be done, but how 
long it will take, I cannot tell you.”17
The issue, for this respondent, was how long it should be before the institutions of the 
state can function effectively without support – regardless as to whether this support 
comes from organs of the UN, or from private actors.  This issue is analysed critically in 
Section 9.3 of this chapter.  PMCs are allocated SSR tasks largely because they have a 
                                                
15
UN. 2005. "60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of 
the right of peoples to self-determination." p.2. 
16
See Section 9.3 below (‘Support for State Institutions and Empowerment of the Weak State’).
17
Interview with representative of the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Mineral Resources, 7
th
December 2008.
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ready source of expertise, but the allocation of such tasks to PMCs, even within a UN 
framework, is not universally accepted.
9.2.1 Task allocation in SSR
The market for SSR services is, in fact dominated by consultants and risk 
management companies on contract to the UN,18 but PMCs pick up many ‘on-the-
ground’ tasks as a result of the need to recruit from qualified and experienced 
personnel from a wide range of backgrounds, and to deploy them relatively quickly.  
An example of this was the provision of equipment and training to RSLAF troops 
for response to internal crises, where a private company was employed to put into 
practice a contingency plan conceived within a department of the UN.19
“People aren’t looking at the root of the problem.  The root of the 
problem is that expertise in the nitty-gritty of SSR is held by 
PMSCs, so instead of attacking the use of PMSCs we should be 
attacking the lack of capability in the UN that makes it necessary to 
use them.”20
While there is little criticism of the capability of PMCs, or their performance on 
such tasks, there is a desire within the UN to see such operations brought in-house.  
But the experiences of one UN project manager, whose department considered 
setting up an internal team to provide security for their operators, is demonstrative 
of the difficulties of trying to bring such tasks in-house: 
“…the only potential candidates were working for private security 
companies already...”21  
Another respondent who worked alongside the UN during the conflicts in Liberia, 
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Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, told of a desire within the UN to expand their 
‘organic capability’ to encompass the needs of SSR from within their own 
organization:
“PMCs don’t dominate the SSR process.  There’s a whole lot of 
consultation between the UN, national governments and local 
institutions before anything takes place in SSR, and that’s 
dominated by development consultants, risk managers, advisory 
NGOs and a host of other freelance experts.  The capability gap in 
the UN is with people who are qualified to actually carry out the 
work.  PMCs either have people with that expertise, or can recruit 
them, and deploy them quickly.  If the UN wanted to take that under 
its own umbrella and expand its own organic capability, it would 
be recruiting largely from the same pool… the task on the ground 
would be the same, but the budget would be massively higher."22
This would suggest that, while in an ideal scenario, the UN would have this 
expertise on board, it cannot do so for reasons of cost.  The nature of SSR 
operations is wide-ranging, and to employ sufficient personnel to cater for every 
eventuality would present not only huge financial costs, but the need for an 
extensive infrastructure to oversee recruitment, training, warehousing, 
administration, planning, command, and operational control.  Some respondents 
commented that concern about the use of private companies was greater within the 
UN than in the governments of the states in which they are employed.  In Sierra 
Leone, the SSR advisor to the Office of National Security is a private security 
contractor – a former British police officer – on contract as part of the SSR 
process.23  Current SSR operations, both in Sierra Leone and Liberia, were the 
subject of lengthy consultation with the respective host governments prior to their 
commencement.
“A lot of people in the UN have a hang-up about it, but many 
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people here don’t care whether they deal with the UN or private 
companies… some don’t even perceive that there’s a difference… 
as far as they’re concerned they’re all foreign and they’re all 
working towards the same ends.  There are international agencies 
working in these countries whose policies include the input of 
private companies in SSR, and they have driven much of the 
planning for the ongoing SSR operations that you see over here.”24
One such agency is the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which 
provides guidance for donors and actors on best practice in SSR, and whose 
operations include the activities of private actors in its SSR frameworks.25  The 
DAC’s Implementation Framework on Security Sector Reform (IF-SSR), on which 
the incorporation of SSR into the development framework in Sierra Leone is based, 
gives guidelines for engaging both state and non-state actors.  This is at odds with 
UN policy, in which no consideration is given to the use of PMCs in UN 
Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), despite their having been used in 
many UN operations.  There, is, however, increasing recognition within the UN as 
to the contribution the private sector can make in SSR.
“… there is a widening view that SSR has to embrace all the actors 
that are involved in bringing about a secure social environment if 
it’s to be successful.  In other words, there is a view that if it’s to be 
effective, SSR has to include the role played by the private 
sector.”26
It was also apparent in several interviews that SSR is regarded as a task for which 
PMCs are well suited.27
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“As long as they [PMCs] are carrying out the task within a UN 
framework and with clearly defined boundaries, and are not in a 
position where they can cross those boundaries, for example by 
taking on a task outside that framework, then the potential dangers 
that we perceive are addressed, and there may be a part for them to 
play, to which they are suited.”28
In summary, it would seem that SSR is an area that could offer a sustainable role for 
PMCs.  Insofar as SSR takes place during post-conflict periods in which an 
international community presence is maintained, it is also an area that offers scope 
for the formal inclusion of PMCs in UN Development Assistance Frameworks.  
Formalization of any relationship with PMCs is, however, subject to equivocation 
within the UN because, in doing so, it is thought that the UN would open the gates 
for the formal involvement of PMCs in other, more contentious activities.  The 
counter argument is that formalization would ensure that the authority for SSR 
remains between the state and agents of the international community whose task is 
to ensure that it is carried out effectively.  As it is unlikely that the UN could carry 
out sufficient expansion of its ‘organic capability’ to encompass the needs of SSR 
from within its own organization,29 the ability of PMCs to fill the capability gap 
makes them an ideal option for SSR tasks within a UN framework.  While it is 
therefore likely that SSR is an area in which the use of PMCs will not only 
continue, but will continue to expand, the prospect of PMCs providing support to 
state institutions outside of a UN framework is a deeply contentious issue.  This 
issue is explored in depth in the following section.
9.3 Support for State Institutions and Empowerment of the Weak State.30
Central to the proliferation of PMCs, in Africa as a whole, is the lack of capacity of 
weak states to provide security as a public good.  At another level, it is the inability of 
state security mechanisms to provide the levels of security required to protect high-value 
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natural resources from non-state actors – or, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, from other states –31 that drives the proliferation of PMCs.  Gaining control of 
resources – as has been demonstrated all too clearly in West Africa – can provide non-
state actors with the financial means to pose a serious threat to the state.
9.3.1 The PMC/State Institution balance
This lack of state capacity, even, in some cases, after long periods of SSR, 
combined with a widespread distrust of state security mechanisms, contributes to 
the proliferation of PMCs.  Sierra Leone is a case in point. Despite several years of 
SSR in Sierra Leone, there is still lack of confidence in the ability of the SLP to 
provide the public good of security.32  Many Sierra Leoneans – particularly those 
outside the capital – prefer to rely on non-state methods of effecting their own 
security, and of deterring and dealing with crime.33  Bruce Baker’s extensive 
research in Sierra Leone drew him to conclude: 
“It is not only the public that have doubts about the efficiency of 
the state police forces.  Even governments sometimes do not trust 
them to handle serious crime.”
34
While there is acceptance that the SSR process in Sierra Leone has re-established 
the security forces, the general feeling is that there has been no reform in the true 
sense of the word, and that the aim of SSR – to bring about a situation whereby 
institutions of security and law-and-order have the public interest as a priority – has 
not been fully achieved. 
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“You could say that the institutions of public security have been 
re-formed, that would be true, but you could not truthfully say they 
have been reformed.”35
PMCs, managed by non-Sierra Leoneans, are therefore employed by many 
organizations preferring not to rely on the SLP, and are favoured by many of the 
local populace over their own security forces.  Key organizations and NGOs 
involved in SSR, commercial businesses, and even private individuals who can 
afford to do so – including some government ministers – employ PMCs to provide 
them with security in preference to relying on the SLP.  The state, however, 
maintains a strong grip where its interests are involved.  An example of this 
surfaced when a conflict of interest developed between a government-contracted 
private company and the department of state for whom it carried out its services.
“The demand for electricity in Freetown has become so high that 
we’re being pressured by the government [of Sierra Leone] to 
provide services way in excess of our contract.  When we said we’d 
have to renegotiate or consider pulling out, the OSD got involved 
and now we can’t get any security company to guard our 
equipment – and those generators are worth hundreds of thousands 
each.  So not only can we not get protection for them while they’re 
in operation, but if we pull out, we lose them.  Now if you ask me, 
that’s an example of the OSD being used as a government tool to 
intimidate us into continuing our contract when it isn’t in our 
interest.”36  
This is an indicator of the level to which the OSD is an enabler of the state’s 
monopoly on the use of coercive force.  Even where PMCs are employed to bolster 
the capacity of state security institutions, the state maintains its hold on the balance 
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of power through the OSD.37  But, conversely, the OSD is also reliant on the 
additional capacity provided by PMCs.  At a lower level, this additional capacity 
has resulted in the involvement of some PMCs in community policing projects.
9.3.2 PMCs and ‘Community Policing’
In terms of policing, the combination of lack of capacity and low levels of public 
trust has also resulted in a civil network of citizens who:  
“…would rather avoid contact with the police, so you’re seeing 
more and more people taking things into their own hands, which 
could lead to mob-policing and vigilantism.”38
Many groups in Sierra Leone have taken the initiative to assure order and security 
through forms of non-state policing, or through partnership boards authorised and 
overseen by the SLP.  That it has embraced these partnerships is an indication of 
recognition by the SLP of its own limitations, but some see it more as an attempt to 
control the worst excesses of vigilantism.  In some cases, PMCs have become 
informally involved in these local partnerships and policing groups, and have 
become an accepted part of what could be considered ‘community policing’.  While 
this might imply a ‘quasi-official’ status on the part of PMCs in community 
policing, they are quick to point out that there is no official tie-in between them and 
local community groups.
On the negative side, this has raised concerns with some respondents that, combined 
with the extent of security provided by PMCs to areas in which extractive industries 
are concentrated, the spread of their activities to the local communities around those 
areas would create enclaves of security that are unrepresentative of the wider 
security environment.  This has the effect of giving a false overall impression as to 
levels of security across the country generally. It is, however, part of a wider 
tendency in weak African states where confidence in the police is low, and where, 
as reflected by Les Johnson’s research, citizens:
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“…rather than being the passive consumers of police services, 
engage in a variety of productive security activities”.39  
The involvement of PMCs in ‘community policing’, even though not formalised, is 
seen by some respondents as a cynical move.  Respondents from PMCs, while they 
understand why it is criticised, assert that their motives are positive:
“Well you can understand why they would be cynical.  Yes, of 
course it’s in the self-interest of PMCs to gain as much local 
knowledge as possible, but it’s a relationship that works both for us 
and for the local community.  And some of the things we do in the 
community aren’t driven by necessity.  We’re even looking at 
sponsoring some of the local soccer teams.”40
This would imply a ‘hearts and minds’ approach on the part of PMCs, and in 
discussions with them, it is evident than they have drawn on their military past in 
this approach to establishing relationships with local populations.  Many community 
representatives, and even some SLP officers working with local Police Partnership 
Boards, see the involvement of PMCs as positive.
“Yes, it benefits us.  It brings a lot of goodwill, because it’s a 
private resource, but it’s benefiting the wider community.”41
In cases where PMCs have had input into the police partnership boards, feedback 
has been positive, and the partnership boards themselves have been found to be 
popular among local communities.  This is reflected in Bruce Baker’s research into 
community policing in Sierra Leone: 
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“…the partnership boards are universally valued, and are not seen 
as unwelcome foreign imports”.42
PMCs are, therefore, continuing to provide considerable support, not only to 
institutions of the state, but indirectly – significantly more so than through those 
formal activities coming under the public gaze – to the wider security situation, and 
to the security of ordinary people in areas where they operate.  In Sierra Leone 
particularly, where the UN and IMATT are winding down their operations, 
businesses and individuals, not yet convinced that the SSR process has sufficiently 
empowered the security mechanisms of the state, are turning more to the private 
sector as a means of ensuring their security.  Further, NGOs, and UN agencies still 
operating in Sierra Leone, such as the UN World Food Programme, continue to 
incorporate security elements in their operations, and this mirrors a significant 
proportion of PMCs’ wider work, which involves providing for the safety of 
humanitarian workers.  This, one of the mainstays of PMCs’ operations in Africa, is 
discussed in the following section.
9.4 Securing the ‘Humanitarian Space’
As discussed in depth in chapters 7 and 8, external perceptions as to the nature and legal 
status of PMCs is a limiting factor, both for PMCs themselves, and for those who would 
avail of their services.  This has been particularly relevant in their use as providers of 
security to humanitarian organizations and departments of the UN.  A survey conducted 
by International Alert in 2002 found that, because their use “… in the press, and in 
public perception… can easily be equated with the use of private armies, or worse, with 
mercenaries”,43 individual staff members within UN organizations and international 
NGOs had been led to:
“flatly deny, contrary to the facts, that their organization has ever 
sought advice from a private security company or used one for 
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more substantive services.”44
There are cases where agencies have assigned additional funding for the specific purpose 
of employing private security providers; in 2001, DFID went further, allocating funds to 
explore ways to deal with the issue of their involvement in humanitarian operations.45  
But despite the sensitivity of the issue, the use of PMCs on the part of NGOs has 
continued to grow.  In more dangerous areas, PMC support to humanitarian groups has 
grown proportionally with the activities of those groups.46
9.4.1 The Link between PMCs and Humanitarian Operations
The background to this link between PMCs and humanitarian organizations 
originated with the surge of humanitarian activity in response to crises that had 
arisen as a result of the ending – or those that had been masked by the presence – of 
superpower patronage in African states.  The withdrawal of external patronage had 
exacerbated the effects of poor governance, corruption, and ethnic rivalries, 
contributing to an increase in conflict within those states,47 and a shrinking of the 
‘humanitarian space’.48
“Historically, aid organizations have been considered as external 
to conflict, and operated on what was regarded as a consent-based 
model, but the targeting of aid organizations is now commonplace; 
in fact in many cases it’s a deliberate tactic, so we’re forced to seek 
ways to ensure the safety of our people operating in dangerous 
environments.”49
NGOs aside, the UN has seen continuing escalation in acts of violence against its 
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staff, including murder, kidnap, rape, sexual assault, and armed robbery.50
“The targeting of civilians and non-state actors has become the 
norm in conflict within states, and that includes targeting people 
working in humanitarian organizations… conceptions of human 
rights and war crimes are not a part of the psyche of many of those 
involved, and humanitarians are an easy target for spoilers of 
peace initiatives,…so security has become a primary 
consideration.”51
The surge, after the Cold War, in the number of humanitarian actors working in 
increasingly dangerous environments, combined with the simultaneous phenomenon 
of the proliferation of PMCs, has resulted in a mutually beneficial, albeit 
uncomfortable, convergence between these disparate organizations.
The crux of the relationship between these actors is that, while the former wish to 
distance themselves from involvement with any military-related organization, the 
desire to continue their work, even in the most dangerous of environments, leaves 
them with no choice but to seek assistance from those with expertise in the field of 
security.  Some regard the use of PMCs as a backward step, fearing that an overt 
security presence – particularly one that is evidently made up of outsiders – will 
simply compound the conditions bringing about the need for security, leading 
ultimately to a further shrinking of the humanitarian space.
“It’s a dilemma for us, because we feel that hiring PMCs detracts 
from our image as an unarmed, neutral party, but where security is 
necessary, if it is provided by the forces of the state, we run the risk 
of being seen as siding with a party to the conflict, and using local 
guards presents problems of its own.” 52
, 53
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Problems associated with the hiring of local guards include disputes between groups 
within humanitarian organizations’ areas of operation, the involvement of local 
guards in protection rackets, affiliations between local groups and parties to a 
conflict, or simply an impression that the organization favours the occupants of one 
locality over another.54
“…if we hire guards from one village, it can be seen by those in a 
neighbouring village as lacking impartiality.”55
Arguments by respondents working for NGOs, that contracting PMCs to provide 
security is a negative step, are contested by other respondents from the same 
category of respondents.  The countervailing view is that the use of PMCs, who are,
in effect, neutral parties, is a more impartial move than hiring locals or relying on 
the forces of the state, and is more in keeping with the neutrality of humanitarian 
organizations.
CARE International, after many years of avoiding the use of private companies to 
provide protection, began to use PMCs after a report from CARE Canada concluded 
that, in the absence of reliable protection from the host state, or from the UN, its 
operational staff should “…consider the privatization of security for humanitarian 
purposes”.56  In Sierra Leone, CARE has made use of a PMC run by a former 
officer of Executive Outcomes to provide protection to its operations, as has the 
INGO World Vision.57
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The need for humanitarian organizations to move from an ‘acceptance’ strategy –
whereby belligerents consent, or at least do not object, to their presence – to those 
of ‘protection’ and ‘deterrence’,58 has brought the need for the sort of expertise and 
capability offered by PMCs. ‘Protection’ can be used to supplement both of the 
other strategies; where acceptance is present, largely as a precautionary measure, 
with a ‘soft’ approach to security, or, where this is insufficient, a ‘hard’ strategy, 
combining protection with deterrence.  While the latter, higher-profile approach 
does not sit well with many humanitarian organizations, the UNHCR and the ICRC 
have acknowledged that, in a number of their operations they accept it as necessary, 
and have adopted it accordingly.59
, 60
The UN World Food Programme (WFP) is a case in point.  While there is a 
mechanism for WFP coordinators to apply for UN staff to provide protection, the 
nature of the coordinators’ work is such that the need for protection varies widely 
from task to task and from location to location.  The internal UN mechanism –
which is subject to tight budgetary controls – is not geared to cope with such 
variances in demand for ad hoc activity, let alone security.  And this is not a new 
problem for UN agencies; in 1999, a senior member of WFP staff reported to an 
inter-agency collaboration:
“The budgetary process to allocate security officers is time-
consuming and inflexible.  The only fast way to deploy security 
staff… was through professional security companies.”61
Where the WFP are concerned, and also the humanitarian organization CARE 
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International, while the use of personnel from private companies to provide 
protection to aid convoys in dangerous areas is acceptable, use of the terms ‘PMSC’ 
and ‘PMC’ are avoided by staff of both organizations.
62
“The perception of UN agencies being involved with PMSCs has 
the potential to undermine their impartiality; you have to be careful 
even how you use the word ‘security’ in conversation, because it 
can give the impression of a barrier between you and the 
communities you’re working in, and, internally… within the UN, 
the term PSC is dodgy enough, but the terms PMC and PMSC are 
taboo.”63
Perceptions also play a part in swaying those who support or oppose the use of 
PMCs to provide security for humanitarian workers.  Some respondents – those who 
had not experienced the nature of personal protection offered by PMCs – regarded 
them as ‘militaristic’, whereas those who had worked with operatives provided by 
PMCs were satisfied that their approach was discreet enough so as not to draw 
undue attention.
“Our operators are briefed on the customs of the areas in which 
they’re going to be operating, and in the way they should behave in 
the presence of locals.  They’re trained to adopt a low-key 
approach, and, if they’re armed, to keep their weapons out of sight.  
Some of our operators have expressed real concern about the lack 
of situational awareness of some of the staff they protect, and their 
lack of local knowledge.”64
9.4.2 The Legal Status of PMCs in Humanitarian Operations
Two respondents working for NGOs expressed concern that, if accompanied by 
security personnel carrying weapons, they would forego their neutrality, or their 
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status as non-combatants.  Further, they were concerned that if a situation arose 
where security personnel had to fire a weapon, their organizations would be 
regarded as taking part in hostilities on the basis that they had contracted the person 
using force, and the organization would therefore have breached its impartiality.
“It’s never happened to us, but I know of PMCs who have turned 
down contracts because they were expected to provide unarmed 
guards so that the contractor couldn’t be seen as taking an 
aggressive role.  That’s ok in some places, but if the contractor is 
underestimating the level of risk, then it’s a no-go.”65
Other respondents were unsure as to the situation.  Further research leads to the 
conclusion that international law does not rule specifically on breaches of neutrality 
in such situations, but the status of security personnel, and the use of weapons by 
those providing protection to humanitarian workers are covered in detail.  Under 
International Humanitarian Law, as dictated by the 1977 Additional Protocols,66
Article 43 of Additional Protocol I specifies only that humanitarian personnel are 
civilians, but on the basis of the exclusions detailed at Article 50, which defines 
those accepted as civilians, security personnel would also be regarded as such, 
“unless and until such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.67
Two important questions arise.  Firstly, what constitutes taking a direct part in 
hostilities?  This has been the subject of much debate, with some positing that the 
presence of armed escorts in a humanitarian operation would make it a military 
operation, which would therefore constitute direct participation.68  Legal advice to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross has, however, concluded that 
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members of PMCs hired by organizations “other than states” are entitled to civilian 
status.  Their presence alone does not, therefore, mean that they or their charges are 
taking a direct part in hostilities.  Given that a situation could arise where members 
of a PMC may have to resort to the use of a weapon to defend their charges, or 
indeed themselves, this leads to the second important question. Would the use of a 
weapon in self-defence, or in the defence of another, constitute direct participation 
in hostilities?  The UN Safety Convention, at Article 21, asserts the right to act in 
self-defence.69  Further, and more specifically, the ICRC rules that: “…if a private 
security contractor’s role is defensive and involves defending persons who are not 
legitimate targets… then they should not be regarded as engaged in direct 
participation in hostilities….”70
It is clear therefore that the contracting of PMCs by humanitarian organizations to 
provide for the security of their personnel would comprise neither direct 
participation in hostilities, nor a breach of international humanitarian law.  It can 
also be concluded that employees of PMCs contracted to provide protection to 
humanitarian organizations would not be taking a direct part in hostilities, either in 
the carrying of weapons, or in their use in situations of self-defence, or the defence 
of their charges.
9.4.3 Indirect Support to Humanitarian Organizations
The provision of security personnel to protect staff is not, however, the mainstay of 
PMCs’ work with humanitarian organizations.  Most of their contracts are carried 
out before the deployment of humanitarian staff, and two respondents, both 
members of PMCs providing protection to humanitarian organizations, viewed this 
as preferable to direct participation on the ground for all parties concerned.
“Our biggest contracts are for risk analysis and crisis 
management, and I know it’s the same for most companies.  The 
most useful thing we offer is situational awareness training, and 
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it’s been taken up by quite a few organizations now.  It works both 
ways because they would rather do that than have us directly 
involved in their operations, but as they’re getting to know our 
capabilities, and that we’re not a bunch of ‘Rambos’, we’re 
building up a relationship with them, so hopefully we might start to 
provide other services”71
“What we fear the most is our people actually having to respond to 
a threat with force, because the likely outcome is not positive at any 
level, so our emphasis is on prevention… operators who can spot a 
situation that’s likely to get out of hand and get their people away 
from the threat before the situation becomes dangerous.”72
Several PMCs have gained considerable experience in the protection of 
humanitarian agencies.   The largest of these, ArmorGroup, DSL, and Hart – all of 
whom are now approved by the UN as security contractors – 73 provide services to
several large agencies, national and international, governmental and non-
governmental.  ArmorGroup, for example, is contracted to DFID, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, CARE International, USAID, and the International 
Rescue Committee, and is held in high regard among these organizations.74
“PMCs that do have those kinds of contracts have always been 
hopeful that their ability to respond quickly, their professionalism, 
and their adherence to humanitarian law and human rights 
principles would lead to wider involvement in the humanitarian 
sphere, but most humanitarian organizations want to keep their 
involvement quiet.”75
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PMCs have amassed a wealth of experience working with humanitarian 
organizations in conflict and post-conflict situations.  Yet, having built up a good 
reputation, they continue to struggle for recognition and acceptance.
9.5 Summary
From the views expressed by respondents involved in this aspect of the research on the 
record of PMCs’ involvement in SSR, in support to the institutions of weak and failing 
states, and in the protection of humanitarian workers – it would be reasonable to surmise 
that there are few reservations as to their capability.  Central to this thesis’ hypothesis –
that PMCs are a viable option for direct involvement in peacekeeping operations in 
Africa – are questions not only relating to capability, but also to the suitability of PMCs.  
The question of suiitability, is an extremely sensitive issue, due primarily, as discussed at 
length in Chapters 7 and 8, to fears that the use of PMCs could be equated with the use 
of mercenaries.76  This sensitivity plays a great part in driving official policy towards the 
use of PMCs.  But, as this chapter has shown, the situation in practice is at a variance 
with declared policy.  PMCs provide the additional capacity needed during the 
implementation of development and assistance frameworks.  They empower 
humanitarian organizations by providing security for their operations.  They have 
established close working relationships with humanitarian organizations, and have 
demonstrated an ability to operate with the high levels of restraint demanded by these 
actors.  A demonstration of the aptness of PMCs in this area is the fact that many PMCs 
have been granted approved status as contractors for such organizations.77  PMCs thrive 
in states with weak institutions of security; they empower such states through the 
provision of support to their security institutions – whether as part of an international 
effort, or contracted by states themselves – and by providing security at local levels.  
This empowerment, however, if not carried out as part of a wider framework, and 
unaccompanied by investment in institutions of state, can lead to long-term dependence 
on PMCs, and could ultimately have a disempowering effect. 
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Despite negative perceptions, PMCs operating in Africa have demonstrated themselves 
to be capable, and to have made a positive contribution where SSR, assistance to state 
institutions, and support to humanitarian organizations is concerned.78  Whether the 
reputation they have built up has done enough to drive appetites for their use in other 
areas is one of the key questions this thesis attempts to address.  This issue is clouded 
largely by confusion as to the legal status of PMCs, and concerns as to how control and 
accountability might be exercised in the event of their becoming directly involved in 
peacekeeping operations.  The following chapter will argue that these problems are not 
insurmountable, and that the use of PMCs would enhance the UN’s ability to achieve its 
aims, in terms of the urgent needs of peacekeeping, as clearly outlined by the DPKO.79
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Chapter 10
PMCs as Peacekeepers?
10.1   Introduction
One of the clearest indicators of the need to address the issue of alternatives to the 
current method of raising troops for peacekeeping missions is the UN’s ongoing 
consideration of other options.1  Proposals for two such alternatives – those of an 
international policing force provided by individual states in rotation, and of member
states providing forces on permanent stand-by – were dismissed at an early stage.  This 
was due to the potential problem of conflicts of allegiance, whereby the primary loyalty 
of troops seconded to the UN must not be to national governments or national interests, 
in order to ensure the apolitical nature of UN peacekeeping forces.2
,3 There is an 
implication in this for the use of PMCs; the primary indictment against them, that they 
are motivated by profit alone, reinforces their own assertion that they are apolitical and 
focus only on the task to which they are assigned, within parameters dictated by the 
prime actor to whom they are contracted.  A further proposal to deal with the problem of 
raising ad hoc forces was that of a standing UN army.  Despite being heavily criticized 
at an early stage,4 the idea has been through many proposed incarnations.  On 
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See, for example: UN. 2000. "General Assembly 55th Session. UN Doc.A/55/305-S/2000/809. Report of 
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See: Morrison, Alex. 1994. "The Fiction of a Standing UN Army." Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 
18(1):83-96.
287
examination, these would seem to reflect the doctrines of the militaries from which each 
of the respective proposals originated; perhaps an indicator of the root of some of the 
problems encountered in raising ad hoc forces.5  These included suggestions for a Corps-
sized force, which would number in excess of 50,000 troops,6 a reinforced Infantry 
Brigade – some 15,000 troops excluding logistical support –,7 a UN ‘Fire Brigade’, some 
5,000 to 10,000 in number,8 and a light ‘rapid deployment’ brigade of 2,000 to 5,000 
troops.9  The eventual manifestation of these proposals was the UN Standing High 
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which opened for business on 1
st
January 2000.  
Despite having been used in UN missions to Ethiopia & Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia 
and Sudan, SHIRBRIG was quietly disbanded in June 2009 “with barely a whisper of its 
demise”.10  As with the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), which was 
disastrously unsuccessful in Rwanda when each of the 19 participating nations failed to 
implement an undertaking to provide military forces,11 SHIRBRIG’s demise was due to a 
lack of political and military will on the part of participating nations, which became 
manifestly evident with the reluctance of every participating nation to continue to 
provide troops.12
The idea of a UN rapid-reaction force has not, however, died completely; even before 
the demise of SHIRBRIG, other options were being considered.13  These later proposals 
for the option of a UN standing army have implications where PMCs are concerned, 
insofar as many of the personnel recruited for such a force would come from the same 
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pool of employees as that used by PMCs.14  More pertinent, however, is that the major 
impediments to a UN standing army are simply a mirror of problems encountered in past 
and current use of ad hoc UN troops.  Paradoxically, since end of the Cold War, the 
largest reduction in troops ever seen has coincided with a seven-fold increase in the 
demand for peacekeepers.15  Nations with the most suitable troops for peacekeeping 
missions – the best trained and equipped, and now massively ‘downsized’ – have also 
seen huge increases in demand for their troops elsewhere.  These nations have become 
less inclined to provide troops for UN peacekeeping missions, particularly to operations 
in Africa.  Richard Gowan, of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 
points out that of some 10,000 European troops seconded to the UN in 2007, only 300 
were deployed to African states.16
One private group, the Global Security Partnership Project,17 came up with a proposal to 
enable states to fulfil their obligations to the UN with private individuals instead of 
national troops.  The organization suggested the establishment of a database of some 
5,000 former servicemen willing to offer their services as UN peacekeepers – an idea put 
forward originally by the IPOA –18 but to be managed by a not-for-profit company rather 
than a PMC, and overseen by a board of trustees.  This, it was suggested, would provide 
troops motivated by a desire to help the international community rather than by personal 
reward – an argument that failed to convince its detractors, who pointed out that, under 
all the anti-mercenary conventions – the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA),19 the 1979 UNOHCR Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions,20 and the 1989 International Convention –21 these individuals 
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would still be mercenaries under international law.
So, with the increasing reluctance of nations with the most suitably equipped and trained 
armies to provide troops for peacekeeping missions or any form of standby force,22 and 
saddled with a lack of alternatives, the UN has become reliant on less affluent nations 
whose troops are poorly trained, equipped and motivated.  Peter Gantz, Peacekeeping 
Associate with Refugees International, and Coordinator of the Partnership for Effective 
Peace Operations, is succinct in his observations as to the quality of UN troops:
“The UN is forced to take what it can get… Most peace operations 
in Africa, for instance, rely on troops from developing nations.  
These troops are frequently ill-trained, poorly equipped, and often 
prove to be incapable…”23
Even Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General from 1997 to 2006, expressed concerns as to 
the poor quality of troops used for peacekeeping operations, citing it as a reason for 
failings in UN peacekeeping operations.24  The Secretary General’s main concern was 
that, with the reluctance of countries with well-trained armies to provide troops, or an 
inability to do so on the basis of much-reduced capacity, the UN has to rely on those 
countries with sufficient manpower to provide large contingencies of troops at short 
notice.
One respondent expressed concerns as to the motivation of those countries providing 
most troops for UN peacekeeping missions:
“The motivations of a lot of countries providing peacekeepers are 
driven by economics, and using those troops is surely morally 
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similar to using private companies.  If the involvement of PMCs 
can overcome difficulties being faced by the UN, isn’t that enough 
of a moral expedient to employ them?”25
A comparison is being drawn here, regarding the perceived morality of financial 
motivation in the field of peacekeeping.  PMCs providing personnel for peace missions, 
in pursuit of profit, are considered to be immoral, one of the bases for this argument 
being the broad assumption that PMCs are inherently iniquitous and national forces 
inherently virtuous.  The provision of military troops by states, on the other hand, whose 
providers derive substantial income from the provision of such troops, is not considered 
so.  Were these troops drawn from the ranks of their states’ standing armies, this would 
not be so contentious, but it would seem that many are recruited and trained solely for 
secondment to the UN. 
“Well, we shouldn’t make any assumptions as to the benevolence of 
the countries that provide so many troops, or their desire to be part 
of an international community effort, but what they get from the UN 
for each soldier far exceeds what they pay them, so providing 
peacekeepers is a handy source of foreign exchange.  In fact, in 
many cases, if those troops weren’t seconded to the UN, it’s 
doubtful that their national armies would sustain them in such 
numbers.”26
While one should not reject the idea that philanthropy might play a part in the motivation 
for these states to provide troops, nor dismiss the fact that it is the most populous 
developing countries that have the human capacity necessary to provide the numbers of 
troops needed for peacekeeping operations,27 the fact remains that many such troops 
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arrive in theatre: “…ill-trained, poorly equipped, and often… incapable…”28.   The UN 
Peacekeeping Soldier’s Training Manual states:  “Many of the skills required for 
peacekeeping are basic military ones which form part of military training in the forces 
of most Member states…”29
But not all troops sent for UN duties have had the same military training or experience as
their counterparts in national armies; some arrive in theatre just weeks after having been 
recruited into the army in their home states.  Military experience is not a trait possessed 
by the majority of UN peacekeeping troops; many are hastily processed for secondment 
to the UN.
“…they continue to get training after they arrive, but you can see 
that most of them haven’t been in uniform for very long, and it 
doesn’t exactly inspire confidence.”30
The nature, quality and capability of troops seconded to the UN is a contentious issue 
even among its own ranks.  The need for an alternative, or at least an enhancement, to 
the current means of obtaining troops for peacekeeping missions is clear and urgent.  
10.2    Prospects for the involvement of PMCs in UN peacekeeping operations
There are two areas of discussion on the prospect of PMC involvement in peacekeeping 
missions.  The first is concerned with the concept of PMCs providing support functions 
to UN peacekeepers.  The second, more contentious area of discussion, surrounds the 
concept of PMCs as peacekeepers.
10.2.1 Support Functions
Many respondents see the proliferation of PMCs in Africa as having come about 
primarily through ‘piggy-backing’ the operations of IGOs and NGOs in post-
conflict situations, and in providing additional capacity for these organizations to 
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achieve their aims.  As discussed at length in Chapter 9, SSR operations, and 
activities in support of humanitarian organizations, have made a considerable 
contribution to the growth and proliferation of PMCs.  Private companies fill the 
vacuum presented by shortcomings in state security mechanisms and gaps in 
capacity of the UN and other IGOs.  But neither of these areas of activity forms the 
mainstay of PMC operations.  The provision of ancillary services by PMCs to 
peacebuilding operations, such as logistics, intelligence services, security, and 
medical support, has been an integral part of every major UN operation since 1990.  
Peter Gantz observes, as was reflected in the Brahimi Report,31 that the UN is now 
reliant on external agencies to provide these functions:
“The UN does not have a proper command and control system, 
intelligence capabilities, or… logistical support system.”32
Logistics, intelligence and command functions that can adapt and expand to cope 
with differing operational needs are vital if the UN is to be effective.33  While 
comparisons with national armies or regional systems such as NATO are not apt, 
insofar as the UN is not geared primarily as a fighting force, these capabilities are 
crucial to UN operations because most contributing nations do not provide these 
functions beyond the needs of their own sub-units seconded to the UN.34  The 
provision of these services, including command and control support functions,35
forms a major part of the activities of several PMCs, and to the extent that PMCs 
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have provided such services to the UN, they have proven their worth in the eyes of 
many respondents who have worked with them.
“These peripheral activities are vital to the success of UN 
operations, but they are not the core of what the UN is there to do, 
and it is evident when you see these people [PMCs] in operation 
that things are getting done efficiently, possibly better than might 
be expected otherwise.  And things like the movement of troops and 
supplies being contracted to an outside organization don’t cause 
too much of a ripple – in fact, they’re largely welcomed by those 
who have worked on the ground.  But the idea of taking it further 
than that is a very sticky issue.”36
The respondent’s ‘sticky issue’ concern hinges around those in the UN who adopt 
an abolitionist stance towards PMCs.37  Among the respondents interviewed for this 
thesis, it is evident that issues of the moral aptness of using PMCs as peacekeepers 
are pitted against issues of operational efficiency.  Several respondents, both in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, made the observation that, generally, UN troops are not 
up to the standard required for the type of operation they are tasked to carry out.38  
In an address to the Security Council in 2004, Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary 
General, voiced his own frustrations:
“UN missions remain hampered by a lack of specialized military 
capacities, generally available from the military forces of 
developed countries. Unfortunately, these countries today make 
only limited contributions of troops to UN peacekeeping 
operations.”39
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A few months earlier, a press article had highlighted the difficulties being voiced by 
representatives of the DPKO: “…the quality of the peacekeepers, most now drawn 
from poor countries, is often questionable.”40   Others were reluctant to voice the 
same conclusion openly, but most were of the opinion that the UN will not, in the 
foreseeable future, be able to obtain, from those states with well-trained armies, 
troops in sufficient numbers for peacekeeping operations.41
Even in urgent situations, when the DPKO gets a clear mandate from the Security 
Council for rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force, it is invariably unable to 
respond in quick time, due to the disinclination or inability of states to provide 
troops and equipment.42 As a result, many UN operations take longer to get off the 
ground than first mandated by the Security Council, and are ultimately carried out 
with fewer troops than planned for.43 Most importantly, those troops that do 
eventually make up the peacekeeping force are, largely, poorly trained and 
equipped.44  Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed concerns as to the 
poor quality of troops used for peacekeeping operations, citing it as a reason for 
failings in UN peacekeeping operations.45  But this was not the Secretary General’s 
primary concern:
“There are cases where the speed of the action may be far more 
crucial than the size of the force. Personally, I am haunted by the 
experience of Rwanda in 1994: a terrible demonstration of what 
can happen when there is no intervention, or at least none in the 
crucial early weeks of a crisis.  Surely, things would have been 
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different if the Security Council had had at its disposal a small 
rapid reaction force.”46
At the beginning of this chapter, I highlighted the demise of the UN’s Standing 
High-Readiness Brigade, which has left the UN with no rapid reaction capability.  
In his speech marking 50 years of UN intervention, Kofi Annan went on to say:
“Some have even suggested that private security firms, like the one 
which recently helped restore the elected President to power in 
Sierra Leone, might play a role in providing the United Nations 
with the rapid reaction capacity it needs.” 47
The two major shortcomings in UN capacity, poor quality troops and lack of a rapid 
reaction capability, are perhaps the strongest arguments, in practical terms, for 
consideration of the use of PMCs in UN operations.
10.2.2 PMCs as Peacekeepers?
Support for the concept of PMCs as peacekeepers has come from what some regard 
as an unexpected source.  Peter Gantz, a peacekeeping associate with Refugees 
International is clear in his view as to a means of overcoming the shortcomings in 
the quality of troops and the speed of response that limit the UN’s ability to deploy 
quickly and effectively:
“…. if the UN is saddled with troops from developing nations that 
are not up to the task, then perhaps the UN should hire the private 
sector to save the day.  This idea has appeal because it promises a 
rapid response to protect victims of systematic, large-scale 
violence.”48
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Gantz expresses his frustration with the inability of the UN to act with speed or 
efficiency, and argues that the use of PMCs offers the advantage of getting a 
holding force on the ground within timeframes specified in Security Council 
mandates.  While PMCs could not provide anywhere near the number of UN troops 
currently deployed on peacekeeping operations in Africa – nor would they wish to 
do so – their approach embraces a crucial principle of intervention.  It is one that is 
guided not by numbers of troops alone, but by capability; it is the ability to project 
credible force against belligerents.49  The importance of this doctrine was 
demonstrated clearly by the two successful interventions in Sierra Leone, brought 
about by small numbers of troops, where thousands of ECOMOG and UN 
peacekeepers had failed.  Exercising this doctrine, these successful interventions –
carried out by Executive Outcomes with a force of less than 300, and subsequently 
by a small contingent of British troops – suppressed the ability of belligerents to 
take action, thereby bringing sufficient stability for elections to be held.  The 
importance of the application of this doctrine in peacekeeping is further 
demonstrated by the consequence of its absence, after the failure of the international 
community to fill the vacuum left when EO were forced to leave Sierra Leone.  
After the humiliation suffered by an 8,000 strong UN force, several of whom were 
killed and hundreds taken captive,50 stability was only regained when a British force 
– numbering less than one tenth their size – once again brought the doctrine of 
credible force into the equation.  International Crisis Group concluded that the UN’s 
unwillingness to use force in Sierra Leone, even when the RUF resorted to killing 
peacekeepers as a means of extracting further concessions from the UN during 
peace talks at Lomé, was a clear signal to the rebels that further breaches of the 
agreement would achieve positive results.51
PMCs are quick to point out that the doctrine of credible force need not necessarily 
involve putting force into effect.  Indeed, as profit-making organizations, it is to 
their advantage to avoid the costs involved in the use of force.  Part of EO’s 
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literature featured a list of the services it could offer, one of which was 
“peacekeeping or persuasion services”.52  ‘Persuasion’ in this context refers to the 
deployment of a capable force which, while not seeking military action, is fully 
prepared and capable of doing so, and doing so successfully, should the need arise.
“It wasn’t about attrition or body-counts, it was about showing the 
rebels that they were up against a group with resolve and 
credibility, and that they would no longer be able to carry out 
violent acts with impunity.  In fact, very few rebels were killed in 
ground actions because after the initial contact, when they realized 
they were up against people who could fight, a lot of them would 
run away.”53  
This approach posits that the projection of credible force, combined with the ability 
and the clearly-demonstrated will to move units into and within zones of conflict 
quickly, brings unacceptable risk to a belligerent who might consider taking action 
against civilians or peacekeepers.54  Further, it has the absolutely crucial effect of 
sapping the morale of a belligerent’s fighters.  A former RUF combatant put this 
into perspective:
“We were able to go anywhere, and we knew there was not much 
danger when we rested up so we always got a good rest, but that 
changed when the Executive Outcome [sic] came to Salone and 
trained the army and the CDFs.55 They would just appear anywhere 
and they seemed to always know where we were.  So, after that we 
couldn’t move freely, and we couldn’t sleep properly and things 
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started to get very difficult and after that a lot of the SBUs [Small 
Boys Units] were very tired and they wanted to quit, but they knew 
they would be killed by our commanders if they tried to run 
away.”56
David Shearer points out that UN troops were as susceptible to tactics used by the 
RUF as were those they were trying to protect – surprise ambushes and quick 
withdrawals – whereas faced with EO’s projection of force, the RUF quickly lost its 
stomach for fighting and negotiated for the first time.57  PMCs have three attributes 
necessary to achieve this – trained and experienced personnel available at short 
notice, suitable equipment, and, if military action becomes a necessity, full 
commitment to the success of a combat operation.58  This latter attribute was 
demonstrated in Sierra Leone when, despite the loss of 20 of its troops in one 
action, EO continued with its contract.  In comparison, after the loss of 10 of its 
troops in Rwanda, the 440-strong Belgian contingent – made up of professional 
soldiers, and by far the most capable UN unit in the country – was pulled out.
EO’s small force in Sierra Leone was more effective than the thousands of 
peacekeepers sent subsequently due greater tactical proficiency,59 in addition to their 
“comprehensive training, experience and overall skill in the battlefield”.60  Shearer 
points out that EO made extensive use of intelligence capabilities to build a profile 
of the RUF’s activities, whereas the UN, lacking sufficient intelligence-gathering 
capacity, declined to use any of a number of private companies offering 
intelligence-gathering expertise that could have protected their troops from the 
tactics of the RUF.61
Stephen Brayton contends that while PMCs could not, and would not endeavour to 
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field the number of troops required for a full-scale peace mission, they can achieve 
certain military tasks better, and at considerably less cost, than UN peacekeeping 
troops.  Singer, Brayton and Shearer all contend that the efficiency of PMCs means 
that they can achieve the same mandate using fewer troops, thereby also decreasing 
the cost of the mission.62  Executive Outcomes had allowed 3 months for the first 
phase of their campaign in Sierra Leone, which was to drive the rebels 100 
kilometres back from Freetown; it took them 9 days.63
“They [the RUF] didn’t actually take many casualties, but they 
knew the game was up.  They knew they couldn’t terrorize people 
any more and get away with it.  I don’t think we needed to do much 
after that, other than to make sure they knew we weren’t going 
anywhere.  That’s what happened in the end… Sankoh engineered 
an agreement where we had to pull out,64 and it took them a matter 
of weeks to regain control.”65
This demonstrates a further advantage of the projection of credible force: casualties 
mount over time in combat operations, and lives, both military and civilian, are 
saved through the application of apposite force for a minimum period, rather than 
that of minimum force for an extended period, the latter approach being that most 
used by the UN.  Further, in civil wars, identities become blurred, and the behaviour 
of factions, both state and non-state, spirals downwards with the progress of time.  
The accuracy of Martin van Creveld’s point: “…the very process of combating low-
intensity conflicts will cause both sides to look alike, unless it can be brought to a 
quick end.”,66 is demonstrated by the increase in abuses of human rights by state 
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forces in Sierra Leone as the war continued.67  
The need to respond quickly is one that PMCs claim they can achieve better than 
the UN.  In 1994, in response to the dire situation the UN faced in Rwanda, two 
PMCs proffered assistance; Defence Systems Limited (DSL) and Executive 
Outcomes, drew up comprehensive plans to assist the UN in controlling the 
situation,68 and offered to put troops on the ground at short notice.69
, 70
“When Rwanda kicked off, the word went out that Eeben71 was 
proposing to put a force together to assist the UN, so we were all 
put on a warning order.  We were ready to go within days… there’s 
no doubt in my mind that we could have had a battalion plus,72
formed up and ready to go within a couple of weeks.”73
The offers of troops were considered by the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 
who decided ultimately not to employ a private company.  In a subsequent speech 
marking 50 years of UN intervention, he announced: “…the world may not be ready 
to privatize peace.”74 It was considered that moral objections to the use of PMCs 
would outweigh any contribution they might make, and it is the moral dimension 
that forms the basis of the most vehement arguments against the use of PMCs.
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10.3   The Moral Dimension
In a report published in December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty stated: “Rwanda in 1994 laid bare the full horror of inaction.”75  
Arguments were put forward for the use of PMCs based on the lesser of two evils – the 
unfavourable aspects of their use outweighing the relatively ‘favourable’ need to stop the 
violence and save lives.  Kofi Annan might well have considered, in hindsight, the 
Utilitarian doctrine as to the correctness of taking action “…if its consequences are more 
favorable than unfavourable to all concerned.”76  Many of those advocating the use of 
PMCs, where no other option is available, cite the doctrine of double effect: essentially, 
if an act has desirable consequences (toward the greater good, such as the saving of 
innocent lives), and the actor’s intentions and actions are aimed exclusively at bringing 
about those consequences, then the positive results of such action outweigh the negative 
aspects.77  Provided the jus in bello principle of proportionality is observed, then the 
doctrine holds that unintended negative outcomes of an action are acceptable if more 
innocent lives are saved through an action than would have been lost had that action not 
been taken.  After Executive Outcomes’ deployment to Sierra Leone, human rights 
abuses fell from over 5,000 cases in 1995 to less than 2,000 in 1996.78  After their 
departure from the country, this rose to some 3,000 the following year, subsequently 
peaking at over 6,000.79  Proponents of PMCs argue that this is a clear case of the end 
justifying the means.
Fernando Tesón argues that attitudes against intervention come down to “…a general 
view that killing is worse than letting die”80 and there is no doubt that the idea of such 
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killing being done by a profit making organization such as a PMC has a multiplier effect 
on such attitudes.  
“The attitude of the UN towards PMCs might be convincing if 
there were another option, but if states aren’t willing to act, then 
using private companies to do something is a far lesser evil than 
doing nothing.  What happened in Rwanda is now happening in 
Darfur and in Congo, and there are private companies willing to 
help.  They’ve carried out surveys and consultations, and they’ve 
submitted plans to deal with the situation.  They did the same in 
Rwanda and they were ignored.”81
The respondent’s case for the use of PMCs, as with most arguments for their use, is 
based on the naturalist doctrine of ‘most favourable outcome’.82  But it would be wrong 
to accept this argument without addressing the consequentialist element of Utilitarian 
perspectives on intervention: we cannot argue conclusively, without having examples of 
PMCs taking direct part in peacekeeping missions, as to the potential consequences of 
their participation.  Enrique Ballesteros, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries at the time of Executive Outcomes’ involvement in Sierra Leone, expresses 
concerns as to the potential consequences of the involvement of private actors.  A strong 
opponent of any kind of private involvement in military affairs, Ballesteros stated:
“…the international community cannot allow the free and 
globalized market to function... for the sale of military assistance 
and peacekeeping and peace-building operations that are the 
province of international organizations.”83
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His main concern, however, regarding the involvement of PMCs, was the issue of 
“unforeseen implications for the exercise of human rights.”84  One might argue that the 
implications of an action, being implicit, can in some way be explored, but Ballesteros 
did not expand on this.  Nevertheless, if we are to read “unforeseen implications” as 
potential unintended consequences of the use of PMCs, we can understand the need to 
address the consequentialist element of Utilitarian perspectives on intervention.
The involvement of EO in Sierra Leone goes only some way toward addressing the 
consequentialist issue; EO’s activities cannot be fully compared to the direct 
involvement of PMCs in peacekeeping operations, where they would be an integral part 
of a UN peacekeeping mission, rather than contracted to a beleaguered state.  Critical 
consideration must therefore be framed relative to arguments against the involvement of 
PMCs in peacekeeping.  
10.4    Arguments against the use of PMCs
The main arguments opposing the use of PMCs are that they would commit human 
rights violations, that their use undermines the authority of states, and that their status in 
international law is not clearly defined or regulated, raising questions of legal 
accountability.  Analysis of field research data in the three preceding chapters has shown 
that these are also the opposing arguments articulated by respondents during the data 
gathering process.85  The following sections will test the central hypothesis of this thesis 
against these arguments.
10.4.1 PMCs and Human Rights
Arguments that PMCs are likely to violate human rights are based, firstly, on 
perceptions that they are the same as the mercenaries in Africa of the 1960s and 70s, 
and would therefore behave in the same way, secondly, that there is no mechanism 
to prevent them committing human rights violations, and thirdly, that they are 
unaccountable for their actions.  In a departure from Enrique Ballesteros’ hard-line 
attitude that PMCs are mercenaries, the UN Working Group on the Use of 
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Mercenaries, in 2008, acknowledged that:
“The relation between private military and security companies and 
mercenary service is not direct.  Performing various activities 
under Governmental contracts and sometimes under international 
intergovernmental agreements, even in conflict zones, does not fall, 
in most cases, under the ‘traditional’ legal definition of a 
mercenary.”86
There is, therefore, increasing recognition that PMCs are not, by definition, the 
same as mercenaries.  But this alone is insufficient.  This thesis seeks to discover 
whether there is a tangible difference between PMCs and mercenaries; not simply a 
semantic one.  A formal recognition that PMCs are not mercenaries per se is 
encouraging for their proponents, but it does little to address the genuine fears of 
those who argue that the employees of PMCs, in the role of peacekeepers, are more 
likely to violate human rights than are troops of UN member states.  Some UN 
officials have gone some way to addressing this issue, suggesting that if the actions 
of PMCs take place as a monitored element of a UN framework of operations, the 
likelihood that they would commit human rights violations would be reduced.
“As long as they [PMCs] are carrying out the task within a UN 
framework and with clearly defined boundaries, and are not in a 
position where they can cross those boundaries… then the potential 
dangers that we perceive are addressed….”87
There is general agreement among PMCs that, in the event of their becoming 
involved in peacekeeping operations, they should expect to be subjected to close 
monitoring as a means of reassurance to the international community.  Most support 
the inclusion of UN personnel in their operations.88  Some are more cautious, on the 
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basis that there are no clear parameters as to what this might entail; their concern is 
that interference could be detrimental to the effectiveness of their operations.  This 
originates from speculation that the UN might impose limitations on how PMCs 
conduct their operations, making them “as ineffective as those of the UN itself… 
which would completely defeat the object”.89 The US industry body for PMCs say 
that firms registered with them would welcome impartial observers on any of their 
missions to monitor their employees’ behaviour.90  There can be no doubt that it 
would be a dereliction on the part of the international community not to have 
monitors observing the actions of PMCs involved in peacekeeping operations.
PMCs working in Africa look to their past performance to demonstrate that have a 
good record in the observation of human rights.  Former members of EO, in 
particular, feel that their record during their involvement in Sierra Leone 
demonstrates that they remained focused on the tasks they were contracted to do, 
and did not indulge in any form of human rights abuse.
“Some people find it surprising that we consider our record in 
Africa something to use as a positive example, because they’ve 
been continually bombarded with the idea of us as racist killers.”91
In 2004, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Sierra Leone published 
its final report on human rights violations that had occurred during the civil war, 
between 1991 and 2000.  A former member of Executive Outcomes, now working 
in Sierra Leone, commented:
“We were the ones being accused of having no regard for human 
rights, but as far as I’m concerned, and I would swear to this, we 
were the only group not committing human rights violations 
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against the civpop.92  In fact, they [non-combatants] saw us as the 
only ones giving them any protection, and we even got recognition 
of that from Sierra Leonean humanitarian groups.”93
, 94
In the final report of the TRC, none of the 40,242 reported abuses of human rights 
was found to have been committed by EO.  Over 300 serious violations of human 
rights, including instances of murder and torture, were found by the TRC to have 
been committed by members of ECOMOG,95 with nearly 2,800 similar violations 
committed by the Sierra Leonean Army and Police,96 many of which were ethnically 
motivated.  This supports PMCs’ claims that as apolitical, external parties, their 
members are not motivated to commit atrocities driven by ethnic rivalry and hatred, 
or in revenge for past injustices, as are many parties not directly involved in a 
conflict.97  ECOMOG and the SLA, for example, committed atrocities against non-
combatants in misdirected revenge for the killing of their own troops.98  Further, 
because the employees of PMCs are fully equipped and resupplied while in action, 
they do not have to resort to invading villages to plunder supplies as did the SLA 
and members of ECOMOG during the civil war in Sierra Leone, an action that led 
to human rights abuses on the part of those forces against the innocent and hapless 
inhabitants of such villages.99
There are PMCs operating in Africa who hold up the actions of EO in Sierra Leone 
– an instance of a PMC in armed combat, unfettered by restrictions as would be the 
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case in an international community effort – as an example of their suitability for 
peace-related operations.  They contend that if, in all-out combat, PMCs have not 
committed human rights violations, it is even less likely that they should to do so in 
a monitored peacekeeping role.  But the question that still remains is whether PMCs 
are more likely than national armies, or than UN troops on secondment from 
member nations, to abuse human rights.  To address this question, we must consider 
the wider involvement of PMCs.
“PMCs have to be very wary of the behaviour of their employees.  
Any mistake, any careless action, could mean the loss of not just 
the contract in question, but future potential business, and negative 
media exposure for the entire PMC industry.  The actions of a bad 
PMC dictate perceptions towards all PMCs, so a single violation of 
human rights will be cited by the media as to why all PMCs should 
be outlawed.  The Blackwater incident, and it is a very, very serious 
incident, is used as a reason why PMCs shouldn’t be allowed to 
operate, but there have been far worse violations of human rights 
by coalition militaries, and far greater in number, from the reckless 
killing of civilians… and not only civilians, but police, and even 
journalists… to beatings, rape and intentional killing.”100
The respondent, a former British Army officer, had worked for PMCs, in some 
cases in support of UN operations.  The incidents he refers to are the Nisour Square 
incident in Baghdad, in which employees of the PMC Blackwater killed 17 
civilians, the shooting by coalition troops of unarmed, protesting civilians in several 
incidents,101 and of Iraqi police,102 and the rape of an Iraqi girl and the murder of her 
family in March of the same year.103  The respondent was not specific with regard to 
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his mention of journalists, but further research has revealed that John Simpson, in 
June 2003, called for the US to investigate the killing of “more journalists by 
American soldiers than by any other means.”104  The respondent made clear that his 
main concerns were, firstly, the disproportionate amount of reporting on the 
Blackwater incident compared to other incidents that were worse in terms of their 
violation of human rights, and, secondly, the comparison of PMC activity in Africa 
with that elsewhere.  He commented: 
“PMC operations in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan arose in direct 
support of large scale military operations by international forces.  
The involvement in African countries came about in a different 
way, and for completely different reasons, mostly in support of 
weak states and SSR operations directed by the UN.  It is simply 
unrealistic to suggest that the activities of PMCs here are 
comparable with those elsewhere.”105
The respondent’s point was that PMC operations in Africa have been conducted in 
support of governments, departments of the UN, humanitarian organizations, and 
private corporations, within the law of the host country – circumstances very 
different to those those in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan.  With regard to the 
suitability of PMCs for UN peacekeeping missions, and the likelihood that their 
involvement would be more likely to lead to abuses of human rights, he 
commented:
“When employees of a PMC in Bosnia were found to have been 
involved in a sex ring, it was devastating to all those PMCs who 
worked so hard to establish impeccable records, because it was 
held up as a reason why all employees of all PMCs are unsuitable. 
Yes, it’s an outrageous, despicable incident, but it absolutely 
dwarfs the number of sex abuses laid at the door of the UN, not 
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only in Bosnia, but in every country where there are peacekeeping 
missions.”106
The incident referred to by the respondent was the involvement of seven DynCorp 
employees in a sex ring in Bosnia in 2003.  In contrast to the much-reported 
DynCorp scandal, the involvement of an undisclosed number of UN officials, 
peacekeepers and police in an extensive sex ring in Bosnia at the same time, was not 
reported in the press to anywhere near the same extent.  Despite calls by Madeleine 
Rees, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia, for the prosecution 
of all UN personnel involved, the UN personnel in question were quickly returned 
to their home countries, and a spokesperson for the UN Liaison Office in Bosnia 
subsequently informed the press: “All cases have been thoroughly investigated. We 
have sent a number of officers home. There is absolutely no toleration of a ‘boys 
will be boys’ attitude here.”107
The ‘boys will be boys’ attitude alluded to by Kirsten Haupt, the UN spokeperson at 
the time of the sexual scandals, has, according to the NGO Refugees International, 
characterized UN peacekeeping missions.108  Two reports highlight the extent of the 
problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers – a shocking report 
by Save the Children, entitled “No One to Turn To”,109  and Refugees International’s 
own report “Must Boys be Boys?”110  These reports highlight a further problem 
associated with the UN’s sourcing of peacekeepers vis-à-vis the cultural 
backgrounds from which many peacekeepers originate, and the cultures of 
peacekeeping missions themselves. One respondent, the representative of an NGO 
working with UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and local social groups, 
commented:
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“Some of the countries that these troops come from don’t have the 
best human rights records; they are male-dominated cultures in 
which women and girls are secondary, and male domination is also 
a feature of peacekeeping missions.”111
The reports cite cultural aspects of UN peacekeeping missions as a major concern.  
“UN peacekeeping missions… are subject to the same problems as the individual 
militaries that contribute troops to them.”112  They suggest, once again, that it is the 
nature of troops carrying out peacekeeping missions that is the major issue, together 
with lack of accountability.113  As accountability lies with individual peacekeepers,114
there is no collective legal responsibility, so while moral responsibility might lie in 
the hands of UN commanders, accountability in legal terms does not flow up the 
chain of UN command.  Further, UN personnel are immune from prosecution in the 
countries in which they serve.  PMCs, on the other hand, are legally liable, under 
both domestic and international law, for the actions of their employees, and their 
employees are liable under the laws of the countries in which they operate.115
The public image of a PMC is crucial to its existence.116 Patrick Cullen argues that 
one of the most catastrophic things that can happen to a PMC, in terms of the ability 
to win future contracts is “loss of credibility”, the PMC Blackwater being a case in 
point.117  The hirer of a PMC can also fire it, and PMCs know that any failure or 
offence is a one-time occurrence, with ruinous consequences for the future of the 
PMC in question. 
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A point made by another respondent– a former army officer and experienced PMC 
manager with experience of working with the UN – is that in Africa, most contracts 
undertaken by PMCs are short term.  PMCs prefer to take on contracts with set aims 
and clear end-dates, rather than risking the ‘mission creep’ of open-ended contracts.  
“PMCs are not usually hired on long term contracts, and even in 
cases where we are, our employee contracts are normally 
measured in months rather than years.  We seek short contracts 
with clear deadlines, and we try to avoid open-ended contracts, but 
my experience is that forward planning is not a UN trait, so that 
could be an issue if we were to become involved in peacekeeping.  
The saying: “African armies sit around playing cards and plotting 
coups” applies equally to UN troops; any troops, in fact.  After a 
period, boredom sets in, and then, well. “the devil makes work for 
idle hands”… so we think it’s best if things are done in quick time 
and people are moved around, but that’s not how the UN works.”118
The respondent was alluding to abuses of human rights – specifically the number of 
cases of child sex abuse carried out by UN peacekeepers,119 and the under-reporting 
of sexual exploitation and abuse uncovered by Save the Children,120  which he 
believes could be an indicator as to the extent of other illegitimate activity on the 
part of UN personnel, and those of other agencies involved in African states.  His 
view is that close management is required – whether of UN peacekeepers,  
employees of PMCs, or those any other organization – to ensure that such abuses do 
not occur, and to prevent involvement in local criminal networks.  He argues that 
PMCs, as corporate entities, manage their employees more closely than the UN do 
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their troops, and looks to the record of PMCs involved in African states as evidence 
of this.  The respondent’s sentiments are echoed by those who employ PMCs in 
Sierra Leone, as discussed in Chapter 9. 
10.4.2 The Threat to Human Rights
Previously in this chapter, I outlined the difficulties in addressing consequentialist 
arguments relating to the involvement of PMCs in peacekeeping – primarily that 
there are no examples of PMCs having acted as peacekeepers.  Allegations that 
PMCs are more likely to carry out abuses of human rights do not hold credibility 
against the comparison of Executive Outcomes – a war-fighting PMC involved in 
direct combat operations – with other actors involved in the civil war in Sierra 
Leone.  Among those actors, the Sierra Leonean Army, the Police, and ECOMOG –
the regional peacekeeping force sanctioned by the AU and the UN – were found by 
the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to have committed 
thousands of serious human rights violations against the population they were there, 
ostensibly, to protect.121  Executive Outcomes, despite several accusations, were not 
found by the TRC to have committed any violations of human rights against the 
civilian population. 
In short, the use of troops from national armies, whether or not as part of a UN 
force, can result in the same unintended consequences as the use of PMCs. As for 
theories that the conduct of operations for financial gain is more likely to lead to 
human rights abuses,122 both Brayton and Bures conclude that the professional 
nature of PMCs makes it less likely that they will commit abuses of human rights 
than members of peacekeeping forces from failed and developing states, whose 
motivations may also be profit-driven.123  The idea that PMCs are more likely to 
abuse human rights than troops from national armies is not only based on a 
questionable supposition, but it has been shown to be incorrect.
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10.4.3 PMCs and State Authority
Stephen Brayton said of Executive Outcomes’ operations in Sierra Leone: 
“…wherever they went civilians stopped dying. The only trouble was they only went 
where the pay-offs were high.”124  This typifies the unease evoked by the concept of 
profit-making organizations becoming involved in peacekeeping tasks, and the 
dangers of tie-ins between governments and PMCs.  However, a former member of 
EO, interviewed during the field research, countered Brayton’s allegation:
“We operated wherever there was a need; in Sierra Leone, that 
translated most urgently, firstly into driving them [the RUF] away 
from the capital, and then into recapturing areas where they had 
taken control of the mines, because if you don’t do that, the rebels 
still have the means to fund themselves and strangle the state at the 
same time... but we also conducted major actions against the rebels 
in places where there were no mining interests at all.  Our 
operations were planned around bringing about a situation of 
stability so the authority of the state could be restored.”125
PMCs and their proponents not only contest the claim that they are a threat to the 
authority of the state, they positively contradict it.  They argue that if a PMC is 
contracted by a state to assist it in re-imposing its authority, then the PMC becomes 
an agent of the state and, far from usurping state authority, augments it.  Arguments 
that the actions of PMCs contravene basic principles of international law, such as 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, and threats to territorial integrity 
and independence, are also strongly contested.  These three principles were in fact 
the drivers of the conventions against mercenarism (CEMA in 1977, and the 1989 
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UN Convention),126 and PMCs argue that these principles are applied to them 
erroneously.  No PMC has become involved in activities that threaten the territorial 
integrity or independence of any state.  Those who attempt to label Simon Mann’s 
attempted Equatorial Guinea coup the actions of a PMC fail to recognize the 
fundamental difference between PMCs and mercenaries.  PMCs are registered, 
corporate entities, with centres of accountability; they are subject to the laws of their 
home states, of the host states in which they operate – a status that does not apply to 
UN troops –127 and to international law.  Mercenaries have no such status; they are 
not legal entities and have no centre of legal accountability.
Returning to the first of the three principles, – that of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of states – PMCs point out that all attempts to indict them for 
intervention in African states have failed.  PMCs act only when they have a contract 
to fulfil; they deploy when requested to do so. 
“Intervention in a state’s internal affairs in international law 
means turning up uninvited.  You can’t accuse somebody of gate-
crashing when they have an invitation.  The UN’s desire to prevent 
a state making its own decisions about where it goes for assistance 
is more of an interference in the affairs of states, especially if the 
UN itself is unwilling to respond to requests for assistance.”128
The context of this statement was the involvement of EO in Sierra Leone.  In 
December 1994, the government of Sierra Leone implored the UN Secretary 
General to: “use your good offices to assist in bringing about a peaceful settlement 
to the rebel war.”129 It was only in February 1995, when it became fully apparent 
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that requests for assistance to the UN and the governments of the UK and USA 
would not be fulfilled, that Valentine Strasser turned to private companies to 
contain the rapidly worsening situation in his country.  Martin van Creveld, even 
before Executive Outcomes’ involvements in Angola and Sierra Leone, had 
predicted that in situations where states had lost the monopoly over the use of force, 
conflict would be conducted by “war-making entities” rather than by states.  He 
posited that “… defending society against low-intensity conflict will be transferred 
to the booming security business.”130  While it is correctly argued that this is the 
result of societies’ progress away from the need for large standing armies, the 
reason for such progress is the elimination of the threat of interstate conflict.  Where 
intrastate conflict is concerned, state militaries are ineffective because the low-
intensity nature of the conflict favours tactics employed by rebel groups, in which:
"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy 
suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, 
ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with."131
In truth, as has been demonstrated scores of times in Africa, national armies are the 
greatest threat to the state.  Where there is no external threat, large standing armies 
are suited neither to the needs of national security, nor to dealing with internal 
threats to sovereignty.  Further, in poor states where spending on basic commodities 
is urgently required, they are a massive drain on resources.  Where the need arises 
for a state to take action against insurgent groups, the use of a PMC offers the 
advantages of being readily available, inexpensive,132 and able to bring immense 
experience to bear in the conduct of finely-focused operations against the tactics of 
rebel groups.
The UN has long recognized that intrastate conflict presents insurmountable 
problems for many governments, and that PMCs offer a workable alternative.  In 
1997, the Special Rapporteur stated:
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“…the expansion of these firms [PMCs] as a kind of alternate 
security model for countries with internal conflicts that are 
practically unmanageable for the Governments concerned make it 
essential to give some thought to the problem.133”
But the ‘problem’ to which the Special Rapporteur was alluding was what he 
conceived to be a threat to state sovereignty.  He continued:
“… is not responsibility for a country's internal order and security 
an inalienable obligation that a State fulfils through its police and 
armed forces? Is it not a grave infringement of… sovereignty to 
hand over such responsibilities …?”134
One could argue that, if the state were able to fulfil its “inalienable obligation” 
through its police and armed forces, there would be no need for it to seek assistance 
in the first place.  Further, if the UN were able and willing to provide such 
assistance when a state, in dire need, specifically requests it – as was the case in 
Sierra Leone – there would be no need for the state to turn to PMCs.
“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state 
in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of 
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.”135
Had the UN responded to the government of Sierra Leone’s pleas for assistance in 
1994, it would not have been forced to turn to a PMC for help.  In the event, the 
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sovereignty of the state was not threatened by the PMC in question, but was 
restored, only to be threatened once more when the PMC was forced to withdraw.  
In every case where PMCs have been involved in African states, the Special 
Rapporteur’s protestations as to the threat to state sovereignty have been shown to 
be misplaced.  
“Is it not obvious to the international community that the trend is to 
replace traditional peacekeeping forces, which, under international 
law, are the responsibility of the United Nations and regional 
organizations, by operations carried out by these companies?”136
The ‘trend’ for PMCs to replace UN peacekeepers has arisen as a result of the UN’s 
inability to respond to threats to the sovereignty of its member states, yet the UN 
condemns both PMCs and the states who turn to them for assistance, on the basis 
that they are a threat to the authority of the state.
10.4.4 The Threat to the Authority of the State
The Special Rapporteur’s argument that PMCs are a threat to the legal authority of 
states, as are those of several respondents to this thesis, are based on the perception 
that the activities of PMCs mirror those of the mercenaries of the 1960s and 70s.  
This has been shown, in every instance of PMC involvement in African states, not 
to be the case; the idea that PMCs are a threat to the authority of states has not 
arisen as a result of any action by a PMC, but as a result of misconception.  No 
PMC has attempted to take over a state to which it has been contracted, or has 
refused to depart when its contract has been terminated, or has taken any action 
against the interests of a state to which it is contracted.  PMCs who are members of 
the BAPSC and IPOA have declared policies of dealing only with governments 
recognized by the UN.  Indeed, they argue that if contracted by the UN, they would 
be subject to the same mandates as UN peacekeepers and would pose no more a 
threat to the authority of a state than such peacekeepers.  Further, far from being an 
“abrogation of the responsibilities of states to maintain international peace and 
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security”,137 PMCs, whose abilities have clearly been demonstrated, are perhaps the 
best means available to the international community of stemming the rapidly 
declining ability of many states to maintain peace and security.
10.4.5 PMCs – Legal Issues
A further argument against the use of PMCs in peacekeeping is that their legal 
status is uncertain, insofar as they are not clearly defined under international law.  
Also, as they are unregulated, there is no guarantee of consistency in terms of 
performance or conduct across the industry.  This latter point is seized upon by 
reputable PMCs as reason for the industry to be regulated, with most PMCs in 
favour of regulation as a means of ensuring adherence to international law and the 
observance of human rights by all companies in the industry.  PMCs are the first to 
point out that ‘dodgy’ companies damage the reputation of the industry.138  A major 
concern is that in an increasingly competitive market, some PMCs might be tempted 
to take on contracts that are not in the interests of their home state, or of the 
international community.  Reputable PMCs have turned down many potential 
contracts of this nature,139 but they are concerned that, without regulation, there is an 
increasing danger that such work might be taken on by less professional companies.  
Eeben Barlow, founder of Executive Outcomes, writes about his view of such 
companies, and reflects the concerns of PMCs who have spent years becoming 
established and building up good reputations:
“… there are also those companies that aspire to be PMCs… but 
are lacking in expertise, experience and any semblance of a 
reputation …they tarnish the reputation of the PMCs and PSCs 
who are able to deliver on their promises.”140
Ironically, it is the most professional, reputable PMCs – those who have little need 
of regulation – that seek it, whereas those companies that pursue unethical agendas 
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stand to lose from regulation, and seek to avoid it.  Many issues precluding the use 
of PMCs in peacekeeping operations hinge around the issue of regulation – or 
rather, the lack of it – and I shall argue that regulation should be considered not only 
in terms of enabling consideration of PMC involvement in the sphere of 
peacekeeping, but, if these organizations are not to be proscribed, as a means of 
reassurance that they adhere to international law and the observance of human rights 
in their wider activities.
Several respondents agreed that the capabilities of PMCs – specifically of reputable 
companies that have built up good working relationships with state actors and 
NGOs – can only be used to their full potential if they are allowed, and can be seen, 
to operate as legitimate, recognised actors.141 They believe that, having come to be 
accepted as an effective tool in helping to bring about reform of the state’s 
institutions of security, these companies have demonstrated that they are capable of 
taking on a deeper role in peace-related operations.  One of the central issues 
articulated by these respondents is that the capabilities of PMCs cannot be utilized 
to their full potential in the absence of regulation.
“Well, without regulation, and I know this is becoming a bit of a 
cliché, they [PMCs] operate in a legal vacuum.  There’s no official 
recognition, and there’s no official condemnation.  There are no 
procedures for employing them at local level, so when a PMC 
could help achieve a specific aim, we can’t use one.”142
NGOs and international organizations are also finding that PMCs enable them to 
respond more effectively as operations progress and circumstances change: 
“We have rigid budgets, staffing structures and country plans, so it 
can take a long time to adjust to changes in situations.  The option to 
use PMCs gives much more flexibility; they can respond quickly, 
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and they can carry out tasks for a limited time, to agreed service 
levels, at an agreed cost, but as long they are unregulated, we can 
only tap in to a fraction of their potential.”143
There was consensus, among respondents for this research, that a framework of 
licensing and/or regulation is needed – not least as a safeguard that the activities of 
the private security sector are commensurate with the promotion of good 
governance.  This reflects calls in African states for further regulation of overseas 
companies operating in their territories.144
There are in fact, among those PMCs working in the humanitarian, development, 
and SSR sectors, several having obtained UN approval, who are included on the 
UN’s official list of approved contractors.145  The tasks on which this approval is 
based hinge around defensive protection, but most of these companies have 
military-related tasks as part of their portfolios elsewhere.  Examples of such 
companies include Erinys, Hart, Olive, Task International, and DSL.146
“We would certainly be interested in working with a UN 
peacekeeping force, we would certainly agree to the monitoring of 
our operations by UN officials, and we believe that we could carry 
them out more efficiently, and at greatly reduced cost.”147
A US appropriation bill echoes these claims:
“… private companies can carry out effective peacekeeping 
missions for a fraction of the funding the UN requires… such 
companies should be used to supplement the number of blue berets 
and blue helmets which, in these turbulent times, the UN is having 
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a difficult time recruiting.”148
Senior representatives of other development organizations acknowledge the part 
played by PMCs, and the need for formalization of their involvement:
“… in an ideal scenario, the Security Sector Reform programme 
would bring about a situation where all the security needs of the 
state are provided by state mechanisms, but where funds are short 
and reform is ongoing, which is the case here, that isn’t going to be 
achieved in the short term.  Private companies can play a part in  
training state institutions, and in filling the security vacuum while 
those state mechanisms are being brought up to scratch.  So my 
answer would be yes, private companies can play a role, but they 
need to be reliable, and so they need to be regulated and 
overseen.”149
It was evident during the field research that a comprehensive understanding as to 
the nature of PMCs and their capabilities has been built up by agencies involved in 
the post-conflict restructuring of Sierra Leone and Liberia.150  There was consensus 
that there is a place for PMCs in the wider development sphere, particularly in post-
conflict settings where governments are less willing, and national armies less able, 
to provide the expertise and resources needed to effect the first prerequisite for 
development – that of security.151  A common thread was that the use of PMCs can 
contribute significantly to the success of agencies working in conflict, post-conflict 
and development scenarios, but with an emphasis that it needs to be conducted
within an agreed, regulated framework in order to afford legitimacy and to ensure 
accountability.  Perhaps the clearest indicator that the UN may be moving towards 
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this position is the Special Rapporteur’s remark: 
“…licensing and regulation of genuine private security companies, 
such as through strong national legislation or an international 
registration mechanism, could serve to identify clear lines of 
accountability for bona fide companies…”152
10.4.6 Legal Status and Regulation
Without a clear legal definition, discussions as to the status of PMCs in law can 
only be speculative.  To the extent that they are business entities, they enjoy the 
same legal recognition and status as other corporations, but the market in which 
they operate – characterized by the potential need for the use of lethal force –
dictates the need for further legal classification.  The failure of the UN to declare a 
clear position obfuscates the issue.  While PMCs are not officially recognized by the 
UN, neither are they proscribed; several are listed as approved contractors.153  The 
extent to which PMCs are involved in support to peacekeeping operations – indeed 
the extent to which the UN and other agencies have become reliant upon them –
reflects the urgency of the need to address the issues of legal status and regulation.  
PMCs desire regulation as a means of demonstrating their willingness to operate in 
accordance with international law and in observance of the fundamental principles 
of human rights, and as a means of excluding those companies for whom self-
regulation is a means to avoid, rather than adhere to, minimum standards.
10.5    Summary
Regarding concerns as to the implications of the use of PMCs as peacekeepers on human 
rights, this chapter has considered consequentialist arguments relating to their direct 
involvement in peacekeeping.  It has established that activities of PMCs cannot be used 
as a direct basis for consideration as to their potential direct involvement in 
peacekeeping operations, as there is no appropriate prior example. Analysis of the case 
of Executive Outcomes – a PMC involved directly in combat – has shown not only that 
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human rights abuses were not a feature of operations carried out by the organization, but 
that its actions significantly reduced the number of human rights abuses perpetrated 
against innocent civilians by other groups.  Arguments that the primary motivation of 
PMC personnel in peacekeeping operations (ostensibly that of financial gain) is more 
likely to result in human rights abuses than the motives of soldiers from national armies 
(the quest for international peace under the banner of the UN) are shown to be without 
foundation.  Indeed, these arguments are dismissed as unfounded both by Stephen 
Brayton and Oldrich Bures, who conclude that the professional backgrounds of PMC 
personnel makes it less likely that they will commit abuses of human rights than soldiers 
on secondment to the UN, or than regional peacekeeping troops.154 As shown in Chapters 
7 and 8, the findings of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission back up 
the conclusions reached by Brayton and Bures.155
Arguments that PMCs are a threat to the legal authority of states have been shown, in 
every instance of PMC involvement in African states, to be flawed.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, no PMC has attempted to take over a state, nor declined to depart at the 
end of a contract term, nor taken any action against the interests of a sovereign state to 
which it has been contracted.  PMCs take the argument further, positing that if they were 
contracted to the UN, they would pose no more a threat to the authority of a state than 
UN peacekeepers, as they would be subject to the same legal mandates.  Furthermore, 
BAPSC and IPOA member companies deal only with recognized governments, and 
members of both bodies desire regulation of the industry to lay concerns regarding their 
personnel and their operations to rest.  The problem, where regulation is concerned, is 
that without legal definition, the status of PMCs in law – other than as business entities –
is uncertain.  Their legal status, as corporations, is inadequate, because it does not 
address the potential consequences of their operations in a market which involves, 
potentially, the use of lethal force.  There is, therefore, a need for more appropriate legal 
classification, not least so that the issue of regulation can be addressed.
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This chapter has also shown the extent to which PMCs have become involved in 
supporting peacekeeping missions. The degree to which PMCs can provide this support 
is limited by two interconnected factors: the first, lack of legal definition and status, 
precludes the second, which is the need for legal regulation.  The extent to which the 
UN, among other IGOs and humanitarian organizations, has become reliant on the 
expertise of PMCs is indicative the urgency with which the issues of legal status and 
regulation need to be addressed.  
Finally, this chapter has illustrated the record that PMCs have maintained, over a period 
spanning two decades, in supporting the UN and other humanitarian organizations, and 
has demonstrated that the capacity and capability of PMCs affords an option for the UN 
to augment its ability to effect peace and stability.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
11.1    Introduction
This thesis’ focus on the states of Liberia and Sierra Leone has been important for 
several reasons, all of which are reflected in the conclusions drawn from the field 
research.  The first of these reasons, which is highlighted in Chapter 3, and explored in 
depth in Chapter 6, is that factors giving rise to the conflicts that occurred both in Liberia 
and in Sierra Leone – of power held by small groups of elites, of the development of 
extreme forms of neopatrimonialism, of the marginalization of civil society, and of 
structural violence precluding meaningful advancement for all but those entrenched in 
patrimonial networks – are manifest in many African states.1  
Second, and of greater specific importance to the elements of peacekeeping and PMCs in 
Africa that are central to this thesis, are the nature of interventions that took place in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, explored in detail in Chapter 6.  Both states experienced 
interventions by a regional peacekeeping force supported by major PMC operations.  
Both experienced large-scale interventions by United Nations peacekeeping forces, the 
former augmented initially by US troops, the latter subject to an additional intervention 
by British troops.  And both experienced major operations by PMCs – Sierra Leone by a 
war-fighting PMC that trained its troops and civil militias and participated directly in 
combat; Liberia by PMCs who provided logistic support, disarmed combatants, 
constructed barracks, and recruited, vetted and trained a professional national army from 
scratch.  
A further reason for the importance of this thesis’ focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone is 
that both states continue to see PMCs carrying out those activities, outlined in Chapters 9 
and 10, in support of their armed forces, of their respective governments’ institutions of 
security, and of UN operations within their borders.  This, again, is a situation that is 
mirrored in other African states, particularly those where UN peacekeeping missions are 
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taking place.2  The states chosen for the field research for this thesis are therefore 
strongly relevant to conditions elsewhere in Africa where conflict exists or is likely to 
occur.  They are also particularly relevant to the activities of PMCs in other African 
states, to peacekeeping conducted by African regional organizations, and to UN 
peacekeeping operations elsewhere in Africa.  
  
The data collated in the course of the field research, particularly that relating directly to 
PMC involvement with the UN detailed in Chapters 9 and 10, gives a good indication as 
to the potential for direct involvement of PMCs in peacekeeping operations.  A wide 
range of information has been gathered on the perceptions, attitudes and experiences of 
respondents from varied backgrounds and disciplines, with experience of working with 
or observing PMCs in action, as detailed in Chapters 7 to 10.  This has produced 
sufficient consistent data to make an original contribution to research in three areas.  The 
first of these is an appraisal of the main concerns as to the prospect of PMC involvement 
in peacekeeping operations, from a wide range of respondents.  The second, detailed in 
Chapters 6 and 9, is an in-depth assessment of the actual record of PMCs in 
peacekeeping situations.  And the third, explored in Chapter 10 and expounded in this
chapter – central to the hypothesis that PMCs are a suitable option, in practical, political, 
legal, economic and moral terms, for direct involvement in UN peacekeeping missons in 
Africa – is a plausible indication as to where the future for PMCs might realistically lie 
with regard to UN peacekeeping operations.
Of immense value in the interpretation and analysis of data collected in the commission 
of the research for this thesis, was that most respondents taking part in the field research 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone had worked in, researched in, or had been involved in 
humanitarian operations in other African states.  The input of these respondents added a 
further dimension to the data gathered in the course of this research, enabling an 
additional element of triangulation which has confirmed that many of the findings of the 
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UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea).
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research in Liberia and Sierra Leone are mirrored in other African states.3
11.2    Comparison of Existing Literature with Field Research Findings
As shown in Chapter 2, literature on PMCs in Africa is relatively sparse; that on PMC 
involvement in peacekeeping is positively lacking – although this is perhaps a reflection 
of the perception of PMCs and peacekeepers as diametrically opposed entities.  From 
both the literature reviewed in this thesis, and from the field research, the most dominant 
theme to have emerged is the perception of PMCs as mercenary organizations, morally 
unsuitable, in the eyes of some, even to exist in a civilized world, let alone for 
involvement in operations in the spheres of peacekeeping and humanitarian activity.  
Much of this is based on atavistic – albeit accurate – narratives on mercenaries which, as 
shown in the Literature Review, reflect an enduring ‘anti-mercenary norm’ in 
International Relations.4  In most cases, however, as the field research has shown, these 
perceptions are not grounded in a clear understanding as to the nature of PMCs, or of 
their activities.  Rather, they are formed of conceptions as to operations of PMCs being a 
continuation of the anti-state activities of mercenaries in Africa in the immediate post-
colonial period.  A notable finding from the research, detailed in Chapters 7 to 10, is that 
respondents having worked with PMCs, or observed them in action, – even those in the 
UN and in humanitarian organizations – do not generally share these perceptions of 
PMCs, or the view that they should be excluded completely from direct involvement in 
peacekeeping operations.5  It is also clear that, regardless of the level of concord in UN 
departments as to the use of PMCs in their operations, fear as to external perceptions of 
the use of mercenaries – by a body whose foundation was based on the primacy of 
sovereign states in the international system – plays a major part in influencing decisions 
as to the use of PMCs by the UN.6
Where PMCs become involved in institutions of governance – for example, in the case 
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when considering the wider relevance of the research findings.
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See Chapter 2, Section 2.  Re: Percy, Sarah. 2007a. Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International 
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press., and Kinsey, Christopher. 2006. Corporate Soldiers and 
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See 10.2 to 10.4.
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studies used for this thesis, in Security Sector Reform, in advice and training of Police 
and Armed Forces, in Justice Sector Development, and as advisors on national security,7    
there are important issues surrounding the drivers of political economies on the use of 
PMCs, and, conversely, the effects of PMCs on the political economies of African states.  
For example, as detailed in Chapter 1, the activities of multinational corporations 
involved in extraction of natural resources are crucial to the maintenance of revenue 
streams to African governments.  Police forces that have been slimmed-down in response 
to neoliberal expedients do not have the capacity to provide security to these 
organizations.   The neoliberal orthodoxy demands smaller and more efficient institutions 
of state, including the military and the police.  As a consequence, many functions of state 
have moved to provision by the private rather than the public, resulting in further 
outsourcing of non-strategic military and security functions to PMCs.  Additionally, the 
commercial opportunities offered by the privatization of state functions enables elites to 
strengthen their political positions.8  The most critical questions to arise from the 
involvement of PMCs in the political economies of states are, firstly, whether reliance on 
PMCs for stable political economies could become a threat to the internal sovereignty of 
states, and secondly, in filling the vacuum created by smaller institutions of state 
security, whether they provide security that reflects the needs and values of society in 
terms of democracy and human rights, or whether they enable states to pay less attention 
to providing the common good of security to their populations. 
The field research carried out in this thesis has both added to the theoretical discussion, 
and has enabled specific conclusions to be drawn on these issues.  In both of the states 
chosen as case studies, the strongest recurring themes were, on the positive side, that 
PMCs are a necessary factor for security, and a positive contribution to a stable political 
economy, and on the negative side, that they are perceived as a potential danger, directly 
or indirectly, to human rights.  Conclusions drawn from the field research on these issues 
are dealt with in the following sections of this chapter.
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11.3    Capability
Throughout the field research, as shown in depth in Chapters 9 and 10, there have been 
few doubts in the minds of interview respondents as to PMCs’ capability to carry out 
tasks directly related to peacekeeping – notwithstanding issues of suitability, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  Indeed, there are many peacekeeping tasks, as defined 
by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations,9 that PMCs have already carried 
out, in which they have shown themselves to be quick to respond and deploy, 
economically viable, and eminently capable of the task in hand,10 moreso in some cases, 
it could be argued, than UN troops.11
The research has also shown that when working in support of other humanitarian 
organizations, PMCs are seen to have demonstrated a clear capability to conduct 
operations in compliance with the high levels of discipline and restraint demanded by 
these actors.  Their record in this respect speaks for itself; many PMCs have become 
specialists in providing support to humanitarian agencies, and have been granted 
approved status as contractors for such organizations.12  PMCs have also demonstrated a 
capability to assemble and deploy faster than multinational troop detachments, at 
considerably less cost than UN troops,13 fully equipped and prepared for the task in hand.  
In contrast to shortcomings in the quality of many UN troops,14 PMCs draw their teams 
for such deployments from a pool of well-trained, experienced personnel, many of whom 
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UN. 2003. "Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations." United Nations 
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For example, disarmament and demobilization operations in Liberia, support to the RUF disarmament 
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See Supra, Note 8.
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See 10.1 and 10.2.
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have worked together on previous operations.15
PMCs have a proven track record, spanning some 20 years, of success in operations in 
African states, both as contributors to UN missions, and as contractors to states and 
departments of state.  As brought out in Chapters 9 and 10, this was reflected in the 
views of respondents across the range of interviewee categories.  PMCs have 
demonstrated an ability to take casualties and continue operating where others have 
declined to do so,16 and many have become specialized at working alongside 
humanitarian organizations, even establishing formal ties with these actors.17  No PMC 
has pulled out prematurely from a task to which it has been assigned, and fears that 
PMCs might wish to take lead roles in the management of peacekeeping operations have 
been shown to be unfounded; PMCs, as the research has shown, tie themselves to limited 
contracts with specific aims wherever possible,18 and have declared themselves willing to 
be observed and monitored by UN personnel.  Having been involved in every major UN 
deployment since 1990, PMCs have taken direct part in a wide range of peacekeeping 
operations, and have done so successfully.19  Both the history of PMCs in peacekeeping 
and humanitarian tasks, and the views and experiences of respondents involved in the 
research for this thesis, as detailed in Chapters 7 to 10 of this thesis, lead to the 
conclusion that PMCs have not only the capacity and capability needed for direct 
involvement in peacekeeping operations, but that their expertise and experience 
enhances the effectiveness of such operations.  For example, in the early stages of the 
current UN operation in DRC, the IPOA offered to provide much-needed equipment and 
expertise that the UN was unable to source from member states, at a fraction of the 
annual total cost of the mission, to be funded by the US as part of its contribution.20  The 
proposal was turned down on the basis that the use of private contractors would be 
unsuitable for peacekeeping missions.  Indeed, several proposals by PMCs, offering both 
                                                
15
See 9.3 to 9.5.
16
See 10.4 and subsections.
17
See 9.4.
18
See Chapter 10, Note 118.
19
See 9.2 and 10.2.
20
The IPOA offered specialized services such as aerial surveillance and intelligence gathering that 
MONUC needed to carry out its mission but was unable to source from member states. Bures, Oldrich. 
2005. "Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?" International Peacekeeping 
12(4):533-546.
331
economic and operational advantages, have been turned down on the basis of 
suitability.21 This is explored, and conclusions drawn, in the following section.
11.4    Suitability
Throughout the research, the most contentious issues pertaining to the ‘suitability’ of 
PMCs to perform peacekeeping tasks were those of political acceptability, 
accountability, legal definition and regulation.22 This section will first deal with these 
individually, with implications and conclusions outlined for each.  Their relevance to 
each other will then be considered and further conclusions drawn, encompassing all four 
of these contentious issues, and relating them to the wider question of the suitability of 
PMCs.
11.4.1 Political Acceptability
PMCs, being legal commercial entities, differ from mercenaries in that their 
activities are sanctioned by states – whether through contracting, licensing, or 
simply permitting them to operate.  PMCs claim only to operate for ‘legitimate 
governments.’  But ‘legitimate governments’ do not always act in accordance with 
international law; states have a great deal to gain through the use of PMCs.  What 
might be in the interests of a state might not necessarily be ethical, and PMCs offer 
a way for governments to pursue objectives through a non-attributable mechanism, 
or at least one that offers a degree of plausible deniability.  Public opinion is a two-
bladed weapon; moral objection to the use of PMCs is balanced by apathy as to 
casualties sustained by PMC personnel.23  Casualties sustained by soldiers are a 
major driver of public opinion against the involvement of armies in overseas 
conflicts, so there is advantage to governments in maximizing the use of PMCs to 
replace soldiers in conflict situations.  The same is true of national forces seconded 
to the UN.  In addition, national armies are stretched, and the option of using PMCs 
to fulfil states’ obligations to provide troops for UN peacekeeping missions holds 
appeal for governments.
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In the research conducted for this thesis as to the political acceptability of the use of 
PMCs, the dilemma between constructivist arguments based on social and moral 
aspects of their use, with rationalist arguments based on functional outcomes, is 
evident, as demonstrated at length in Chapters 9 and 10.  The former is based on the 
primacy of state actors and highlights what it considers to be the potential dangers, 
to international security and the protection of the individual, of the abdication of 
state responsibility to PMCs.  The constructive argument, therefore, considers the 
use of PMCs as politically unacceptable.  The rationalist argument, on the other 
hand, considers the reluctance, or inability, of states to fulfil their obligations to the 
UN, and regards the use of PMCs in peacekeeping operations as a means of 
ensuring international security and the protection of the individual where state 
institutions have failed.  The latter argument posits that, where the choice is 
peacekeeping using PMCs, or ineffective peacekeeping – or no peacekeeping at all 
– the use of PMCs is not just politically acceptable, but politically expedient.
11.4.2 Accountability
The most common argument put forward by respondents against the use of PMCs 
was that they are unaccountable for their actions.24  In response, those advocating 
the use of PMCs point out that they, and their employees, are subject to the laws of 
their home state, as well as those of any state in which they are operating.25 Thus, 
their proponents argue, the employees of PMCs are more accountable than UN 
peacekeepers, the latter being immune from prosecution in states other than their 
own.  PMCs as corporations are also liable under corporate law internationally, and 
under the law of contract in the states in which they operate.  Accountability is seen 
as more a concern in states where the institutions of security are weak, and this gave 
rise to arguments by some respondents that limitations of legal institutions in weak 
states should be a basis for the exclusion of PMCs.  Others regard this as a selective 
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argument: limitations of the law in weak states apply equally to any individual or 
company working there.  In the case of UN peacekeeping troops, where 
responsibility for many abuses of human rights has been demonstrated,26 they do not 
apply at all.  There was also agreement among respondents as to the fact that 
Security Sector Reform, the process that addresses the issue of weak institutions of 
security is a mainstay of PMC work in African states; the use of PMCs in SSR is 
therefore seen as contributing positively in the longer term to the issue of legal 
accountability.27  There was, however, a widely-held view among respondents both 
for and against the use of PMCs that an international regulatory system would be 
the best way to ensure accountability in states where the institutions of security are 
weak.  This would also ensure consistency in national regulation.  But international 
regulation cannot take place until there is an internationally-accepted legal 
definition for PMCs. 
11.4.3 Legal Definition
Responses from interviewees as to the aptness of international conventions against 
mercenarism – the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 
(CEMA),28 the 1979 UNOHCR Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,29
and the 1989 International Convention,30 – for dealing with the issue of PMCs in 
international law were overwhelmingly negative.  Even those supporting the 
conventions agreed that they are inadequate, but feared that a redefinition of PMCs 
would afford legitimacy to all of their activities.31
The UN has moved from a stance of singular support for the 1989 convention as a 
means of controlling PMC activity,32 to one proposing that PMCs should be 
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differentiated from mercenaries under international law.33  The current UN stance 
adds weight to the findings of the research for this thesis – that there needs to be a 
legal definition of PMCs beyond that of normal corporate entities, due to the nature 
of activities they undertake, and the potential impact of those activities on human 
rights.   This is of primary importance because, without an internationally-accepted 
legal definition, there can be no progress as to their status under international law, 
and none therefore on how their activities might be controlled or regulated. 
11.4.4 Regulation
The most extensive study into the concept of regulation of PMCs, a British 
government green paper,34 suggests that ‘reputable’ PMCs are suitable for 
peacekeeping roles,35 and recommends regulation on a national basis as a means of 
allowing such companies to operate while eliminating disreputable companies from 
the market.  This view is reflected in the findings of this research, but with 
respondents wishing to see PMCs regulated on an international basis if they are to 
be included in UN peacekeeping missions.  As with the issue of legal definition, the 
UN stance on regulation – or at least the stance of its Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries – has moved from opposition on the basis that this would be 
tantamount to legalizing the activities of mercenaries, to one suggesting that a 
regulatory framework could be a positive move.36
It is the UN’s stance on PMCs that holds the greatest sway over the issue of 
regulation, but even with the more pragmatic approach that generally pervades the 
UN since the inception of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries,37 there is 
still opposition to the concept of the UN as originator or arbiter of any form of 
international regulatory framework.  On the basis that ultimate responsibility for the 
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transference of the use of force to private bodies lies with individual states, the 
Working Group has proposed that member states impose their own legislative 
measures.38  While describing PMCs and their activities as “of international 
character”, the proposal stops short of international regulation, going only so far as 
suggesting “the promotion of cooperation between states”39 as a means of 
addressing the issue.  This,  a departure from previous calls by the same body for an 
“international registration mechanism”40  fails to address the concerns of those 
respondents who believe that international regulation is vital if PMCs are to be 
considered for further involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.41
11.4.5 Summary – Suitability of PMCs
The issues of accountability, legal definition and regulation are closely connected.  
The research shows conclusively that regulation on an international basis, which is 
dependent on a clear legal definition, is a priority for those concerned that PMCs 
and their employees might escape accountability for their actions.42  Of these three 
interlinked issues, lack of international regulation is the primary driver for PMCs 
being regarded as unsuitable for direct involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.  
There is concern that regulation on a national basis will fail to deal adequately with 
the potential dangers of the use of PMCs.  The capabilities and the effectiveness of 
PMCs can only be exploited to their fullest if they are seen as legitimate.  
11.5    Economic Factors
Included in the data gathered from respondents were views as to the potential for 
efficacy in economic as well as practical terms.  Some of the most fervent arguments 
made by respondents, both for and against the use of PMCs as peacekeepers, have been 
based on economic lines of reasoning.  Those opposing the use of PMCs argue that they 
are motivated only by profit, and not by the genuine needs of situations in which they 
might perform peacekeeping tasks.  This also forms part of the moral argument against 
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the use of PMCs, but the salient point of the argument, in economic rather than moral 
terms, is that strategic considerations might fall foul of economic drivers.  PMCs, and 
those supporting their use, cite their record to date as evidence that the profit motive 
does not detract from the performance of the task, and point out that no PMC has failed 
to complete a mission for economic reasons.  Indeed their track record suggests that the 
need to remain profitable creates efficiencies in terms of time and resources, as has been 
demonstrated in Sierra Leone and Liberia,43 and reflected by respondents in the field 
research for this thesis, as expounded in Chapter 10.44
This, however, raises a further point.  PMCs work, wherever possible, to limited 
contracts with specific aims, and they seek definite objectives in terms of task, time, and 
budget.45  UN peacekeeping operations are generally open-ended, so PMCs fear that, if 
they were to be incorporated into a UN approach, there could be a decline in operational 
effectiveness, and subsequently in economic advantage.  If PMCs are to be incorporated 
into UN operations, the manner in which it is executed is therefore crucial, both to PMCs 
and to the UN.  In response to claims that they might act to extend a contract by 
prolonging conflict,46 PMCs consent to, and indeed urge the inclusion of international 
observers in their operations.
PMCs have shown themselves able to carry out complex operations at a fraction of the 
cost of UN troops.47  They have demonstrated commercial expertise in the ability to cost 
and plan operations accurately, and no PMC has pulled out of an operation for financial 
reasons.48  The employment of PMCs in elements of peacekeeping operations, and in 
those areas where the activities of PMCs overlap with those of the UN,49 have been 
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shown to be not only economically viable, but financially advantageous,50 and this is a 
compelling argument as to the potential economic advantage of their use on a wider 
scale.  Yet, as evidenced by the research for this thesis, the use of PMCs is blocked by 
perceptions as to their legitimacy.  
11.6   The Balance between Effectiveness and Legitimacy
PMCs’ contributions to peacekeeping missions, to humanitarian operations, to post-
conflict rebuilding, and to Security Sector Reform, have been demonstrably effective; 
this, as the research has shown, is acknowledged by respondents working for 
organizations involved in all of these activities.51  The involvement of PMCs in these 
activities is a situation that has come about not by design, but through necessity.  Calls 
for the formal inclusion of PMCs in peacekeeping missions have come from some 
unexpected sources,52 but combining the effectiveness of PMCs formally with the 
legitimacy of UN will remain difficult and elusive while there is no formal recognition, 
in legal or regulatory terms, of PMCs.  Many departments of the UN, while maintaining 
the official line that they do not use the services of PMCs, continue to do so informally.53  
This reflects a lack of capacity within the UN in areas of expertise for which they have 
become reliant on PMCs,54 and one that could be addressed with the formal inclusion of 
PMCs in UN operations.
Indeed, the use of PMCs by departments of the UN has overtaken the progress of the 
Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries in their efforts to establish a UN-wide 
position on PMCs.  While struggling with the issue of their legitimacy, the UN makes 
increasing use of PMCs to bridge gaps in its capacity.  The more it does so, the more it 
sees the effectiveness that PMCs bring to its operations.55  The UN Charter does not 
stipulate that UN peacekeeping forces must be made up entirely of forces seconded by 
member states, nor does it exclude the use of contractors.56  Re-working of the UN 
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Charter is not, therefore, a necessity to bring about the inclusion of PMCs in UN 
peacekeeping operations, or to instigate the formation of a contract force to fulfil the 
UN’s primary responsibility for international security.57  The balance between 
effectiveness and legitimacy is not as difficult for the UN to achieve as the balance 
between those within the UN who support, and those who oppose, the inclusion of 
PMCs in their operations.  But the research undertaken for this thesis reflects increasing 
pragmatism within the UN as to the positive contribution PMCs can make to 
peacekeeping, security and development.
11.7   The Danger of Self-perpetuation
PMCs’ contribution to stability in weak African states, particularly in post-conflict 
situations, is notable.58  Their use reflects a transformation in the approach to security 
and the use of force – a diffusion of control over force away from the state, and a 
diminishing of ‘us and them’ conceptualizations that feed unrest.  While it may be that 
PMCs are an inevitable part of a burgeoning neoliberal orthodoxy, their effectiveness, 
particularly where state security institutions have broken down, detracts from the need 
for re-investment and rebuilding of such institutions, and in some cases, enables funds to 
be diverted elsewhere.  An example of this is the Government of Sierra Leone’s 
expansion of its armed ‘gendarmerie’, the OSD, at the expense of the Sierra Leone 
Police whose strength remains the same as it was at the end of the civil war.59  This has 
been enabled, inadvertently, by the effectiveness of PMCs in bringing about a secure 
environment in areas where they operate.
While there is no evidence that PMCs seek to create conditions whereby their contracts 
might be extended, concerns that their use could be self-perpetuating are well-founded, 
particularly in circumstances such as those described above.  To counteract this, there is 
a need for the activities of PMCs to take place within a coordinated framework.60  Even 
without formal links between the UN and PMCs, the activities of these organizations 
have become increasingly interdependent.  Due to the discreet nature of PMCs – a 
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quality they stress to their clients – and the reluctance of UN departments to publicise 
their use of PMCs, quantitative data as to the extent to which PMCs are involved in UN 
operations is difficult to compile, and this is an area that requires further research.
11.8    Conclusions
There are three scenarios that emerge from the consideration of the direct involvement of 
PMCs in peacekeeping.  The first involves the use of PMCs to engage directly with 
spoilers of UN peacekeeping efforts.  UN peacekeeping has moved from intervention in 
conflicts with clearly-defined adversaries to those where at least one warring faction –
usually more where conflict is ethnic in nature and factions splinter – is insurgent in 
nature, undisciplined, murderous, ignorant or dismissive of humanitarian law, and 
unwilling, or unable, to negotiate.61  The reluctance of the UN to use force,62 and the net 
result of the traditional UN approach, whereby all parties to a conflict are treated with 
equal political status, invariably ends up with political power being gained by those 
whose approaches are similar to those adopted by Charles Taylor in Liberia and Foday 
Sankoh in Sierra Leone – the use of conciliation in conjunction with force, to obfuscate 
and spoil peacekeeping operations that threaten their ultimate goal.63  This first scenario, 
the use of PMCs to deter spoilers to peacekeeping – potentially, but not necessarily, 
becoming directly engaged in combat – is unlikely to materialize.  While PMCs have 
submitted plans to carry out such operations,64 and the UN recognizes that their mandate 
allows for force to be used against spoilers to peace processes, or against any party that 
threatens humanitarian activities, it is a step too far for the UN to countenance the 
potential for PMCs to become involved in combat operations under the auspices of UN 
peacekeeping operations.
The second scenario is that of PMCs being co-deployed with peacekeepers, primarily as 
a means of addressing troop shortages across most of the UN’s peacekeeping 
deployments.  This has the potential to achieve several other things.  There is a body of 
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opinion, and this is backed up strongly by the research for this thesis,65 that the judicious 
deployment of PMCs would increase the efficiency of peacekeeping missions, and the 
prospect of the use of specialized PMC trainers providing training to existing UN troops 
could be investigated further.66  Second, it would bring a significant reduction in costs,67
which could be monitored and explored further as PMCs are deployed.  Third, it would 
ensure that the actions of PMCs on peacekeeping missions are kept under observation.  
Fourth, while easing the burden on the UN’s need to maintain troop strengths, a 
combination of PMCs and national troops would still maintain the obligation by UN 
member states to provide troops.68  And fifth, it would also be an acceptable compromise 
to those who are concerned that the actions of PMCs must take place within a monitored 
UN framework.  The downside of this is that one of PMCs’ major strengths – the ability 
to support UN operations with areas of specialist expertise – would be lost if their 
employees were used simply to bolster numbers of blue-helmetted UN troops, and this is 
an option that does not hold appeal for many PMCs.
The third scenario is the use of PMCs by the UN on an ad-hoc basis to perform 
specialized tasks in support of peacekeeping operations.  In fact, PMCs are already used 
by some UN departments, but at low level, and outside formal UN frameworks.69  PMCs 
are hired by governments and other organizations to carry out tasks in support of human 
and economic security, in some cases mirroring the activities of UN personnel, for 
example in tasks related to Security Sector Reform.  As mentioned previously in this 
chapter, the more the UN makes use of PMCs, the more it sees the effectiveness they 
bring to its operations.  The UN would best be served by pursuing its own regulatory 
regime where PMCs are concerned, in order to bring legitimacy to a resource it can no 
longer do without.  This could form the basis for international regulation, and would also 
serve the purpose of expediting national regulatory frameworks for PMCs, thereby 
addressing concerns as to the activities of PMCs outside as well within a UN framework.
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PMCs offer a powerful addition to the ability of the UN to conduct successful 
peacekeeping operations.  The UN cannot continue to maintain an approach that has 
been shown to be inadequate in circumstances of dire humanitarian need.  While PMCs 
cannot address all the problems presented by the need for peacekeeping, they have 
demonstrated a clear ability to provide both human security, and to contribute to the 
political and economic security required to assure human security in the longer term. The 
scope of this research is insufficient to venture as to whether the use of PMCs would 
always result in the accomplishment of conditions needed to bring about long-term 
stability; they certainly could not achieve that as a stand-alone entity.  But their inclusion 
in a UN framework would enhance the ability of the UN to achieve that end.  The 
research has, however, shown that PMCs are a viable option for stemming the rapidly 
declining ability of states to provide enough troops, of sufficient quality, to enable the 
UN to respond quickly to situations of humanitarian need.  No peacekeeping mission 
should fail because of shortcomings in areas that can be fulfilled by the private sector, 
and consideration of the use of the PMCs should not be precluded for lack of a 
pragmatic, dispassionate approach.  In situations where the ultimate goal is human 
security, and where the stark choice is between peacekeeping using PMCs, and 
inadequate peacekeeping – or no peacekeeping at all – the findings of this thesis are that 
it is time for consideration of the use of PMCs in peacekeeping missions to be pursued 
actively.
11.9    Recommendations - areas for future research
The private security and military industry, during the writing of this thesis, has 
undergone far-reaching change.  Since the boom in demand for services of PMCs in Iraq, 
the industry has seen a spate of mergers and acquisitions.  It is not yet known whether 
this will strengthen competition, and therefore prompt a market-driven improvement of 
standards through self-imposition, or will lead to a more powerful industry with 
increased influence and the ability to shape the nature of security and politics.70  This is 
an area in which further research is required to conceptualize the nature of the emerging 
corporate nature of the private military industry.
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The prospect that a more powerful PMC industry might influence the shaping of the 
nature of security and politics adds weight to fears that PMCs could create conditions 
whereby their contracts might be extended. This is further reason for the activities of 
PMCs to take place within coordinated frameworks, in order to counteract actions that 
might lead to self-perpetuation of PMC involvement, particular in the field of Security 
Sector Reform.71  This is another area in which there is a need for research to establish if 
there are patterns of behaviour that lead to self-perpetuation of PMC involvement, and to 
consider ways to prevent such behaviour on the part of PMCs.
There is insufficient data as to the extent that PMCs are involved in UN operations.  This 
is due largely to discretion on the part of PMCs – a military trait, based around ‘need to 
know’ concepts, and one they use to market their services.  But this adds to perceptions 
of PMCs as clandestine organizations, and feeds suspicion that they might be involved in 
dubious activities.  There is a need for further research in this area, perhaps coordinated 
with the industry bodies that represent the interests of PMCs.  Research in this area 
would no doubt be challenging, but without quantitative data, the extent to which PMCs 
are already involved in peacekeeping operations can only be extrapolated from what 
limited data is available.  There is therefore a pressing need for research in this area.
Another area that is of interest in considering options available for the use of PMCs in 
peacekeeping operations is the concept of UN peacekeepers being provided with training 
by PMCs, prior to, or during, deployment on peacekeeping missions, or both.  This 
proposal results from the poor quality of troops being seconded to the UN,72 and the need 
to compensate for the limited number of troops being provided by professional armies to 
fulfil the role of peacekeepers.  It is not known whether any PMC has submitted 
proposals for the training of UN troops, but the success of DynCorp in recruiting and 
training Liberia’s new army would suggest that there is sufficient capability within the 
private military industry to improve significantly the quality of troops deployed on UN 
peacekeeping missions.  Further research is, however, required, as the concept has not 
been explored in any depth – certainly not outside PMC/UN circles.
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Finally, consideration of the issue of regulation of PMCs has taken place in the context 
of a market with an increasing number of suppliers and consumers.73  Regulation of an 
industry with fewer, more powerful players increases the necessity for such regulation to 
be international in nature.  Despite calls by the UN Working Group on the Use of 
Mercenaries for international cooperation to address the issue of international regulation, 
there is still opposition to the idea of the UN becoming an arbiter for any form of 
international regulatory framework.74  A workable international regulatory framework is 
crucial to ensure that the continuing growth of the private military sector does not result 
in an over-powerful industry with disproportionate influence in the shaping of policy.75
To achieve this, there is a need for the conceptualization of a credible and workable 
regulatory framework, and this is an area in which further research is essential.  
International regulation is crucial if the positive contribution PMCs have made to 
peacekeeping operations in Africa is to be consolidated.76  
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